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Abstract 
The Infinite Longing for Home: 
Desire and the Nation in Selected Writings of Ben Okri and K.S. Maniam 
This thesis sets out to examine Okri's and Maniam's problematisation of 'the 
good society' within and beyond the context of Nigeria and Malaysia. It looks 
into the motives and means by which peoples forced to live together in a country 
love and hate each other and the knowledge that contains the truth about 
themselves. It examines why some people embrace heterogeneity and open-
endedness while others are internally compelled to cling to absolutes, spin out 
ideological narratives of "why did things go wrong", elaborate on the Obstacles 
standing in the way of their final self-realisation, and organise their lives around 
the fantasy that "if only we were to get rid of Them, . . . everything would be 
OK" (Zizek 1999e). Lastly, this thesis traces in Okri's and Maniam's selected 
writings a way out of today's political aporia, a path to true freedom and the 
creation of a new society humbled and unified by the recognition of its 
participation in flawed humanity. 
The primary literary texts we have chosen to study in this thesis are the 
three volumes of Okri's abiku trilogy, namely The Famished Road, Songs of 
Enchantment and Infinite Riches, and Maniam's two novels, The Return and In a 
Far Country, as well as two of his short stories, 'Booked for Life' and 'Haunting 
the Tiger' . Our examination of these texts is informed by a range of theoretical 
perspectives on key notions like subjectivity, causality and agency. It draws 
largely on Jacques Lacan's teachings in psychoanalysis, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe' s theory of hegemony and especially Slavoj Zizek' s critique of 
ideology and reactualisation of Hegelian dialectics. 
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Abbreviations and References 
Page references to these special texts will follow the abbreviations given below. 
All other references will be by author and year of publication, as compiled at the 
end of this thesis, under 'List of Works Consulted' . 
Okri 
The Famished Road 
Songs of Enchantment 
Infinite Riches 
Astonishing the Gods 
TFR 
SOE 
IR 
ATG 
SONC 'Stars of the New Curfew' 
Maniam 
The Return TR 
In a Far Country IFC 
'Booked for Life' EFL 
'Haunting the Tiger' HTT 
Between Lives BL 
Below are the abbreviations of the key political parties frequently referenced in 
this thesis: 
Nigeria 
AG 
NCNC 
NPC 
Malaysia 
Keadilan 
MCA 
MIC 
PAS 
UMNO 
Action Group 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
N orthem People's Congress 
Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) 
Malaysian Chinese Association 
Malaysian Indian Congress 
Parti Islam Sa-Melayu (Pan-Malaysian Islamic 
United Malay National Organisation 
Party) 
INTRODUCTION 
Desire is an infinite 1netonymy, it slides from one object 
to another. [Its] 'natural' state is thus that of melancholy 
- the awareness that no positive object is 'it', its proper 
object, that no positive object can ever fill out its 
constitutive lack. (Zizek 1997a: 81) 
The Premise 
In the Beginning, before the emergence of the Word, there was nothing, nothing 
but an internal churning of unbearable longing and sadness. 'Nature', in Slavoj 
Zizek's reading of F.W.J Schelling's philosophy, is permeated with melancholy 
because although it yearns to reach and define itself, it is unable to do so since the 
medium of expression is not yet given. That is why the emergence of the Word in 
man is seen as an answer to Nature's deadlock. "It is as if living nature itself was 
secretly pointing towards, waiting and longing for, the emergence of logos as its 
redemption" (Zizek 2000d: 88). With the spoken word Nature is redeemed. But 
redemption comes at the price of its alienation from itself, of the externalisation of 
the power of its centre in a medium outside itself, in man, the subject of 
enunciation who is "not part of nature, but Nature's Other" (1997b: 43). 
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According to Zizek, the above logic of symbolisation, redemption and 
alienation applies also to the subject as conceptualised by Jacques Lacan. Prior to 
subjectivisation, man is not the 'I' of self-experience but a pulsation of drives, a 
pure melancholic Wollen ('Willing') for something obscure (Zizek 1996b: 14). It 
is only and precisely by means of his 1 passage from the closed circuit of drives to 
the open world of signs that man acquires being. Signifiers give him his moorings 
and reference points, a sense of definition and equilibrium. It opens up for him a 
distance from himself, a space in which he can begin to discover his 'real' 
meaning. But words ultimately fail. We can never say it all or say enough about 
who we 'really' are, capture ourselves in language. Language simultaneously 
creates and displaces us from ourselves, and it is in the searching movement of 
language that we become metaphorised as subjects of desire. 
In this thesis, we will see that the above-defined "Schellingian mood" 
(Zizek 2000d: 87) permeates the writings of Ben Okri and K.S. Maniam too. We 
will see that Okri's and Maniam's fictional universe is a universe marked by a 
strange sadness. In it, and in their own ways, its main characters all long to 
belong, to find that elusive home in themselves and in the fractured country into 
which they have been thrown. Azaro, the lonely spirit-child protagonist in Okri' s 
abiku trilogy, for example, spends his whole life wandering the road of destiny in 
1 For simplicity's sake, the masculine pronoun will henceforth be used to refer to the subject 
instead of the cumbersome 'he/she' or the strange-sounding 'it'. This, we should qualify, does not 
mean that we privilege the male in our discussion. 
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search of the sublimity of living in a ravaged country not dissimilar to Nigeria. 
Similarly, Rajan in Maniam's novel In a Far Country (IFC) aches to belong in 
"that vast country ... called life" (IFC 144) and in Malaysia, a country with 
"many countries inside that one country" (116). 
What is the nature of this infinite longing, this Gelust (' craving that does 
not involve the head') that propels Olai 's and Maniam' s characters to experience 
the world in the way they do? Why is it so central to our investigation? And in 
what ways is it related to the 'nation' as a concept and to the discourse of 
nationhood in Nigeria and Malaysia? This thesis is an attempt to answer these 
questions. It sets out to examine Okri's and Maniam's problematisation of 'the 
good society' within and beyond the context of their respective homelands. It 
looks into the motives and means by which peoples forced to live together in a 
country love and hate each other and the knowledge that contains the truth about 
themselves. It examines why some people embrace heterogeneity and open-
endedness while others are internally compelled to cling to absolutes, spin out 
ideological narratives of "why did things go wrong", elaborate on the Obstacles 
standing in the way of their final self-realisation, and organise their lives around 
the fantasy that "if only we were to get rid of Them, ... everything would be OK" 
(Zizek 1999e). Lastly, this thesis traces in Obi's and Maniam's writings a way 
out ·of today's political aporia, a path to true freedom and the creation of a new 
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society humbled and unified by the recognition of its participation 1n flawed 
humanity. 
Subject of Desire 
The primary literary texts we have chosen to study in this thesis are the three 
volumes of Okri's abiku trilogy, namely The Famished Road, Songs of 
Enchantment and Infinite Riches, and Maniam' s two novels, The Return and In a 
Far Country, as well as two of his short stories, 'Booked for Life' and 'Haunting 
the Tiger'. Our examination of these texts is informed by a range of theoretical 
perspectives on key notions like subjectivity, causality and agency. It draws 
largely on Jacques Lacan's teachings in psychoanalysis, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe's theory of hegemony and especially Slavoj Zizek's critique of 
ideology and reactualisation of Hegelian dialectics. 
Our argument begins on the Lacanian premise that desire is "the very 
dynamic of our being as individual subjects" (Jameson 2002: 50). Desire springs 
from what we lack inside. But it does not denote, as in common usage, "what I 
want" since "I do not actually desire what I want" (Zizek 1997b: 80). My desire 
can never be satisfied by any positive object because what I desire is ultimately 
impossible, something that cannot be had simply because it does not exist. The 
Lacanian subject is by definition ignorant of the ironic truth about his founding 
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conditions. In vain he pursues the lost/absent/nonexistent Thing, the Real Object 
that causes his desire (objet petit a in Lacanese). He slides from one object to 
another, saying each time 'this is not it' even when he gets what he asks for. The 
subject suffers from his belief in the power of the Object. But he also derives 
jouissance ('enjoyment', unbearable traumatic-excessive pleasure in unpleasure, 
('pleasure and pain in a single packet') from the infinitely deferred prospect of 
reuniting with the Object he posits as lost, even though it was never in his 
possession. His entire being revolves around and is in fact sustained by this 
strange pleasure which comes at the price of suffering. 
Lacan's reformulation of the Freudian subject as an enjoying mistake 
arising out of misrecognition (meconnaissance, 'failure to know') is set out in his 
famous lecture 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I'. In it, 
Lacan posits that before the advent of the empirical ego, there is no distinction 
between self and other, being and non-being, the 'I' and the 'non-I'. The infant, 
for example, has no consciousness of himself as a distinct self. Being originally a 
discordant closed circuit of partial drives, he remains thus until somewhere 
between the age of six and eighteen months when he experiences for the very first 
time a sense of ontological coherence through the recognition of his own image in 
the mirror. The startling spectacle of himself 'out there' reflected back at him 
gives the child great narcissistic joy as he fixes his attitude "in a slightly leaning-
forward position in order to hold it in his gaze" (Lacan 2001: 2). But the child's 
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jubilance is short-lived, for almost as soon as he finds himself in the specular 
Other, he is snatched away from himself.2 As Nick Mansfield writes: "Your 
selfhood - your subjective centre of gravity - is grounded outside of you, in the 
very field of images from which you first gained a sense of separation. In short, 
your selfhood makes you alien to yourself' (2000: 43). 
The subject is alienated from himself the moment he misrecognises the 
unitary self in the mirror as himself, and it is this illusory lost unity that the 
subject strives to re-find upon his entry into the symbolic order. The symbolic is 
Lacan's name for the Saussurean world of language. It "provides a form into 
which the subject is inserted at the level of his being" (Lacan, in Stavrakakis 
1999: 20). In the semiotic field, words compensate for the Object from which the 
subject is excommunicated. They allow him to signify his lack, desire and 
suffering. But words are never enough. The subject will - never find full 
satisfaction in them because of his division by the effects of language. "He will 
simply find his desire ever more divided, pulverised, in the circumscribable 
2 In Lacan's revised version of his theory of the mirror stage (1960s), the mirror image is invested 
with libido and internalised as the core of the infant's ego only as a result of the affirmation, 
acknowledgment or approval of the- parent "who is holding the child before the mirror ( or 
watching the child look at itself in the mirror)" (Fink 1997: 88). What is important to note here is 
that the mirror image does not become formative of the ego unless it is ratified by an-Other 
person, i.e. caretaker or someone of importance to the child. The child's desire becomes tied to the 
approval or recognition of this Other. He internalises what he perceives to be the latter's ideals, 
and his actions becomes judged as estimable or shameful according to how he peceives the Other 
perceives him. 
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metonymy of speech" (Lacan 1998: 188). Eternally the subject can only signify 
himself in a system he does not command but which rather commands him. 
The Lacanian subject of desire is a subject of discourse, a being-in-
language constituted within a particular sociosymbolic network. But he is not 
nothing but language, an ongoing text or the dispersion of subject positions 
postulated in the mass-culture version of poststructuralist and postcolonial 
theories. In Lacan, "everything that I positively am, every enunciated content I 
can point to and say 'that's me,' is not 'I'; I am only the void that remains, the 
empty distance towards every content" (Zizek 1993: 40). That is to say, 'I' qua 
subject is originally devoid of any substantial content. He is the empty point of 
self-relating and an endless craving for content, for an acceptable conception of 
himself so that he may walk with assurance in this life. The subject is only 
subj ectivised when he submits to the law of signs, internalises particular 
"editions" of social discourse and becomes systematised as his own discourse 
with a "particular itinerary and a particular configuration of attention and 
response" (Alcorn 1994: 32, 3 7). 
Unlike the Althusserian-Foucauldian subject, the Lacanian subject is not a 
discourse subjected to the effects of discourse colligation. Lacan's clinical 
experience tells him that, far from being simply acted upon, the subject has vast 
resources for ideological and psychoanalytic resistance. Resistance is significant 
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because, as Marshall W. Alcorn Jr. explains, it "implies agency, an ability to 
counteract forces that in other contexts would successfully constitute subjects" 
(Alcorn 1994: 29). The subject has the power of determination to do many things. 
He can resist and contain conflictual knowledge that threatens to rupture his 
identity. He can do this by refusing to incorporate certain knowledge into his own 
discourse system. He can exercise his will to deny, dismiss or deform social 
directives. He can deny an understanding of the cause of his suffering and 
jouissance. He can disavow knowledge of his identity as a mistake in the 
Lacanian sense explained earlier. And he can refuse to let go of the only thing he 
can more or less be sure of, namely his conception of 'who he really is', for 
without it he is nothing. 
All that does not mean the Lacanian subject is entirely free to develop 
according to his personal wants and desires, and shift his identification from one 
thing to another as he pleases ('follow your heart', 'rewrite your past' and 'be 
yourself, as the pop-psychology mantra goes). The paradox in Lacan is that the 
subject is neither fully determined by his surroundings nor by himself but is in the 
last instance unconsciously predetermined by some senseless contingency, by 
what Lacan describes as "the first choice, the first seat of subjective orientation 
[which] will henceforth regulate the entire function of the pleasure principle" 
(Critchley 1998). Echoing the Freudian "choice of neurosis" (Neurosenwahl), this 
"first grinding" (mouture premiere), which occurs early in the history of the 
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subject, is a traumatic encounter that forever 'contaminates' his psychic 
development, his choice of passions and ethical imperatives in life. 3 We will 
return to probe deeper into the subject's first choice in later chapters, to consider 
why the subject is, although subjected to his unconscious choice, deemed by 
Lacan to have chosen it and must therefore be held accountable. For now, let us 
continue with the task of defining the parameters of this thesis. 
Political Desires 
Predisposed by his first grinding and carried along by the force of natural 
causality, the Lacanian subject actively negotiates and in time arrives at a 
relatively stable conception of himself, at a master discourse that accounts for his 
radical lack, for why he does not feel 'at home' inside. It is a discourse to which 
he becomes passionately attached, a knowledge he takes as his truth even though 
it is full of holes. For example, the subject may be convinced that wherever he 
goes, he is first and foremost a Malay. He may believe that there is an 
uncontaminated dividing line between his race and other races, and that members 
of his race should consolidate their hold on power in the country "regardless of 
whether it was fair or unfair to the other races" (Lee 1998: 549). Strangely 
enough, he may still believe all that ( and may perhaps even be prepared to suffer 
3 In the case of the Wolf Man (Freud 's famous patient), for example, it was the accidental 
witnessing of his parents in coitus that gave his life its 'pathological' tum. 
9 
and die for his belief) even if he knows very well (but cannot bring himself to 
believe) that race is "not a biological or genetic category with any scientific 
validity" (Hall 1992: 297-8). 
From what we have seen so far, it should be clear that the subject's pursuit 
of his desire is not simply an intimate, personal matter to be worked out in the 
privacy of his interiority. Desiring subjects who believe with absolute certainty 
that "I AM = I AM KNOWLEDGE = I AM THE ONE WHO KNOWS" can 
seriously harm those over whom they have power (Ragland 1996: 134). They are 
what Jacques-Alain Miller describes as "blind masters", those who rule in order 
not to see, speak so that others will say they are right, and culpabalize the Other 
so that the inherent cracks and fissures of being may be papered over. They are 
also the ones who will "destroy others and wage wars, rather than admit [they] 
lack anything" (Ragland 1996: 142). Complementing the political blind masters 
are the "idiots" (idiotese, "foreign to such or such profession, ignorant"), feeble 
subjects who always require "an Other who will be the master" (Miller 1990: xxv, 
xxix). They are the ones who find joy in abandoning themselves to the master's 
logic, in taking the imperatives it institutes as supreme as truth itself. Finally we 
have the "nonidiots", analysts who are "savvy" (Lacan 1990: 3) enough to de-
identify with the master discourse and to know that the master place "is never 
occupied but by what Lacan called a semblant, which one might translate into 
your language as a 'make-believe"' (Miller 1990: xxx). 
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In different guises, these three subjects - the master, the idiot and the 
analyst - are ever-present in Okri's and Maniam's writings which we will be 
examining. In Parts II and III, we will look at the roles they play and the political 
dynamics they create in the context of nation-building. This will be done 
primarily against the background of Nigeria and Malaysia, the postcolonial 
countries from which the writers respectively originate and in which their works 
are directly or indirect set. 
Aside from being ex-British colonies, Nigeria and Malaysia face a 
strikingly similar set of historically entrenched problems. As will be discussed 
extensively in Part I, the deep racial cleavage, widespread corruption and 
cronyism, institutional contempt for basic human rights, the rise of militant 
Islamism, and the upsurge of tribalism/racism are but some of the more serious 
problems. In addition, we will see that above and beyond the standard realpolitik 
contestation for wealth, power and limited economic resources, there is something 
else at stake: jouissance ('enjoyment') as a hidden political factor. As we 
mentioned earlier, jouissance is the disavowed pleasure the subject derives from 
the way he relates to the primordially lost object-cause of his desire. It is that 
uncanny excess of pleasure, envy, shame and horror that 'washes over' the subject 
when he imagines the Other (e.g : Jew, Igbo, Chinese and other demonised 'races') 
undeservingly enjoying a privileged relationship to its own object-cause. As will 
be elaborated in due course, the Other either appears to possess "the object-
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treasure, having snatched it away from us (which is why we don't have it), or 
poses a threat to our possession of the object" which causes our desire (Zizek 
1994: 71). 
The Structure 
The themes and issues identified above are discussed in three parts. Part I contains 
two chapters. Chapter 1 looks at different conceptions of the nation and 
nationalism, and draws on the writings of a diverse range of thinkers including 
Fanon, Soyinka, Chatterjee, Renan, Anderson, Zizek, and Laclau and Mouffe. 
Theories covered in Chapter 1 are then contextualised in Chapter 2 when we 
discuss the politics of nationhood in Nigeria and Malaysia, and at the same time 
establish a historical horizon against which Okri' s and Maniam's novels will be 
read in Parts II and III. We will trace the fracture lines and fore ground significant 
moments in the history of the two countries from precolonial times to the present. 
As well, notions like racism, ideological interpellation and political resistance will 
be examined contextually from a Lacanian viewpoint. 
Part II concentrates on Okri's writings and his three-pillared philosophy. It 
consists of three chapters. Chapter 3 looks at The Famished Road (TFR), the first 
book in the abiku trilogy. It starts off by drawing links between the trilogy and 
12 
Nigeria, Okri's country of origin. It then tries to relate this to what is arguably the 
most striking trope in the novel: the abiku nation and the abiku cycle of "being 
reborn and after each birth come blood and betrayals" (TFR 494). We will explore 
the hidden dimensions of suffering and the paradoxical ways in which Okri 
believes jouissance may be harnessed from suffering to resuscitate the undead 
nation. In connection with that, we will analyse Okri' s politico-spiritual 
conception of predestination and agency, and the Lacanian ways in which they 
depart from indigenous African conceptions. We will also look at how, as homo 
fabula or "story-telling beings" (Okri 1996a: 24 ), human beings are said by Okri 
to possess an overlooked capacity to heal profound sicknesses of the spirit 
through fictions and stories. Through Dad, the abiku narrator's father, we will 
discuss Okri's Lacanian notion of the 'subject of drive', as well as the logic of 
'belief before belief by which agency is exercised and concrete political changes 
are wrought. As conclusion to Chapter 3, the Lacanian notion of the 'authentic 
act' (the revolutionary kind that 'changes everything') will be examined, as will 
the question of why the act must be performed if the unborn nation is to break its 
abiku cycle. 
Within the parameters of Okri' s philosophy set out in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
opens by revisiting Africa and its place in the world. Much has been said about 
the traumatic impact of colonialism upon the continent and its peoples. Is it 
possible, however, that colonialism did not penetrate the kernel of Africa, as Okri 
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believes? If so, what are the implications? These are but some of the issues we 
will be addressing in relation to Songs of Enchantment (SOE), the second book in 
the abiku trilogy. Rather than repeat the entire debate on the coloniser-colonised 
binary and related concepts, Chapter 4 will take it as over-familiar to the reader 
and proceed to ask just one question: where does Okri sit in this familiar 
landscape? Colonialism and its impact are clearly a big issue for Okri, as his 
writings attest. Yet he vehemently rejects the 'postcolonial' label. Why? What 
does he mean when he says that "the whole context of the margin, the periphery, 
postcolonial and stuff like that" are "poor descriptions of the work that some of us 
are trying to do" (Falconer 1997: 44)? Also on the agenda in Chapter 4 is a 
critique of notion of the 'African Way' foregrounded by Okri in SOE. We will 
compare the philosophy behind it with Senghor' s much-maligned Negritude and 
attempt to come up with a reading that casts neither conception as naively or 
strategically essentialist. Lastly, we will evaluate Okri' s ideal of the "universal 
civilisation" (Okri 1990) and contrast it, again, against Senghor. 
Chapter 5 focuses on Infinite Riches (IR), the final book in the abiku 
trilogy. IR' s uniqueness calls for a slightly different approach ( a historical one) 
from the one we adopt in our investigation of the first two books. IR, as we shall 
see, is not only the 'angriest' anti-colonial writing Okri has produced to date, it is 
also the most historically engaged and politically subversive volume in the 
trilogy. The novel introduces a major new character, the racist Governor-General 
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of the unborn African nation, who by virtue of his nefariousness eclipses 
everyone else in the book. In his English ways, he oppresses the people, rigs the 
independence elections, rewrites the continent's past and alters its present. A 
much longer list of the Governor-General's crimes against Africa is presented in 
IR - but why? Why is the harshest treatment accorded to this particular British 
administrator? Does it not somehow besmirch the good name of the actual-
historical Governor-General who oversaw Nigeria's transition to independence in 
the late 1950s? As our argument develops, it will become clear that Okri 
sometimes blurs the line between fiction and historical reality - not because it is 
the 'postmodern' thing to do but because he appears to have something very 
important to reveal about Nigeria and its wounded destiny, some 'dirty secret' 
presently obscured by dominant accounts of the country's history. 
In the second section of our discussion of IR in Chapter 5, we will 
investigate Okri' s blurring of the line between fiction and reality - this time in 
relation to magical realism. As we know, the fictional universe in Okri's trilogy 
does not always follow the laws of the universe as we know them, and because 
Okri is most famous for his trilogy (TFR to be exact), he has come to be known in 
popular in1agination as a magical realist writer of the same type as Marquez and 
Rushdie. Is that an accurate and fair description of what Okri tries to do in his 
writings? We will explore that question before finally coming to grips with Okri's 
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belief that "words are things" (Hattersley 1999) and "nations and peoples are 
largely the stories they feed themselves" (Okri 1996a: 21 ). 
From Okri we shift our focus to K.S. Maniam in Part III. We begin by 
reframing Maniam's two novels, The Return (TR) and In a Far Country (IFC), as 
two thirds of a trilogy which has yet to be formally realised. Chapter 6 explains 
this and examines the overarching feature that unites the would-be trilogy, namely 
the 'curse' of the 'eternal return'. Inherited by Maniam's protagonists, the curse 
forever bars those afflicted with it from ever finding the rootedness they yearn. It 
is that which they must cancel out of existence, just as Okri' s characters must 
break the abiku cycle. But can it be done? Our answer is yes and the key, as we 
will see, lies in what we term the 'logic of freedom'. With TR as the prime site of 
our investigation in Chapter 6, we will see that the curse of the eternal return is 
not just a 'personal thing' but has far reaching cultural and political implications 
too. This, as we delve into Maniam's portrayal of TR's subjects of desires (Ravi, 
Naina, Periathai), will be fleshed out in the context of Malaysian nationhood. 
Our approach to TR and IFC is against the grain insofar as it challenges 
the standard reading of both texts as Maniam' s thesis on the therapeutic goodness 
of 'roots'. Maniam writes about cultural, migrant, and colonial experiences. But 
that does not mean that he advocates cultural loyalty, as claimed by some critics. 
Neither does it mean he writes from the Indian migrant perspective or that he 
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regards all things English as degenerate. In our Lacanian critique of IFC in 
Chapter 7, the last chapter of this thesis, we will see that the text occupies a much 
more radical position than critics have given it credit. Instead of affirming racial 
stereotypes, IFC suspends them in order to understand anew the basis of racism in 
Malaysia. As well, it rethinks instead of simply accepting the commonsense 
understanding of such notions as culture, truth and freedom. Lastly, in Chapter 7, 
we will look at a new form of heroism Maniam believes must be actualised if 
Malaysia is to realise its radical possibilities. 
As conclusion to this thesis, we will relate the lessons from Okri and 
Maniam to contemporary politics and the issue of responsibility in the twenty-first 
century. 
About Okri and Maniam 
Ben Okri was born in 1959 1n Minna, central Nigeria. He started writing 
creatively from his failure to get a place at a university in Nigeria. His early works 
were published in women's magazines and the evening papers. One of the pieces 
he wrote was about charlatans. It grew and grew and eventually became Flowers 
and Shadows, his first novel which he completed by the time he was eighteen 
years of age. In 1978 he began studying comparative literature at Essex 
University but had to withdraw from the course when his scholarship was 
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withdrawn by the cost-cutting government of Shehu Shagari, President of 
Nigeria's Second Republic. Okri has since published a total of fourteen books, 
including essays (Birds of Heaven, A Way of Being Free), poetry (An African 
Elegy, Mental Fight) and short stories (Incidents at the Shrine, Stars of a New 
Curfew). His novels include Astonishing the Gods, Dangerous Love and the latest, 
In Arcadia. Okri won the Booker Prize for The Famished Road in 1991. He lives 
in London, England. 
Maniam was born in 1942 in Bendong, a town located in Kedah, Malaysia. He 
was raised in a hospital compound where his father worked as a launderer. For a 
year, he attended a Tamil school which catered mainly to children from nearby 
rubber estates. Maniam was subsequently transferred to an English school after he 
"stood up and said [he] would go to an English school or no school at all" 
(Maniam 1994a: 3). After completing secondary school, Maniam left for India to 
read medicine. There, he had a change of heart and moved to Wolverhampton, 
England for teacher-training. In 1970 he enrolled for a Bachelor of Arts (English) 
at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. After graduating in 1973, he went on 
to pursue a Masters degree at the same university where he later worked until 
retirement. Maniam's wrote poetry in the 1960s and the 1970s. 'The Eagle' 
(1975), a short story, was his first published work. To date, he has published three 
volumes of short stories (Plot, The Aborting, Parablames and Other Stories; 
Arriving ... and Other Stories; Haunting the Tiger), a collection of plays and 
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short stories (Sensuous Horizons) and two novels (The Return, In a Far Country) . 
In 2000, Maniam became the first recipient of the Raja Rao Award for 
outstanding contribution to the literature of South Asian diaspora (instituted by 
the Samvad India Foundation, co-founded by Vijay Mishra). He lives with wife 
and two children in Subang Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia. 
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Part I 
NATION(S) 
I love my country, but since I love in my country 
something more than it, I mutilate it. (Salecl 1998: 79) 
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- 1 -
THE NATION 
Conceptions 
In the discourse of nationhood, reference is often made to the relation between the 
nation-state and modernity - or more precisely European modernity which began 
with the commencement of the Enlightenment project. From the eighteenth 
century onwards, Europe had not only evolved from the agrarian to industrial 
phase, it had also begun to reorder its thoughts, institutions and values through a 
process of formal rationalisation. As well, it had come to see itself as advanced 
and superior to its unenlightened medieval past. Europe's modernist urge for 
progress and freedom has been credited with the dismantling of feudalism and the 
liberation of communities from oppression. As with the nation-state, nationalism 
too has been ascribed as Europe's invention, the latter definable as "a product of 
Enlightenment rationality, insofar as it endorsed the democratic notion of popular 
sovereignty that treated people as citizens of a nation rather than subjects of a 
monarch" (Lawson 1995: 80). 
21 
In this Eurocentric scheme of things, non-European societies are deemed 
primitive, still "stuck on various lower rungs of the evolutionary ladder" (Crick 
1997: 7 6), and therefore transient since it is their transhistorical destiny to become 
modem (Geddes 1997: 13). Their evolution towards this goal is said to have 
properly begun with the advent of colonialism which supplanted indigenous 
systems with what modernity had to offer. The implicit assumption here is that the 
postcolonial nation which owes its founding to colonialism is no more than a 
perpetual consumer of modernity (Chatterjee 1996: 216). Having selected and 
applied a set of the already available modular form of nationalism from Europe, 
the postcolonial nation need not even use its imagination to form a national 
community since colonial impact itself had set the inevitable in motion. Worse, 
postcolonial peoples are not only passive imitators, they are also inept in 
governing their country and practising western democracy, as is evident from the 
countless sociopolitical upheavals that have wrecked so many third world 
countries. 
The "curse" (Davidson 1992) of inheriting the colonial legacy called the 
postcolonial nation is all too familiar to us. In Africa, as in Asia, the euphoria of 
decolonisation and independence had largely been succeeded by widespread 
disillusionment and the deepening of pre-existing antagonisms. Political elites 
betrayed the nation's founding dream and the masses became bloodthirsty over 
race, religion and land. We need only recall the partitioning of India and Pakistan 
22 
which resulted in the death of over a million Muslims and Hindus who actively 
slaughtered each other over the three passions. Millions more in Sudan and 
Nigeria have died under similar circumstances. Malaysia, while admittedly less 
bloodied historically, has also had its share of spilled blood. 
If, as it appears, independence is about the elite class using "its class 
aggressiveness to comer the positions formerly kept for foreigners" (Fanon 1990: 
125), if atrocities inflicted upon the people by the invisible hands of these elites 
have in cases been worse than atrocities inflicted by the colonial masters they 
replaced, and if the betrayed masses have for most parts received mere scraps of 
the spoils of independence, how then does one justify the postcolonial nation's 
existence? Is its creation necessarily "the righting of historical oppression by 
peoples in-stating their own emancipation in realist national governments" (Luke 
1995: 97-8)? And, as Soyinka poses, "what price a nation?" (1996: 19). If the 
nation only creates a fragile sense of belonging that glosses over seemingly 
unbridgeable differences between the disparate communities constituting the 
nation, would it be justified then to say that it is "a mere sentimental concept, 
unfounded in any practical advantages for its occupants" and "the only hard fact 
that confers the status of nationhood on any human collectivity [is] its right to 
issue passports" (Soyinka 1996: 20)? Given these circumstances, what should we 
say to the idea of unquestioning national unity as an absolute good? Achebe's 
response succinctly sums up our answer: "Quite clearly it is nonsense" (1984: 12). 
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Multinational, Ethnocultural and Imagined Communities 
Before we interrogate the issues raised above, let us first clarify the term 'nation'. 
Commentators have taken divergent approaches in coming to grips with the 
nation as a modern regime of power. For Montserrat Guibernau, a clear 
distinction is drawn between nation, state and nation-state. Drawing from Max 
Weber, she defines "state" as "a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" 
(Guibernau 1996: 47-8). The "nation" is defined as "a human group conscious of 
forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly 
demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future 
and claiming the right to rule itself." ''Nation-state" on the other hand is defined 
as a "modern phenomenon characterised by the formation of a kind of state which 
has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a 
demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means 
of homogenization, creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving 
traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them." 
Here it is worth noting that 'nation' and 'state' do not always exist 
coextensively. A state can exist without being a nation-state, and not all nations 
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have corresponding states (Canavan 1996: 51).4 In most cases, it would be 
difficult to categorise definitively a country as a state, nation-state or nation. As 
Ernst Renan poses, why is "Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions 
and three or four races ... a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogenous, is 
not one?' (1993: 12). Taking into account the fact that many countries today are 
multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural in makeup, K wame Gyeke in his 
commentary on the nation as a multinational state - that is, a complex entity 
representing the totality of subnations or subnationalities within the national 
frontiers - argues that the true goal for the nation should. not be nation-building 
but nation-destroying. Ethnocultural consciousness which hinders national 
cohesion has to be erased before "the essence of nationhood" can be distilled 
(Gyekye 1997: 83). This, he underscores, is particularly applicable in Africa 
where the top-down imposition of the nation-state on identity-conscious 
indigenous communities has led to intractable problems of governance. 
In contrast, eighteenth-century German philosopher Johann Gottfried 
Herder conceived of the nation as an organic ethnoculturally homogenous 
community that would be rendered unnatural and weakened should foreign races 
and nationalities become incorporated into the body politic. By Herder's 
standards, most countries today which are heterogeneous in make-up would 
4 Margaret Canavan cites the Soviet Union as an example of a state which was not a nation-state, 
and Poland (before the establishment of the Polish state following the First World War) as a nation 
without a state (1996: 51). 
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qualify as what he called "patched up contraptions, fragile machines, for they are 
wholly devoid of inner life" (Gyekye 1997: 78). We know, of course, that this is 
an inaccurate assumption. A heterogeneous citizenry is not necessarily a liability. 
One need only look to the United States and Australia as proof. In any case, 
ethnocultural homogeneity is hardly sufficient basis for nation-creation. As Renan 
points out, the United States and England, Latin America and Spain speak the 
same languages, yet they do not form single nations (Renan 1993: 16). One might 
also add that Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim countries which furthermore 
share the same language, yet they are not one. 
Herder's conception would no doubt be rejected as racist by today's 
standards. Its appeal, however, 1s far from diminished. In countries such as 
Malaysia and Nigeria, race continues to be used to mobilise support and sharpen 
or blur group differences for political reasons. This, despite the horrors of Nazism 
which caused the death of over six million Jews, and despite the often-repeated 
fact that race is "not a biological or genetic category with any scientific validity" 
(Hall 1992: 297-8) but a system of representation based on a loose and often 
unspecified set of differences in characteristics, "the so-called pre-discursive 
marks on the body (skin, hair, bone), which serve as the desiderata of race" 
(Seshadri-Crooks 2000: 8). 
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We shall have more to say about race later in our discussion. For now, let 
us consider the conception of a school of thought which holds that the nation is 
bound not so much by particulars like race, culture and ethnicity but by 
consciousness. This approach to nationhood can be traced to Renan who pinpoints 
a shared past and daily large-scale plebiscite as the nation's double cement. It also 
recalls Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities' wherein the nation 
is conceived as imagined into existence with the help of two forms of imagining: 
the novel and the newspaper (1991: 24-5). They provide the technical means for 
re-presenting the nation as a limited sovereign political community, enabling 
millions of its members who will never meet in person to conceive of a shared 
nationality in homogenous empty time. In Anderson's words, they provide "a new 
way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together" (1991: 36). The 
notion of the nation as consciousness or a discursive formation (mediated by 
language and supported by print-capitalism) is not without its problems. One 
might query, for example, if the imagining community might not have an 
unconscious, an unacknowledged past that dare not speak it name. As well, one 
might ask if the element that binds the nation is not so much the shared goal of 
recovering its sense of communitarian fullness but rather a shared lie which hides 
the fact that the nation never had what it purports to have lost. These are some of 
the key questions we will be examining shortly. 
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Modernity and the Accidental Nation 
Historically, the nation as a political mode of organisation came to be because of 
the functional needs of Europe's industrial economy. The "only society ever to 
live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth", Europe saw the world "as 
homogenous, subject to systematic, indiscriminate laws, and . . . open to 
interminable exploration" (Gellner 1988: 23). Modernity impelled the continent to 
expand territorially. "It supplied the momentum for the development of the 
European nation-state. It became the basis for the expansion of trade and the 
capitalist enterprise. It stimulated the application of science and _promoted the idea 
of the individual" (Albrow 1997: 25). To be highly productive, Europe had to 
break free from its agrarian past, undergo a new division of labour and create a 
uniform school-transmitted culture to allow its workforce to communicate 
competently (Gellner 1988: 36). Its transition to industrialism was a period of 
extreme societal readjustments and modifications. It was also the age of 
nationalism, a phenomenon that necessitated worldwide colonial conquests to 
satisfy the urges of industry and trade. 
Against this background, the postcolonial nation might be seen as 
'inauthentic' insofar as the impetus for its own transition from the agrarian to 
industrial phase was not so much internally generated as it was externally 
imposed. It is in the first instance an accident that somehow became reified in the 
process of western capitalist expansion, a 'leftover' of colonialism and by 
28 
extension European modernity. To say that the postcolonial nation was created 
"by aliens for alien purposes" (Guibemau 1996: 117) would in fact be putting it 
mildly. By Bertrand Badie's and Pierre Bimbaum's estimation, "the state in 
Africa and Asia is a purely imported product, a pale imitation of the diametrically 
opposite European political and social systems, a foreign body which is moreover 
overweight, inefficient and a source of violence" (Guibemau 1996: 118). Badie 
and Birnbaum have unfortunately been proven correct to an extent by history. 
Still, the relation between colonialism, modernity and the pathology called the 
postcolonial nation is not as straightforward as it seems. Indian nationalists, for 
instance, have denounced colonialism for having corrupted the principles of 
modernity. In Habermasian mode, they argued that "the conditions of colonial 
rule necessarily limited and corrupted the application of the true principles of a 
modem administration" (Chatterjee 1993: 15). Their quarrel was not with 
modernity but colonialism and its institutions of power which were simply "not 
modem enough". 
But what about the 'good' that has come out from what Goran Therbom 
terms "colonial modernity" ( 1995)? Might it not be said that if not for colonialism 
(which precipitated the rapid development of colonial metropolitan centres and 
the incidental modernisation of the third world), modernity would not have 
reached its advanced, global form today? Put another way, if colonialism had 
brought progress to postcolonial peoples, should they not at least be appreciative 
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enough to accept colonialism as a necessary evil that would culminate in the 
realisation of a universalist ethical culture when the modernity project reaches its 
conclusion? This line of argument is clearly unconvincing to those who not only 
have little faith in the aggressive all-levelling means of the project but also in the 
project itself. The thesis of necessary evil may promise universal emancipation 
but does it not in fact privilege western purveyors of modernity and perpetuate the 
uneven global distribution of power for the infinity it takes to complete the 
project? Besides, is the representation of western modernity as the triumph of 
reason and superiority not based on highly selective or arbitrary interpretation of 
evidence which creates the truth-effect that "the non-Western world can only 
participate in the global by assimilating to 'Western' practices" (Holton 1998: 
31)? 
To concede that Europe brought modernity to the postcolonial world is not 
to say that it did not sneak in mechanisms that rendered the latter structurally 
weak. The problem, as Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy explain, may be traced to the 
incongruence between "statehood" and "nationhood" in the postcolonial nation 
(1984). Unlike Western European countries which had the luxury of time to make 
the two coincide, postcolonial elites by and large had to make them overlap as 
much as possible within a short period of time just prior to independence. We 
need to recall that by the late eighteenth century western European countries had 
already invented 'citizens' who were generally able to subordinate self-interest to 
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the state. The unification of communities into a larger whole was even accepted 
by minority groups as a favourable move since a "small state can never bring to 
complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production" 
(Geddes 1997: 18). While Europe today has not completely closed the gap 
between nationhood and statehood, there is nonetheless "in virtually every 
European country . . . one cultural group which comprises more than half the 
population of the whole country, and in many cases, more than two-thirds" 
(Mazrui and Tidy 1984: 374). 
In contrast, many African countries have been said to be too 'unnatural' to 
be economically and political viable. As a result of the Berlin carve-up of the 
continent in 1885 for economic exploitation by European powers, not only were 
territories simply parcelled off to colonial authorities, cultural spaces and pre-
existing political-economic units were arbitrarily dissected. Of the approximately 
fifty thousand miles of colonial frontiers, seventy-four percent were astronomical 
and mathematical lines (Nugent 1996: 41 ). Africa's international boundaries "cut 
through a total of 191 culture group areas, some of which were partitioned by 
more than one boundary" (Griffiths 1995: 91). To compound to the problem, 
former French colonies were deliberately balkanised "in order to create a string of 
weak states that would individually be dependent on France instead of being 
united in strong federations able to challenge the domination of Paris in African 
affairs" (Mazrui and Tidy 1984: 66). Balkanisation was in fact "the essential 
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prerequisite of neo-colonialism in post-independent French-speaking Africa." 
Inter-tribal wars, irredentism and secessionist upns1ngs are some of the 
consequences of Europe's carve-up and balkanisation of Africa which are all too 
evident today. 
Mazrui and Tidy's companson between Anglophone and Francophone 
African nations is useful in further explaining why former colonies face such 
major obstacles in their efforts at nation-building. Although British colonial 
policies were never evenly implemented throughout all its colonies, the 'indirect 
rule' and 'divide and rule' approaches to governance had made national 
integration extremely difficult. With their "culturally relative and ethnically 
specific" attitude (1984: 376), the British with the help of co-opted native 
authorities had encouraged, perpetuated and even invented group difference. For 
example, it carried out population censuses which not only extracted vital 
information about the colonies for administrative purposes but also "[ smuggled] 
in numerous cultural assumptions and even [ created] new social realities" (Crick 
1997: 70). Furthermore, locals were encouraged to retain their indigenous roots 
and loyalties, and organise themselves in centrifugal clusters to protect group 
interests. British education policies which encouraged instruction in vernaculars 
for local communities did not contribute to national consciousness either. Instead 
they fostered pride in native languages and cultures which, together with the 
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above-mentioned causal factors, strengthened the foundation of statehood at the 
expense of nationhood. 
In contrast, French colonial policy of assimilation and integration in its 
former colonies had contributed to a strong foundation for nationhood but 
compromised statehood. Mazrui and Tidy argue that by emphasising culture 
instead of race like Britain, France had given the "highly Gallicized black man ... 
a much better chance of acceptance in French social and cultural circles than a 
highly Anglicized black man ... in comparable British circles" ( 1984: 3 81 ). This 
is not to say that racism was not rife in France, only that the incentive made it 
easier for locals to let go of their indigenous cultures and languages and look 
towards France for affirmation. As well, French policies promoted a more 
culturally integrated group of native elites. Even at the height of nationalism, their 
approach to politics was to think at "the macro-level of national and continental 
heritages rather than at the micro-level of ethnic legacies". This was in itself "an 
aid to nation-building", according to Mazrui and Tidy (1984: 377). Furthermore, 
because France saw its colonies as an extension of the metropolitan motherland 
and sought to acculturate and assimilate third world French nationals, African 
elites even became active participants in French metropolitan politics. Leopold 
Sedar Senghor, for instance, was reputed to have had a hand in drafting the 
constitution of the Third Republic of France (Mazrui and Tidy 1984: 379). 
33 
Another significant factor hindering sociopolitical cohesion in former 
British colonies was the high rate of illiteracy which impeded the general 
population's assimilation of concepts of internal sovereignty and citizenship. To 
overcome this problem and at the same time consolidate their precarious hold on 
power, postcolonial ruling elites had to largely resort to varying degrees of 
coercion to instil order and to forge cohesion. Intrusive policies implemented to 
shift ethnic or regional loyalty to the nation had in many cases caused deep 
resentment and violent upheavals. 
The Nation qua Impossible Thing 
It is evident that if the nation is to work at all the people must be able to at the 
very least feel "the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members 
identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide 
upon their common political destiny" (Guibernau 1996: 47). The persistent 
problem with national consciousness, however, is that "instead of being the all-
embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of 
being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people", it 
all too often turns out to be "only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of 
what it might have been" (Fanon 1990: 119). Nationalism has suffered such bad 
reputation that John Dunn even declares it "the starkest political shame" of the 
twentieth century, charging it of going against "the rationalist and universalist 
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ethical culture of modernity" which emphasises enlightened reasoning and human 
rights (Seth 1995: 41). 
The passion for patria called nationalism is clearly Janus-faced, 
synonymous with emancipation on the one side and, on the other, the explosion of 
primordial passions, fanatical violence and the egotistical urge to dominate. This 
poses the question: as a point of rally, is nationalism modem or pre-modem? 
According to Sanjay Seth, it is "neither a premodem survival nor a part of the 
modem era that is simultaneously a negation of modernity" (1995: 41). Neither is 
it "one of the detours by which the march of modernity is only made more secure" 
(1995: 42). Like the modem state it serves to legitimise, nationalism is "very 
much part of the modem age" (1995: 41). It is "an 'answer' to questions relating 
to boundaries and identities that become pressing only in the modem era." 
Sharing a similar view, Charles Taylor underscores that what is quintessentially 
modem about nationalism is the context of nationalist struggles, the stakes and 
predispositions to struggle which "could only arise in modernity" (1998: 204). 
Like a giant wave that threatens to engulf traditional cultures, modernity impels 
modernising elites to answer the "call to difference" (1998: 206). It forces them to 
assert national difference in the register of dignity and to refute "the imputation of 
inferiority against the culture they identify with." It is this engagement with one's 
sense of self-worth that nationalism, according to Taylor, draws its primordial 
power. 
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To answer the call to difference is essentially to define the nation and its 
people by means of predicative statements. It is to capture in language what Zizek 
in his Lacanian critique of ideology terms the Nation-Thing. The Na ti on-Thing is 
that which makes us exclusive and unique as a nation. It appears to us "as 
something accessible only to us, something 'they', the others, cannot grasp" 
(1993: 201). Nationalist discourse constantly alludes to it and those who speak in 
the name of the nation, particularly politicians, never fail to underline its 
existence. Despite that, there is curiously little of substance that can be said about 
the Nation-Thing. All we can do is enumerate disconnected fragments of the way 
our community organises its "way of life", its 
cluster of customs, op1n1ons and prejudices that include dietary 
practices, the sequestration or near-sequestration of [our] women, 
the sermons delivered by [our] mullah of choice, a loathing of 
modem society in general, riddled as it is with music, godlessness 
and sex, and a more particularised loathing (and fear) of the 
prospect that [our] own immediate surroundings could be taken 
over - 'westoxicated' - by the liberal, western-style way of life. 
(Rushdie 2001) 
Although we regard our national Thing as rightfully ours, it is also 
paradoxically something we must constantly re-find. There are for instance 
always more colonial chains to unshackle from our once-colonised minds, the 
original grandeur of our culture to restore, and/or the surplus population of our 
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country to be put in their proper place. All conditions must be met before we, the 
nation, can arrive at our rightful state of communitarian fullness. What this 
amounts to saying is that the Nation-Thing an impossible object. We claim it is 
ours but it can never fully be in our possession since there will always be 
just one more matter to attend to, just one more precondition to 
fulfill ... just one more account to settle. And with this just one 
more and one more and one more arises the structure of 
postponement and indirect living that keeps the system of 
excessive production going. The latter, of course, always knows 
how to present itself as an unconditionally 'good end' that deludes 
us with its light as though it were a real goal but that whenever we 
approach it recedes once more into the distance. (Sloterdijk 1987: 
194) 
The Nation-Thing is always-already lost, "found at the most as something 
missed. One does not find it, but only its pleasurable associations" (Lacan 1992: 
52). We derive enjoyment from its absent presence, in heightened anticipation of 
its return and the national 'completion' it promises to bring home. The truth that 
we never had what we purport to have lost is simply overlooked. No one wants to 
know the truth because it is unbearable, which perhaps explains why we rarely 
hear of anyone rallying for political support by reiterating to the masses that their 
celebrated national Thing does not exist or that it exists only as the effect of their 
belief in its existence, and that the function of its existence is to conceal and at the 
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same time embody the nation's (and by implication the people's) lack of original 
meaning. As Zizek explains, a nation "exists only as long as its specific enjoyment 
continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through 
national myths that structure these practices" ( 1993: 202). 
Zizek argues that because the national Thing forever eludes predication, 
nationalist discourse must construct an Other, outsiders to whom we can impute 
"an excessive enjoyment" (1993: 203). These intruders want to steal our 
enjoyment and keep it for themselves. They want to ruin our way of life and 
reduce us to their level of depravity. 'They' can be just about anybody. Jews, for 
instance, are always vilified as hungering for the destruction of the Islamic Thing. 
Shifty aggressive Chinese in Malaysia are choking the life out of inert Malays, 
lazy immigrants are stealing all our jobs and the syphilitic west, arguably the 
Mother of all Others, is defiling our purity. Blaming the Other is a politically 
expedient thing to do. It is also a good excuse to not confront the fact that, all too 
often, "the disease that is in us, is from us" (Rushdie 2001). Moreover - and we 
usually count ourselves out in this regard - when we fantasise about the Other 
enjoying itself at our expense, not only do we feel tortured, we even, to our 
horror, enjoy ourselves. As explained in the Introduction, enjoyment (jouissance) 
is not 'pleasure' in the everyday sense of the term. It rather designates that which 
"emerges when the very reality that is the source of unpleasure, of pain, is 
experienced as a source of traumatic-excessive pleasure" (Zizek 1997b: 24). For 
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example, a person might commit adultery, experience terrible guilt, and yet find 
this feeling of guilt intensifying the enjoyment of sinning (1994: 175). Similarly, 
the fantasy of how 'they' want to 'swamp' our country and steal our precious 
national Thing might disgust a racist. Underneath it all, however, it is always 
possible that the racist is 'tickled' by the thought of the wretched outsiders 
worshipping-craving his Thing. (Being tickled is after all intensely torturous and 
yet perversely enjoyable.) Through the Other, the racist gets to recognise (again) 
the joy of the national Thing which must now be defended even more strenuously. 
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Zizek' s nation of enjoyment bears fundamental similarities with Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's notion of the "impossible society" (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985). For Laclau and Mouffe, modem society ( or nation, in our usage) is 
structured around a traumatic kernel (the Nation-Thing in Zizek, the Lacanian 
Real which lies outside the symbolic order) which cannot be mastered but which 
nevertheless functions as its unifying locus. This locus was in the past "embodied 
in the person of the prince and tied to a transcendental authority" (Mouffe 1993b: 
11 ). Today modem democratic society still turns around the same centre - except 
that the prince has been evacuated and the seat of power is empty. No individual 
or group can permanently occupy the place left vacant by the prince because 
national elections allow for periodical redistribution of power and controlled 
contest (Torfing 1999: 192). At any one time there is always a plurality of 
nationalist discourses competing with each other for hegemony. Every emerging 
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discourse must offer a credible and compelling imaginary framework through 
which society's 'irrationalities' may be made sense of. Additionally, it "must aim 
to position itself not just as one alternative among many, but as the only possible 
framework for the resolution" of society's crisis (Smith 1998a: 167). 
V 
For Laclau and Mouffe, as for Zizek, hegemonic discourse has no 
transcendental authority which predetermines its success. Nothing - neither object 
nor event - possesses an objectivity that we must re-find. An earthquake and the 
falling of a brick may be natural phenomena or expressions of God's wrath 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108). Similarly, an anti-government street-protest may 
be constructed as proof of populist democracy, anti-democratic hooliganism, the 
Jewish conspiracy, and so forth. An event as such functions as a "floating 
signifier" that bears neither "absolute non-fixity" nor "absolute fixity" of meaning 
(1985: 111 ). It has no objective necessity to signify anything in particular 
although it may be sutured to any number of signifieds. 
The extent to which discourse becomes dominant in the national 
imagination is substantially dependent upon the prevailing horizon of 
intelligibility or interpretative framework which delineates "what is possible, what 
can be said and done, what positions may legitimately be taken, what actions may 
be engaged in, and so forth" (Smith 1998a: 64). As well, it hinges on the 
effectiveness of particular political struggles to recompose that framework. When 
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one discourse prevails over the others, it will begin to depoliticise itself ( suppress 
its political character, the fact that its institution is a political act par excellence) 
and rule out alternative frameworks for identification as "increasing illegitimate, 
immoral, irrational and finally incoherent" (1998a: 171). Because hegemonic 
discourse is a usurper of the place of the prince, its hold on power can never be 
total. Alternative discourses can always be articulated in radicalised forms in 
counter-hegemonic struggles. By the same logic, society in Laclau and Mouffe's 
conception has no objective principle that holds it together as a field of 
differences. It has neither endogenous meaning nor internal necessity to constitute 
itself this way or that, or to assume this or that form. The implication of this, 
Laclau stresses, is not that 'everything is discourse' or that one discourse is as 
likely to gain currency as the other. The point rather is that "no guarantee of the 
permanence of a certain hegemonic arrangement is obtainable outside the 
hegemonic struggle itself" (Laclau, in Bowman 1999: 100). 
For Laclau and Mouffe, antagonisms arising from hegemonic struggles are 
simultaneously the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility for a 
'free society', that is, a society from which antagonisms have been entirely 
eliminated. The logic is Lacanian at heart. When the Lacanian subject arrives at 
his 'final destination' after removing all the external blockages, what he will find 
is not the anticipated fullness of being but its radical opposite. He will discover 
that he is a signifier without a natural signified, that he has meaning only insofar 
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as he misrecognises his originary meaningless. Similarly, when society in Laclau 
and Mouffe's conception eliminates the Other it denigrates as the stain on its 
perfection, what it will find is not its crystallisation as a homogenous, harmonious 
totality but rather its dissolution (in the sense of becoming totalitarian). Society is, 
in this precise sense, impossible. Antagonisms must be eliminated before society 
can constitute itself as a unitary One. Yet the realisation of an antagonism-free 
and full-constituted society can only result in its radical negation since, without an 
outlet for the heterogeneous communities to air and redress their problems, there 
can be no free society in the true sense of the word. 
In underlining the non-eradicable character of antagonism, Laclau and 
Mouffe are not saying that we should abandon the pursuit of the good society, 
embrace nihilism, aim for the total elimination of power, and/or accept all 
differences in political op1n1on as a positive good. Their point rather is that 
society, with all its local conditions and historical peculiarities, exists only "in the 
pragmatic - and as a consequence always incomplete - movements of its 
affirmation" (Laclau 1990: 183). It is "the product of hegemonic and contingent -
and as such, always reversible - articulations and not ... the result of immanent 
laws of history" (emphasis added, 1990: 189). Nothing is granted as a destiny 
since destiny is ultimately predestined by the agent himself. 
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- 2 -
TWO NATIONS 
Nigeria, Malaysia 
Drawing on the insights of thinkers such as Chatterjee, Anderson, Zizek, and 
Laclau and Mouff e, we have in the preceding chapter examined some key issues 
in contemporary debates on nationhood. We have considered the nation as a by-
product of modernity, a collective imagination, and an impossible Thing. In this 
chapter, these theories will be contextualised as we examine the discourse of 
nationhood in Nigeria and Malaysia and at the same time establish a historical 
horizon against which Okri' s and Maniam's novels will be read in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Nigeria 
Hell on Earth 
There is a joke about Nigeria which begins with a Nigerian who died and went to 
hell. There, he met and befriended an American and a Briton. They conferred and 
agreed that they should telephone their loved ones on earth to warn them that hell 
was real. They negotiated with Satan and agreed that each of them would pay the 
dollar equivalent of their telephone calls. After the calls were made, the American 
was billed twenty dollars and the Briton twenty-five dollars. The Nigerian's bill 
amounted to thirty-five cents. The American and the Briton immediately 
protested, demanding to know why the Nigerian got a discount. "There is no 
preferential treatment," said Satan. "The Nigerian only made a local call."5 
Nigeria, as the joke implies, is not very far from where hell is located. 
Indeed the proximity between the two has earned the world's largest black nation 
a string of appellations: a crippled giant (Osaghae 1998), an open sore (Soyinka 
1996), a mere geographical expression (Chief Awolowo, in Morris-Hale 1996), a 
mistake (Sardauna of Sokoto, in Kirk-Greene 1968), a pariah nation (Obasanjo 
1999) and one of the most corrupt, insensitive, inefficient places under the sun 
5 Adapted from Rudolph Okonkwo's web-article 'Nigeria, A Deferred Dream' (1999). 
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(Achebe 1984: 9). Unflattering as they are, and despite the fact that Nigeria's 
return to civilian rule in 1999 has been an encouraging step in the right direction, 
these labels are not wholly unjustified. Intellectuals have been stifled, persecuted 
and driven into exile by repressive ruling regimes. Corruption runs rampant and 
officials loot the national coffers with abandon. The country has furthermore been 
put through a succession of military coups and counter-coups, intertribal clashes, 
daylight assassinations of political leaders, judicial murders and state-sponsored 
executions. On top of that, the economy of the oil-rich country is in a state of 
disrepair. 
It is hard to imagine that Nigeria, with a landmass nearly three times the 
size of Malaysia and a population five times greater, was once economically on 
par with Malaysia. In the 1960s it was even tipped to emerge as an "African tiger" 
(Osaghae 1998: 15) in the same way that certain Asian countries have 
transformed into powerful economic dragons. Today Nigeria languishes at the 
bottom end of the World Bank's Gross National Product (GNP) ranking, reduced 
to 
a sharply divided country with a divided and highly politicised 
army, a poor beggar country, yet underdeveloped and home to a 
large number of brigands, fraudsters and murderers in position of 
power and influence. (Justice Akinola Aguda, in Abiandu, Djebah, 
and Adeniyi 1999) 
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Nigeria has also been described as the "only country in the world where 
the best is impossible and the worst never happens" (Okonkwo 1999), a country 
guided by "a mysterious spirit which usually rescues it from the brink of self-
inflicted disintegration" (Williams 1998b: 8). National disintegration is self-
inflicted because those who wreak violence upon the Other (tribal, military, 
political, and so forth) often elicit reactions that have historically proven to be 
"more intense and graver than action, real or imagined" (Obasanjo 1981: 159-
160). As Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo puts it, "the sowers of wind are 
usually also the reapers of whirlwind." 
North, South, East, West 
So why has Nigeria failed to "astonish the world with its will and capacities" 
(Okri 1994a)? How it is possible that "a nation favoured by Providence" (Achebe 
1984: 9) with an abundance of natural resources and the best of talents could be 
so destitute after more than four decades of independence? In William Graf s 
contention, breakdowns in Nigeria's political system have "always occurred 
within the context of inter-ethnic controversy" (1988: 13). Larry Diamond 
concurs, arguing that "nothing can be understood about Nigeria until its pattern of 
ethnic diversity is delineated" ( 1988: 21 ). Eghosa Osaghae too places a similar 
accent on ethnicity, adding that "for most Africans, the ethnic community is the 
only real entity worth dying for" (1991: 53). 
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Nigeria is ethnically divided between the Hausa-Fulani in the North and 
two ethnic majorities in the South: Yoruba in the southwest and Igbo in the 
southeast. The problem, as Okri summarises it, is as follows: "the southerners fear 
the eternal domination of the north. The northerners fear the secret domination of 
the south; they also fear the south's vengeance" (1994a). Nigeria is not the only 
country bedevilled by interethnic unrest. Nonetheless its situation is unique. Like 
few other countries in the world, it has to create a nation out of an estimated two-
hundred and fifty to six-hundred and nineteen ethno-linguistic groups living 
within its borders (Nnoli 1995; Levin 1997). To grasp the breadth of Nigeria's 
challenge, it would be instructive to recall that the Hausa-Fulani-dominated North 
has been an Islamist enclave since the fifteenth century. Consisting mainly of 
savanna scrubland and broad-stepped plateau, it has, by virtue of proximity to the 
Sahara trade routes, been influenced predominantly by the Muslim-Sudanic 
culture. Society is conservative, hierarchized and ruled by Islamist principles 
which political elites have used to forge trans-tribal Muslim solidarity and to 
"inculcate habits and attitudes of political deference and subordination" (Coleman 
1958: 39). In contrast, the South is less stratified and was considered "more 
receptive to the kind of social change needed for integration into the colonial-
capitalist economy and society" (Graf 1988: 15). Geographically, it is largely 
made up of coastal rain forests and swampy plains. These natural barriers have 
historically inhibited intermingling between tribes, which explains the large 
number of small and isolated communities living in southern Nigeria. They have 
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also served to impede the spread of Islam from the North. Its proximity to the 
coast, however, had facilitated an early contact with Christian missionaries in the 
nineteenth century, resulting in its intensive evangelisation. Today Christianity is 
still preponderant in the South, especially Igboland in the southeast. Y orubaland 
has an almost even number of Christians and Muslims. 
While the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo dominate numerically in their 
respective regions, hundreds of ethnic minorities make up more than a third of 
Nigeria's population. The largest of the minorities (Edo, Tiv, Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio 
and Idoma) collectively make up twenty-six percent of the total population. The 
smaller ethnic groups consist of between one thousand and one million members 
each. Many of them have a history of pre-colonial inter-kingdom warfare. The 
ancient kingdoms of Yoruba and Kanuri, for instance, had had to fight off the 
Fulani empire's hostile expansionism from the North (Diamond 1988: 21-2; 
Coleman 1958: 23). 
Whatever animosities that might have existed then were exacerbated by 
colonialism which formally began with the annexation of Lagos as Britain's 
colony in 1861. The ostensible aim of the British then was to "exercise an 
influence on the surrounding tribes which may, it [was] hoped, be permanently 
beneficial to the African race" and "to secure for ever the free population of Lagos 
from the slave-traders and kidnappers who formerly oppressed them" (Crowder 
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1973: 169). Over time, Britain extended its piecemeal conquest to the entire Niger 
Basin. Territories were amalgamated and in 1914, the North, South and Lagos 
became Nigeria under the watchful eyes of Sir Frederick Lugard (then Governor 
of the British Protectorates and a renowned racist, as we shall see in Chapter 5). 
Even after Nigeria's creation, the North and the South continued to be 
administered under separate systems. That, needless to say, did not contribute to 
social cohesion between the two sides which already saw one another as aliens 
rather than fellow countrymen. The situation was also not helped by the division 
of the Southern provinces into Western and Eastern Regions in 1939, and the 
absence of a unitary constitution until as late as 1947 (Kirk-Greene 1971: 8; 
Diamond 1988: 28). The Richards Constitution was supposed to promote unity 
when it was introduced in 194 7 but it ended up doing the exact opposite. While it 
created a central government comprising representatives from all regions, it also 
strengthened the foundation of ethnoregionalism in Nigerian politics. It made the 
regions nearly autonomous and the centre weak, causing regional and ethnic 
loyalties to take precedence over national interests. 
Many attempts have since been made to redress the problem of federal-
regional imbalance, including the creation of more states. None, however, have 
been politics-free, for even "decisions on which states were to be created reflected 
the prevailing power equation at the time of the exercise" (Nwosu 1995: 1). 
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I.A.A. Ayoade (1997) notes that the North invariably ends up wi_th more states 
than the South with each state-recreation exercise. Ten states were created in the 
North and nine in the South when General Murtala Muhammed was in power. 
Under the Babangida regime, there were eleven in the North and nine in the 
South, later revised to sixteen and fourteen respectively. The North had the upper-
hand again in 1996 when General Sani Abacha gave nineteen states to the North 
and seventeen to the South. 
Insecurity Dilemma 
Southern fear of Northern domination is not unfounded even though leaders from 
the North have 'denied' harbouring any such ambition. "All of us need one 
another", says Alhaji Maitama Sule, a Northern leader. He adds that 
Every one has a gift from God. The Northerners are endowed by 
God with leadership qualities. The Yoruba man knows how to earn 
a living and has diplomatic qualities. The Igbo is gifted in 
commerce, trade and technological innovation. God so created us 
individually for a purpose and with different gifts. (Ayoade 1997: 
14) 
According to Maitama Sule, Nigeria "will definitely become a great 
nation, a great influence in the world" if each group were to keep to their place 
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(Ayoade 1997: 14). What Alhaji is effectively saying is that Northern hegemony 
is justified within his holy scheme of things, not because Northerners covet power 
but because they were simply created by God to rule. Alhaji' s "barefoot 
philosophy" (Ayoade 1997: 14) bears an uncanny resemblance to the logic of 
Malay domination in Malaysia. Abdullah Ahmad, a politician from Barisan 
Nasional (the ruling coalition) insists that Malays only want to assert their legally 
non-challengeable birthright to be "politically dominant" in Malaysia. That, he 
reasons, is not to the same as "political domination" over minority ethnic groups 
(Das 1987). He further says that that is how things are and must continue to be 
because Malays would rather share poverty with Indonesia than see their political 
position eroded by non-Malays. 
As we are well aware, the fear and loathing of the Other need not arise 
from a real threat. Sometimes the mere fact that there is group distinction is in 
itself sufficient to cause intergroup animosity (Tyrell 1996: 243). In an unstable 
country, one group's demand for what it regards as equitable treatment ( on 
grounds of real and/or imagined wrongs it has suffered) is likely to heighten fear 
in other groups whose sense of security is already threatened. In Nigeria, the 
mutual fear and suspicion between ethnic groups very often tum into violent 
confrontations that are disproportionately excessive in relation to their cause. For 
instance, in 1987, a small argument broke out between Christians and Muslims at 
the College of Education (Kafanchan, Nigeria) over a Christian group's 
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interpretation of the Quran at a conference. It led to a Muslim assault on 
Christians which then spilled over to other places including the Ahmadu Bello 
University in Zaria. As ripple effect, churches, mosques and other properties in 
Kaduna and Katsina were destroyed. In the final count, thirty churches and three 
mosques were razed, "as well as 46 private houses, 19 vehicles, 30 hotels, 9 
shops, workshops and offices [and] 1 petrol station" (Nwosu 1996b: 145). As ifto 
underline the tragic excess of the clashes, a total of nine dead cows were included 
on the casualty list. 
The tragedy of such eruptions is that sometimes the participants do not 
actually set out to cause others harm. Alan Collins explains that, in a security 
dilemma, "uncertainty [about the other's intent] can lead to the pursuit of actions 
which are paradoxical because they make matters worse" (1998: 263). He argues 
that mitigation and ultimately escape from an ethnic security dilemma lie in 
power-sharing and ethnic reconstruction. Power-sharing could take the form of a 
coalition regime, while ethnic reconstruction could involve non-assimilatory 
identification with a 'neutral' concept like Bangsa Malaysia (the Malaysian 
people transcending race and religion). Collins' proposal is admittedly alluring. 
Theoretically, at least, power-sharing and benevolent ethnic reconstruction do 
seem like viable options. The problem is that solutions are often problems that 
require new solutions. A solution may tum into a problem when there are 
conflicting views on what constitutes neutrality where the construction of 
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'national race' is concerned, or how power ought to be aggregated between 
competing groups. 
Nigeria's perennial census cns1s 1s an example of how solution and 
problem often coincide. Attempts at counting Nigeria's population have always 
been rife with controversy because of the enormous implications of census results 
on the country's balance of power. Because revenue, resources and federal 
parliamentary seats are allocated in proportion to ethnoregional population size, 
numerical superiority literally translates into control of the country. So important 
are numbers, in fact, that the dead, the unborn, the nonexistent and livestock were 
said to have been counted to inflate census figures (Osaghae 1998: 41; Okafor 
1998: 33). 
From the South's perspective, the census exercises of 1962 and 1963 were 
an opportunity to remove the numerical basis for Northern domination. More 
precisely, it was to undo Britain's colonial engineering which grossly inflated 
figures from the 1952-53 census in favour of the North (Diamond 1988: 131). The 
1962-3 plan failed and the North was again declared officially more populous. 
Howls of protests came loudest from Eastern Premier Michael Okpara who 
rejected the "worse than useless" census outcome, claiming that the Northern 
count was "riddled with flagrant malpractices" (Diamond 1988: 13 8). Legal 
attempts to nullify the results failed and the case was subsequently closed. 
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Meanwhile, North-South relation continued to fester. By the decade's end, it 
erupted into a series of military coups, counter-coups and a bitter civil war which 
claimed over a million lives and dispossessed an estimated two to three million 
(Osaghae 1998: 69). 
Racism and the Spectral Menace 
As we have seen, a security dilemma is akin to self-fulfilling prophecy: 'I fear the 
worst and try to avoid it. But in avoiding it I inadvertently set in motion a chain of 
events that culminates in the realisation of what I most fear.' Collins suggests that 
a way out of this dilemma is by mitigating "information failure" between the 
parties (1998: 269). "In the case of power-sharing, if ethnic elites adhere to an 
agreement where each group has influence over government policy then their 
uncertainty about the intent that lies behind that policy is, at worst, minimized, 
and at best, removed." At the one level, this form of communication occurs every 
day. If not perfect, it is at least effective enough to allow for pragmatic social 
interactions. The problem, however, is that intersubjective communication is often 
more problematic than we are fully aware. We are constantly faced with the 
persistent gap between utterance ('You're telling me this ... ' ) and its enunciation 
(' ... but what exactly are you aiming at? What do you want from me?') (Zizek 
1989: 111). We mistake signs for wonders, reading into every utterance some 
hidden, profound meaning and undreamt-of-depth. And we interpret "contingent 
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accidents as meaningful 'answers of the real' - that is, as confirmations of [our] 
paranoiac forebodings" (1994: 42). Zizek's example of the anti-Semite German 
and Mr Stem, his Jewish neighbour, is useful in illustrating the point we are 
making. The German, instead of giving up his racist belief when presented with 
evidence of Mr Stem's normality (that is, his failure to act like the schemer and 
wire-puller that all Jews are supposed to be), perversely inverts it into the support 
of his anti-Semitism: "You see how dangerous they really are? It is difficult to 
recognize their real nature. They hide it behind the mask of everyday appearance 
- and it is exactly this hiding of one's nature, this duplicity, that is a basic feature 
of the Jewish nature" (1989: 49). 
By the same logic, an apparently neutral political discourse can be 
compelling not just for "what it explicitly says, but also because of its concealed 
responses to our unspeakable desires" (Smith 1998a: 75). A hypothetical Yoruba 
man might support Nigeria's 'three Rs' plan which was introduced after the civil 
war ( or Northern-led genocide of Igbos, as some view it) to reconstruct, 
rehabilitate and reconciliate the country. Publicly, he might declare that there is 
no victor or vanquished in a war of brothers (to paraphrase the official line of the 
Gowon regime which initiated the plan) and that although Easterners should not 
have attempted to secede from the federation and bring chaos to the country in 
doing so, the war is over and everyone should now put the past behind and work 
towards the preservation of Nigeria's territorial integrity. Secretly, however, is it 
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not possible that the hypothetical subject might have been motivated by tribalist 
resentment and envy at the Igbo East for daring to seek enjoyment-existence as a 
separate, sovereign entity ( an ambition that he perhaps harbours for Western 
Nigeria)? Perhaps he feels that by placating and simultaneously locking 
Easterners within the federation, they would be assured of never having access to 
the coveted Thing that he too is deprived of. 
"Scratch the surface of culture and ethnicity and race will appear 
underneath it all to found its essence." That, as succinctly put by Kalpana 
Sheshadri-Crooks, is why race never dies even though we know very well it does 
not exist (2000: 4). Race is everywhere. It is the fantasmatic Thing implicitly 
referred to in multiculturalist discourse, the presupposed specificity of self-
enclosed Others whose difference we ought to respect - albeit from a distance, as 
if we are entirely different from them and better off for it. The underlying claim of 
racially-deterministic discourse is always the same: we are our race, born as fixed 
racial actors with naturally pre-established religion, goals and often immutable 
h . 6 arc -enemies. 
6 James Coleman notes that it was not uncommon for members of smaller tribes living in the 
Middle Belt to change their tribal identity by voluntarily identifying with the prestigious Hausa for 
the status it conferred (1958: 22). Similarly, Okwudiba Nnoli's study shows that communities 
living in isolated and difficult terrain in Nigeria are sometimes mistaken as homogenous because 
their surrounding environment occludes differences and reveals superficial similarities (1995). 
Communities can also acquire a new identity through no fault of theirs, as was the Epi's fate when 
they found themselves classified as Ijaw (instead of under the umbrella of Edo) following 
administrative changes (1995: 27). 
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In order to work, racial essentialism must paper over the irreconcilable gap 
between subject position and structural position. It must cover up the fact that 
'who we are' is not naturally predetermined by our race, class, sex and so forth. A 
male Hausa Fulani can always view the world from any number of fantasmatic 
frameworks: radical pan-Africanist, right-wing socialist, anti-Igbo nationalist, a 
self-hating racist, etc. Should he experience his commitment to an ideological 
cause from, say, a pan-Africanist perspective, it would be unlikely for him to 
support the marginalisation of his 'natural' enemy, namely Southerners. Similarly, 
there is no Celestial Decree which says that a person who identifies himself as 
Malay must view the Chinese in Malaysia as a natural enemy or sexually-fecund 
pug-nosed dragon out to devour his/her race, as described by prominent Malay 
writer Shahnon Ahmad in his novel Menteri ('Minister') (1967). 
Race identity, writes Kalpana Sheshadri-Crooks, "is about the sense of 
one's exclusiveness, exceptionality and uniqueness. Put very simply, it is an 
identity that, if it is working at all, can only be about pride, being better, being the 
best. Race is inextricably caught up in a Hobbesian discourse of social contract, 
where personal ( or particular) interest masquerades as public good" (Seshadri-
Crooks 2000: 7). For these reason, a racist is often impervious to rational 
arguments. He can usually enumerate a series of empirical features that causes his 
muddled feelings of anxiety and repulsion towards the Other: their pathetic 
m1m1cry of our ways, the pagan rites and rituals to which they enslave 
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themselves, the way they always gather amongst their suspicious kind and get up 
to no good, and so on. Proving 'algorithmically' to a racist that racism is heinous 
is not likely to change his mind about being a racist. The reason for this, Zizek 
argues, lies in the fact that the racist 'enjoys' being one. He would rather suffer 
his irritating symptom ( embodied by the racial Other) than give it up and lose the 
enjoyment he derives from it (1989: 74) 
It should be emphasised here that the Other's 'bad' attributes which a 
racist uses to reinforce his racist beliefs are not external to himself. Also, they 
need not be 'real' before the racist can feed on them. To elucidate this, let us first 
cite Melanie Klein's theory of identification. According to Klein, a child in early 
stages of psychic development learns to deal with good and bad experiences of 
the external world by splitting his ego in two. One part of the infantile self is . 
identified with the good object and the other with the bad (Rustin 1991: 64). It 
then evolves through these identifications. The boundary between self and other is 
highly volatile and porous (porosity generally decreases as the child matures). In 
moments of introjective identification, he may take the attributes of others into 
himself, while in projective identification, he gets rid of unwanted feelings by 
attributing them to others. Furthermore, 
Others are sometimes perceived as possessing qualities which in 
reality belong to the self; the self is sometimes experienced as 
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possessing qualities put into [him] by others (if bad qualities) or 
stolen from them (if good ones). (Rustin 1991: 64) 
In a relation of countertransference, others may sometimes unconsciously 
take on fantasmatic roles which in part derive from the subject's projection onto 
them (Rustin 1991: 65). In doing so, they would inadvertently 'confirm' the 
subject's reality and receive further projections. This theory is well-known in the 
field of educational psychology. A teacher's low expectations of a student will not 
only shape his pedagogic approach, it may also hail the latter into acting out the 
role unconsciously assigned to him, causing him to under-perform academically. 
In the same way, a racist will, by way of dealing with his inner conflict, partake in 
irrational projections. Parts of himself which he finds repellent or inferior will be 
projected onto the racial Other so that he may perceive himself as good. The 
Other is then blamed for trying to corrupt and weaken the racist's 'good' self -
hence the need to keep him at bay or, more drastically, exterminate him. 
Here we should be careful not to essentialise the racist and his victim( s) as 
possessing fixed properties or attributes which become distorted in intersubj ective 
communication. As well, we should avoid misreading projection as resolution of 
the racist's inner conflict. Zizek explains that racist hatred is "not limited to the 
'actual properties' of its object but targets its real kernel, objet a, what is 'in the 
object more than itself"' (1996a: 107). The racist may enumerate the Other's 
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annoying features but these features only "function as indicators of a more radical 
strangeness." Objet a is this radical strangeness, the spectral surplus "that stands 
for what in the perceived positive, empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze 
and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it" (1996a: 105). Obj et a 
intrigues and irritates the racist who cannot quite grasp this no-Thing which keeps 
manifesting his fantasies from within. The closer he gets to the spectral menace, 
the more threatened he feels and the more he needs to negate it. This the racist 
achieves by inflicting pain on the Other. The Other's pain enables the racist to 
experience jouissance because it serves as evidence that the spectre he perceives 
is not an illusion but really does exist in the Other (not just as symbolic fiction but 
in the Real). When a racist strikes at his victim, what he is really trying to do is 
strike at the spectre, forcing it to 'materialise' through the victim's pain. The 
racist's aim is as such comparable to a sadist's: "by means of my victim's pain, I 
make the Other exist" (1996a: 105). 
On Power and Ideology 
As we noted earlier, Nigeria tends to experience pain in epic proportions. More 
often than not, pain comes directly from above, namely the ruling elite ( a prime 
target in O kri' s novels, as we shall see in later chapters). The African slave trade 
would not have been so successful if not for the local rulers who readily "brought 
... slaves to shipside in exchange for European trinkets" (Coleman 1958: 40). 
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Similarly, colonialism would not have reached its depth of penetration without 
local elite support of British expansionism.7 As well, post-independence military 
dictators were so oppressive towards the people that Nigeria was once ostracised 
from the international community. Between 1984 and 1999 alone, military 
regimes promulgated no less than fifty-six decrees that flagrantly violated basic 
human rights (Aina 1999: 26). 
If there had been any doubt about Nigerian ruling elites' propensity for 
destruction, it would have been dispelled by General Sani Abacha who came into 
power after the annulment of the 1993 election result. Abacha' s ruthlessness was 
"unique even by Nigeria's standards of brutal military dictatorship" (Williams 
1998b: 8). Even before seizing power, the "first real dictator Nigeria has known" 
(Synge 1998: 14) had ordered soldiers to mow down at least four hundred 
unarmed demonstrators protesting against the election annulment. His other, more 
illustrious, victims include Ken Saro-Wiwa and Kudirat Abiola (wife of the 1993 
President-elect Basarun Abiola who was gunned down in broad daylight in Lagos 
by Abacha's killer squad). The day Abacha died suddenly of a cardiac arrest 
( ending his five-year rule which Nigerians call the 'years of the locust'), his death 
7 Elizabeth Isichei quotes an essay written by Aminu Kano on Northern leaders and the British: 
"The emirs are not concerned with anybody or whatever may befall anybody, so long as they are 
fulfilling the commands of the Europeans. And the European, for his part, out of sheer hypocrisy 
stands aloof and overlooks and pretends that he does not know what crimes have been committed 
in the course of doing his bidding. He seems to believe that so long as no one screams aloud, no 
one is suffering." (1983 : 381 ). 
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was celebrated with such morbid jubilation that the people were reported to have 
taken to the streets with a mock coffin, singing anti-Abacha songs. 
After all that the Nigeria has been through, it would not be surprising if 
the people should regard the political class as a "desperate and incorrigible lot, a 
collective of veteran delinquents" (Williams 1998b: 9). The trouble with Nigeria, 
as Achebe writes, is "simply and squarely a failure of leadership . . . the 
unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility" (1984: 1 ). 
Leaders lack the executive foresight and intellectual rigour which made Julius K. 
Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah respected personalities. What they do possess, 
however, is "Nigerian-style leadership", namely "a tendency to pious materialistic 
wooliness and self-centred pedestrianism" (1984: 11 ). Achebe makes an example 
of Obafemi Awolowo, a former leader from Western Nigeria who was quoted to 
have said: 
I was going to make myself formidable intellectually, morally 
invulnerable, to make all the money that is possible for a man with 
my brains and brawn to make in Nigeria. (Achebe 1984: 11 )8 
8 In the 1960s The Coker Commission found A wolowo guilty of misusing W estem regional funds. 
He was indicted for having diverted public funds totalling N4.4 million in cash and Nl .3 million 
in overdraft to finance the Action Group (the then dominant Western political party) (Osaghae 
1998: 40). 
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In the past, elites had relied mostly on superstition, charisma and/or brute 
force to elicit obedience from the masses. Feudal rulers in Nigeria, like Malay 
rajas who intimidated their subjects with threats of punishment by magical 
powers (Milner 1995: 15), were known to have done the same from behind a 
phenomenal veil. The Oba of Benin, for example, would not cross a river for fear 
of exploding the myth of royal invincibility should he fall in and drown. The Aku 
Uka of Wukari made himself absolute and supreme by only eating food prepared 
by men, while the Mai of Bomu maintained the aura of divinity by always 
speaking to his subjects from behind a holy curtain (Ayoade 1997: 5). In instances 
such as these, the ruler's magical exterior "implies that there is something behind 
it which appears through it", that "it simultaneously hides and reveals the essence 
behind its curtain" (Zizek 1989: 193). What is really hidden is "the fact that there 
is nothing to hide" since what "is concealed is that the very act of concealing 
conceals nothing". Behind the feudal ruler's phenomenal veil, there was not a 
more substantial reality but literally nothing whose existence nevertheless had to 
be presupposed if the ruler's claim to power was to attain legitimacy. 
Today, although we no longer naively believe in the politician's rhetoric, 
we still sometimes act as if we believe, as if we are practical solipsists rehearsing 
the formula of fetishistic disavowal. We know very well, for instance, that the 
Prime Minister is a usurper of the place of the prince, someone who perverts the 
country's enshrined constitution in the name of his race for his own pathological 
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purposes, yet we still act as if his regime is legitimate. We still carry on with our 
daily lives (pay taxes, read regime-controlled newspapers, apply for this or that 
permit and licence from the authorities) as if all is well. That, according to Zizek, 
is precisely how ideology functions. It succeeds because of how we act, 
regardless of what we know or might have to say about it. Ideology is in this 
precise sense 
not simply a 'false consciousness', an illusory representation of 
reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be 
conceived as 'ideological' - 'ideological' is a social reality whose 
very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to 
its essence - that is, the social effectivity, the very reproduction of 
which implies that the individuals 'do not know what they are 
doing'. 'Ideological' is not the 'false consciousness' of a (social) 
being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by 'false 
consciousness.' (1989: 21) 
Political elites in Nigeria have done some heinous things, as have non-
elites who, according to Osaghae, know very well that ethnic ideology can be put 
to their service (Osaghae 1991: 54). They use it to scale social hierarchies and 
access the spoils of elitism: "wealth, reputation, influence, connections with, and 
control of, government and its agencies" (1991: 43, 54). The intimacy between 
elites and non-elites is well reflected in prebendal politics, described by Richard 
Joseph as "patterns of political behaviour which rest on the justifying principle 
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that [political] offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal 
benefit of office holders as well as for their reference or support group" (Joseph 
1987: 8). It is not uncommon in Nigeria for the public purpose of an office to 
become a secondary concern once it has been won, "however much that purpose 
might have been originally cited in its creation or during the periodic competition 
to fill it" (1987: 8). 
Prebendalism is almost always mentioned in the same breath with another 
national bane - clientelism or patron-client instrumental friendship in which "an 
individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and 
resources to provide protection or benefits or both, for a person of lower status 
( client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal services to the patron" (Joseph 1987: 57). As a system of 
reward, prebendalism and clientelism feed on intergroup rivalry. The more 
insecure a group feels, the more it tends to subscribe to the system. Opting out of 
it entirely is an option, but it would not be easy since refusal to 'play along' 
effectively means forgoing the "loans, scholarships, licences, plots of urban land, 
employment, promotion" that usually come from being under the protection of an 
oga ('godfather') (Joseph 1987: 56). Furthermore, the repercussions are not only 
the individual's to face, they also affect his kinsmen or dependants because one's 
personal fate is considerably dependent upon the political fortune of the group( s) 
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to which one is affiliated. In our discussion on Okri in Part II, we will see how 
ruinous it can be to have the wrong affiliations. 
From Independence to War 
By 1951, Nigeria was already "firmly and clearly established on the road to 
independence" (Hatch 1971: 215). All nationalists had to do was "display 
sufficient power and national unity to compel a commitment" from Britain 
(Coleman 1958: 396). Their struggle for freedom was "less a matter of defying 
foreign authority" and more 
a matter of drawing boundaries, founding capitals, and distributing 
power in such a way as to dampen and contain sharpening ethno-
regional hostilities prior to the disappearance of authority. It was 
marked not so much by growing insurgency in order to force the 
British to leave as by feverish negotiation, in both Lagos and 
London, in order to create a modus videndi among the Yoruba, Ibo, 
and Hausa-Fulani so that they could leave. (Rudolph 1971: 270) 
The required show of unity was nonetheless a tall order, considering the 
antagonistic nationhood ideals of the three ethnoregional blocs and the communal 
character of the dominant political parties in each region. In retrospect, it seems 
extraordinary that any consensus was reached at all. The North - headed by the 
Northern People's Congress (NPC) - was from the outset averse to Southern 
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demands for early self-government. To the bitter resentment of Western and 
Eastern leaders - respectively from the Action Group (AG) and National Council 
of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC)9 - the North had, in 1953, rejected the original 
target of 1956 for self-rule and threatened to secede if things were to proceed. 
Fearing Southern domination, NPC demanded that the date be left indefinite so 
that it could first catch up with Southern progress. Frustrated AG and NCNC 
members reacted by staging a parliamentary walk-out, leaving spectators to jeer at 
NPC politicians. The Southern press began criticising Northern leaders in stinging 
terms, labelling them imperialist stooges and thieving kolanut chiefs without 
minds of their own. The Northerners were highly incensed by the attack, 
particularly since Hausas were said to regard personal and public humiliation 
"one of the most grievous social offences, outweighing in its gravity physical 
assault" (Kirk-Greene 1971: 9-10). 
Tension escalated and six weeks later violence erupted in the erstwhile 
peaceful Kano (Northern Nigeria). Northerners and Southerners "attacked each 
other violently, burned and looted each other's houses and stores, mutilating their 
murdered opponents" (Hatch 1971: 217). Thirty-six people lost their lives and the 
casualty toll was reported to be two hundred and seventy. Despite the political 
turmoil, the South continued to press for independence in 1956, and the North 
9 NCNC was formerly known as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. 
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was equally emphatic in rejecting it. The situation was impossibly deadlocked 
until NPC unexpectedly changed its position in 1956, announcing that it would 
seek regional self-government in 1959 (three years after regional self-government 
for the South). Following further bargaining, it was unanimously agreed that 1959 
would be the year of destiny, although it was later revised to 1960 (Coleman 
1958: 404). On 1 October 1960, Nigeria became the sixteenth sovereign African 
country. 
Before we venture to trace some of the maJor . post-independence 
developments which led up to Nigeria's devastating civil war in 1967, we should 
clarify that the above account of the country's journey towards independence is 
neither the only available account nor is it uncontested. In Part II of this thesis, we 
will see that whenever Okri reiterates in the abiku novels that the birth of the 
'fictional' nation has been aborted even before the moment of its birth, that dirty 
secret pacts have been made between the coloniser and the colonised, and that this 
great betrayal would set in motion a chain of catastrophic events that would 
culminate with the civil war, he is possibly alluding to an 'uncut' version of 
Nigerian history that mainstream accounts have suppressed. We will also later 
encounter in Okri' s IR a nefarious character who, although known only by the 
name Governor-General, bears an uncanny resemblance to the unofficial portrait 
of Sir James Robertson, the real-life Governor-General of Nigeria who saw the 
country through independence. In his memoir, Robertson argued that the show of 
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unity which earned Nigeria its independence had been ephemeral because "the 
force of tribalism was greater than anyone had estimated" (1974: 256). Or was it? 
That is one area we will subsequently be examining. 
Suffice to say for now that Nigeria was not "well-built upon firm 
foundations" as claimed the independence day speech of the country's first Prime 
Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Northern leader (1964: 59). Although the 
post-independence years between 1960 and 1962 were relatively peaceful, 
nothing had really changed "except the colour of the rich man emerging from the 
back seat of his car" (Kirk-Greene 1971: 31 ). In colloquial terms, Nigerians "had 
only exchanged monkeys for baboons" (Williams 1998a: 289). Instead of 
materialising the anticipated new social order, educated elites - often more 
tribalistic than the illiterate masses - turned "shamelessly mean and unscrupulous 
in their appeal of the baser loyalties of their tribesmen" (Nwankwo and Ifejika 
1969: 36). Under Balewa's "uninspiring and weak leadership" (Nwankwo and 
Ifejika 1969: 38), the federal and regional governments became embroiled in one 
plot after the other to weaken their rivals. Amidst increasing political turmoil, the 
military staged its first coup on 15 January 1966. By the time Nigerians had 
gathered coherent information about the event, top politicians - including the 
Northern and Western premiers, the Federal Prime Minister, and a number of top 
military officers - had been assassinated by the coup-plotters headed by Major 
Nzeogwu. The East and Mid-West premiers managed to survive the partially-
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successful coup which aimed to purge Nigeria of its corrupt "internal otherness" 
(Zizek 1994: 78), namely tribalists, nepotists, homosexuals, political profiteers, 
and so forth. 10 
Although the military regime was initially welcomed by ordinary citizens, 
its benevolent 'fire brigade' intervention soon became a suspected Igbo plot to 
dominate Nigeria. All the signs suddenly confirmed the conspiracy theory: most 
of the military personnel assassinated were from the North and West while 
Eastern political leaders were spared, a suspiciously high number of Northerners 
were dismissed from the air force to make way for Southerners, and the military 
regime had tried to replace federalism with republicanism, a plan which Northern 
elites read as an attempt to remove what was and is regarded as "a device to 
protect differences and ensure that each segment of the country progresses at its 
own pace" (Osaghae 1998: 60). 
Following a groundswell of anti-Igbo sentiment, General Gowon and his 
Northern backers struck back in a revenge counter-coup code-named Operation 
Araba ('Secession Day' in Hausa) in July 1966. What followed was an 
"orchestrated ritual of blood" (Okafor 1998: 13) in the North, a pre-meditated 
extermination of an estimated eighty to a hundred thousand Easterners between 
10 See the transcript of Major Nzeogwu's martial law announcement in Kirk-Greene (1971: 125-
127). 
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May and September 1966 (Osaghae 1998: 63). Victims were said to have been 
sadistically tortured before being slaughtered like rats. Some were reported to 
have been "made to swim in ponds of faeces for several hours before being finally 
shot" (Nwankwo and Ifejika 1969: 159). On account of mounting violence against 
Easterners and revenge killings of non-Easterners in Eastern cities, the military 
governor of the Eastern region, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu urged Easterners in 
other parts of Nigeria to temporarily return to the safety of their home region. 
Tension continued to mount and in May 1967 the East seceded, sparking Nigeria's 
civil war. By May 1969, the Republic of Biafra ( as the East had named itself) had 
lost eighty-percent of its territory to federal forces. When the war ended with the 
defeat of Biafra in 1970, the death toll was a staggering one million, making it 
"one of the worst civil wars in modem African history and the most expensive 
both in monetary terms and in human waste" (Irukwu 1983: 171). 
Historical accounts of the civil war are split: did Biafra secede for self-
serving reasons or was it forced to break away or perish from a Northern attempt 
to wipe out all Igbos? Was Ojukwu a hero forced to fight for justice (Nwankwo 
and Ifejika 1969) or was he a "gangster" and a "decrepit and diminutive Hitler" 
who suffered from an "unbridled desire for personal power" (Federal Ministry of 
Information 1967b )? In the eyes of the federal government, Biafra' s breakaway 
bid was high treason, an irresponsible attempt to destroy what took years of toil to 
build (Departments of State and Public Institutions 1969: 8). General Olusegun 
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Obasanjo insisted that the civil war was not a bloodthirsty Muslim holy war 
against "the victimised children of the Pope" (Obasanjo 1981: 147). Biafra, he 
argued, was not the "Israel of Africa" portrayed by influential American Jews. By 
the federal government's anti-secessionist logic, Nigeria's unity was non-
negotiable and Igbos should "once and for all renounce tribal domination and 
escape from their persecution complex" (African Statesmen 1969: 5). Igbos were 
further urged to stop harping on "the golden age which they never had" and learn 
to share with other Nigerians instead of monopolising public offices and trade for 
themselves (Federal Ministry of Information 1967a). 
In radical contrast to the federal view, Biafran sympathisers argued that 
secession was the only alternative to the prospect of being killed in a Northern-
sponsored ethnic-cleansing mission disguised as a one-Nigeria nationalist project. 
As Nwankwo puts it, it did not matter whether Biafrans supported or rejected the 
notion of a unitary Nigerian destiny since they had always-already been singled 
out for extermination: "You were qualified for death so long as you were a 
Biafran" (1969: 270). 
Officially, allegations of genocide were rejected in reports submitted by a 
team of observers from the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity 
(OAU), as well as representatives from countries like Britain, Poland, Sweden and 
the United States. Nwankwo, however, disputes the findings, arguing that the 
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delegates had been hoodwinked by scenes staged specifically for their benefit 
(such as Nigerian soldiers feeding and acting kindly towards Biafran civilians). 
Contrary to the official line which proclaimed that there was neither victor nor 
vanquished in a war of brothers, Okafor holds that "the war had a definite victor 
[North] and an acknowledged vanquished [East]" (1998: 38). The vanquished 
continued to be punished. First there was the voiding of the Biafran currency 
which made paupers of most Biafrans. Then there was the deliberate economic 
and developmental neglect of certain Biafran territories and the systematic 
political and economic dispossession of Easterners through official policies such 
as the Indigenisation Decree and the Abandoned Properties Decree. 11 Most 
significant of all, the war had deepened the wedge between Y orubas arid Igbos 
(who felt betrayed by the Yorubas' non-support of its Biafran cause) and 
entrenched Northern hegemony. 
11 The Igboezue Cultural Association claimed that Igbos have been unfairly sidelined from 
occupying important ministerial positions in Defence, Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Works and 
Housing, Mines and Power, Transport [and Water] Resources. They further charged that "for over 
100 years of the existence of [the] Board of Customs and Excise, no Igbo person has been 
considered qualified to head the strategic parastatal" (Eguzozie 1999). 
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Malaysia 
Anus Horribilis 
In keeping with the tradition we have set for ourselves in the previous section, let 
us begin our analysis of the politics of nationhood in Malaysia with an impolite 
joke which nevertheless captures the country's prevailing political climate. The 
joke goes like this: one day, a medical student went to the morgue after class to 
get a little forensic practice before a final examination. There he proceeded to the 
table where a body was lying face down, removed the sheet covering the cadaver, 
and found to his surprise a cork stuck up the corpse's anus. The student pulled out 
the cork and to his amazement, music and the repetitive chant "Hidup Mahathir!" 
('Long Live Mahathir!' Mohamad, the Prime Minister) rang out from its anus. 
The student replaced the cork and the music and chant stopped. Intrigued, the 
student called out to his professor who is standing nearby, saying "Look at the 
corpse. This is really something! Apa macam?" (Colloquial Malay for 'What do 
you reckon?') He pulled the cork back out again. Instantly "Hidup Mahathir" rang 
out. "So what?", the professor replied, unimpressed with the student's discovery. 
"But isn't that the most amazing thing you've ever seen?" the student asked. "Are 
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you kidding?" replied the professor. "Any asshole can sing praises for 
Maha thir''. 12 
If the above humour comes across as scathing in its appraisal of Mahathir, 
it is because there is much to be scathing about. From his critics' standpoint, 
Malaysian politics has become increasingly corrupt - or to extend the rectal 
imagery - 'full of shit'. So voluptuously excremental that it inspired Shahnon 
Ahmad (a well-known Malay writer and more recently politician) to lampoon the 
Prime Minister and his elite cronies as pieces of excreta in his political novel Shit 
@ Pukimak @ PM (1999). Artistic merits aside, the genre-defying novel is 
interesting because it does what is rarely done in Malaysia: to openly criticise the 
Prime Minister and in such scathing terms at that. 13 Set mainly in the large 
intestines, Shit has as its antagonists a hardening tyrant of a kepala taik ('unholy 
leader') named PM14 (also known as PukiMak15) who refuses to purge himself 
and his coalition-of-shit (Barisan Nasional, the ruling coalition) from Malaysia's 
bowels. PM has no qualms in promoting the stink of the excrescence that is 
himself as a progressive "new culture" (Shahnon Ahmad 1999: v). Neither is he 
12 Adapted from a joke posted on the Democratic Action Party of Malaysia (DAP) internet 
discussion list by a regular contributor Michael Fong on 28 January 2000. Access DAP website at 
http: //www.malaysia.net/dap. 
13 Virginia Hooker notes that it was and still is considered improper in traditional Malay society to 
openly criticise one's superior. The preferred way of resolving disputes is to avoid bringing the 
conflict to public notice. "It is a measure of the people's desperation that they decide to engage in 
... open confrontation" (Hooker 2000: 335). 
14 The initials 'PM' is derived from Pukimak although it alludes primarily to 'Perdana Menteri' or 
Prime Minister, in English. 
15 A Malay swear-word, 'Pukimak' literally means 'mother's cunt'. 
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disinclined to banish those who dare question the ethics of his iron-fisted rule, as 
the protagonist Wirawan 16 (Anwar Ibrahim, the sacked Deputy Prime Minister 
and accused sodomite) discovers when he is rudely expelled from the intestines 
for not 'playing along'. Cleansed by rain water and subsequently installed as the 
nation-people's new hero, Wirawan lives his life on the outside fighting for a 
disciplined regulation of political bowels. His strategy is disarmingly simple: no 
real exertion on the part of the people is necessary; all they have to do is wait for 
the foulness in the intestines to purge itself as it necessarily must since "world 
history has proven that falsity will always be destroyed and replaced by truth" 
(Shahnon Ahmad 1999: vi). True enough, PM - at the height of his pregnant 
foulness - self-ejects to the deafening roar of the jubilant nation-peoples. 
Shit closes with the dawn of a new era of beauty and justice. In contrast, 
events following Malaysia's 1999 general election clearly demonstrate that beauty 
and justice do not fall from the sky or come laden in a fairy ship (to borrow 
Achebe's metaphor), and that they actually have to be worked for and unceasingly 
def ended. In 1999, the Mahathir regime was returned to power after securing two-
thirds parliamentary majority, Anwar Ibrahim was put behind bars after a 
16 
'Wirawan' comes from the stem wira ('warrior'). The name also alludes to Anwar Ibrahim, the 
disgraced and sacked Deputy Prime Minister who was accused of sodomy and became the symbol 
of the Reformasi (reformation) movement, a loose anti-Mahathir grouping consisting of 
Pergerakan KeADILan Sosial (Social Justice Movement or ADIL), led by Anwar's wife Wan 
Azizah, and supporters from various NGOs and political parties including DAP and PAS. 
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scandalous show-trial, and Shahnon Ahmad's excrement-free utopia remains 
stuck in fictional space, untranslated into reality. 
The Mahathir regime has denied all charges of ethical perversion levelled 
against it. It maintains that the judiciary and the parliament have not been 
rendered subservient to arbitrary executive power (International Bar Association 
2000). Likewise the non-debatable privileged position of Malays as bu,niputras 
('sons of the soil', 'original inhabitants') of the country is not institutionalised 
racism, political domination over country's ethnic minorities or a ploy to create a 
breed of elites who have since "effectively cornered economic planning and 
decision-making to enrich themselves while paying lip-service to poverty 
eradication" (Mehmet 1986: Preface). Malaysians should not doubt that Malaysia 
is a secular Islamic nation even though the term is oxymoronic and the 
constitution clearly defines it as secular (Lim 2001). 17 Dhimmis (non-Muslims) 
need not be unduly worried that their religious freedom is being eroded even 
though more than thirty Indian temples in the state of Selangor have recently been 
identified for demolition because "We do not want temples mushrooming" 
(Mohamad Khir Toyo, in Perumal 2001). 
17 Lim Kit Siang clears up what is effectively an artificially-created confusion: The first Prime 
Minister and Bapa Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who held office for 15 years as head of 
government, two years as Chief Minister 1955-1957 and thirteen years as Prime Minister, 1957-
1960, never saw Malaysia as an Islamic State. If he had, he would not have made the following 
declaration in parliament soon after independence: "I would like to make clear that this country is 
not an Islamic State as it is generally understood, we merely provided that Islam shall be the 
official religion of the State" (Hansard 1 May 1958, in Lim 2001). 
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Similarly, human rights in Malaysia have not been reduced "to a namesake 
directly confronting the rule of law" (Rais Y atim, in Lim 1998: 9). According to 
Mahathir, human rights are not just about political dissent. Citizens cannot be 
allowed to express dissenting views at the expense of political stability, economic 
development and the livelihood of the innocent. That is why, as explained in a 
booklet published by the Information Ministry's Special Affairs Department, 
citizens must at all times deal with the government only by "informing and 
advising with gentle words" (Loone 2001). This is because Prophet Mohammad 
had allegedly taught his followers that "whosoever wishes to advise the 
authorities about a matter should not do it directly, but should instead hold the 
person's hand and give the advice privately. If the advice is accepted, that is a 
good thing, but if it is not accepted, the adviser is considered to have carried out 
his responsibilities" (Loone 2001). For the aforementioned reasons, Malaysian 
who travel, study or reside abroad should not criticise the government so as to 
avoid having their passports impounded upon their retum. 18 
Mahathir has untiringly insisted that "democracy has been successfully 
practised" in Malaysia because "Malaysians, Malaysian politicians and Malaysian 
political parties know how to use this democratic system" (1998a). Many 
18 In recent times, seventy-eight citizens have reportedly been "banned from going abroad for 
having tarnished Malaysia 's image on previous trips" (Tong 2001a). 
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scholars, however, beg to differ. 19 Malaysia does have such conventional markers 
of democratic as the institution of parliament and regular elections. However, the 
presence of these features does not suggest the threshold of democracy has been 
reached. Besides, "democratic and authoritarian characteristics . . . do not 
necessarily contradict each other but can often be mutually supporting" (Crouch 
1996: 5). An authoritarian regime can conduct free elections in such a way that it 
would never lose. It may restrict political competition, manipulate the media, and 
legalise arbitrary arrests and detention without trial. It may also use Islam to give 
its opposition containment strategies the appearance of divine necessity. 20 
Internationally, Mahathir is regarded by many as the chief architect of 
Malaysia's oppressive political culture. As John Funston notes, even though 
authoritarianism pre-dates Mahathir, Mahathir is the one who has "carried the 
process forward substantially" (Funston 2001: 192). He has amended the 
constitution and added to it a collection of laws which enhances executive power 
and reduces individual rights. For successive years the Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ) has put Mahathir on its 'Enemies of the Press' list which 
features the likes of Robert Mugabe and Jiang Zemin, describing him as "openly 
contemptuous of press freedom" and "notoriously thin-skinned" when exposed by 
19 See Wong (1995), Munro-Kua (1996), Syed Faris Alatas (1997), Crouch (1996), and Gomez 
(1999). 
20 See, for example, Astora Jabat's essay ' ISA Menurut Rasulullah ' ('The Internal Security Act, 
according to God ') in which the draconian Internal Security Act (which allows for arbitrary arrest 
and detention without trial) is justified as Islamic by referring to the Quran (2001 ). 
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foreign media which he "regularly demonizes" (CPJ 2001). In all fairness, one has 
to concede that Mahathir is not the barefaced despot that Nigeria's Sani Abacha 
was. Coincidentally or otherwise, in the time Mahathir has been in power, 
Malaysia has experienced some remarkable economic growth and infrastructural 
development. When he unexpectedly resigned from all official positions in July 
2002, the general public was even reported to have expressed overwhelming 
sadness and reluctance to let him go. "It is sad Dr Mahathir is resigning, because 
if it were not for him, the country would not have achieved so much", an eighteen 
year-old college student from Sepang was quoted to have said in a media 
interview (Malay Mail, 26 June 2002). Another interviewee even said, without 
irony, that "We are not ready to go as we still need him to fight for our rights." 
If it is true, as Mahathir reasons, that "we can live in comfort, we can work 
and earn a living from our toil" (Mahathir Mohamad 1998), what then have 
Malaysians to complain about? Are they not at least obliged to "obey and listen to 
the government whether [they like] it or not, as long as [they are] not asked to do 
evil", as the aforementioned government booklet advises (Loone 2001)? To the 
informed observer, the above questions might seem overly naive. But it should be 
remembered that Malaysians who have been deeply "socialised ... to accept and 
even appreciate authoritarian rule, norms and institutions" (Gomez and Jomo 
1999: 4) do not always recognise the reality of their oppression, just as the 
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"experience of subordination does not guarantee that the subordinated social agent 
will develop a radical perspective vis-a-vis her subjection" (Smith 1998a: 8). 
Conceivably, some Malaysians would genuinely be unable to understand 
how they might be seen as oppressed (in the same way that the proverbial ' stupid' 
native cannot integrate into his belief system the 'impossible' fact that white men 
in colonial metropolitan centres actually work as manual labourers, the traditional 
occupation of lowly races). The majority, however, tends to misrecognise the 
reality of things in the Lacanian sense of the term. As illustration, although ethnic 
minorities in Malaysia know that the Law recognises them as full-fledged citizens 
but effectively treats them like an inconvenient leftover of colonialism, they 
continue to act in their daily lives as if they do not know, as if the playing field is 
not tilted against them by virtue of their 'race', and as if they are the surplus 
population of the country. By contrast, there is what Maniam calls a "new 
diaspora", a small minority of men and women dispersed among various cultural 
communities, all living "within a common mental and imaginative space" (1997: 
22-3). Members of the new diaspora are "insiders and outsiders at the same time; 
they know that they are conditioned by their individual cultures but at the same 
time they will not [allow] themselves to be circumscribed by them." They are not 
only cognisant of the falsity of the Malaysian fantasy of peaceful coexistence, but 
are also prepared to expose it as "a gift of shit" (Lacan 1998: 268). As will be 
explained further in Chapter 7, they seek to radicalise the Malaysian way of life 
81 
(by repoliticising normalised racial identities and sedimented sociosymbolic 
practices) and hegemonise a new national imaginary which is "less dominated by 
race and religion but by issues of justice, freedom, democracy and good 
governance" (Lim 1999b). 
Malaysians seeking to traverse the national fantasy are invariably branded 
by the government as extremists, puppets of the west, terrorists and/or internal 
traitors envious of Malaysia's Nation-Thing. To paraphrase the Prime Minister, 
'they' are resentful of the peace, development and safety in the country and its 
ability to defend itself from attacks by foreigners (Tan 2001). 'They' have even 
been targeted in a special government campaign called the 'Seven M Operations' 
which was launched in 1999 to eradicate the 'seven deadly sins' (slander, lie, 
hate, scold, cast bad impression on others, incite hate, swear) of its critics. 
Uncannily, even when we know full well that it is absurd to regard all who 
criticise the government as enemies of the nation, we still sometimes experience 
irrational guilt for identifying with 'their' cause. There is always the 'good 
citizen' side of us that shies away from doing anything that will make us appear 
as troublemakers in the critical gaze of the Authorities. This unfortunately is 
generally true of Malaysian society which has historically proven to be politically 
docile and apathetic in comparison to its Nigerian counterpart. Despite wanting 
political change, Malaysians in general are not inclined to rock the boat too much, 
as Maniam too concedes (Lim 1999a). They are fearful of being targets of regime 
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crackdown, and of turning the country into "a second Afghanistan" (Mahathir 
Mohamad, in Tan 2001) or another Indonesia where lives and livelihood have 
been destroyed by runaway political passions. That the people should suffer 
irrational guilt and fear, and unconsciously censor themselves from contemplating 
emancipatory political alternatives also has much to do with how they are 
constantly reminded through the media of the horrors that would certainly be 
unleashed if the ruling coalition were no longer the government of the day. Still, 
this does not mean they do not 'enjoy' their fantasy that 'everything is OK' even 
though they are, in actual fact, oppressed. 
It is in this context that Maniam is located as a writer who concerns 
himself not only with articulations of competing nationhood ideals and their 
impact on social relations in Malaysia, but also with the repoliticisation of these 
sedimented relations. However, as will be made clear in Chapters 6 and 7, 
although the political big picture weighs heavily on Maniam's thoughts, he does 
not directly knock against the larger forces in the way Shahnon Ahmad does in 
Shit @ Pukimak @ PM. His prime focus is the small picture, that is, insignificant 
individuals striving to make something of themselves, yearning to belong but 
constantly reminded of their alienness and relative insignificance in the Malay 
scheme of things. In Maniam' s words: 
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I'm preoccupied with the question of whether you belong or don't 
belong. Why as a writer I'm so preoccupied with that is because 
everywhere you turn they ostracise you. They say you're a nobody. 
So, you have to find out why you're a nobody and how you can 
become a somebody. Or the forces that have made you a nobody. 
(Lim 1999a) 
Before the Beginning 
In Malaysia the issue of 'race' is as thorny as 'tribe' is in Nigeria. More than four 
decades after independence was declared, race continues to divide the nation, the 
core from the surplus population, Malays from non-Malays. The division is by no 
means natural. Although the ruling regime sporadically stresses the importance of 
creating Bangsa Malaysia ('the Malaysian people') which transcends race and 
religion, it has also actively acerbated racial antagonisms, albeit not to the point 
where they become unmanageable. As a Chinese Malaysian parliamentarian 
explains in his "boiling kettle theory", Malay leaders from UMNO (the 
hegemonic Malay-Islamic party in the ruling coalition) are skilful enough to know 
"precisely when and how much to lift the 'lid' in order to keep Chinese 
resentment from boiling over" (Case 1995: 350). That the regime should 
perpetuate the biological notion of race is hardly surprising, considering how the 
legitimacy of Malay dominance literally hinges on the perpetuation of a sharp 
racial distinction in the country. That, including what we have touched on so far 
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and more, is nicely captured in the poem by Cecil Rajendra which Malay 
organisations have denounced as inflammatory, seditious, anti-Malay and anti-
Islam (Tong 2001b): 
Kingdom of Purplaya 
The Kingdom of Purplaya 
is located somewhere in Asia 
slightly north of the Equator. 
Its people are of mixed origins: 
some Indonesians, some Chinese 
some Indians, some Portuguese ... 
Most Purplayans were immigrants 
from the neighbouring countries; 
only a handful are pure indigenes 
who live up in the mountains 
and are hunters & fruit gatherers 
but not land-owners - just tenants. 
These natives - true sons of the soil -
have been made marginal 
by usurpers who stole their mantle 
claiming that they are the original 
god-chosen people of Purplaya and all 
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others, including indigenes, are mere aliens. 
To ensure their privileges in perpetuity 
this 'purple' bunch of pretenders 
(With aid of their colonial masters) 
drew up a farcical Constitution 
which ensured that King & President 
would always be of their persuasion. 
They implemented a quota system 
to reserve places for their children 
in school, college & university; 
stuffed ranks of Police & Anny 
with officers of their nomination 
to protect their pockets & property; 
and legislated that any question 
of their special powers & position 
would invite a charge of treason. 
These self-anointed 'purple people' 
now enjoy licences unlimited 
for they are the only ones free 
to libel enemies in their papers 
burn effigies on street-corners 
while other citizens of the country 
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face torture & imprisonment 
if they criticise the government 
or organise any kind of rally 
Still, this apartheid autocracy 
- the world's last bastion 
of institutionalised racism -
harbours pretensions extraordinary 
and lays claim to be 
the only true surviving democracy! (Rajendra 2001) 
To understand how Malaysia became an "apartheid autocracy", let us now 
trace the history of the land and its peoples. The story of Malaysia normally 
begins with Melaka, a sultanate state founded in 1400 by Paramesvara, a refugee 
prince from Palembang. Situated where the state of Melaka is today, the sultanate 
with China as its overlord quickly rose to fame and prosperity as a cosmopolitan 
entrepot state in the fifteenth century. The spread of Islam to the region and its 
adoption as the state religion during the reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1446-
1459) further enhanced its power and prestige. Melaka lasted about a hundred 
years before it was invaded and captured by the Portuguese in 1511. It was not 
until 1957, after going through the hands of British and Japanese and British 
forces, that Melaka and the other states in Malaysia re-found independence. 
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The centuries before Melaka's founding are generally treated as relatively 
unimportant in the historical evolution of modem Malaysia. According to Andaya 
and Andaya (2001 ), the reasons for that are usually attributed to difficulties in 
reconstructing the pre-l 400s. Tangible evidence of pre-Melaka is hard to come 
by. Sources are often opaque or fragmented. Furthermore evidence decay rapidly 
in a tropical climate. These are not unreasonable reasons but there is a little more 
to it than that. In both Malay nationalist discourse and the popularly-consumed 
state-sanctioned version of Malaysian history, the lack of emphasis accorded to 
the pre-Melakan period has also to do with the fact that before Melaka there was 
not a void but the pre-Islamic era, a time when societies in the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago were held sway by Hindu-Buddhist culture or "the irrational, non-
scientific and fairy-tale ideas", according to Shahnon Ahmad (Solehah Ishak 
1998: 83). 
It is played down by the state21 but not unwritten in history books that 
before Islam was brought to Melaka (in the first half of the fifteenth century by 
Indian-Muslim traders), the region was predominantly Hindu-Buddhist in 
character. Archaeological investigations and Chinese imperial chronicles show 
that Indianised kingdoms were already firmly established in many parts of 
21 In his cogent study 'The Construction of the Post-Colonial Subject in Malaysia' , C.W. Watson 
identifies the "accepted" version of Malaysian history as "the dominant discourse articulated 
throughout the system and given voice in the hegemonic institutions of Malaysia: the media, the 
education system and the party machines of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition of parties" 
(Watson 1996: 306). 
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southeast Asia by the middle of the eighth century. These include estuarine 
settlements facing the Straits of Melaka. Andaya and Andaya underline that the 
kingdoms which existed then were not mere trading posts but states which stood 
in a tradition of government (2001: 23). Excavations in thirty local sites have 
provided strong evidence of a thriving economy based in Kedah ( a northern state 
in Malaysia) in as early as the fourth century. A grander example is the kingdom 
of Srivijaya which existed between the late seventh century and the late thirteenth 
century. Located in Palembang, Srivijaya was one of the wealthiest and most 
prestigious of the early harbour ports. The "uncontested master of the Straits", 
Srivijaya was renowned across the world not only as a cultured maritime kingdom 
but also as "a centre of knowledge that could hold its own against far older 
kingdoms". The Andayas write: 
Perhaps the greatest indication of the respect given to scholarship 
in Srivijaya was the strength of religion. When the Chinese pilgrim 
Yiqing went there in 671 he found a community of over 1000 
Buddhist monks, and in his own writings he commended the city 
as a place to study the Buddhist scriptures. With the wealth 
brought in by trade, Srivijayan rulers could sponsor religious 
studies and maintain religious foundations. One maharaja endowed 
a Taoist temple in Canton while another rebuilt a Buddhist 
sanctuary in India's great pilgrimage centre of N alanda. Although 
the nature of Buddhism in Srivijaya is not totally clear, several 
schools, including Tantrism, coexisted. When the history of 
Buddhism in the archipelago is understood more fully, Srivijaya 
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may assume even more importance as a dissemination point for 
religious ideas. (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 27) 
Following Srivijaya's decline, Melaka rose to prominence in the fifteenth 
century by following many of the traditions set by its predecessor. China was 
courted for its protection, commercial facilities were made attractive to lure 
traders away from rival ports, security was given a high priority, and the legal-
administrative machinery was kept efficient. The structure of government too was 
borrowed from Srivijaya. Melaka's dynastic rulers stood at the apex of society 
and at the centre of all meaningful activities. They also positioned themselves as 
sacred descendents of Palembang royalty which mythically sprung from the line 
of Alexander the Great. 
In Malay nationalist discourse, Melaka' s adoption of Islam in the fifteenth 
century is regarded as the main contribution to the evolution of Malay culture. 
The pattern of government and the particular lifestyle it established are taken as 
the foundations of traditional Malay culture and statecraft (Andaya and Andaya 
2001: 39). In the eyes of these nationalists, Melaka is the honoured fount of 
Malay historical memory. The kingdom's founding is also taken to mark the zero-
level of Malaysia's beginning which revolves around the Malay subject as the 
privileged agent of history. This Malay-centric interpretation of history has not 
gone uncontested. Andaya and Andaya argue that the early centuries before 
90 
Melaka were not "merely a prelude to the great Malay power" (2001: 36-7) and 
that the "story of Malaysia does not ... begin at Melaka" (2001: 7). Melaka is 
only part of a constructed historical continuum, not the objective foundation 
which legitimises ketuanan Melayu ('Malay supremacy') in modem-day 
Malaysia. Read against the grain, the severance of early Melaka from what 
preceded it may be seen as a deliberate attempt to 'overlook' the past in its 
entirely - a past which, given full attention, threatens to unveil as false the claim 
that "the Malays are not just the pribumi or indigenous community but also the 
people to whom this country belongs" (Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, in Cheah 1996: 66). It is possibly for this reason that laws 
were passed in Malaysia to criminalise any debate on the political and moral 
legitimacy of the Malays' special status. 
In addition, it is crucial to note that historical evidence of the route by 
which Malays came to settle in pre-Melakan Malaya is far from conclusive. 
Malay nationalists would undoubtedly refute the theory that the first Malays 
originated from Yunnan in southern China rather than Sumatra in Indonesia. 
According to the theory, Proto-Malays made their way to Malaya and on to the 
islands beyond in a drawn-out series of migration between 2500 and 1500 BC. 
Upon arrival in Malaya, they "forced the original N egrito inhabitants back into 
the hills and jungles" (Ryan 1971: 3-4 ). Then from about 300 BC the second 
wave of Malay migration began. Also from Yunnan, the second batch of migrants 
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known as Deutoro-Malays arrived in Malaya, "overcame the Proto-Malays and 
pushed them inland where they remained and are known today as Jakun" (1971: 
4). The early Malays were animists but were later influenced by the Hindu-
Buddhist culture which Indian traders and voyagers brought to the region. Among 
other sources, Chinese chronicles show that by the middle of the eighth century 
Indian culture had become dominant in the region. By the fourteenth century 
Malaya had "absorbed much of the civilisation of India" (1971: 13). Paramesvara, 
the founder of Melaka, is even believed to be a Mahayanist Buddhist who 
practised a form of Buddhism which bore Tantric and Hindu influences. "Recent 
research indicates he never converted to Islam; this apostasy was performed by 
his grandson" (Dumarcay and Smithies 1998: 9). 
The influence of Indian culture on Malay culture is generally played 
down, if not altogether repudiated in Malay nationalist discourse. In 1919, 
Windstedt, a well-known educationist and author of Malay culture and traditions, 
was severely criticised for putting forward the theory that "Malay culture had its 
origin in India and that even Islam came to the peninsula via India" (Khoo 1993: 
271). A certain Muhammad Al-Johari had written in to Pengasuh (a publication 
of the Kelantan Religious Council), countering that any similarity between Indian 
and Malay cultures would be coincidental and that Arabs from Hadramaut were 
more likely the ones who brought Islam to Malaya. That incident, according to 
historian Khoo Kay Kim, was "practically the beginning of conscious attempts to 
92 
deny that Malay culture had borrowed heavily from [Hindu-]Indian culture" 
(1993: 271). 
Surplus Population 
From the late nineteenth century until the 1930s, colonial Britain had actively 
encouraged mass migration from China and India to Malaya to supply labour 
demands in the booming tin-mining and rubber plantation sectors. Some migrants 
responded with the hope of finding a better life. Others took it as an opportunity 
to flee from political oppression in their homeland. Almost all migrants arrived 
poor, but there were crucial differences between the Chinese and Indians. The 
Chinese mostly arrived as free rather than indentured labourers. This meant that 
they were freer to move in and out of the different sectors of the economy. Over a 
generation or two, their mobility had helped them fare better economically, and 
for some to move into the middle and upper strata of colonial society (Muzaffar 
1993: 213). Still, only a small minority had truly made it economically. Many 
who failed were said to have "developed a defeatist and fatalistic attitude" and 
opted to remain overseas to "let their lives fade away rather than lose face in front 
of relatives and kinsmen in their home villages" (Yen 1986: 8). By the late 1960s, 
a select few Chinese individuals had come to hold thirty-four percent of the 
nation's equities. (Foreign interests held more than sixty-percent of the wealth 
while Malays held about four percent.) This reinforced the racial fantasy that all 
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Chinese were wealthy (and dangerously deceptive if ever they declared 
themselves poor) and therefore "opportunistic" and "avaricious" (Rabushka 1973: 
64). In reality Chinese mean income in 1970 was "still considered destitute as 
compared to other developed countries. The striking difference between the races 
was that one was more destitute than the others were" (Boo 1998: 32). 
By contrast, Indian migrants who arrived in Malaya were crippled from 
the outset. They were a captive labour force ripe for exploitation by colonial 
capitalism, effectively slaves or "objects of contempt and ridicule" who had to 
"cringe and crawl before the others" (Muzaffar 1993: 215). To add to their woes, 
they were indoctrinated to remain subservient within the kangany ('foreman') 
system of plantation management. Within the system, the kangany who is usually 
a labourer of a higher caste acted not only as a link between India and the 
labourers' new world but also as "something of a father figure" and an enforcer of 
social discipline (Arasaratnam 1993: 194). 
The entire plantation system had in fact trapped workers and their families 
in a life that held little hope of upward socioeconomic mobility. Wages were kept 
at the barest minimum and working conditions were harsh in the malaria-infested 
plantation zone, popularly seen as "a death trap yawning to engulf the surplus 
population of India" (Sandhu 1993: 153). In general, Indian labourers were 
undernourished, the mortality rate was high, and social problems like domestic 
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violence, crime, alcoholism and destitution in old age were rampant. Even formal 
education, the standard escape route from poverty, failed to make any significant 
impact. Instead of imparting meaningful skills, Tamil-medium plantation schools 
only prepared students for manual jobs, which were in line with their role as "an 
agent of social control and meeting the manpower needs of the plantation 
economy" (Marimuthu 1993: 465). 
The oppression of the Indian community in Malaysia maimed not only the 
migrant generation but also successive ones. Today the Indian community 
remains one of the most marginalised ethnic groups in the country. Its members 
constitute the lowest strata of Malaysian society and are negatively stereotyped as 
toddy-drinking habitual liars who are furthermore great pretenders lacking in 
personal cleanliness and susceptible to melodrama (Khoo 1993: 279). Perhaps the 
only thing more unfortunate than the community's misfortune is the prevalent 
belief that its lowly status is the result of predestination when it is largely the 
result of long-term oppression and neglect (Ramasamy 1984). 
Malay-in-itself 
Like Indians and Chinese, Malays too have had to grapple with European 
modernity which colonialism ushered in. According to Mahathir in his polemical 
book The Malay Dilemma, Malays were especially ill-prepared for the turbulence 
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of modernisation and social change because they had been over-accustomed to an 
idyllic existence in the precolonial land of plenty where in-breeding and 
polygamy were commonplace. At any rate, he says, 
the hot, humid climate of the land was not conducive to either 
vigorous work or even to mental activity. Thus, except for a few, 
people were content to spend their unlimited leisure in merely 
resting or in extensive conversation with neighbours and friends. 
(1970: 21-2) 
Ill-prepared and unable to compete, Malays were said to have had to 
"retreat before the onslaught of the Chinese immigrants" (Mahathir Mohamad 
1970: 25). Being strong and resourceful, the latter had upon their arrival in 
Malaya "destroyed the self-reliance of Malays in craftsmanship, skilled work and 
business" (1970: 27). (Curious little is made of Indian immigrants - something 
which perhaps points to their relative insignificance in the political scheme of 
things.) The textbook fear and loathing of the Other which Mahathir's writing 
demonstrates is and was not uncommon among Malay-centric Malays. Like 
Mohd. Eunos Abdullah, Abdullah Rahim Kajai and other early Malay ideologists 
who harangued Malays to remember their race and make it great and powerful, 
they tend to paint themselves as victims and blame the Chinese for having 
"successfully sucked" their racial life-blood (Milner 1998: 156, 161; see also Lee 
1965b: 58). The ultra battle-cry can be heard as loudly today, as attested by the 
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following (translated) poem which Mahathir, "choked with emotion [and] almost 
in tears" (2001 ), recited at an UMNO summit in Kuala Lumpur: 
Melayu Mudah Lupa ('Malays Forget Easily') 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
That their race was oppressed 
Malays forget easily 
That their race was divided 
Malays forget easily 
That their race used to be screaming/shouting 
Malays forget easily 
That their race used to be ignorant/idiots 
Malays forget easily 
That their race was second-class 
Malays forget easily 
That their race was looked down upon 
Malays forget easily 
That their race used to be in disputes 
Malays forget easily 
That their race suffered 
Malays forget easily 
That their race was belittled 
Malays forget easily 
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That their race was isolated 
with no sovereignty, no honour, no freedom 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
Malays forget easily 
The history of their sleeping race 
And their dry and bleeding land 
Remember, remember my race 
Not to forget easily again 
For your struggles are not over yet. (2001) 
However much one disagrees with the Prime Minister's belief that tropical 
climate encourages lotus-eating and low mental activity, and that Malays forget 
easily, one simply cannot deny that Malays had been gravely wronged. As is well 
known, Britain's colonial policies deliberately sought to keep rural Malays docile 
and backward. Higher education was made available only to sons of Malay 
aristocrats and royalty so that they could later be absorbed into the Malay 
Administrative Service. The rest had had to contend with training that only went 
so far as to improve their lot as agriculturalists (Cheah 1996: 45). The most 
significant contributing factor to the Malay dilemma, however, is rarely raised in 
everyday discourse in Malaysia. In his study on the ontological foundations of 
pre-colonial Malay polity, Anthony Milner (1995) posits that much of the 
problem is rooted in the customary pacification and socialisation of ordinary 
Malays by their elites into being 'good Malays', "always unobtrusive and self-
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effacing" by Mahathir's definition (1970: 160). Drawing from the journals of 
Munshi Abdullah, a well-known early nineteenth-century Malay translator and 
language teacher, Milner underlines that 
the main reason for the Malay situation ... is the 'tyranny and 
injustice of the government of the rajas, especially towards their 
own subjects.' Abdullah declares he would never wish to settle in 
the Malay territories which lay beyond the British settlements: 'To 
live close to a raj a is like making friends with a poisonous snake.' 
(1995: 15) 
Malay common subjects were ruled by autocratic feudal laws which 
discouraged any kind of change. They were prohibited from acquiring a private 
identity, knowledge and property, or even lifting their heads and enjoying 
themselves. According to Abdullah, the ruler's authority was so absolute that it 
allowed him to humiliate his subjects "as though he thought of them as animals" 
(Milner 1995: 19). Few had dared to challenge the ruler's power because he was 
seen as Dzil Allah fil'alam, "the shadow of Allah on earth" (Tham 1981 b: 254). 
Those who "dared to act contrary to the customs and beliefs traditionally 
associated with Malay life and institutions" were punishable by the daulat 
('magical powers') the ruler was believed to exude.22 
22 Daulat is an Arabic expression of the Hindu concept of God's sakti which the Srivijayan court 
may have invoked and propagated to ward off acts of derhaka ('treason against the ruler') by the 
ruler's subjects (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 27). 
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Apart from highlighting the today-forgotten fact that Malays have 
traditionally been oppressed by their leaders, Munshi Abdullah's journals also 
reveal a disparity between the notion of Malayness during his time and 
contemporary conception which retroactively posits early Melaka sultanate as the 
country's golden lost origin. 23 According to Milner (1995), what foreigners 
perceived as elements of unity (religion, language, literature, clothing, legal 
system, political culture) in the early nineteenth century were "more obvious to 
outsiders than to Malays themselves." Malays then identified themselves not as 
Malays but as subjects of their ruler and members of their dialect group, e.g. 
Javanese, Sumatran, Rawa, Achenese, Minangkabau, Bugis and so on (Shamsul 
1998: 137). It was only when western racial discourse seeped into the writings of 
Malay ideologues via colonialism that Bangsa Melayu ('the Malay race') was 
invented and gradually became a formal social category in Malay thought 
(Watson 1996: 311).24 Radical Malay nationalists once defined 'Malay' to include 
Indonesians. The Malaysian Constitution subsequently narrowed it to designate a 
Malaysian-born individual who "professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks 
Malay, and conforms to Malay custom" (1998: 162). As it stands today, those 
persons of the Malay race who, for whatever reason, do not profess the religion of 
23 Malay polities and their royal palaces were not as noble and dignified as commonly believed. 
Munshi Abdullah noted, for example, that the walls of the royal dwelling of the ruler of 
Trengganu (a Malay state in Peninsula Malaysia) were "covered with dirt, spittle, betel juice and 
moss" (Milner 1995: 14). Housing for commoners was even more shabby. In Pahang (another 
Malay state) "piles of rubbish under them emitted a foul odour which 'filled one's nose" ' (1995: 
14-15). 
24 In precolonial times, ethnic orientation could be discarded and acquired with ease by altering 
one's customs, language and attire (Milner 1998: 159). 
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Islam (for instance, a Malay who converts out of Islam) is considered to have 
automatically forfeited his status as a Malay (Shaq Faruqi 2002). 
Because the above definition of 'Malay' is an ethnic rather than a racial 
definition (since there is no blood qualification), it should follow, as is in fact 
provided under Article 160 (2) of the Malaysian Constitution, that "Muslims of 
non-Malay races ... Arab, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, Siamese, Philippine and 
Kampuchean who speak Malay, observe Malay custom and have roots in the 
country by way of birth or descent can be deemed to be Malays" ( emphasis 
added, Shaq Faruqi 2002). Things in real life do not however work out quite so 
straightforwardly. An individual from an ethnic minority group may satisfy all the 
legal requirements and yet not be accepted as a 'real' Malay. Indian-Muslims are 
a case in point. Peranakan Chinese is another as example. Despite having 
absorbed Malay language, dressing and traditions into their culture, they are still 
"genetically" Other, writes Mohd. Taib Osman (1988: 128). Could the reason for 
this perhaps be attributed to the belief that one does not become Malay, one can 
only be Malay by birth. Could it perhaps be that his physical appearance, the way 
his racial markers ( skin tone, hair texture, body shape and so forth) deviate from 
the Malay 'norm'? If so, then would his marginalisation not be racially 
discriminatory? In any case, our main concern here is not simply that the subject 
is discriminated against because his racial markers give him away as 'non-Malay'. 
Recall, as we discussed previously, that what really 'irritates the shit' out of the 
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racist is not (limited to) the 'actual properties' of the object but obj et petit a, the 
uncanny spectral ' something more' in the Other which manifests itself in and 
through the Other's racial markers. Objet petit a functions as a fetish by means of 
which the racist is able to preserve his unproblematic identity and misrecognise 
the fact that, as 'pure Malay', he does not exist. K. Das explains: 
You scratch a Malay and you are likely to find anything from a 
Thai to a Turk, from a Makasarese to a Malayali underneath, or a 
bit of a Chinese or even a scrap of an Orang Putih [Caucasian]. 
Similarly you scratch a Chinese and the fellow who lies below the 
surface can be anyone from a Mongolian to a Malay. Or a 
Portuguese. And Penang [ one of the states in Malaysia] is full of 
Indians with Malay ( or is it Malay with Indian) blood thumping 
UMNO tables as vigorously as Dollah or Anwar or Daim or Kadir 
or Mahathir. (Das 1987: 18-19)25 
'Pure Malay' qua Malay-in-itself as discursively constructed by the likes 
of the Prime Minister is ultimately a fiction since it works only if its inherent 
impossibility is transposed into a prohibition. 'What I am not', in other words, 
must be turned into 'what I am prevented from fully becoming' by assigning to 
the Other (the West, internal traitors, sodomites, vampiric Chinese) the role of 
external blockage, as the ones always desiring to 'do us in'. Additionally, the 
Other as the embodiment of the non-existence of Malay-in-itself must not only 
25 What K. Das is insinuating here is the well-known belief that many Malays, including Mahathir 
himself, are actually 'tainted ' with Indian blood. 
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always remain delimited as radically Other, it must also be antagonised, baited 
and made to suffer pain - why? Recall that what is at stake in (institutionalised) 
racism is never just about political power and material wealth. At the bottom of it, 
there is the obscene surplus-enjoyment to which the racist is 'addicted' and which 
'washes over' him when he hentam ( a colloquial Malay-sian term for 'beat the 
shit' out of) his victim, be it physically, verbally, politically, etc. "The victim's 
pain has the weight of an ontological proof: it demonstrates that the [ racial] Other 
exists in the real, beyond symbolic fiction, in the fullness of his/her being" (Zizek 
1996a: 105). Just as importantly, it attests to the racist's (fantasy of his 
epiphenomena!) existence: 'I ( qua 'pure Malay' must) exist because the Other's 
existence in the real, its dependence upon my magnanimity for the alleviation of 
his/her pain which I caused, is proof that I exist.' 
(De )politicising Politics 
Perhaps it is this partiality for enjoyment that drives the ruling regime to 
continually antagonise ethnic minorities in Malaysia. Take, as case in point, the 
controversy surrounding the debate on the National Culture Policy in the 1980s. 
Then, in a Sadean rash of Malay cultural revivalism, the ruling regime declared 
that "Malay identity must be moulded and developed in all aspects of national 
culture. In this respect there should be no give-and-take" (Foreign Minister Tan 
Sri Ghazali Shafie, in Kua 1985: 18). Where other cultures were concerned, only 
103 
certain "suitable elements" may be included but they could only be seen as 
"adjuncts" to the central bumiputra component. Unsurprisingly, the policy which 
effectively amounted to culturocide caused a furore amongst the "new 
immigrants", a derogatory term that the now disgraced former Deputy Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim ( then the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport) had used 
in referring to non-Malay citizens of the country (Kua 1985: 18: 83). The position 
of those who objected to the move was succinctly put in a statement jointly issued 
by fifteen concerned Chinese organisations: 
It is fundamentally wrong to justify the policy using the 
Constitutional provision for the 'special position of the Malays'. 
That provision was included specially to safeguard the economic 
and religious position of the Malays and the position of the Rulers, 
NOT to be used as justification for cultural predominance over the 
other cultures. (Kua 1985: 84-5) 
Anwar Ibrahim responded to protests by assuring ethnic minorities that 
"the incorporation of Islamic values in the national culture was not to eclipse 
other cultures." To suppress other cultures, he said, "was like practising narrow 
nationalism, and such a practice was inconsistent with Islamic teachings" (Kua 
1985: 30). As a show of the regime's sincerity and good intentions, he 
subsequently announced that it was "willing to hold talks with anyone" - on the 
condition that the policy was not criticised. Criticisms, said Anwar, would be 
rejected because those who criticise (that is, 'politicise' the issue) "would only 
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cause a lot of misunderstanding" (1985: 46-8). 26 The view was echoed by other 
UMNO leaders, one of whom declared that those who questioned the 
implementation of the policy were "breaking the unity of the people" (1985: 22). 
The circumvention of debate and the branding of detractors as politicking 
troublemakers are two example of how racism and anti-democratic practices may 
work together to obscure the power relations operating behind the appearance of 
neutrality. Indeed, as Zizek underscores, "the basic aim of antidemocratic politics 
is and was depoliticization - that is, the unconditional demand that 'things should 
go back to normal', with each individual doing his or her particular job" (1999f: 
188). In Malaysia, strategic depolicitisation is regularly employed by the powers 
that be as a means to naturalise Malay supremacy and neutralise opposition. To 
illustrate this, we might recall an interesting propagandist film-clip which was 
heavily rotated on Malaysian television channels in the months leading up to the 
1999 general election. The film-clip, a high-budget animation reminiscent of Walt 
Disney's animated feature film Pocahontas, made its appearance at a time when 
Malaysia was in deep turmoil.27 Sponsored and 'dedicated' to all Malaysians, the 
film-clip depicts a happy crew of men and women in various shades of brown 
26 Under the Act of Sedition, discussions deemed "likely to arouse racial feelings and endanger 
racial peace in the country' ' are punishable by a fine and imprisonment (Morris-Hale 1996: 184). 
27 Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister long regarded as Mahathir's successor, had been 
ignominiously sacked, the Malay community was bitterly split between Mahathir and Anwar, and 
the reformasi movement was staging street demonstrations every week, demanding justice for 
Anwar and the reinstatement of democracy. 
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( denoting perhaps the different ethnic communities 1n Malaysia) breezing 
homeward on a ship built in the topographical shape of West Malaysia. In the 
midst of enjoying each other's convivial companionship, dark storm clouds 
suddenly gather in the distance and billow threateningly towards them. Alarmed 
but poised, they hurriedly prepare the ship for the most violent storm they have 
yet encountered. The storm hits. Crashing waves and howling winds slap the ship 
hither and thither. 'Water, water everywhere, but not a drop will we drink!', the 
determined look on their faces seem to speak. In response to their impudent 
defiance, a giant wave comes rolling in (in slow-motion for heightened dramatic 
effect). The wave effaces the ship. A long eerie silence ... then the ship breaks 
through. The crew roars with triumph and instantly it is blue skies again. The 
crew sails towards a safe harbour on some mystical paradise home-land to the 
cheer of weeping family and friends. And the classic finale: the 'star' crew-
members comprising loving, doe-eyed, brown-skinned husband, wife and child 
stand united and proud, eyes streaming tears of joy. The camera pans in on the 
beaming family, the glorious sun rises behind them, seagulls flutter peacefully 
across the screen. The End. 
The moral of the film-clip was clear enough even to mesmerised 
Malaysians who had never before seen such sophisticatedly-produced propaganda 
on Malaysian television: in these turbulent times when the country was facing one 
of its worst crisis since independence and when economies in the region were 
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allegedly being battered by George Soros, his Jewish associates and rogue 
currency traders, Malaysians of all races should show that they are 'true 
Malaysians' ( emulate the crew in their unwavering solidarity) by putting aside 
their 'petty' complaints against the government and by gathering behind it 
(instead of opposing it) so that, together, the country might emerge from the 
'storm' stronger and more prosperous than ever before. The other lesson of the 
film-clip was of course that western neo-imperialists and their Malaysian stooges 
were trying to steal the fruits of Malaysia's hard work and success. They were also 
responsible for the country's crisis, not the government. Unpatriotic critics should 
therefore stop barking up the wrong tree. 
It goes without saying that the film-clip which faithfully reproduced the 
regime's standard rhetoric28 during the crisis period was a 'naYve' falsification of 
reality, that it conveniently overlooked the "tens of thousands [ of multiethnic 
Malaysians who] took to the streets or cyberspace to criticize government 
leaders" (Funston 2001: 167), and that the projected peaceful system of different 
subject positions (Malaysians of all races living in perfect harmony) merely 
whitewashed the underlying interethnic tensions the regime had instigated (via the 
National Culture Policy, for instance). Transparent as the clip was, it was 
28 The same message was disseminated through other government campaigns, including yet 
another film-clip which featured a long footage of real-life scenes depicting the horrors of political 
upheavals (burning houses, women and children crying tears of anguish, and so forth). The clip 
ended with a plea to Malaysians that they did not to make the same mistake by voting for the 
opposition. 
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nonetheless successful in helping the regime win a new term in parliament - why? 
Imaginably, some would watch the film-clip, unreflexively identify with its 
interpellatory mandate and then proceed to act on it by gathering behind the 
regime. "See how literal they [the general population] have become?", Maniam 
laments when the issue was raised in an interview (Lim 1999a). "That's na1ve 
psychological exploitation. It works because that's the level at which we get 
people thinking in this country." 
Then there is a majority of practical solipsists who, although cynically 
cognisant of the ideological proposition's falsity, would not renounce it as such, 
thus perpetuating the power structures which oppress them. The refusal to act on 
the knowledge which the subject already possesses is precisely what Lacan means 
by misrecognition (meconnaissance). The subject misrecognises when he 
prevents himself from integrating into his belief system or from "knowing 
something that [he] knows or suspects but wants ( at some level) to repress" 
(Alcorn 1994: 34). This to a large extent explains why the majority of centrist 
voters in Malaysia tend to be swayed by a regime's fantasy of peaceful 
coexistence. It allows them to unconsciously identify with an ideal through which 
they might appear likeable to themselves ('decent, peace-loving folks'), as 
opposed to identification with an ideal which would, in the gaze of Authority, 
give them a bad conscience and negative self-image ('fanatical, peace-wrecking 
traitors of the nation'). 
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The above cynical mode of ideology's functioning is distinguishable from 
what Peter Sloterdijk calls kynicism, "a popular, plebeian rejection of the official 
culture by means of irony and sarcasm" (Zizek 1989: 29). To an extent, kynicism 
can be an effective mode of resistance. It embarrasses the regime by exposing its 
solemn ideological propositions as lies (albeit lies which the cynical subject at 
some level already recognises as lies). Often, however, the subversive potential of 
kynicism is already anticipated by the cynicism of the ruling culture. As 
illustration, an opposition party's unmasking of the government's lofty pre-
election promises as hollow and manipulative may not necessarily lead to the 
latter's undoing. If kynical detractors openly decry the film-clip as ideological 
manipulation, others especially the aforementioned centrist subjects would only 
be too glad to resist knowing, just as they would pretend to not see that some 
hapless person is being mugged on the street. The lesson here is that to obtain the 
desired response from the politically-wooed subject, the opposition must also take 
into account the jouissance to which the subject is passionately attached. It must 
take into account of the fact that the subject may resist identification with certain 
values and ideas (regardless of their truth-content) that threaten the stability of his 
identity. 
A way out of this deadlock may be found in social overidentification, as 
opposed to disidentification. Zizek explains that the latter mode is "what holds a 
community together" (1999f: 267). It delegates "the members' hatred or love to 
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another agent through whom they love or hate." When we express our love for our 
nation, for instance, we usually do it symbolically, through its agent, namely the 
government-as-institution. Whereas in overidentification, the subject will identify 
with the agent's avowed doctrine, party principles, etc., and take it so literally and 
zealously that the original intermediary agent cannot but appear as failing to live 
up to or as having betrayed what they preach. The subject as such hijacks the 
agent's discourse and turns him into the enemy of his own word. So, for example, 
instead of maintaining a cynical distance towards the official notion of Bangsa 
Malaysia, we should identify with it even more radically (for instance, by 
building a credible multiethnic oppositional force that will be strong enough to 
challenge the hegemonic bloc), to the point where the regime is 'humiliated' into 
honouring its word. Of course, overidentification can also work the other way and 
to catastrophic results. The long-standing rivalry between UMNO and PAS (Parti 
Islam Se-Malaysia) is a case in point. In attempting to win Malay support, both 
parties have tried to displace one another as the party with the real interest of 
Malays at heart. PAS leaders denounce UMNO as corrupt, and leaders from the 
latter party counter by calling them misguided religious extremists while, at the 
same time, intensifying its Islamisation policies so as not to lose the support of its 
Muslim constituents to PAS. PAS then charges that UMNO lacks commitment to 
the Islamic-Malay cause, an accusation which rarely fails to rouse UMNO into a 
further frenzy of political Islamisation. 
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Destination Bolehland 
UMNO "ultras" or leaders with "keen ethnic motivations" (Case 1995: 97) from 
as far back as independence have consistently taken the untenable position of 
denying that the policy of Malay dominance is about "casting anyone in an 
inferior position" (Abdullah Ahmad, in Das 1987: 162) and, at the same time, 
rejecting the creation of a Malaysia society that does not discriminate between 
Malaysians "as a matter of right" and Malaysians "as a matter of hospitality" (Lee 
1998: 624). According to Lee Kuan Yew, it was for that precise reason that 
Singapore separated from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. UMNO was 
determined to "maintain total Malay supremacy" (1998: 547). In parliament and 
to the international media, UMNO elites would say "Yes, Malaysian Malaysia. 
Yes, we all agree [to an inclusive nationhood ideal that is not identified with the 
supremacy, well-being and interests of one particular ethnic group at the expense 
of others]. It is an old concept" (Inche Senu, in Lee 1965b ). But in their "private 
circuit" they would indulge in racist propaganda and aggressively stoke Malay 
hatred for ethnic Chinese. "Every time they (the United Malays National 
Organisation) wanted to have things their way in the Alliance, they used the 
threat: "blood will flow. The meaning is that our ['chauvinistic' Chinese] blood 
will flow" (Lee 1965b: 18). When invited to discuss their differences rationally, 
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UMNO supporters shouted "We are united, we are ready to die" (Lee 1965b: 
28).29 The situation, according to Lee, was impossible: 
Some people may wonder why it is that we are not just keeping 
quiet and allowing people to say what they like, such as 'Malays 
unite.' They shout this everywhere ... Everyday they are pumping 
this out in Jawi [Arabic script]. I say people get worried. If among 
the Chinese you hear people say, 'Hokkiens unite', all the non-
Hokkiens will say 'What is this all about? Is it to wallop the non-
Hokkiens? So, when they say 'Malays unite,' we say 'What is this 
all about?' It is a fair question. (Lee 1965b: 17) 
Relations between the two sides became even more strained when race 
riots erupted in Singapore in the years leading up to its secession from Malaysia. 
UMNO blamed the Singapore government, "depicting it as oppressing the Malays 
of Singapore" with the hope of frightening "those elsewhere in the Federation into 
rallying around UMNO for protection" (Lee 1998: 562). Lee's interpretation of 
events is backed by a report by the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur 
which states that communal tension "has been sharpened during the past few 
months by a propaganda campaign ( conducted primarily by the leading Malay 
newspaper, Utusan Melayu) ... Utusan Melayu often acts as a mouthpiece of 
29 Although Lee Kuan Yew was writing about Malay 'ultras' of the late 1950s and early 1960s, his 
description is not inapplicable today. Only recently did Mohd Khir Toyo, the Menteri Besar 
(Chief Minister) of Selangor, warn non-Malays that Malays were "willing to bathe in blood" to 
protect Malay privileges (Ghani 2002). 
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UMNO, and in particular of its extremist secretary-general, Syed Ja'afar Albar" 
(1998: 565). 
Contrary to popular acceptance, Singapore's secession in 1965 was not 
just about the excising of one tiny island and two million Chinese from Malaysia 
but effectively the abortion of Bangsa Malaysia in the making. One might say that 
something died that day but no one took proper notice until the first symptom 
erupted four year later. On 13 May 1969, Malays massacred several hundred 
ethnic Chinese during the race riots of 13 May 1969 at the instigation of Malay 
elites (Lee 1998: 642; Slimming 1969) or- in another version of the story- when 
Malays defended themselves against the Chinese who allegedly wanted all 
Malays to die and all aborigines to return to the jungle, as reported by the 
National Operations Council (1969: 29). Today Malaysia cannot be further from 
where its founding fathers envisioned it to be in the 1940s. Originally conceived 
as a progressive, democratic, tolerant, multi-religious, secular nation, it has over 
four decades of independence regressed into an Islamist Bolehland where 
'everything also can' (Malaysian English for a land where 'everything 1s 
achievable/yours') if one has the right kulitfication (' skin qualification'). 
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Part II 
BENOKRI 
The Abiku Trilogy 
Stories are always a form of resistance. (Okri 1996a) 
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- 3 -
THE FAMISHED ROAD 
The Road to Nigeria 
To the Booker Prize judges who picked Ben Okri's The Famished Road (TFR) as 
the winner in 1991, TFR was a "beautifully written and moving" novel which 
"convey[ ed] Nigerian peasant life in a changing world." In the 1992 Vintage 
edition of the novel from which the preceding quote is taken, we find a similar 
view by another critic: "Okri's Nigeria, on the eve of independence, is a country 
where people commonly dream strange and sometimes important dreams ... 
[TFR reads] like an epic poem" ( emphases added, back-cover of TFR). Few 
indeed would disagree that TFR and by implication the two other abiku novels 
Songs of Enchantment (SOE) and Infinite Riches (IR) are directly or indirectly 
about Okri' s homeland. Our reading will in fact be similarly premised - except 
that we do not take the Nigerian background as a given. 
Several critics have rightly pointed out that the trilogy itself offers few 
certainties where the setting is concerned. We know that events unfold in an 
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African country that is about to achieve independence from colonial Britain. It 
may well be Nigeria but the word Nigeria never once appears in any of the three 
texts. There are numerous allusions to politico-historical events that closely 
correlate with actual developments in Nigeria: "coups and riots, tribal massacres 
and famine . . . explosions at oil sites, the genocide of war and decades of 
hardship to come" (IR 49). Yet no specific details and temporal indices are given. 
We are not told the names of the tribes "quarrelling with one another, disputing 
their myths of supremacy and their legends of the origin of all things" (SOE 20). 
And we cannot say with absolute certainty if the "genocide" in question is or is 
not an allusion to the Biafran war which we looked at in Chapter 2. There are a 
number of sociocultural references that are of Nigerian or at least West African 
origin. The calabashes of palm-wine, the abiku (Yoruba for 'spirit child'), the 
egungun procession and the everyday religious rituals are just some of more 
obvious ones. But the question remains: do these references necessary mean that 
the novel is about Nigeria? 
It is instructive to note that Okri's reluctance to commit to neither absolute 
fixity nor absolute unfixity is not just confined to the abiku trilogy. Going through 
his writings, both fiction and non-fiction, we will find that Nigeria is scarcely ever 
mentioned by name. Even on the few occasions that it is mentioned, Okri never 
discusses it as extensively and in quite the unequivocally 'angry' tone for which 
pioneer Nigerian writers like Achebe and Soyinka are renowned. Neither has his 
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writings demonstrated overt partiality to any party, tribe or geopolitical section of 
the country. In all, Okri has perhaps published but one piece of writing that 
directly engages with Nigerian politics. The work in question is 'The Catastrophe 
Now Facing Nigeria' (1994a), an essay written in response to the Nigerian 
political crisis resulting from the military proscription of the 1993 election results. 
"My country's choice", he writes, "is either democracy or the descent into chaos 
and civil war". Underscoring tribalism, the North-South divide and military 
dictatorship as key obstacles, he warns that "blood might again howl" unless "an 
intelligent and equitable solution is found." Apart from the essay, Okri has also 
paid particular attention to the themes of corruption, military brutality and 
nationhood in his novels, short stories, and poems. Most of these engagements, 
however, display little contextual specificity. 
What are the implications of Okri' s purging of definitive references to a 
particular nation in the trilogy? Does it, for instance, make him "more 
introspective, more personal, less historically ambitious [and] less radical, than 
Achebe and his peers", as Charles Nivens suggests (Hawley 1995: 37)? Leaving 
the second question aside for now, let us, by way of answering the first, recall 
certain remarks Okri has made on his strategy of contextual unfixity. In response 
to the question of how his work "reflects life in Nigeria", he says "the first thing 
I'd say is that I think it's important to understand that a piece of writing is, first of 
all, a piece of writing. By that I mean that one may be writing about Nigeria, but 
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that terrain may be the place in which one can best see very strong universal 
concerns" (Ross 1993: 337). On TFR specifically, Okri explains that the aim was 
to write an "unfixed book, a river" text that reflected the African aesthetic. He 
describes this aesthetic as "a way of looking at the world in more than three 
dimensions", and as characterised by a boundless openness to endless possibilities 
and a celebration of riddles and paradoxes. Crucially, he says, any attempt to fix 
the aesthetic "too much within national or tribal boundaries" would only 
contradict the spirit of the work (Wilkinson 1992: 87-88). 
Okri 's strategy of contextual unfixity works hand in hand with what we 
might call his technique of 'narrative stealth' to circumvent interpretative closure. 
In a videotaped interview by Edward Blishen (1988), Okri remarks that people 
rarely want to know or read about their condition, to confront and vanquish the 
"ghosts and monsters that we all carry within us" or, in Dad's words, "the corpses 
in the consciousness of all peoples ... things that weigh us down and drag us 
towards death and prevent us from growing" (SOE 289). That is why, Okri says, 
with certain works he finds it necessary to eschew social realism for what he calls 
"a deeper kind of realism" so as to lure readers into thinking that "they are 
reading about something else when in fact they are reading about themselves." 
Okri has articulated this notion of stealth in several of his essays including 'The 
Joys of Storytelling I': 
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Storytelling is always, quietly, subversive. It is a double-headed 
axe. You think it faces only one way, but it also faces you. You 
think it cuts only in one direction, but it also cuts you. You think it 
applies to others only, when it applies mainly to you. When you 
think it is harmless, that is when it springs its hidden truths, its 
uncomfortable truths, on you. It startles your complacency. And 
when you no longer listen, it lies silently in your brain, waiting. 
(1997b: 43) 
What we have just seen should serve as caution against narrowly reading 
the abiku trilogy as just another story about Nigeria in search of nationhood, as if 
it is solely about 'their' (Nigerians, Africans) struggles and we are somehow 
outside the realm of the author's concern. To read the trilogy as such would be to 
miss the significance of its open-endedness and double-edgedness - two features 
that are central not only to Okri' s design for the trilogy but also to his overarching 
philosophical vision which we will be mapping in the course of our discussion. 
The First Day of Politics 
It is signalled early in The Famished Road (TFR), the first book of the abiku 
trilogy, that a momentous event of national proportions is about to take place. 
Independence is coming and the compound where Azaro, the spirit-child narrator, 
and his impoverished parents live is "aflame with politics" (TFR 128). The day 
politics makes its first public appearance, the compound literally turns into "a 
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place of vomiting" (130), a ominous foreboding of things to come. Men, women 
and children who had earlier consumed the "rotten milk of politics ' (132), 
distributed to the poor by the Party of the Rich to canvass their votes, are found 
retching and contorting in agony all over the compound as the poison courses 
through their system. Politics has well and truly arrived and according to Dad, 
Azaro' s load-carrying father, it has "begun to spoil everything": 
Now they want to know who you will vote for before they let you 
carry their load . . . If you want to vote for the party that supports 
the poor, they give you the heaviest load. I am not much better 
than a donkey. (TFR 81) 
The dehumanisation and dispossession of the compound people 
progressively worsens as independence approaches. By the time we come to SOE 
and IR, they would have been reduced to "ghosts of history" (IR 228). As Azaro 
puts it: 
We were the empty bodies on whose behalf the politicians and 
soldiers rule; we were not real. We could not communicate our 
desires save by the intensity of our cheering or hissing. We were 
shadows in the world of power; the mere spectators of phenomena, 
the victims of speeches. We were meant to listen, never to speak. 
We were not meant to feel or to think or argue or dissent. Assent 
was all we were good for. (IR 228-9) 
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TFR makes it clear that the nation is dying even before it is born, and that 
there is a political tug of war going on between the powerless but awakened few 
and those acting as "a braking-power on the awakening consciousness of the 
people" (Fanon 1990: 135). A "choice between living and dying" (Okri, in 
Wilkinson 1992: 84) has to be made. Will the nation work towards attaining a 
harmony of politics and heart and the realisation of its "fabulous possibilities" (IR 
201 ), or will it alternatively persist as an eternal undead, tormented by 
immortality- in short, as an abiku nation? 
Abiku Nation 
Before we proceed to unpack the idea of the abiku nation, it would be helpful if 
we first acquaint ourselves with the abiku as a sociocultural phenomenon and a 
literary trope in African literature. A Yoruba term, the abiku ( or ogbanje in Igbo) 
is believed to be "part human and part spirit", a liminal entity bound to the eternal 
cycle of life, death and rebirth (Achebe 1986: 27). The word abiku literally means 
"born to die" (Bascom 1993: 35). In southern Nigeria where belief is the abiku is 
prevalent, it is said that before an abiku enters the phenomenal world, it will make 
a pact with its companions, promising to return to the spirit world on a 
predetermined date. It then spirits itself into its earthly mother's womb in order to 
be born, live a sho1i mischievous life and then will itself unto death before a full 
and natural life cycle is completed. The abiku then repeats the cycle, often 
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returning to the same hapless mother. The condition is a curse because it 
condemns the abiku to perpetually live out half an inconsolable life in the spirit-
world and the conventional world. But it is a 'blessing' insofar as it affords the 
abiku terrible powers over its parents who live in constant fear of its early demise 
and return to the spirit-world. 
The abiku is generally dreaded by the living and regarded as eccentric 
and/or mad because of its regular 'soliloquies', i.e. mysterious conversations with 
invisible spirit-friends. Often cantankerous, unpredictable and prone to fights, it is 
said to "collapse and if not attended to soon enough, die" when physically 
punished (Achebe 1986: 30-1). It is also perennially sickly and in need of medical 
attention. To sever the abiku's link to the spirit-world and bind it to its earthly 
home, sacrifices which often impoverish its family must be made. The abiku's 
magic token, usually buried in a remote area, must be found and destroyed. If the 
suspected abiku child dies within days of birth, its body is whipped and mutilated 
to deter its return. The body may be marked by shaving a spot on its head, cutting 
a notch in its ear, or severing a toe or finger (Bascom 1993: 35). Once in a while, 
an abiku may decide to renege on the promise to its companions in order to 
remain in the world of the living. When that happens, the abiku's spirit kin will 
attempt to lure it back home through persuasion or force. The latter involves 
making life as uncomfortable as possible for the abiku renegade. 
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The abiku phenomenon has inspired a range of African writers before 
Okri. In Things Fall Apart, Achebe's handling of the abiku is "largely 
ethnographic" (Quayson 1997b: 123). His project is to "validate the coherence of 
Igbo beliefs and the efficacy of the structures built by the culture as security 
against the irrational". Soyinka's treatment of the same subject in his poem 
'Abiku' is an "attempt to locate the organizing consciousness of the literary 
artefact within the realm of the spirit-world" (Quayson 1997b: 124). In the poem, 
insight into the abiku's mind comes directly from the abiku itself who mocks the 
living when offered supplicatory items: 
In vain your bangles cast 
Charmed circles at my feet 
I am Abiku, calling for the first 
And the repeated time. 
Must I weep for goats and cowries 
For palm oil and the sprinkled ash? 
Yams do not sprout in amulets 
To earth Abiku's limbs. (Soyinka 1967: 62) 
In J.P. Clark's poem, also entitled 'Abiku', the perspective is reversed. 
The abiku does not speak but is spoken to by the persona who poignantly 
implores it to stay even though the proffered sacrifices amount to little compared 
to what it could enjoy in the spirit-world. Because the addressed abiku is silent, 
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the poem, according to Olatubosun Ogunsanwo, can at the most be said to register 
"Clark's characteristically humanist outlook that allows the implied author to 
accept the abiku myth from the humane approach" (Ogunsanwo 1995: 47): 
Then step in, step in and stay 
For her body is tired, 
Tired, her milk going sour 
Where many more mouths gladden the heart. ( Clark 1967: 61) 
Finally we come to Okri whose handling of the subject articulates "a 
particular perception of events ... that brings the literary tradition into a direct 
engagement with the ambit of the socio-political while remaining steadfastly in 
the realm of the mythopoeic" (Quayson 1997b: 121). In the trilogy, we gain 
access not only to the precocious Azaro' s consciousness but also, by virtue of his 
role as the chief narrator, the trilogy's universe, including how he is himself 
perceived by those around him. Against the standard approach, and 
notwithstanding the abiku's tendency to upset "all kinds of balances" (TFR 5), 
Azaro and his abiku companion Ade are not mere sadistic spirits bent on bringing 
nothing but misery to their earthly parents. The first intimation of this is found 
early in TFR when Azaro says that abikus often "returned [to the spirit-world] 
inconsolable for ... all the suffering they hadn't redeemed" (3). Similar insights 
into the extra-traditional role of Okri's abikus are found in SOE. To Azaro, Ade 
says that he "was born to love the world as [he finds] it. And to change it if [he] 
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can" (SOE 196). In a scene following his botched attempt to kill Madame Koto, 
Ade says that by failing he has fulfilled his destiny as catalyst: "The tears of a 
child dying of hunger in a remote part of the country can start a civil war. I am the 
tears of a child. I am the country crying for what is going to happen in the future" 
(SOE 195). 
Like Ade, Azaro - superstitiously shortened from Lazaro by Mum because 
of its uneasy echo of Lazarus - is an abiku with a mission. The difference is that 
Azaro is an abiku who, according to a herbalist, "didn't want to be born, but who 
will fight with death" (TFR 8). Somewhere along the endless coming and going, 
he makes the momentous decision to commit to life. In doing so, he effectively 
forfeits the aquamarine paradise from where he originates, a "world of pure 
dreams" (TFR 4) where suffering does not exist and spirits bathe in the radiance 
of diverse rainbows. Interestingly, Azaro is not only fully aware of what he is 
leaving behind but also what is in store for him in the world of the living, namely 
"the rigours of existence, the unfulfilled longings, the enshrined injustices of the 
world, the labyrinths of love, the ignorance of parents, the fact of dying, and the 
amazing indifference of the Living in the midst of the simple beauties of the 
universe" (TFR 3). Azaro's decision to make this 'terroristic' break has nothing to 
do with the usual earthly pleasures of "offerings of oils and yams and palm-nuts" 
or the "promises of special treatment" (TFR 5). As he says, 
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It may simply have been that I had grown tired of coming and 
going ... It may have also been that I wanted to taste of this world, 
to feel it, suffer it, know it, to love it, to make a valuable 
contribution to it, and to have that sublime mood of eternity in me 
as I live the life to come. But I sometimes think it was a face that 
made me want to stay. I wanted to make happy the bruised face of 
the woman who would be my mother. (TFR 5) 
Described as a "lonely" child (SOE 5) with a "lonely heart" (IR 65) 
"wandering an unhappy world" (IR 217), Azaro is propelled in life by a 
melancholic longing for the mysterious sublimity of living. But why melancholy? 
Why is paradise insufficient? To answer these questions, it would be instructive if 
we first recall Zizek's definition of melancholy as explicated in his critique of 
Satyricon (1969), a film by Italian director Federico Fellini. Based on Gaius 
Petronius' first century Roman satire of the same name, Satyricon is about "a 
universe in which Christianity is yet to come, from which the notion of Christian 
redemption is totally absent" (Zizek 2000d: 88). Zizek writes that although the 
ancient Roman hedonistic figures do not know that salvation is coming, they 
already suffer from a "strange sadness, a kind of fundamental melancholy". It is 
as if "they somehow already have the premonition that the true God will soon 
reveal Himself, and that they were born just a little too early, so that they cannot 
be redeemed." The lesson to be derived from this, according to Zizek, is similar to 
the Hegelian dialectics of alienation: 
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We are not dealing with the Paradise which is ... lost due to some 
fatal intrusion - there is already in paradisiacal satisfaction . . . 
something suffocating, a longing for fresh air, for an opening that 
would break the unbearable constraint; and this longing introduces 
in Paradise an unbearable Pain, a desire to break out - life in 
Paradise is always pervaded by an infinite melancholy. (2000d: 88) 
The Roman figures' suffocation and longing for fresh air is not dissimilar 
to Azaro' s experience prior to his (re )birth in TFR. For all the paradisiacal 
pleasures obtainable in the spirit-world, Azaro knows that so long as he is bound 
to the endless abiku cycle of coming and going, and committed to neither this nor 
that realm, he will be denied access to something greater. And it is because of this 
inkling of there being something greater out there to be experienced that Azaro 
makes the break. Against this background, Margaret Cezair-Thompson is justified 
in arguing that Azaro's decision to escape the "captivity or exile" of time (1996: 
41) and to replace his "power to die with the power to live" (1996: 43) is a step in 
the right direction - albeit not a step away from exile since "To be born is to come 
into the world weighed down with strange gifts of the soul, with enigmas and an 
inextinguishable sense of exile" (TFR 5). This leaves us with the question of 
whether it is justified to argue, as Cezair-Thompson does, that because the abiku 
is symbolic of society's unreadiness or irresolution to live, Azaro' s sudden 
steadfast commitment to life therefore parallels society's readiness to "move 
beyond [its] crippling historical-social conditions" (1996: 41)? Our answer is no. 
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Certainly, the abik:u condition is symbolic of the nation's state of undeadness. As 
Dad himself discovers in the fevers of his dream, theirs is 
a spirit-child nation, one that keeps being reborn and after each 
birth come blood and betrayals, and the child of our will refuses to 
stay till we have made propitious sacrifice and displayed our 
serious intent to bear the weight of a unique destiny. (TFR 494) 
However, Azaro's commitment to life cannot be said to reflect the nation's 
readiness to move forward for the simple reason that it is not ready to move 
forward. It is enough for now to recall that the nation is repeatedly described in 
the trilogy as "dying from a lack of vision, too much greed and corruption, not 
enough love [and] too many divisions" (SOE 91). If the abik:u condition of 
coming and going is to be paralleled to the nation, it would be more appropriate to 
see it strictly in terms of the waxing and waning of the people's will to sustain the 
nation's birth and future flowering. Alternatively, the unborn nation may be 
compared with the twisted abik:u triplets ( emblematic perhaps of the three main 
ethnic communities in Nigeria) warring against each other in the pregnant 
Madame Koto's bloated stomach (TFR 464, 494). With regard to Azaro, it might 
be more appropriate to view him as symbolic of the "unbreakable things in us" 
(Okri, in Wilkinson 1992) or, in the context of the trilogy, the positive forces 
struggling to ensure that the nation not only lives but lives up to its potential. 
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Logic of the (Im )possible 
At the face of it, Azaro' s volitional forfeiture of paradise and decision to face a 
life of hardship and lonely wandering in search of "the river of [his] destiny" 
(TFR 6) does admittedly seem somewhat masochistic. Why give up paradise for 
suffering, however sublime it might be? Why not eliminate suffering altogether? 
The answer, as will be elucidated, lies in the fact that the total elimination of 
suffering is, although necessary, simultaneously impossible and undesirable. 
The logic of this Okrian proposition should already be familiar to us since 
it is essentially the same logic which, as discussed in previous chapters, regulates 
the Lacanian subject's impossible pursuit of completion, as well as the agent's 
pursuit of the impossible society in Laclau and Mouffe. If we recall, the Lacanian 
subject is by definition an empty nothing with an infinite craving for something. 
The subject ( qua pure craving) believes that by possessing the lost object of his 
desire, his emptiness will be filled out and the state of ontological fullness will be 
attained. What he misrecognises is that no positive object is ever 'it', which is the 
same as saying that desire is inherently inextinguishable. 'It' which does not exist 
in materiality is designated objet petit a in Lacan, that is, the non-symbolisable 
surplus that sets the subject's desire in motion. In itself, objet petit a is literally 
'nothing' and ultimately the subject himself. That is why, if and when the subject 
actually arrives at himself, what he will find is not the anticipated plenitude but its 
radical negation. The subject will find to his subjective obliteration that he is 
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neither the ego nor the unconscious but a pure nothingness devoid of any inherent 
meaning. So long as the subject misrecognises this and continues to postpone the 
moment when he actually 'catches up' with himself, he will continue to exist and 
pursue completion. In this precise sense, desire may be seen as the condition of 
possibility and impossibility for the realisation of the subject's completion. 
In the same way, Laclau and Mouffe designate antagonisms as the 
condition of possibility and impossibility for the realization of a society from 
which antagonisms have been entirely eliminated. Antagonisms which threaten 
society's stability must be eradicated before a free society may be constituted. 
The complete eradication of antagonisms, however, can only result in society's 
disintegration since without an outlet for subordinated, oppressed and dominated 
communities to articulate and redress their problems, there can be no free society 
in the true sense of the word. Because of the paradoxical status of antagonism, the 
ideal (democratic) society is, like the Lacanian subject's desired fullness, an ideal 
that is a good only insofar as it cannot be reached. 
For Okri, the same logic of the (im)possible is articulated in spiritual-
aesthetic rather than psychoanalytic or politico-philosophical terms. In place of 
desire or antagonism, he places suffering at the heart of the logic. Okri 
acknowledges that suffering in its many forms (poverty, oppression, dislocation, 
exile, self-sabotage), depending on the intensity to which it is experienced, can 
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corrupt, break and/or destroy a person. Nevertheless, suffering - when it reaches 
the limit of human endurance and slides into the beyond - can also empower 
because it is "the thing in us which most makes the spirit wake up" (Okri, in 
Hattersley 1999). Also, he says, 
Suffering drenches [the oppressed] in mystery. Intensities of 
existence accelerate their ageing. They mature more strangely and 
more deeply than their oppressors ... They may be dwindling but 
it is precisely because of all they have suffered and are still 
suffering that they have much to struggle for, to be alive for. (Okri 
1990) 
In the abiku trilogy, suffering is the motivating force that pushes 
characters like Azaro and Dad to go beyond themselves and perform 'impossible 
acts' so as to eliminate the very suffering that drives them in the first place. In this 
sense, suffering ( as a manifestation of what we lack) is what makes fullness or 
completion possible. (Without suffering, there would be no necessity to pursue 
fullness). Its final elimination is, however, undesirable since it will only bring 
about the exact opposite of what it promises to yield: a life of death-like 
'perfection' which offers the subject neither reason nor drive to continually 
expand the boundaries of the possible. The secret here then is that the true aim of 
the pursuit of completion is not completion but the pursuit itself. It is through the 
pursuit precipitated by suffering that the "inner liberation" of the unsuspected 
powers of the human spirit may be achieved (Okri 1999b: 63). 
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To further illustrate the tension between the need to eliminate suffering 
and the need for suffering, let us tum to the scene in TFR where Azaro stumbles 
upon a community of dead beings in the interspatial no-man's-land. According to 
his three-headed spirit guide, these strange beings once lived for an eternity "as 
faces on the great tree" (TFR 329). One day, their prophet spoke of other "worlds 
of people high up", particularly a place called Heaven wherein resides a "great 
people who did not know their own greatness." The prophet urged his people to 
build a great road to Heaven so that "they could visit those people, and that those 
people could visit them. In this way, they would complete one another and fill an 
important destiny in this universe." The three-headed spirit explains that the 
prophet gave his people this sublime goal to work towards because they were -
like Azaro prior to his rebirth - suffocating within the ( en)closure of eternal 
placidity. 
They wanted to live, to be more alive. They wanted to know the 
essence of pain, they wanted to suffer, to feel, to love, to hate, to 
be greater than hate, and to be imperfect in order to always have 
something to strive towards, which is beauty. They wanted also to 
know wonder and to live miracles. Death is too perfect. (TFR 329) 
Driven by this goal, the prophet's people have been building the great road 
for two thousand years. What they do not "know", however, is that "the road 
cannot be finished" (TFR 329) and that arrival is impossible: 
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When they have built a long section of [the road] , or forgotten the 
words of their prophet and begun to think they have completed it, 
landquakes happen ... the road goes mad and twists and destroys 
itself, or the people become distorted in spirit and start to tum the 
road into other things, or the workers go insane, the people start 
wars, revolts cripple everything and a thousand things distract 
them and wreck what they have built and a new generation comes 
along and begins again from the wreckage. (TFR 329-30) 
The road-builders are unaware of the impossibility of completing their 
task not because they have not been told the truth. Rather, despite having been 
told the truth, they continue to misrecognise it in the Lacanian sense. They 
continue to act as if they do not know. As the prophet says, they are "deaf to the 
things they need to know the most" (TFR 330). The road-builders ' deafness to the 
truth and their resultant pursuit of Heaven perfectly parallels the Lacanian 
subject' s misrecognition of his constitutive lack and the impossible pursuit of 
himself. Without misrecognition, they would not have found it necessary or 
worthwhile to desire and pursue the impossible. Non-pursuit would mean that 
their very identity of the road-builders would be negated. They would literally 
cease to exist as road-builders and return to being "faces on the great tree", frozen 
in death-like perfection. They would also be deprived of the opportunity they 
presently have as road-builders to explore their "capacity to create, to overcome, / 
To endure, to transform, to love, / And to be greater than [their] suffering" (Okri 
1999b: 61) . 
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In the same way that the Lacanian subject's failure to arrive at himself is 
his subjectivity, the road-builders' failure to reach Heaven (symbolised by the 
great unfinished road on which "all human beings travel" (TR 70)), is "their soul, 
the soul of their history" (TFR 329). And just as the subject's attainment of 
completion will result in his radical negation, the road-builders' 'arrival' at 
Heaven will lead to their annihilation. The logic of this ironic reversal of fortune 
is nicely captured in one of the stories Dad tells Azaro. Once upon a time, an 
African emperor ordered all the frogs in his kingdom to be exterminated because 
they were disturbing his sleep. The emperor's order was carried out and he was 
able to sleep serenely until "the mosquitoes, whose larvae the frogs fed on, came 
and spread disease. His people fled and what was once a proud land became a 
desert waste" (IR 131). 
Desire to Drive 
The cycle of toil, arrival, destruction and fresh recommencement of toil that plots 
the existence of the road-builders - the 'cycle of life', as we may call it - is not 
unlike the 'abiku cycle' of birth, death and rebirth we discussed previously. The 
two cycles are identical in that they both mark the flow of life, the rise and fall or 
the coming and going of things and events. The crucial difference is that, unlike 
the cycle of life, the abiku cycle is a condition of bad infinity. Those fated ( or fate 
themselves) to loop ad infinitum within its closed circuit do not actually undergo 
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any real change or achieve progress. For the doomed agents, the more things 
change, the more they remain the same. It is precisely from this strangulating 
condition of bad infinity that Azaro needed to escape in order to complete a 
natural cycle of life in the world of the living. It is also the same condition which 
qualifies the nation as an abiku nation, an obscene undead caught in a state of 
endless repetition and "arrested development" (Quayson 1995a: 157). As further 
illustrations of the eternal recurrence of the same, we might recall the road-
builders' original existence (immobilised as "faces on the great tree") where life-
quality was measured not by growth but stillness and stagnation. We might also 
recall the "strange kind of utopia" (SOE 115) Azaro discovers in the mind of the 
corrupt Party of the Rich's masquerade, a sterile place like the road-builders' old 
world where there is "no chaos, no confusion, no alternatives, no dialectic, no 
disturbances." 
In contrast to abiku the cycle of bad infinity, the cycle of life is first and 
foremost defined by its openness to growth. In concrete terms, it is the cycle of 
Azaro' s new life in the world of the living and the cycle into which the road-
builders enter when they commence their pursuit of Heaven. (Heaven, which is 
populated by a "great people who did not know their own greatness"' is 
ultimately the world of the living.) Another salient point we should underline here 
is that the cycle of life is not regulated by the Lacanian Big Other ( also known as 
the 'Other of the Other' and 'the subject supposed to know'), that is, the 
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ultimately non-existent Absolute Guarantor (Historical Necessity, Nature, and so 
forth) whom we presuppose as the One pulling the strings. It is rather the agents 
themselves who, through their own actions, regulate it. As we saw in the case of 
the road-builders, it is their own selves who predestine themselves. If at any time 
they choose to for get "the words of their prophet and [begin] to think they have 
completed" their task, everything will start to crumble. Until they 'remember', i.e. 
begin afresh the impossible journey to Heaven, they will not experience growth. 
And until they have endured enough suffering and accumulated enough wisdom 
to fully recognise the truth of life's impossibility, they will not "become gods" 
(TFR 332). 
In Okri, becoming a "god" is not about attaining absolute perfection. 
Rather it is about effecting a radical mental and attitudinal shift from 
misrecognition to recognition of the truth about the impossibility of Heaven and 
the significance of the impossibility. For the road-builders, it means recognising 
Heaven as a kind of Platonic 'necessary lie', an illusion "by which we can 
become I More real" (Okri 1999b: 3). It means recognising that although the goal 
is to arrive at Heaven and meet its inhabitants, the aim is to recognise themselves 
as the inhabitants of Heaven, that is, imperfect desiring beings who attain 
satisfaction by pursuing rather than arriving at themselves. Whereas 'non-gods' 
who, upon receipt of this truth, will abandon the aim (pursuit), "paralyse 
themselves with despair" or "poison themselves with emptiness" (1999b: 4), 
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Okri' s "gods" will embrace the toil of overcoming oneself and the circular 
alternation of life's ascent and descent as the very reason to never stop pursuing 
the impossible goal. 
The nuances of the shift from road-builder to god in Okri may be further 
teased out through Lacan's theory on the transformation of the subject of desire 
into the subject of drive. As we discussed in the Introduction, the subject of desire 
is by definition impossible. That is to say, although he desires the attainment of 
his unattainable goal (the sublime object, Heaven), he also desires his desire to 
remain unsatisfied. It is in this tension that the subject 'enjoys' himself. He 
experiences jouissance ( enjoyment that comes at the cost of pain) not in the 
realisation of his goal but in the anticipation of its realisation. The subject of 
desire becomes a subject of drive when he crosses the "bridge of self-discovery" 
(ATG 30) and recognises the truth he has hitherto misrecognised. The crucial 
detail that sets subject of drive apart from subject of desire is that the former does 
not long for an object proper: 
The object of the drive coincides with the itinerary of the drive ... 
In other words, the object of the drive is not an object [that is] 
supposed to provide some satisfaction to the subject, but this 
satisfaction itself: the object of the drive is satisfaction as object. 
(Zupancic 2000: 142) 
137 
To further clarify the distinction between desire and drive, it would be 
useful to refer to Alenka Zupancic' s comparison between two legendary seducers, 
Laclos' Valmont and Moliere's Don Juan. 30 Valmont is a subject of desire. He 
sleeps with a succession of women in order to save himself from falling in love 
with any of them. By avoiding love, Valmont believes he will be able to maintain 
the very gap between himself and love which makes desire possible. Having a 
succession of lovers is his way of reproducing desire. Don Juan, on the other 
hand, seduces all kinds of women regardless of age, size, colour and background 
- not because he has a preference for a variegated menu but because he is 
indifferent to difference (Zupancic 2000: 131). For Don Juan, "each and every 
woman is the right one, and what drives him further is not what he did not find in 
his previous lover, but precisely what he did find". He "attains satisfaction 
precisely in so far as his aim is nothing but 'getting back into circulation'" (2000: 
136). Okri's god is similar to Don Juan (qua subject of drive) insofar as his aim is 
not to arrive but rather to 'enjoy' himself by transcending his self-limitations 
within the cycle of life. For him, the impossibility of arriving is the very condition 
of possibility for infinite self-transcendence. 
Although Okri does not explicitly articulate it in psychoanalytic terms, the 
notion of 'traversing the fantasy', of seeing "things as they really are" (ATG 49) is 
30 Valmont is the protagonist in Pierre Choderlos de Laclos' eighteenth century French novel Les 
Liaisons Dangereuses ('Dangerous Liaisons '), while Moliere's version of the infamous 'Seducer 
of Seville' is found in his play Don Juan or the Statue of the Peas(_ 
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clearly a pivot in the abiku trilogy and almost all his publications since TFR. It is 
in ATG, though, through a plot that almost parallels the road-builders' impossible 
pursuit of Heaven, that the theme receives its most thorough treatment. 31 A brief 
discussion of ATG at this point would therefore be useful. ATG narrates the life 
and quest of a nameless protagonist who is searching for himself. The protagonist 
is literally invisible. His literal invisibility did not disturb him (since he was 
unaware of it) until he was sent to school where he discovered that neither him 
nor his people exist in "all the history books he read" (ATG 3). This new 
knowledge which introduces a lack in him sets him off on a quest for the secret of 
visibility. After seven years of endless searching, the protagonist arrives on a 
magical island-utopia inhabited by the Invisibles, a community of invisible beings 
who are simultaneously "masters of the art of transcendence" and "masters of 
suffering" (ATG 9). Through them the protagonist learns how to see the same 
truth that the road-builders in TFR have to recognise before godhood may be 
attained. The truth is that the true aim of his quest is not visibility (perfection, 
arrival) but a higher invisibility, a 'journey towards perfection [that] is continued 
without any hope of ever arriving" (109). 
The Invisibles have long known the truth that is the logic of the 
impossible. Their achievement has not come easy, as explained by one of the 
31 See Lim (1996) for a detailed analysis of Olai 's Astonishing the Gods. 
139 
Invisibles to the nameless protagonist. "It has taken us much suffering, much 
repetition of our suffering, much stupidity, many mistakes, great patience, and 
phenomenal love to arrive at this condition" (ATG 53). As gods, they fully 
recognise "the great laws [guiding] the rise and fall of things" (53). They know 
that as soon as they for get the lessons they have learned through much suffering, 
their island-utopia will disintegrate. Knowledge of this 'horrific' truth does not 
cripple or tum them into "god-like monsters" (Okri 1999b: 13) because they 
recognise that its disintegration is "an illusion, an excuse" to re-learn the truth and 
to continue scaling "higher and hidden levels" of invisibility (ATG 53). 
Political Strong Poet 
In the preceding sections, we have seen how suffering might serve as a catalyst 
for self-liberation. The idea might seem more spiritual than political. But look 
deeper and we will find that the spiritual in Okri is no less than an aesthetically-
encoded articulation of the radically political. To explain what we mean by this, 
let us first retrace our argument so far. We began with a political tug of war taking 
place at the heart of the unborn nation. On the one side are forces bent on aborting 
the nation, and on the other, there are those like Dad fighting to keep it alive. It 
goes without saying that in a situation where the odds are weighed heavily against 
the latter, it will be infinitely easier for those situated on the wrong side of politics 
to look at their condition with despair and to accept their fate as empty bodies on 
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whose behalf the politicians and soldiers rule - or worse, join the dark side the 
way Madame Koto does, the barwoman who because of greed turns into "the 
GREAT WHORE OF THE APOCALYPSE" (TFR 377). Alternatively, the 
downtrodden may take the infinitely more rigorous path which leads not to the 
dead-end of hope but to endless possibilities. These two divergent paths are 
similar to those available to Azaro and the road-builders. One leads to stagnation, 
the other leads to godhood. The simple fact that there is a choice is in itself 
already proof that destiny is not externally predetermined but is the direct result of 
one's wilful attempt to transcend the limitations one inherits. If nothing is 
predestined, then destiny can only ultimately be self-authored: 
If people think that God or Nature has made the world as it is, they 
will tend to consider their fate inevitable. But if the Being of the 
world that they inhabit is only the result of the contingent 
discourses and vocabularies that constitute it, they will tolerate 
their fate with less patience and will stand a better chance of 
becoming political 'strong poets.' (Laclau 1991: 97) 
Like Lacan's subject of drive, Laclau's political strong poet - also referred 
to as the "exclusive author of the world" ( 1991: 97) and "constructor of the 
world" (1990: 189) - is not dissimilar to Okri's god. The three are in a sense one 
and the same. To be either one of them is to have traversed the fantasy and 
adopted an attitude of thought that rejects closure ( of which predestination is a 
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prime example) for the endless journey towards "the freeing of human beings 
through a more assertive image of their capacities" (Laclau 1991: 98). 
In equating destiny with agency, and in placing agency back within the 
self, Okri already departs quite radically from the standard indigenous African 
conception of predestination. In Yoruba and Igbo cosmology, destiny is always-
already set before re-birth. It is believed that before a person is born, the soul will 
meet with God (Olorun, the Yoruba Sky God and God of Destiny; Chi Ukwu, the 
Igbo Supreme God). The soul is then given the opportunity to finalise its destiny 
or 'lifeplan' ( ori in Yoruba, chi in Igbo) which encompasses lifespan, identity, 
attributes and talents, including the manner in which it wishes to utilise these 
qualities (Achebe 1986: 18; Lawson 1984: 68). The entire process is highly 
complicated. Not only must the soul debate the merits and limitations of his 
aspirations with its spiritual double (its alter-ego or ancestral spirit who resides in 
heaven) in order to win its support and approval, it also has to present a 
reasonable and detailed request to God in a humble manner or risk having it 
rejected (Achebe 1986: 20; Bascom 1993: 34). Once the terms are agreed upon 
and the contract is sealed, the soul is re-born. Upon birth, memory of its ori is 
erased. The 'amnesiac' has to then rediscover the river of its destiny, often 
through consultation with the divining oracle (Lawson 1984: 68). 
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Although destiny is preordained before birth, it is not entirely 
unchangeable. The individual's lifespan may not be extended but it may be 
shortened by suicide, human acts and curses of offended deities or evil magic by 
one's enemies. Similarly, the blessings of one's ori cannot be increased but may 
be 'spoilt', reduced through witchcraft or when certain taboos are not observed. 
Should a bad or incompatible ori be chosen, or if the spiritual double refuses to 
endorse the ori, the individual will be unlucky in life. Not only will bad things 
come to him, he will also bring bad luck to his relatives and associates. A person 
with a good ori will, on the other hand, find good things coming to him with less 
effort. This is not to say he will automatically receive all the blessings of a good 
ori. He is still required to work hard to bring the potentialities of his ori to fruition 
(Abimbola 1994: 112). As the upper limit of the good and the bad are unalterably 
fixed, the most a person with a bad ori can do is make continuous traditional 
sacrifices to ancestral spirits and deities so that his bad ori may be prevented from 
fully realising itself. A person with a good ori, on the other hand, can aim to 
cultivate a good character and work towards realising his potential for success as 
well as to protect his ori from spoilage by performing sacrifices. 
Here then lies the key difference between Okri' s and the traditional 
conception of destiny. Although the latter is a "combination of predestiny and free 
will" (Abimbola 1994: 115), the upper limit to which an individual may liberate 
himself is always-already irrevocably decided by his ori. This in contrast to Okri 
143 
for whom destiny is contingent upon the active pursuit of destiny - which is the 
equivalent of saying that destiny is constituted by the subject himself. Notice that 
Okri neither fully abjures the African belief system nor fully embraces it. What he 
does is adapt aspects of indigenous beliefs including the abiku logic into his 
worldview which he defines as his "own philosophy, but part of the African 
aesthetic" ( quoted in Hattersley 1999). Okri' s recasting of the African belief 
system is one of the reasons why we insist on a metonymic rather than a literal 
linking of the abiku trilogy to Nigeria. The universe of the texts does not always 
faithfully reflect the actual Nigerian lifeworld. Despite the many parallels 
between the two, subtle but crucial variances are always present in the former. 
Dad the Kynical Hero 
The political strong poet 1n Okri is not a deluded optimist whose life is 
emblematic of the timeworn expression, 'hope (for the good life) springs eternal.' 
Certainly, hope is in the equation but it is not "something one should put in there; 
it's something that emerges out of the sheer necessity of its place in the pantheon 
of human survival and the human spirit" (Okri, in Falconer 1997: 49). 
Furthermore, Okri says: 
One should be very, very serious when one is going to talk about 
hope. One has to know about the very hard facts of the world and 
one has to look at them and know how deadly and powerful they 
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are before one can begin to think or dream oneself into positions 
out of which hope and then possibilities can come. (Wilkinson 
1992: 88) 
Living alertly and rigorously without the crutches of illusions is, in Okri, 
the hallmark of godhood - illusions here designating, firstly, the comforting 
fictions we tell ourselves in order to avoid confronting the "ghosts and monsters 
that we all carry within us" (Okri, in Blishen 1988), and secondly, the Big Other 
to whom we surrender responsibility for ourselves because it is easier to be a 
victim of bad infinity than to be a self-responsible strong poet. Needless to say, 
until more of us rid ourselves of illusions, there will always be more victims than 
heroes. Laclau concedes that the "hero of the new type" is rare. Its creation, 
however, is "absolutely necessary if our time is going to live up to its most radical 
and exhilarating possibilities" (Laclau 1991: 98). 
The new hero may be rare but one is already in the making in the abiku 
trilogy. Unlike the many faceless compound cynics, Azaro's father, Dad, has 
neither inhibitions when it comes to renouncing society's hypocrites nor tolerance 
for the artificial limitations imposed on him by 'fate' and 'the system'. Dad - like 
Diogenes of Sinope (the Greek proto-kynical philosopher) and Till Eulenspiegel 
(the fourteenth-century German peasant clown) - draws no boundary between 
theory and praxis. Being wretchedly poor and illiterate does not stop him from 
being 
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an enlightener of the crude sort who is not intimidated even by 
trashings . . . He embodies a robust intelligence that does not 
censor its impulses. He stands, like all kynics, halfway between the 
impudent and the spontaneous, between the na1ve and the artful, 
and because he oscillates so ambivalently between honesty and 
nastiness with his vulgar assent, conventional morality does not 
have an easy time with him. (Sloterdijk 1987: 142) 
In addition to possessing the above kynical characteristics, Dad is also a 
feared and fearless boxer, with a powerful and masculine physique to boot. With 
this unwieldy combination of irrepressible kynicism and killer fists, Dad quickly 
becomes a headache for the self-assured political swindlers who feign 
respectability - similar to the way in which Diogenes stumped Athenian elites 
when he demonstrated "Plato's subtle theory of eros by masturbating in public" 
(Sloterdijk 1987: 101 ), or when he went about the streets with a lantern during the 
day claiming to be looking for an honest man but never finding one. 
The abiku trilogy provides countless examples of Dad's kynical bite. 
Consider Dad's unrestrained treatment of his creditors in TFR. The incident 
follows a feast thrown by Mum and Dad to celebrate Azaro 's safe return from one 
his many solitary wanderings. Soon after the party, creditors who had earlier 
joined in the merry-making start demanding payment for the loan Dad had taken 
to purchase more drinks for the party guests (including, ironically enough, the 
creditors themselves). Failing to extract money from Mum, they throw stones at 
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her and subsequently seize the family's furniture in Dad's absence. Upon learning 
what the creditors have done, Dad goes into a rampage and sends the guilty 
parties scurrying for cover with the roar of his voice: 
They are hiding now behind their wives' wrappers and yet in broad 
daylight they THREATENED my WIFE and SON and STOLE 
ALL MY THINGS! They are RATS COWARDS THIEVES AND 
ROGUES. Let them come out and DENY it! (TFR 97) 
Two community elders emerge to calm Dad but they are rebuffed. A 
husband and wife couple is heard quarrelling somewhere in the compound. After 
a moment of silence, a door opens and one of the creditors tiptoes out to return an 
item he had stolen from Mum. When he tries to slink home, Dad appears and 
gives him an earful: "Money will kill you," Dad said. "You drank of my beer, ate 
of my food, and because of a small amount of money you behave like a rat?" 
(TFR 98) What Dad finds offensive is the creditors' lack of community spirit and 
bared-faced thievery, even if he did make the mistake of borrowing from them. 
(As we shall see, Dad is something of a community conscience and a "doctor of 
society" (Sloterdijk 1987: 162) whose mad voice and "crude eloquence" (TFR 24) 
upsets the compound people because it disturbs their fantasy of being helpless 
casualties of oppression.) As further illustration of Dad's kynicism, consider how 
he demonstrates that "the head has not only ears to hear and obey but also a brow 
with which to menacingly defy the stronger" (Sloterdijk 1987: 103). Dad, it 
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should be remembered, "has got a strong head" (TFR 407). When interrogated by 
thugs from the Party of the Rich about the party he supports, he tells them to mind 
their own business. Pressed for an answer, he tells them bluntly that he does not 
support their party because "it is a party of thieves" (TFR 255). 
Dad is not the only poor man contemptuous of the Party of the Rich. The 
compound people are no strangers to the ways of the party which once, to great 
comical effect, let slip the truth through the loudhailer: 'WE ARE YOUR 
FRIENDS. WE BRING YOU ELECTRICITY AND BAD ROADS, NOT GOOD 
MILK. I MEAN GOOD ROADS, NOT BAD MILK (TFR 153). Few of them, 
however, rarely ever risk standing their ground and publicly opposing the party 
thugs. Their apprehension is not without reason. Although they may not fully 
fathom the sweeping changes politics has brought to the country, they are more 
than acutely aware that the brave are liable to end up badly beaten or dead, as 
Ade's carpenter father discovers a little too late when he is killed and left to rot in 
the open. Terrorised into submission, some of them have learned that, for the 
reason of self-preservation, it would be safer to tolerate tyranny, support the party 
they cannot oppose and reap the rewards of patronage while at it. As a direct 
consequence of the way they act rather than what they think or know, the 
politicians' "manufactured" (TFR 494) reality which the cynics are cynical about 
becomes further reinforced and therefore more real. This, despite the ironic 
distance they continue to maintain towards the 'false' reality imposed on them by 
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rival political parties. In a perverse way then the cynics get precisely what they 
seek: self-preservation, that is, the preservation of their identity as political 
victims. 
Dad, on the other hand, is consistently portrayed throughout the trilogy as 
a fiercely proud man whose most glaring faults are, from the standpoint of the 
Party of the Rich, his obstinate refusal to be bought and his insistence on saying 
all kinds of politically seditious things. When the women at Madame Koto's bar 
talks about the infinite wealth and power that the people will receive from the 
Party of the Rich, Dad silences them with "Rubbish!" (TFR 296). And when the 
landlord threatens to increase the rent if he does not vote for the Party of the Rich, 
Dad provocatively goes around the compound telling everyone that he "wouldn't 
vote for the landlord's party" even "if they killed him" (TFR 203). Fearing the 
pricked-up ears of the landlord's spies, Mum tries without much success to get 
Dad to tone down his views. In his usual dramatic vein, he announces, "What 
right has the landlord to bully us, to tell us who to vote for, eh? Is he God? Even 
God can't tell us who to vote for. Don't be afraid. We may be poor, but we are not 
slaves." 
Although Dad is resolutely against the Party of the Rich, he is not unaware 
of the rot in the Party of the Poor, the party he supports. When Ade's carpenter 
father tries to convince Dad that the Party of the Poor is "as corrupt as everyone 
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else", Dad replies, "Still, I support them. At least they don't spit on us ... at least 
they think of the ordinary hard-working man" (TFR 211-2). He is, however, to 
learn the full extent of the Party of the Poor's treachery in SOE. After Ade's 
rampaging father is murdered by Madame Koto' s thugs from the Party of the 
Rich, the Party of the Poor astonishes everyone by decreeing that "no one in the 
area must bury the corpse ... unless they were the murderers" (SOE 24 7). By 
using the corpse as political capital against the former party, the Party of the Poor 
has committed a 'spiritual' crime against Ade's father. This is because in African 
indigenous belief, "a person whose dead body is not buried, that is, with due and 
correct rites, will not be admitted to the abode of the blessed departed ones, and 
therefore will become a wanderer, living an aimless, haunting existence" (Idowu 
1973: 174). Since no one from the compound wants to be accused of being a 
murderer, the body remains unburied, rotting near the bushes. Their inaction 
literally condemns the spirit of Ade's father to wander aimlessly until Dad, 
defying the Party of the Poor' s decree, gives the body a proper burial. Dad's 
heroic action is to earn him jail time in IR. 
In the trilogy, Dad is portrayed as neither a superhero immune to the stings 
of suffering nor a joyless moralist who sees evil everywhere. His characterisation 
is much more multifaceted than one would normally expect from a figure whose 
name (or rather namelessness) 'Dad' is suggestive of a cardboard everyman. We 
see how fragile he can be when Mum nearly dies during an illness. He loses his 
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bearing and combative fervour, and turns into "a giant who was lost" (TFR 58). In 
SOE, he becomes "a giant destroyed by the sun" (SOE 34) when Mum abandons 
him because of his demon-incited lust for Helen, "a stinking beggar girl with a 
goat's eye" (SOE 16). In his lighter moments, however, Dad can be affably mad. 
In an earthy and sensuous way, he displays a robust sense of the ridiculous, an 
amusing trait which Azaro appears to have inherited. Recall for instance Dad's 
child-like gregariousness at the thanksgiving party for Azaro. To the cheer of an 
appreciative crowd, Dad, with an eagle feather stuck out from the back of his 
bandaged head, jokes, tells riddles, falls into impersonations, dances, beats a tune 
out of a bottle and sings in a powerful voice to the music of his invention. At one 
point, when the women are singing in their village choir voices, Dad 
mischievously taps at his glass with a spoon and spoils the women's rhythm (TFR 
41-4). For all his kynical fire and child-like mischievousness, Dad is at heart a 
poet-philosopher who knows too well the "very hard facts of the world" (Okri, in 
Wilkinson 1992: 88). In what is arguably one of the most poignant, life-affirming 
moments in TFR, Dad implores to Azaro who is, having willed himself to die, a 
breath away from completely exiting the world of the living: 
My son, my only son ... We are poor. We have little to give you, 
but our love. You came out of our deepest joy. We prayed for you. 
We wanted you ... You have wept for us and watered the tree of 
love. We have suffered for you. Suffering is our home. We did not 
make this strange bed that we have to sleep on. But this world is 
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real. I have bled in it. So have you ... We are the miracles that 
God made to taste the bitter fruits of time. We are precious, and 
one day our suffering will tum into wonders of the earth ... Do 
you not see the mystery of our pain? That we bear poverty, are able 
to sing and dream sweet things. (TFR 337-8) 
Aside from revealing the poetic dimension of Dad's character, the 
melancholic entreaty also plays an obvious but crucial narrative function of 
bringing Azaro back from near-death, which in turns allows us uninterrupted 
access to the narrative universe in the trilogy. Just as important to note about 
Dad's supplication is the consummate optimism of his vision for the future. It is 
the same kind of optimism that Dad attempts to instil in others from the 
compound with irrepressible fervour so that they too can perceive political 
possibilities in impossibilities: 
We must take an interest in politics ... We must look at the world 
with new eyes. We must look at ourselves differently. We are 
freerer than we think ... Human beings are gods hidden from 
themselves. (TFR 498) 
If the way in which Dad articulates his political imaginings is 'insane', the 
content of the vision is even more so. To the bewilderment of those around him, 
Dad proposes that mosquitoes be trained as international spies, and flies as 
messengers (SOE 122). Less outrageously, he conjures an image of a country in 
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which everyone will receive the highest education, with music and mathematics 
as compulsory subjects (TFR 409). He vows to build universities for beggars and 
proposes that the people be taught, among other things, the art of concentration 
and the numerous philosophies of the land. As well, he plans to introduce special 
taxes on illiterates (SOE 122). Dad's imaginings may be silly and humorous but 
the humour is nonetheless serious because, as Edna Aizenberg notes, it "affirms 
the power of [the] mind to stretch, to assume responsibility, and to effect change" 
(1995: 29). 
Although the idea of performing the impossible ("redreaming the world", 
as Dad puts it) is, theoretically speaking, minimally plausible, we cannot ignore 
the fact that Dad gamers little support for his political vision. Neither can it be 
said that he manages to get the compound people to traverse their fantasy and see 
themselves as political strong poets. Still, to apply the lesson we have learned on 
suffering and the infinite wealth one can draw from it, would it not be more 
appropriate to read Dad's low rate of conversion as an indication of the vast 
success waiting for him? 
Belief before Belief 
The dilemma Dad faces in convincing others to subscribe and to actively live the 
belief in possibilities in impossibilities lies in the fact that no 'hard proof can be 
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produced to substantiate the truth of the belief. For that reason, Dad is viewed as a 
dreamy buffoon by those whose welfare he 'dementedly' tries to uplift. His 
inextinguishable optimism reminds us of Okri, whose writings demonstrate 
remarkable optimism in humanity's immense possibilities despite the "enshrined 
injustices of the world" (TFR 3). Although there is no ultimate guarantee to the 
truth of his belief, Okri continues to hold that there is an "immutable star" within 
us, a forgotten capacity to "give birth to [our] true self' (TFR 488). Okri has 
consistently returned to this central notion in all his writings from TFR onwards. 
In the poem 'Time to be Real', for instance, he lyricises the passing from "The 
illusion of our lesser selves / To the reality of our greater selves", the latter 
described as: 
What we sometimes suspect we are 
What we glimpse we are when in love 
Magnificent and mysterious beings 
Capable of creating civilisations 
Out of the wild lands of the earth 
And the dark places in our consciousness. (Okri 1999b: 4-5) 
Like Dad's ideas, Okri' s ideas are often regarded by detractors as 
unintelligible and/or dreamy (Hattersley 1999; Adil 1995). This is not unexpected 
since, in this age of diffuse cynicism and transgressive excesses where most 
things have lost their shock value, there are arguably few left who, having been 
"schooled in reality", would allow themselves to believe in something as 'na1ve' 
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as Okri' s notion of the immutable star, lest they be "taken for suckers" (Sloterdijk 
1987: 5-6). Still, from Okri's point of view, this does not detract from the 
misrecognised reality of our greater selves. That is to say, it is precisely because 
cynicism is so pervasive that our consciousness has become "humiliated" to the 
point where we overlook our inner capacity to go beyond ourselves (Okri 1999b: 
5). 
Convincing the cynic of the existence of his greater self requires more 
than 'hard proof, in the same way that it takes more than rational argumentation 
to convince a racist to give up his racist beliefs, or an infidel to embrace Islam, 
Christianity, and so forth. That is because Okri's immutable star is not an object 
that exists in materiality, unchanging in essence, and lying romantically dormant 
within each of us. Rather, it is real only if we first act as if it is real. To explain 
this paradox of "belief before belief'32 (Zizek 1989: 40), we first need to examine 
the logic of belief. From the psychoanalytic standpoint, we do not believe in 
something after we are convinced by some infallible proof of its truth. We find 
reasons attesting to our belief because we already believe without being conscious 
that we hold that belief (1989: 37). Belief is independent of knowledge; it only 
needs to presuppose that its guarantor ('hard proof, confirmatory knowledge) is 
'out there' even though "this guarantor is always deferred, displaced, never 
32The notion of 'belief before be1ief may be traced to the Christian thought of St. Augustine: 
crede ut intelligas ('believe in order to understand') . 
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present in persona" (Zizek 1997a: 108). Proof of our belief, however, is always-
already exteriorised, borne witness by our actions. As Zizek puts it, belief is 
"radically exterior, embodied in the practical, effective" customs that we follow 
(1989: 34). The fact that we follow a custom is already proof of our inner belief in 
the authority of that custom. This remains true even if the custom remains 
incomprehensible to us or if we continue to maintain a cynical distance towards it. 
The implication here is not that our factual behaviour directly conditions the 
content of our belief. Rather, our external activity is that which provides material 
support for our belief. If and when we become conscious of the belief, the 
conversion would merely be a "formal act by means of which we recognize what 
we have already believed" (1989: 40). The radical exteriority of the unconscious 
is similarly discernible in the domain of politics. Recall as previously discussed 
that the subject is seized by ideology precisely when he acts as if he does not 
know the falsity of the ideological proposition, as if it is possible to escape 
interpellation simply by maintaining a cynical distance towards the 'false' 
ideology. 
Here we can already appreciate why in Okri the "immutable star" or the 
"greater self' is real only if we first act as if (we believe) it is real. By 
unquestioningly submitting ourselves to the belief (as Dad does, as we shall see) 
and by imitating the ways of those who have 'moved mountains', belief will come 
by itself and along with it positive effects that could only have materialised 
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through belief. The procedure is not as strange as it may sound. Recall the road-
builders' metaphoric pursuit of their greater selves which Okri depicts as a pursuit 
of Heaven. The road-builders 'know' that Heaven does not 'really' exist. But 
because they continue to presuppose its existence and act as if Heaven not only 
exists but is within reach, they already 'objectively' believe. This remains true 
irrespective of what they consciously know or think is the significance of their 
pursuit. If and when the road-builders recognise the truth of the impossibility of 
their pursuit, the conversion would merely be a formal act of giving a name to 
what they have unconsciously believed in all along: the existence of their greater 
selves. 
The Authentic Act 
On Okri' s notion of the greater self, we could say that its actualisation requires a 
certain blind faith on the part of the subject and, more importantly, a leap of faith. 
All leaps of faith (ventures into the feared unknown) involve a minimum of risk 
( of bringing about some major catastrophe as a result of the transgression). From 
within the horizon of what precedes the leap, the leap "always and by definition 
appears as a change 'from Bad to Worse"' (Zizek 1999f: 377). In the face of this, 
the "proper heroism" is not to hold on to the Bad but to fully assume the Worse. 
The flamenco dancer in Okri ' s essay 'Beyond Words: A Secular Sermon' (1996a) 
clearly exemplifies the ' ten·orism' of the act. Wounded by someone who alluded 
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that she has no duende ('fire'), the dancer knows "she has to dance her way past 
her limitations, and that this may destroy her forever. She has to fail, or she has to 
die." With ritual slowness, she begins her dance, stamps fire into her loins and 
takes herself apart before the audience's sceptical gaze: 
She is disintegrating, shouting and stamping and dissolving the 
boundaries of her body. Soon she becomes a wild unknown force, 
glowing in her death, dancing from her wound, dying in her dance. 
And when she stops - strangely gigantic in her new fiery stature -
she is like one who has survived the most dangerous journey of all. 
(Okri 1996a: 10) 
The outcome of heroism is always radically undecidable. The flamenco 
dancer, for example, does not know if she will succeed in surpassing herself and, 
in doing so, prove her critics wrong. It is very possible that she might fail. If she 
does, her credibility will be irreparably damaged. Fully aware of the risk, she 
nonetheless decides that she cannot not do it. She starts off slowly and in no time 
blazes as if 'something in her more than her' has suddenly seized control to propel 
her to a new level of the possible. 
The flamenco dancer's performance is what Zizek would term an 
"authentic act" (1999f: 374). An authentic act is not just any action performed to 
achieve or avoid something. It is rather an act that "unexpectedly 'just occurs' ... 
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(after an authentic act, my reaction is always 'Even I don't know how I was able 
to do that, it just happened!')" (1999f: 375). The paradox is that although the act 
is not intentional in the usual sense of being consciously willed, "it is nevertheless 
accepted as something for which its agent is fully responsible - I cannot do 
otherwise, yet I am none the less fully free in doing it" (1999f: 376). Furthermore, 
the act, if successful, always leads to a 'miraculous' symbolic death and rebirth. 
Okri' s flamenco dancer blazes into a "new fiery stature ... shining in celebration 
of her own death" (Okri 1996a: 10), in the same way that the Lacanian subject of 
desire transforms into the subject of drive, recreated ex nihilo, when he traverses 
his fantasy. The lesson here applies equally to Okri's politics and the result is the 
same in that it leads to a radical rewriting of the rules of the game. The act 
redefines the very contours of what is possible ( an act 
accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to 
be 'impossible', yet it changes its conditions so that it creates 
retroactively the conditions of its own possibility). (Zizek 2000a: 
121) 
In TFR , the main agent of the authentic act is, unsurprisingly, Dad. 
Encouraged by the countless number of political thugs and creditors he has 
frightened off with his fists , Dad - who used to box and wrestle before moving to 
the city ghetto - decides to embark on a side-career in boxing to make some 
money from bets. Calling himself Black Tyger, Dad starts to train dementedly. It 
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is during one of his solitary training sessions that he performs his first of three 
authentic acts in TFR. Out of the darkness of the night, a man who goes by the 
name of Yell ow Jaguar emerges to challenge Dad. (Dad is to later realise that 
Yellow Jaguar is the spirit of a famous boxer who died three years ago.) Black 
Tyger accepts the challenge and they fight, raining blows on one another and 
falling into puddles. Towards the end, Dad is pulverised, crushed "with an 
avalanche of ceaseless punches" from his opponent (TFR 356). Just when defeat 
appears imminent, something unexpected happens: 
Dad rose miraculously in stature. And with all the concentrated 
rage and insanity of those who have a single moment in which to 
choose between living and dying, Dad broke the chains of 
exhaustion and thundered such blows on the man as would 
annihilate an entire race of giants. (TFR 357) 
Unable to withstand the blows, Yellow Jaguar crumbles and promptly 
disappears into the earth. Victory leaves the seriously wounded Dad in a state of 
subjective and physical destitution. He literally loses himself in "agony and 
amnesia" (TFR 359). Like "the biggest newborn baby in the world", he has to be 
fed pap. He drools, farts indiscriminately and sleeps "like a baby". But on the 
seventh day he makes a miraculous recovery. He is reborn with "fresh energies", 
"interesting powers and a kind of madness" (TFR 364). 
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If Dad's first symbolic death and rebirth gives him a burning new 
enthusiasm to train harder, his second (following an authentic act performed 
during a boxing match with the menacing Green Leopard) transforms him on a 
deeper level. As if the fight had "dislodged something in his brain", Dad starts to 
talk about "becoming a politician and bringing freedom and prosperity to the 
world and free education to the poor" (TFR 408). With unselfconscious 
exuberance, he goes around the compound in earnest to canvass support, 
persisting even when he is verbally abused and doors are slammed in his face. 
Despite his illiteracy, books become a new priority. In his speeches, visions of 
political miracles are conjured and the people chastised "for not thinking for 
themselves", for their "sheep-like philosophy, their tribal mentality, their 
swallowing of lies, their tolerance of tyranny, [and] their eternal silence in the 
face of suffering" (TFR 420). Because of his enhanced determination in fighting 
"the threatening extinction that poverty and injustice" brings, Dad (Black Tyger) 
has been compared to the Yoruba gods, Shango and Ogun (Quayson 1995b, 
1995a). The former is the feared god of thunder who "when he spoke, fire came 
out of his mouth" (Bascom 1993: 44). Ogun, on the other hand, stands for 
"justice, the justice of the gods and the justice required in human action" (Lawson 
1984: 62). 
If Dad's second transformation (authentic act, symbolic death, recreation 
ex nihilo) brings about a conversion whereby he formally becomes the political 
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strong poet he has always informally been since his early days as a headstrong 
kynic, the third marks his ultimate traversal of fantasy and the transformation of 
the kernel of his being. Destroyed and bed-ridden for days after a near-fatal duel 
with "the man in a white suit", Dad suddenly arises "from the bed as from death" 
(TFR 497). With his wounds healed, despair deepened, and spirit strengthened, 
Dad is no longer the same man: "I am converted - I am blinded - I am beginning 
to see" (TFR 499). (This, as we will subsequently see in SOE, is to lead to the 
crystallisation of his hitherto scattered and partially-formed political vision for the 
liberation of Africa.) Thereafter, the beggars Dad previously adopted as his 
"world constituents" (TFR 419) become even more central to his politics. They 
are fed, looked after and promised social upliftment through education so that 
they would no longer be deceived and treated like children by powerful people 
(SOE 8). Dad gets so carried away by his obsession with the beggars' welfare that 
his own family is neglected and Mum, exasperated beyond words, is (temporarily) 
given into Madame Koto 's circle of influence. 
Dad's irrational act bears all the hallmarks of the psychoanalytic notion of 
the authentic act. By "striking at himself, at what is most precious to him" (Zizek 
2000a: 122), namely his self-interest, Dad is not, as it might appear, 'stupidly' 
sabotaging his own life. On the contrary, he is "cutting himself loose from the 
precious object through whose possession the enemy [keeps] him in check." 
Dad's authentic act makes it clear to the corrupt politicians and their thugs that no 
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ransom may be held against him. The act also allows Dad to directly over-identify 
with the ideology of shared prosperity (that the parties cynically propagate to win 
votes) to the point where he literally hijacks it. Dad's kynical heroism may be 
seen as laughably na1ve today but it is precisely what Okri' s politics demands. To 
enjoy shared prosperity, one should not just talk about it or expect to just share the 
prosperity of others. One should more importantly, share one's own and, in doing 
so, concretely demonstrate that man is, or can at least try to be, god to man (Okri 
1992d). For Dad, there is no distinction between theory and practice. Through his 
actions, he demonstrates to the powers-that-be the ethical way in which power 
ought to be exercised - not for obscene self-enrichment but towards the 
upliftment of the welfare of the people, the impoverished compound-dwellers 
including himself, Mum and Azaro ( all of whom are only one socioeconomic step 
away from becoming beggars themselves). 
For the above reasons, it would be inaccurate to say that "Dad never really 
meets politics head-on" (Phillips 1996: 167), or that Okri is "more introspective, 
more personal [and] less radical, than Achebe and his peers" (Charles Nivens, in 
Hawley 1995: 3 7). Okri, through Dad, is in fact 'terroristically' political since he 
goes a step beyond the kind of intervention that works within the framework of 
existing sociopolitical relations. His politics is the "art of the impossible" (Okri 
1996a: 43), a politics that seeks to change "the very parameter of what is 
considered 'possible' in the existing constellation" (Zizek 1999f: 199). Likewise, 
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Dad is political - not in the nai:ve sense of being the superhero who single-
handedly changes the world. Rather, his role is closer to Fredric Jameson's 
"vanishing mediator" (1988) or, in Fyodor Dostoyevsky' s less romantic terms, 
"manure of the future" (Sloterdijk 1987: 182), that is, a catalyst like Ade who 
paves the way so that others after him may extend the struggle. 
The logic and moral of Dad's radical act is embedded in a parable he tells 
Azaro about the good man and the evil mosquito. "There was once a man who 
suffered all the bad things that can happen to a human being", Dad narrates. 
Everything precious had been taken away from him. His son died, his house 
burned down, the wife left him, his boss gave him the sack and, while crossing the 
road, a cow kicked him in the face. On top of that, the man fell sick and began to 
die. Instead of cursing his fate, the man bore his ill fortune with fortitude. Out of 
nowhere, a mosquito appeared before him with an irresistible proposal: stop being 
a good n1an and you will not only live but gain all the wealth and luck one can 
only dream of possessing; refuse and you will die the next morning. The man 
rejected the mosquito's offer and set off to perform more good deeds in one night 
than in his entire life. The next morning, the mosquito returned. To its 
astonishment, the man said that he was not afraid to die: 
I have given them my life. I used to be one. Now, I am many. They 
will become more. How many of us can you kill? The more you 
kill, the more we will become. (SOE 46) 
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Through the three main authentic acts he performs in TFR, Dad has well 
and truly awakened to the radical possibility of impossible political 
transformations, the truth of which is encapsulated in the famous sentence which 
appears near the end of the first book of the abiku trilogy: "We can redream this 
world and make the dream real" (TFR 498). 
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- 4 -
SONGS OF ENCHANTMENT 
Mathematics of Destiny 
Where TFR closes on a uplifting note, Songs of Enchantment (SOE) opens to an 
ominous future. As if to remind us readers of the impossibility of completion, and 
as if to caution us against hastily equating Dad's transformations in the first book 
of the trilogy with 'arrival', Azaro says early in SOE that nothing is ever finished 
and "struggles are never truly concluded" (SOE 3). With his abiku foresight, 
Azaro reveals that the political chaos brought on by the coming independence is 
spreading. It is already amidst the compound people, "waiting to burst into 
flames" and unhinge the minds and lives of many. Children will die from water 
poisoning. Around the country, dissension will grow fat and many who have 
hitherto opposed the rich party will accept its patronage. They will be defeated by 
hunger, unable to wait any longer for justice to come. Ade will die in a car crash, 
his father will go insane and be killed by thugs from the Party of the Rich, 
Madame Koto will be stabbed (but her death postponed until IR) and countless 
other calamities will befall the compound people before SOE runs its course. 
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Interestingly, although the unborn nation is fast disintegrating in the novel, Okri 
does not see it as a "dark" book: 
My books that seem to be books of light are actually books of 
despair, and I always say that, with the passing of time, 
Astonishing the Gods, which is seen as the book of light, will grow 
darker, and a book like Songs of Enchantment, which is seen as a 
dark book, will grow lighter. It will change over time. (Falconer 
1997) 
Okri does not elaborate on how SOE might be seen as growing lighter in 
time but the answer is already implicit in the 'twisted' logic of the impossible 
('the greater the lack, the more there is to overcome, and the more levels of self-
transcendence there is to achieve'). Darkness is light in the same way that every 
failure is a secret victory, a prepared ground for the active reinvention of a higher 
order. In the context of SOE, we might say that the darkness overshadowing the 
lives of the compound people is a prelude to the emergence of a higher political 
order. This "mathematics of destiny" (Okri, in Falconer 1997: 46), the way in 
which things, when the time is right, will somehow work out for those who 
persevere, applies as much to the trilogy as it does to Nigeria and Africa. 
"Things peak at different times for different people", says Okri (Hattersley 
1999). "Africa has gone through its own stage of civilisation a thousand years 
ago and gone into a decline. It ' s like Greece." Elsewhere, Okri suggests the 
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reason for such a decline: "It is possible that one has been travelling on one road 
for too long" (Linton 1991). As a result, one has 'forgotten' the reason for 
travelling. Forgetting, as we know from the road-builders in TFR, leads to the fall 
of civilisation. Applying the logic to postcolonial Africa, we might say that the 
people's challenge to stay alive (within the global economic system) and to stay 
intact ( as a nation in a world divided by ethnonationalist upsurges) need not 
extend into bad infinity. The prevalent image of Africa as a perpetually starving 
and naturally backward continent "inhabited not by human beings but by a 
monstrous variation of black insects" (IR 203) is far from a reflection of the norm 
or the culmination of its destiny. Similarly, Africa's present decline does not 
suggest, as "contemporary peakers" believe, that its people "never had a peak" 
and that "all they had was dark ages" (Okri, in Hattersley 1999). 
Okri points out that rarely do commentators underline the continent's 
"incredible capacity not to die and not be destroyed" (Hattersley 1999). They tend 
to overlook Africa's "resilience of the spirit" and over-emphasise the negatives 
such as "the effects of colonialism on our consciousness". It is not possible, Okri 
asks, that colonialism did not penetrate the kernel of Africa, "our spiritual and 
aesthetic and mythic internal structures, the way in which we perceive the world" 
(Wilkinson 1992: 86-7)? Of course, he says, colonialism had been "a hugely 
negative thing in many ways - particularly its effect on the self-perception of the 
people ... for a while, the people saw themselves as less than what they were" 
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(Hattersley 1999). But does it mean that the damage is irreparable or that Africa's 
resilience is less worthy of attention in comparison to its "brief nightmare of 
colonisation" (IR 114 )? 
Okri 's contestation of the metanarrative of the west as the privileged agent 
of history and the bearer of light to Africa is not a new enterprise. Many others 
before him have questioned if scholars (including even well-meaning Africanist 
historiographers and anthropologists) have not themselves perpetuated the 
distorted image of the dark continent in their haste to grasp and explain away its 
failures (see, for example, Temu and Swai 1981; Jewsiewicki and Newbury 1986; 
Austen 1993). Similarly, the relationship between coloniser-colonised has been 
debated since as early as Senghor, Fanon, and Memmi. Much of that has been 
explored elsewhere so, to avoid needless repetition, we will in this chapter limit 
our focus to just one question: where does Okri sit in this familiar landscape? We 
might begin by noting, first of all, that in spite of evident postcolonial concerns in 
his writings, Okri himself is not keen on the label. As he says in an interview: 
I reject utterly the way in which my work is placed within the 
whole context of the margin, the periphery, postcolonial and stuff 
like that. I think those are very poor descriptions of the work that 
some of us are trying to do. Because it completely situates the 
work within a time/historical context and not within the context of 
the self and inner necessity, which is bigger and beyond that. And 
there are affinities between writers that have more to do with that 
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than they have to do with the fact that they both come from so-
called ex-colonial nations. When people do that they're not seeing 
what I'm doing and they're completely missing the point and I feel 
sad about that. (Falconer 1997: 44) 
Here one might perhaps be tempted to read Okri' s self-distancing from the 
"postcolonial and stuff like that" with a pinch of salt. After all, according to the 
standard cynical view, writers almost never fail to bemoan the fact that their 
writings have been misinterpreted, and readers should therefore treat writers' 
outbursts as a kind of writerly posturing that ultimately has little if any bearing on 
the writings themselves. There is, generally speaking, nothing inherently wrong 
with this approach. Writers do sometimes overlook the textuality of their texts. 
The problem with taking this approach to Okri, however, is that his texts are in 
many ways at odds with textbook prescriptions of postcolonial theory. For 
instance, is 'Africanness' a 'stupid' essentialist myth, a defensive-reactionary 
appeal to some unique essence that does not exist? Is it a self-defeating response 
to colonialism, a cover-up of Africa's inferiority complex and shame of its 
colonizability? Could it instead be a 'necessary lie' that is useful only if we use it 
to "free us from our smallness" and "help us get to our true reality" (Okri 1999b: 
5)? These are some of the key questions we will be examining in relation to 
Okri's attempt at revalidating Africa's relationship with the rest of the world. 
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The African Way 
Dad continues to propound his fantastic political visions and the novel ways in 
which he is "going to rule this country" (SOE 119) in the same feverish style in 
SOE as in TFR. It is in SOE more than TFR, however, that these visions attain 
fuller density and historical-contextual specificity. Consider, for example, the 
episode set in Madame Koto' s bar where Dad is found sounding off his political 
ideas to Azaro and goes on for so long and so vigorously that Azaro, already 
growing edgy, is invaded by all kinds of insects. Although this scene is not much 
different from the others where Dad talks about wondrous political possibilities, it 
is particularly worth noting because Dad's ideals are for the first time explicitly 
referred to (by Azaro) as visions of an "African utopia" ( emphasis added, SOE 
124 ), where "we would pool all our secret wisdom, distil our philosophies, 
conquer our bad history, and make our people glorious in the world of 
continents." 
Africa, continues Dad, "is the home of the world" that "could be the 
garden of the earth" (SOE 126). But "look at how we live in this world", he 
laments, pointing to all that is wrong with the continent. Dad's emphasis on 
Africa is amplified by Azaro 's account of a momentous spirit event secretly 
taking place amidst the nation's political chaos. With his abiku eyes, Azaro sights 
in the sky "the slow migration of the great spirits of Africa" (26). He is initially 
unable to comprehend what he sees, their dreams "impenetrable, locked and 
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coded in gnomic riddles." After a few sightings, he begins to understand that the 
innumerable great spirits of the continent and master spirits from all over the 
world are "coming together for their mighty convocation" ( 40-1 ). They are trailed 
by "representatives of our forgotten gods, our transformative ancestors" (159), 
and behind them, representatives from the spirit world who had lived 
The African Way - The Way of compassion and fire and serenity: 
The Way of freedom and power and imaginative life; The Way 
that keeps the mind open to the existences beyond our earthly 
sphere; that keeps the spirit pure and primed to all the rich 
possibilities of living ... The Way that preaches attunement with 
all the higher worlds, that believes in forgiveness and generosity of 
spirit, always receptive, always listening, always kindling the 
understanding of signs ... The Way that always, like a river, flows 
into and flows out of the myriad Ways of the world. (SOE 159-60) 
Also referred to as "the Original Way" (SOE 160), the African Way is yet 
another expression of Okri's trope of (un)fixity. Characterised by neither absolute 
fixity nor absolute non-fixity, the African Way is fluid and open to the myriad 
other Ways. From Azaro we also learn that it is a way of being in the world, a 
spiritual mode of existence in which "forgotten and undiscovered" ancestral 
knowledge was produced (161). Ancestral knowledge encompasses 
legends and moments of history ... wonderful forms of divination 
by numbers and cowries and signs, numerological systems for 
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summoning the gods, ... the stories and myths and philosophical 
disquisitions on the relativities of African Time and Space . . . 
astronomical incidents: the date of a stellar explosion, a supernova 
bursting over the intense dream of the continent, heralding, 
according to a king's soothsayer, a brief nightmare of colonization, 
and an eventual, surpassing, renaissance. (IR 113-4) 
From Okri' s description of the African Way quoted above, it would seem 
that he is advocating a return to the idealized purity of pre-colonial Africa, and 
that he subscribes to Senghor's Negritude which today is generally dismissed as 
na1ve and essentialist. The question is: is it possible for Okri' s African Way to 
overlap with Senghor's Negritude? Is Okri not known as a postmodern writer, and 
are postmodern writers not opposed to essentialism? To answer these questions, 
we should perhaps begin by pointing out that the most unfortunate thing about 
Negritude is that the popular view of it being theoretically suspect is also the most 
inaccurate. Negritude has been dismissed for setting up false binarism: "Negro 
emotion confronting Hellenistic reason; intuitive Negro reasoning through 
participation facing European analytical thinking through utilization" (Mudimbe 
1988: 94). It has also been criticised by writers like Ayi Kwei Armah, Wole 
Soyinka and Ezekiel Mphahlele for making the black man look ridiculous by 
portraying him as having "insect antennas" and "mystic emotion" (Senghor 1964: 
74). Are these fair accusations? Let us look at two passages from Senghor's On 
African Socialism: 
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In contrast to the classic European, the Negro African does not 
draw a line between himself and the object; he does not hold it at a 
distance, nor does he merely look at it and analyze it. After holding 
it at a distance, after scanning it without analyzing it, he takes it 
vibrant in his hands, careful not to kill or fix it. He touches it, feels 
it, smells it. (Senghor 1964: 72) 
Thus the Negro African . . . abandons his personality to become 
identified with the Other, dies to be reborn in the Other. He does 
not assimilate; he is assimilated. He lives a common life with the 
Other; he lives a symbiosis ... he 'knows [i.e. "is born with"] the 
Other'. Subjects and objects are dialectically face to face in the 
very act of knowledge. (1964: 72-3) 
Of the two passages, the first is clearly the romantic one. It paints the 
Negro African as a native endowed with the mythical ability to perceive secret 
interconnectivities between all things and experience harmonic oneness with the 
world. The second passage, by contrast, is not only perfectly reasonable but also, 
one is tempted to say, Lacanian in implication: the Other is not external to the 
subject's identity but intimately external; it is extimate, "radically interior and at 
the same time already exterior" to oneself (Zizek 1989: 180). The subject always 
by default misrecognises the truth about this extimate relationship. That is why, it 
is only when he abandons his personality (his agalma, what is most precious to 
him) to become identified with the Other (recognise that he has always already 
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been the Author of his Fate), will he be symbolically reborn in the place where the 
Other always-already was (become a self-recognising subject of drive). Reading 
the second passage from Senghor from a Lacanian standpoint, we might also say 
that reality is not a pre-discursive object but something that has to be found "in 
the very act of knowledge" (Senghor 1964: 73), in the traversal of one's 
fundamental fantasy. (That Senghor might have been influenced by Lacan is not 
at all improbable. We need only recall that Negritude, which sprang from French-
speaking African intellectuals, was "not an exotic or theoretical doctrine foreign 
to French thought" (Markovitz 1969: 4 7), and that Senghor, then a prominent 
figure in the elite French social circle, was well versed in continental philosophy.) 
It is not often mentioned that Senghor was acutely aware of the hostile 
reception to his ideas. Defending his position, he says in "Negritude: A 
Humanism of the Twentieth Century" that all he is simply saying is that Africa 
has gone through history in ways that are distinct from Europe, and that because 
of these differences, Africa has come to possess unique culturally-encoded 
sensibilities that are not irrelevant and inferior simply because they differ from the 
European norm. The fundamentals of Senghor' s vision are not lost on scholars 
like V.Y. Mudimbe who argue that the dominant view of Negritude as promoting 
false binarisms "seems quite wrong" (1988: 94). Senghor's philosophy, he says, 
can be simply understood through a challenging proposition he offered to the 
Senegalese Socialist Party in July 1963: "Finally, what too many Africans lack, is 
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the awareness of our poverty and creative imagination, I mean the spirit of 
resourcefulness." The same point has been highlighted by Janet Vaillant. With 
Negritude, she says, Senghor is not trying to resuscitate the past; neither is he 
advocating that Africans live in a museum. Rather, he is "making sure that in 
transforming the African milieu, Africans remain true to the best tradition of the 
past" (1990: 265). Is that not also the same point Okri makes when he formulates 
the African aesthetic as "a way of looking at the world in more than three 
dimensions" and "the mythic frame that shapes the way we affect the world and 
the way the world affects us" (Wilkinson 1992: 88)? 
In the abiku trilogy, Okri not only insists on the resilience of the African 
Way, he also says that those who attempt to negate it would only end up negating 
themselves. To borrow the words of the Governor-General in IR, because 
imperialists "set out to dominate the world, they are condemned to live with the 
negative facts of their domination. They will be changed by the world that they 
set out colonize" (IR 161 ). The logic of 'he who thinks he penetrates Africa is, 
unbeknownst to him, always-already penetrated' (to adapt Lacan's 'the one who 
counts is always-already included in the account') is nicely illustrated by Cezair-
Thompson in her reading of the 'famished road' motif. In her essay, she contrasts 
Okri's road of creation with the road in Joyce Cary's Mister Johnson. The latter, 
she argues, represents the path "which the colonizers impose upon Africa, and 
which symbolically appropriates the natives' rights to 'imagine' their own 
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destiny, map their own terrain and tell their own story" (1996: 35). Olai's road, 
by contrast, is mythic-creative in origins, always transforming itself and elusive of 
all attempts to pin it down. It is perpetually hungry and ever-ready to devour those 
who travel on it without first offering the proper sacrifices. In TFR, one of its 
victims is the white man in Mum's story. The white man in the tale was once an 
important figure in the colonial government of the unborn nation. Then all the 
Independence trouble started and for three years he tried to leave the country but 
kept failing. Even taking a plane out was futile. When he got off the plane, he 
found himself back in the same place. It was only later he discovered that "the 
only way to get out of Africa is to get Africa out of you" (TFR 483). The moral 
here is that the white man - representative of "short-sighted conquerors of the 
times' (SOE 160) - may colonise the continent, extract its riches and wreak havoc 
on it, but ultimately it is he who is 'screwed' (like Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness), 'swallowed up' by the Africa. 
Olai's Original Way is similar to "the Way" in Ayi Kwei Armah's Two 
Thousand Seasons in that both are related to the concept of healing through 
ancestral knowledge. The difference between them, however, is that while 
Armah's Way is directed primarily towards healing the social diseases caused by 
colonialism (Phillips 1996: 170), Olai's Way is "a supra-human agency that 
provides the present generation with the means to remember forgotten wonders 
and regenerative myths." Maggii Phillips is correct to note that it cures by 
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revitalising the subject with "heightened psychic perception." However, it would 
be erroneous to assume from this that the psychic/spiritual and the social/political 
in Okri are separable. Firstly it is worth stressing that healing and self-
reconciliation via Okri' s African Way is not equivalent to the ideal act of 
rendering oneself ontologically complete by returning to ancestral practice. It is 
rather to "say yes to destiny and illumination" (TFR 487), to rekindle what 
Senghor calls Africa's "spirit of resourcefulness". Put another way, it is to replace 
one's cynical-defeatist attitude of thought with one which keeps the mind wide 
open to possibilities in impossibilities. 
To clarify this with one final illustration, we might imagine the subject in 
search of healing via the African Way as having to "make a parabolic journey" 
(SOE 281) across to the unknown 'other side' where the Cure is believed to lie 
waiting. The twist here is that if and when the subject does eventually make the 
journey and cross the threshold ('let go' of himself, think the unthinkable), he will 
discover that, contrary to what he had hitherto assumed, the Cure is not 'out 
there', external to himself, to be found in the mimicking of ancestral rituals. These 
rituals, "if they are noble" (Okri 1999b: 5), are only there to help us cope with the 
"fire and ice of being born" (SOE 131) and to recognise that "OUR DESTINY IS 
[and has always been] IN OUR HANDS" (italics added, SOE 279). This perhaps 
explains the significance of the novel's title and the reason why Okri sees SOE as 
a book of light rather than darkness. SOE celebrates the enchantment and 
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redivination of the self, and this celebration is made possible, ironically enough, 
by the "new powers" that are attempting to negate it, namely the corrupt political 
class of the would-be nation as well as "those whose hunger had been defeated by 
the promise of wealth and instant protection" and "who didn't want to suffer and 
wait for justice any more" (SOE 111 ). This is ultimately the same as saying that 
SOE 'celebrates' political strife - not by perversely revelling in it, but in 
recognising that it is, in the final account, a secret opportunity to surmount the 
seven mountains of life and, in doing so, surmount oneself. For that reason, we 
argue, the spiritual in Okri is always-already political. 
All Things are Linked: Okri, Senghor and the Universal 
Civilisation 
If Okri's African Way is, as with Senghor's Negritude, not 'stupid' essentialism, 
might it then perhaps qualify as strategic essentialism, defined by Gayatri Spivak 
as the ideally self-conscious "strategic use of an essence as a mobilizing slogan or 
masterword" ('African ', 'woman', 'the name of the nation', and so on) (Spivak 
1993: 3 )? As one of the "myriad Ways of the World" (SOE 160), is the African 
Way in any way comparable to, say, the 'Asian Way' , an ideology strategically 
championed by East Asian leaders like Singapore 's Lee Kuan Yew and 
Malaysia' s Mahathir Mohamad? 
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The Asian Way asserts its particularity as a synthesis of 'Asian values' 
and capitalist-economic rationalism. It can be and is in fact powerfully appealing 
to many Asians who harbour a "deep resentment against the West for its past 
colonialism and who have an inferiority complex in regard to Western 
civilization" (Tatsuo 1999: 28). Not dissimilar to Okri's Way, it is at once a 
reaction-formation to the trauma of colonialism, a rejection of the West's self-
representation as the body of universal values, as well as a "beautiful" (1999: 40) 
way of healing its post-colonised people. The two Ways - Asian and Okri' s -
clearly overlap in certain ways. If we examine them closely, however, we will 
find that they are quite distinct. Unlike Okri's Way, the Asian Way is in the last 
instance a cynical ideology deftly employed by the political class in East Asia to 
restrict civil rights, inculcate blind obedience to authority, cover up corrupt 
practices and perpetuate existing relations of oppression. It is also a kind of 
reverse racism, constituted as it is strictly on the basis of pure difference, where 
transaction between self and other could only be conducted with the former being 
perpetually tormented by a deep fear of being robbed of its superior Asian Thing-
jouissance. (This, despite the obvious fact that there is no one homogenous Asia, 
just as there is also no one Africa). 
In radical contrast, Okri' s Way is not, to put it in Laclau' s parlance, a 
particularity posited in a purely differential relation with other particularities 
(Laclau 1996d: 27). It does not close in upon itself but "always, like a river, flows 
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into and flows out of the myriad Ways of the world" (SOE 160). Although it has 
its distinctive, culturally and historically determined expressions (forms and 
divinations, stories and myths, etc.), it shares with the other Ways the same 
pulsation, "a nameless yearning" for the impossible (Okri 1997b: 11). Like the 
river of creation which became a road which then branched out to the whole 
world (TFR 3), all Ways flow like rivers to the great sea to constitute what Okri 
calls the "universal civilisation". 
The notion of universal civilisation has not received as much attention as 
the abiku and famished road motif but it is pivotal to, if not culminative of, Okri' s 
vision in which "All things are linked" (TFR 483). It appears to have received 
first mention in 'Redreaming the World', an essay where Okri, by way of clearing 
the ground for the introduction of the term, reminds contemporary victors not to 
forget the mathematics of destiny, i.e. that "to swallow the history of others into 
your own history is to expect to be constipated with the history of others" (Okri 
1990). To "strangled nations" and "wounded peoples", he asks that they not "hold 
themselves down with rage about their historical past or their intolerable present" 
but to instead find the humility to distil what they have into the "highest 
creativity". It is only when people recognise the logic of the rise and fall of things, 
Okri writes, that there may be hope "for us all to create the beginnings of the first 
true universal civilisation in the history of recorded and unrecorded time." 
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Universal civilisation surfaces next in Okri' s essay, 'Time to Dream the 
Best Dream of All' (1995b) wherein he urges the United Nations (UN) to 
steadfastly commit to its "universal goal": "the realisation of the human potential, 
the eradication of poverty, the enhancement of liberty, and the triumph of justice". 
Despite UN' s shortcomings, Okri says, it is today "the only organisation still 
vaguely capable of articulating the notion of one world, a sort of symphony of 
humanity." It is not until Astonishing The Gods (ATG), though, that the notion 
receives its fullest treatment. From the allegorical novel, we learn that the dream 
of the Invisibles is to "initiate on earth the first universal civilisation where love 
and wisdom would be as food and air" (ATG 131), a place where 
the most ordinary goal was living the fullest life, in which 
creativity in all spheres of endeavour was the basic alphabet, and in 
which the most sublime lessons possible were always learned and 
relearned from the unforgettable suffering which was the bedrock 
of their great new civilisation. (ATG 28) 
Since ATG, the notion has been invoked in several other places. In 'The 
Joys of Story-Telling I', for instance, Okri reflects on the postmodern collapse of 
the great systems (in whose name nations and individuals have wreaked violence 
upon others), how the "fragmentary edifices of certainties strewn about the world" 
are celebrated rather than mourned by strong poets, "albeit with some sadness in 
their hearts", because they know that only when the last remaining towers of 
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certainty collapse can "the beginnings of a true world history and genius flower .. 
. only then might the world hope as one and struggle as one, towards the first 
universal golden age" (Okri 1997b: 30). Finally, we come to the abiku trilogy 
where the notion is invoked as the "grand picture of humanity" (IR 113), a 
composite of "the great jigsaw that the creator [had] spread all over the diverse 
peoples of the earth, hinting that no one race or people can have the complete 
picture or monopoly of the ultimate possibilities of the human genius alone" 
(112). 
Even from these few examples, it is clear that the universal civilisation is a 
central constant in Okri' s writings. What is perhaps not as evident, however, is 
how much the notion recalls, if not owe its roots to Senghor's lesser-known 
Negritudist conception of the "Civilization of the Universal" (1993: 32). For 
Senghor, the universal civilisation is a reconciled totality of inherently equal parts 
of a "divided but interdependent world". It is a panhuman order to be achieved 
through a world-historical "dynamic symbiosis" wherein only the fecund 
elements of each part will be retained and the harmful discarded (Senghor 1964: 
49-50). In Senghor's view, Africa stood to benefit from "an infusion of the 
inquisitive spirit and a higher development of analytical reason", while "Western 
Europe, now locked in a dehumanising worship of machines and material wealth, 
will benefit from the African contribution of its greater emotional and spiritual 
development, vitality, and understanding of the interconnectedness of all life in 
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the universe" (Vaillant 1990: 266). Senghor rejected Sartre's class-inflected 
reading of Negritude which says that Africa's black cultural values will be 
cancelled out when the grand symbiosis of cultures happens. Africa, Senghor 
argued, will remain African, true to the culture of Negritude and the goal of 
African socialism which was to create "a society in which the human personality 
can reach its potential" (Vaillant 1990: 268). As well, Senghor rejected Marxist 
historical determinism, that is, the belief that one day when the revolutionary 
proletariat has finally done away with capitalism, all of society's false 
contradictions will dissolve, power will cancel itself out and a post-political 
utopia will materialise itself. In Senghor' s humanistic view, the march of history 
was neither inevitable nor irreversible, for if it was, then "there could be no 
purpose in human life or value in any human ideal" (Vaillant 1990: 266: 268). He 
did, however, ultimately believe, in contrast to Okri, that the new order was a 
practical possibility through collective effort. 
It is clear from what we have just seen that Senghor' s philosophy has, 
directly or otherwise, shaped Okri' s own. Although there are essentialist moments 
in both conceptions that would furrow the brows of postcolonial critics, we should 
not, as previously iterated, overlook the fundamental premise of Okri' s and 
Senghor's project: the reaffirmation of the worth of all Ways within the universal 
scheme of things. We should also note that Okri does not draw wholesale from 
Senghor but radicalises his thought, "blasphemes aesthetically" (Okri, in Falconer 
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1997: 46), we might say. For example, where Senghor conceives the realization of 
the universal civilisation as a distant but actual possibility, Okri sees it as an 
impossible ideal to be pursued but never to be fully attained because that would 
only lead to the cessation of the infinite overcoming of self-limitations. Okri's 
universal civilisation (like the road-builders' Heaven in ATG) is in this precise 
sense a "transgressive utopia" (Sargisson 2000: 2) which, instead of insisting on 
arrival, celebrates process over product. 
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- 5 -
INFINITE RICHES 
The Third Cycle 
As with SOE, Infinite Riches (IR), the third volume of the abiku trilogy, begins on 
a solemn note that anticipates the advent of some major calamity. In contrast to 
Azaro's opening lines in SOE, Dad's which opens IR is markedly 'unmagical', 
intimating that Dad is perhaps, for the first time, coming to realise that one man's 
consummate optimism and ceaseless struggles may not be enough to shortcircuit 
the nation's abiku cycle of bad infinity: 
Time is growing ... And our suffering is growing too. When will 
our suffering bear fruit? One great thought can alter the future of 
the world. One revelation. One dream. But who will dream that 
dream? And who will make it real? (IR 5) 
The reader who has followed the abiku saga from its inception would, no 
doubt, growing a little restive, ask the same: will the people's positive dream for 
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the would-be nation's flowering ever come true, or will the nation repeat ad 
infinitum the abiku cycle of bad infinity? 
As the nation enters the final stages of its birth-throes in IR, Dad will be 
arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of murder for daring to bury the rotting 
corpse of Ade's father. Mum, hitherto content to remain in the background, will 
temporarily come forward and overshadow Dad after she stumbles into national 
prominence as a political figure. Madame Koto, the seemingly invincible 
barwoman-turned-politician will finally meet with her death, as Azaro has long 
predicted. And Jeremiah, the small-time photographer, who was brutalised in TFR 
by political thugs for taking incriminating pictures of "reality and corruption" 
(TFR 233) before he disappeared, will reemerge as a successful "international 
photographer" (IR 41 ). On the political side of things, the infinitely postponed 
great political rally planned since TFR will finally take place, albeit to anti-
climactic results. Future leaders will have dreamt of "nation-destroying policies in 
advance" (IR 11 ), secret "economic pacts between the colonizer and the 
colonized" signed, and the elections that will "seal the fate of the unborn nation" 
(IR 337) forewon by an unnamed political party that publicly vows to let those 
who vote against it "eat dustbins" (IR 228). 
IR is decidedly bleak if approached directly. But if it is read in the light of 
Okri's logic of the impossible, we will see or at least remind ourselves to see that 
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every failure is a secret victory, an opportunity to reinvent a higher order and 
rediscover our "infinite riches". That, arguably, is the import of the book's title. 
Infinite riches, a phrase borrowed from Christopher Marlowe's play The Jew of 
Malta ("Infinite riches in a little room"), is synonymous with notions of the 
"greater self' and the "immutable star". All three terms refer to humanity's 
"immense possibilities" (IR 162), the lost-forgotten wealth that the diverse people 
of the earth have to rediscover before the "awesome picture ... of divinity, or 
humanity" may be constituted. These pillar-concepts in Okri's philosophy -
infinite riches, universal civilisation, logic of the impossible - underpin IR as 
surely as they do TFR and SOE. 
What makes IR interesting! y different from the first two books, though, is 
not so much Okri' s revisitation of these concepts which we have previously 
examined, but his fiery treatment of colonial racism and the betrayal of the would-
be nation by the coloniser and the colonised. As we signposted in Chapter 3, IR is 
by far the 'angriest' book in the trilogy. It is the most historically-engaged in that 
it contains more concrete historical allusions than TFR and SOE combined to link 
the 'fictional' unborn nation to Nigeria. And it contains the strongest allusions yet 
to Okri's ideological persuasion where Nigeria's North-South debate is 
concerned. To flesh out these points, let us begin with an examination of Okri' s 
portrayal of Governor-General (the queen's representative to the soon-to-be 
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postcolonial nation) who, by virtue of nefariousness, eclipses the rest of the 
characters in the book. 
The Governor-General 
An "Englishman with a polyp on the end of his nose" (IR 110), the Governor-
General is damningly described in IR as the leader of "a country whose people he 
did not like much, and seldom saw except" as "a monstrous variation of black 
insects [that hindered] his complete domination of the continent" (IR 36, 203). For 
him, contemplating Africa amounts to ruminating aloud to his languid, tropics-
detesting wife on Africa's Otherness (blackness of skin, inferiority, unreason). In 
one scene, he contemplates two options. Is Africa a pathological aberration, an 
accidental effect of higher creation, as Ovid's Metamorphoses suggest? (In Ovid's 
account, the wilful son of the sun-god brought the sun-chariot so close to Africa 
that the skin of its inhabitants became permanently scorched.) Or is Africa the 
abjured cause of western civilisation, as Herodotus suggests? (According to 
Herodotus, Africa, through Egypt, created ancient Greek civilisation which in tum 
made western civilisation possible.) After a moment's reflection, the Governor-
General decides to go with Ovid's theory. The choice allows him to continue to 
misrecognise the inversion of his worldview, i.e. that the presupposed otherness 
of Africa is the very support of his racist fantasy of western superiority, and that 
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the "blood of the continent" is what "sustain his divine status in the universe of 
humanity" (IR 205). 
That the Governor-General should choose to enjoy Africa, including the 
three African women who "consoled" and bore him seven illegitimate children 
(IR 36), is entirely consistent with his role as he who, with his white man's 
authority and in "sloping calligraphic hand", rewrites Africa's history: 
[He] deprived us of history, of civilization, and unintentionally, 
deprived us of humanity too . . . And as the Governor-General 
rewrote time (made his longer, made our shorter), as he rendered 
invisible our accomplishments, wiped out traces of our ancient 
civilization, rewrote the meaning and beauty of our customs, as he 
abolished the world of spirits, diminished our feats of memory, 
turned our philosophies into crude superstitions, our rituals into 
childish dances, our religions into animal worship and animistic 
trances, our art into crude relics and primitive forms . . . as he 
rewrote our past, he altered our present. (IR 111-2) 
After Okri sets the Governor-General up as a thorough racist, the latter is 
then made to renounce his enjoyment. By means of Okri's 'divine intervention', 
an angel flies over the city and touches "the Governor-General with a sudden 
perception of the beauties of the continent" (IR 157). So "touched" does he 
become that he starts to wiite about a different Africa, one which Senghor would 
not have been unfamiliar with: 
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He rhapsodized about their love for music, their unscientific 
thinking, their explosive laughter, their preference for myth over 
reality, for story over fact, for mystification over clarification, for 
dance over stillness, for ecstasy over contemplation, for 
metaphysics over logic, for the many over the one. (IR 159) 
The Governor-General in IR is clearly not a character in the full sense of 
the term. He is more a caricature and a whipping-boy whose primary function is 
to illustrate Okri' s point on white racism against Africa and the truth of his three-
pillared philosophy. That Okri uses his poetic licence to animate the colonial 
figure into performing 'impossible' acts ( e.g. "rhapsodize" about the beauty of 
blackness) does not mean that the latter is without historical precedents. Reading 
IR against Nigeria, it is possible to show that Okri's Governor-General may well 
have been inspired by, if not at the very least an allusion to two prominent British 
colonial administrators who had served in Nigeria: Sir Frederic Lugard and Sir 
James Robertson. 
Like many British colonial administrators, Lugard (the first Governor-
General of Nigeria, 1914-9) was famous for his unapologetic racism, a trait which 
historians like Margery Perham saw not as a crime but as imperial benevolence: 
To Lugard and the other makers of new empire Africa was a place 
of poverty, ignorance, and of unremediable cruelties. Above all, 
they had seen the helplessness of Africa in the grip of slave-trade. 
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They had no doubt that the greatest conceivable good for this 
unhappy continent was for it to come under the rule of civilized 
powers. (Perham 1956: 712) 
Lugard was additionally famous for his contempt for the 'pagan' and 
Christian South, and for his friendliness towards the pale-skinned feudal Muslim 
North which he saw as possessing a superior civilisation ( due to the alleged 
regenerative powers of Aryan and Hamitic blood with which it had been infused 
through Islam) (Isichei 1983: 392). On a parade of the Eastern chiefs of Calabar, 
Lugard had reportedly exclaimed that it was "the most wonderfully comic sight I 
have ever seen in Africa! The very antithesis of the dignified Mohamedan Emirs 
of Northern Nigeria in their flowing robes with their medieval civilisation" 
(Isichei 1983: 391). 
Lugard's preference for the feudal North was not just motivated by 
political expediency. According to Isichei, there was "some more deep-seated 
neurosis at work" (1983: 391). This perhaps accounts for Lugard's belief that 
education made Africans in general "less fertile, more susceptible to lung-trouble 
and other diseases and to defective dentition [ arrangement of teeth]." It also 
probably explains why Lugard kept Christianity and western education out of the 
Muslim North (to the Emirs' delight) and "reserved his most venomous ridicule 
and hostility for [those] who resembled him most closely, and had taken his 
culture as a model" - a description which perfectly fits the westernised, 
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christianised and educated Nigerians in the South (Isichei 1983: 391). Lugard had 
good reasons to despise the South and think of Southerners as "infernally 
bumptious" creatures who "think themselves superior to everyone, white men 
included." Southerners were vocal, combative and nationalistic when compared 
with their Northern counterparts. Furthermore, they had had the temerity to reject 
colonialism and demand for independence even though they had not, in Lugard' s 
view, "shown themselves to be possessed of ability to rule either [their] own 
community or backward peoples of [their] own race, even under favourable 
conditions" (Coleman 1958: 158). As Lugard further remarked: 
You free them, you give them equitable laws, more or less, and 
show them a means, by trading, of becoming rich and comfortable 
and safe, and before you know where you are they want to drive 
you out, imagining that they can govern themselves because one or 
two have been educated. (Isichei 1983: 391) 
In companson to Lugard whose real-life racism makes the 'fictional' 
racism of Okri's Governor-General appear benign, his colleague, Sir James 
Robertson (the last Governor-General of pre-independent Nigeria, 1955-60), has 
been treated much more kindly by mainstream historians. Michael Crowder, a 
well-known historian, described Robertson in his book as "the ideal man to 
represent Britain during the final phase of [Nigeria's] self-government" ( 1973: 
290). Sir Gawain Bell, a former colleague of Robertson in Sudan and Governor of 
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Northern Nigeria between 1957-62, was even more effusive: "He worked 
untiringly to preserve the unity of the Federation and to forestall or prevent 
anything that might damage it ... To him too, Nigeria owes a substantial and 
lasting debt" (Bell 1989: 107). Margery Perham, who penned the foreword to 
Robertson's memoir, Transition in Africa, too was full of praise. In her opinion, 
Robertson - like Lugard whom she described as "the pride of his country" 
(Perham 1956: vi) - had displayed "dignity and imperturbability" as the 
Governor-General of Nigeria. He was "like a charioteer whose task was not to 
choose the course or the winning post but to keep his three highly spirited horses 
running in unison" (Perham 197 4: xiii). 
The three "horses" refer to the leaders of the three rival political parties in 
Nigeria at that time: Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC in the North), 
Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC in the East) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (AG in the 
West). All three contested in the 1959 elections under Robertson's auspices. The 
elections were critical in the history of Nigeria as they were to decide who would 
have governing control of the country upon independence, and whether the 
would-be nation would begin life with its integrity intact or mortally 
compromised. They were also in all likelihood the same elections Okri had in 
mind when he closed IR with the ominous line, "The elections would seal the fate 
of the unborn nation" (IR 337) and set in motion a chain of catastrophic events 
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that is the history of Nigeria's bad infinity: "coups, executions, scandals, ... 
uprisings ... and the four-year war" (188). 33 
If the 1959 Nigerian elections are the same elections referred to in IR, does 
history in tum bear witness to Okri' s contention in IR that the election "results 
had already been decided in advance" (IR 176) - "rigged" (57), in a word? Does it 
also show or at least intimate that Sir James Robertson, like Okri's 'fictional' 
Governor-General, was "made a chief by a tribe in return for a favourable 
decision in a fierce boundary dispute with another tribe" (IR 15 8)? And was he an 
impartial "charioteer" who did not "choose the course or the winning post" but 
kept "his three highly spirited horses running in unison", as Perham vouches 
(1974: xiii)? Comprehensive third-party accounts of Robertson's role in Nigerian 
history are conspicuously hard to come by. The ones that are available are sketchy 
at best. In Crowder's The Story of Nigeria (1973: 169), Robertson is mentioned 
but once and in passing at that. Coleman in his seminal book Nigeria: 
Background to Nationalism (1958) sums up the Governor-General's role in one 
short paragraph. Isichei's A History of Nigeria (1983) does not even have him 
listed in the index. That Robertson should receive so little attention from 
historians is extremely curious, especially if we take into account Perham' s claim 
that he had not merely presided over the formal stages but played the role of an 
33 The "four-year war" is a clear allusion to Nigeria's first military coup and counter-coup which 
took place within a year (1966), and the succeeding three-year Biafran war (1967-1970). 
195 
active mediator whose influence greatly shaped political events leading up to 
Nigeria's independence (1974: xii). 
Nonetheless, from the little that is available, it is evident that Robertson, 
like Lugard, was more a friend to the North than he was to the South. Southern 
leaders, his memoir reads, were argumentative, uninhibited and vociferous 
troublemakers "who noisily showed [their] disagreement in Council or Parliament 
without good manners or restraint" (1974: 223). By contrast, Balewa, the main 
"horse" from the North, was a "man of the highest integrity" (1974: 214). 
Robertson wrote that he and Balewa became so close in the course of their 
friendship that there was "little [they] could not discuss" (1974: 214-5). So close, 
in fact, that he invited Balewa to form federal government even "before the results 
of the [1959] elections were announced (but presumably when they were already 
known)" ( emphasis added, Osaghae 1998: 33). 
Nnamdi Azikiwe (' Zik'), the leader of NCNC and the Eastern "horse", 
had criticised Robertson's invitation to Balewa as "premature and inept" 
(Robertson 1974: 235). Robertson in tum remarked that Zik was probably 
disgruntled because he wanted to be the Prime Minister himself, which was not an 
unfair comment since Zik had, and had been, expected to lead independent 
Nigeria for the reason that he had fought for and won Nigeria's independence. 
Fu1ihermore, he had the "largest supporters in the country north and south" 
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(Omoruyi 2001 ). Instead he was sidelined, "tricked" into resigning his seat in the 
House of Representatives and accepting the position of President of "the rubber 
stamp Senate." 
To understand how this came about, we need to bear in mind that the 
momentous 1959 elections produced no clear winner. None of the competing 
parties secured the required majority to independently form government, which 
meant that a coalition had to be formed. Osaghae argues that had national interest 
been a priority, NCNC (East) and AG (West) together with their alliance parties 
in the North (representing mostly ethnic minorities residing in the NPC-
dominated North) would have been "in the best position to form a coalition" 
(1998: 32). That was because NCNC and AG had a much larger national spread in 
comparison to NPC (which only managed to secure token votes outside the North, 
and which furthermore "refused to be drawn out of its regional shell"). In the 
triumph of politics over reason, what emerged instead was an NCNC-NPC 
coalition and the installation of Balewa of NPC as the country's first Prime 
Minister, a man "considered by some as a puppet to the Sardauna [of Sokoto]", 
Sir Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, "the most powerful man in the north" (Hatch 1971: 
219). That was followed by the political marginalisation of hundreds of minority 
ethnic groups and the "huge fraud" (Omoruyi 2001) that was Nigeria, born 
'deformed', its entire political character and destiny spoilt by bad politics. 
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Why did an NCNC-AG coalition not eventuate? Robertson reasoned that 
NPC would not have countenanced a Southern government, which was what an 
NCNC-AG coalition would have been. Britain " rould not have countenanced it 
either, ostensibly for fear of the North pulling out of the federation and putting the 
entire independence plan in jeopardy if the North did not have (at least some) 
control of parliament. Osaghae points out that 
once the favoured status of NPC was made clear, the question of 
coalition was no longer a theoretical one; it was simply which - the 
AG or the NCNC - the NPC leaders were willing to work with. 
(1998: 33) 
What this means, in short, is that NPC had always-already forewon the 
elections, in the same way that the elections in Okri' s abiku trilogy had been 
forewon by the unnamed political party which proudly proclaims through a 
loudspeaker that "VICTORY IS ALREADY OURS. WE HA VE WON. WE 
BRING POWER TO THE PEOPLE. WE BRING WEALTH AND STABILITY. 
THOSE WHO VOTE FOR US WILL ENJOY, THOSE WHO DON'T WILL 
EAT DUSTBINS!" (IR 228) 
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The Conspiracy: Fact or Fiction? 
This brings us back to the question we posed earlier: did Robertson have a hand in 
the North's forewinning of the elections? Was he, like Okri's Governor-General, 
the type who would, if he were guilty of treason against Nigeria, destroy "all the 
secret documents, all the evidence of important negotiations, the notes about 
dividing up the country, the new map of the nation, the redrawn boundaries, 
memos about meetings with religious leaders and political figures" (IR 36)? And 
was Okri alluding to Robertson and other key players when the murderers of 
Ade's father confess that 
wrote: 
they had masters above them, a hierarchy of masters, who never 
committed crimes, whose hands were always clean, and who 
delegated the thoughts, the acts and the consequences of their 
crime and wickedness to lesser beings, to their minions, their 
servants and their disposable friends? (IR 57) 
As if to preempt blame, Perham, in defence of Britain and Robertson, 
It must be accepted that no British administration, handling the 
tense, final process of colonial emancipation, could have re-made 
situations which resulted from hasty frontier-making in the 
malleable Africa of the preceding [i.e. nineteenth] century. (1974: 
xiv) 
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Robertson, on his part, appears to have a clear conscience. Like Perham, 
he attributed Nigeria's failure to circumstances beyond his control. The country 
failed, he wrote, despite the perfectly-sound federal constitution - "freely 
negotiated and accepted by all the political party leaders" (Robertson 1974: 256)-
which he had helped to create. The right structures were in place but "the force of 
tribalism was greater than anyone had estimated" (1974: 256). Furthermore 
"many of the politicians were corrupt and aimed at their own enrichment". 
Robertson's argument is not without merit: tribalism and corruption was endemic. 
What he failed to mention, though, was that tribalism and corruption did not by 
themselves spontaneously appear, and that they were, according to one school of 
thought, largely the effects of his having created in the first place the political 
climate which gave the North the political upper-hand over its Southern 
neighbours. 
The Eurocentric little which has been published on and by Robertson in 
the traditional paper-and-ink format does not directly attest to this, but there are in 
existence electronically published essays which claim that Whitehall (British civil 
service) officials had "freely admit[ted]" in private that they had rigged Nigeria's 
Independence Elections (Smith 1991-7). The author of these essays, Harold 
Smith, a man who says he is a former British Government senior civil servant at 
the Department of Labour in pre-independent Nigeria, alleges that he knew 
Robertson personally and that, for his refusal to remain quiet about Britain's 
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rigging of the 1959 elections, he had been threatened by Robertson, bribed by 
Margery Perham on Robertson's behalf, poisoned and subsequently 'erased' from 
the files of the British government. 
Smith's charges are scandalous, to say the least, but do they bear up to 
scrutiny? To be sure, they have not been validated by the 'authorities' (academics, 
historians, etc.) and it remains unconfirmed if he is truly who he claims to be. 
That, we should stress, does not mean that his reassessment of Britain's role in 
Nigeria is necessarily fiction. Firstly, we should bear in mind that the internet has, 
in the last decade, become a crucial and credible new medium through which 
truths, hitherto repressed by dominant discourses, are set free. (Consider, as 
example, the home-grown Malaysian alternative portal, malaysiakini.com. 
Without it, English-reading Malaysians would be deprived of access to a 
dedicated source of news and views which offer a different perspective to those 
disseminated by government-controlled media.) 
Secondly, it serves us well to remember that the British had committed the 
same act of treason in Malaya/Malaysia as it is accused of in Nigeria. As revealed 
in the memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, "the 
British plan was to have an independent Malaya with Malays in charge - Malays 
who would nevertheless need them for some time to help govern the country and 
fight the communists" (1998: 225). Lastly, it should be noted that Smith's essays 
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do come across as authentic, filled as they are with elaborate details and first-hand 
inside information on the main players. Furthermore, they come complete with 
the reference numbers of letters from the British Cabinet Office and Ministry of 
Defence granting Smith permission to publish the essays on the internet. 34 
Certainly, these supporting factors do not by themselves confirm the accuracy of 
Smith's claims, just as historical narratives are not in themselves a "heaven of 
truths" (Badiou 2001: 43) simply because they are available in print. Thus, for the 
purposes of our discussion, Smith's account should at best be taken as a marginal 
counter-discourse that may well become hegemonic in the future. At the 
minimum, it serves as a compelling narrative that enables the reader to better 
appreciate !R's anger at the wounding of the nation's destiny. 
If official historical accounts only go so far as to suggest that Robertson 
may have inadvertently created a pre-independence political climate which 
favoured NPC, Smith's essays come right out to say that there was nothing 
inadvertent about it. It was not that "Sir James [Robertson] would do anything 
dishonourable on his own initiative to diminish or discredit Nigeria", Smith is 
careful to qualify in our email exchanges. 35 Rather, as "part of his code of duty 
and honour" as an officer, he was compelled to carry out Whitehall ' s and 
Westminster ' s orders without question. Smith explains in his essays that 
34 Smith 's essays are hyperlinked from http://www.libertas .demon.co.uk 
35 Our email exchanges took place in August 2000. Harold Smith may be reached at: 
hsmith@libertas.demon.co.uk. 
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The name of the game in handing over Nigeria to the pro-British 
North was to make safe a vulnerable target for Soviet penetration. 
An oppressed colony was assumed to be an obvious target for 
Soviet imperialism. A newly 'independent' nation safely inside the 
Commonwealth with moderate and responsible, i.e. pro-British 
leaders, would expand the free world. ( 1991-7) 
Smith contends that although British attitude towards Nigeria was 
coloured by Lugard's pro-North racism, Britain still had good reasons to believe 
that an NPC-led government would give the newborn country the stability it 
needed. Furthermore, as was well-known at that time, there were fears that an 
NCNC-AG alliance would tempt Southern leaders to settle old scores with NPC. 
That by itself was likely to have plunged the country into chaos and paved the 
way for its infiltration by communists. But "we will never know" if the worst-case 
scenario might have eventuated since Britain had "flagrantly destroy[ ed] 
Nigeria's first experiment in democracy" when it decided the winner well in 
advance of the independence elections (Smith 1991-4; 1991-7). Omo Omoruyi, an 
Africanist scholar, has also indirectly made the same point, underlining that 
Britain's fear that the Sardauna of Sokoto would "take his 'North' away" was 
illogical (2001). Although NCNC and AG were Southern parties, they had 
"representatives throughout the country including the North ... So which 'North' 
would the Sardauna have taken away?" Besides, writes Omoruyi, "Who told Sir 
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James that the three political parties (NPC, NCNC and AG) could not work 
together as a transitional measure within the first four years after independence?" 
The extent to which Britain went to secure victory for NPC as revealed in 
Smith's essays is astonishing. It did not merely involve a simple tweaking of the 
elections results but a systematic effort to cripple the leadership of NCNC and AG 
years in advance of the 1959 elections. Zik (leader of NCNC in the East), whose 
activities had been monitored by British intelligence for some time, was charged 
and found guilty in 1957 of having improperly handled public funds. All that is 
well known but what remains untold, Smith charges, is that Britain had 
deliberately "built in the legal loophole" which enabled Zik to use the funds to 
finance his political activities. Having thus set the trap, they allowed him to 
commit a minor breach which, over time, developed into a major misdemeanour. 
When the 'crime' became sufficiently serious, a tribunal was set up to find him 
guilty. Zik did not lose his Eastern support base as a result of the scandal 
(Crowder 1973: 291). But he had been politically neutered, for not only was he 
personally bankrupted, his "great NCNC, the vessel which would guarantee him 
power, [ was left] drifting on to the rocks. The British had struck at his weak point, 
the money needed for political action" (Smith 1991-4). The same trap was laid for 
Obafemi Awolowo (Awo ), leader of AG in Western Nigeria. In 1962, he was 
charged, found guilty and jailed for having diverted money from a government 
corporation to fund AG's political activities. According to historian John Hatch, 
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Awo's sentence was generally regarded as "a political trial" set up by his 
opponents, "particularly those in the federal government" [ controlled by NPC], to 
ruin and remove him from public life (Hatch 1971: 227). 
Smith's essays detail many more concrete examples of British chicanery. 
For our present purposes, let us select only a handful which directly highlight the 
Governor-General's complicity. Robertson, the essays reveal, was not a "blimp" 
that journalists who wrote about Nigeria's independence might have imagined, 
but "an Oxford-educated street fighter, experienced in covert intelligence, anti-
Communist operations, terrorism and pulling the wool over inquisitive journalists' 
eyes" (Smith 1991-7). He was "a manufacturer, a retailer of phenomena" (IR 
232). Many journalists had been lied to, others simply wanted to write about "the 
British empire's finest hour". And then there were scholars like Michael Crowder 
(author of The Story of Nigeria) who, according to Smith, not only knew about the 
rigging of the 1959 elections but was also blackmailed into writing a clean 
version of its history (1991-4). Smith claims that Crowder was a close friend and 
"a very promiscuous homosexual" whose "dangerous" lifestyle in Lagos was 
known to Robertson. He alleges that Robertson had used that knowledge against 
Crowder by asking him to persuade Smith to "stop dabbling in politics", i.e. to 
keep quiet about the elections rigging. Otherwise, Crowder might suddenly find 
himself embroiled in some sex scandal that would ruin his career. The end result 
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was that Crowder was forced to make his peace with Government House and 
thereafter omit vital facts from his book. 
How should all this inflect our reading of the abiku trilogy? What would 
be the implications if we accept that the 'fictional' Governor-General in IR is 
Okri's allusion to Sir James Robertson, the last white Governor-General of 
Nigeria? And what is it that IR reveals but TFR and SOE do not? Firstly, it is 
important to note that IR does not merely afford the reader the strongest hints yet 
as to the identity of the unnamed and betrayed unborn nation around which the 
trilogy orbits. (From TFR and SOE, we already know that the said nation is, at one 
level of interpretation, an inference to Nigeria, Okri's home country.) More 
importantly, IR puts in historical context the possible reason why the unborn 
nation (Nigeria) is repeatedly described in TFR and SOE as always-already 
aborted. (Recall that the first two books lament the would-be nation's betrayal 
without revealing the specifics of the historical correlates). By repudiating the 
whitewashed dominant history of Nigeria (as recorded by the likes of Crowder, 
Perham and Robertson) and tangentially retracing what it posits as the repressed 
history of Nigeria's betrayal, IR retroactively recasts TFR and SOE, thus making 
it clear to the reader that while the abiku trilogy may be a work of fiction, it is 
neither detached from history and reality, nor lacking in political commitment, as 
certain critics claim. That it is this particular version of history that emerges from 
the trilogy ( and not any other version which downplays British treason) also, by 
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implication, suggests Okri's political positionality vis-a-vis Nigeria's North-South 
debate. Like many other southern nationalists, he appears to reject the North's 
anti-democratic Islamist nationhood ideal - an ideal which, as we discussed in 
Chapter 2, envisions Nigeria becoming a great nation if each tribe were to adhere 
to its god-given purpose and place, and allow the leadership-endowed Northerners 
to rule the country. 
A Deeper Realism 
In Okri, as the above discussion shows, fiction is not always distinguishable from 
reality. Fiction can enunciate an 'unthought' reality which although strictly 
speaking belongs to the realm of fiction, may yet prove to be more real than the 
hegemonic social reality it seeks to subvert. That is to say, it may prove that 
Nigeria's textbook history was the reality Nigerians never lived (IFC 297). 
The third alternative is similarly detectable in Okri's 'magical realism' in 
the countless number of unearthly phenomena in the trilogy: the cast of spirit 
children (Azaro and Ade), the "invisible black insects" clinging to the Governor-
General's body during the highly-anticipated political rally (IR 232), the spirits 
that borrow other people's bodies to attend the "fabulous masked ball in honour 
of Mr Harold Macmillan, prime minister of England" (145), and the angel who 
magically Africanised the Governor-General. On the one level, we know of 
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course that these in-between beings are not real and that they exist only as a 
literary device that enables Okri to tell a story. From the standard postcolonial 
standpoint, we might even say that they are discursive constructions whose 
function is to parenthesise absolutes (reality, norms, facts and so forth), dissolve 
borders and resist closure. Approaching Okri holistically, however, we will find 
that the aim of Okri' s literary inscription of the magical in the trilogy is not 
simply to academically underscore the discursivity of 'hard reality' and 
deconstruct it. Rather, as will be made clear, the aim to heal-reconcile the nation(-
peoples) at the level of the signifier. Before we delve into the specifics of the 
political in Okri's use of the magical, let us first analyse 'magical realism' as it is 
popularly understood and consider if TFR, SOE and IR fit the description. 
That magical realist texts are potentially subversive is a point most critics 
will acquiesce to with little hesitation. As Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. 
Faris put it, their "in-betweenness, their all-at-onceness encourages resistance to 
monological political and cultural structures, a feature that has made the mode 
particularly useful to writers in postcolonial cultures" (1995a: 6). Because Okri's 
magical works exhibit these characteristics, critics have aligned him with a 
diverse international range of magical realist writers including Salman Rushdie, 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Robert Kroetsch, Wilson Harris and Gunter Grass. 
There is logic in categorising Okri alongside these writers; at the minimum, they 
all construct fictional worlds that do not quite follow the laws the universe as we 
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know them (Faris 1995: 167). The underside of this lumping together of writers 
from diverse cultures, however, is that they tend to be seen as practitioners of a 
"flourishing trend" and an "international mode" of representing-subverting local 
realities ( emphasis added, Zamora and Faris 1995a: 4-5). This top-down approach 
is problematic because it creates the misleading impression that the magical in 
magical realist texts is external to the local/traditional resource base. In addition, 
it implies that the function of the magical is purely instrumental, that its primary 
role is to amplify the respective writers' non-magical local concerns. In short, the 
approach runs the risk of turning magical realist writings into a product of 
glocalisation36, i.e. a global commodity (magical realism) with a local face (local 
cultural-political content). 
'Glocalised magical realism' is arguably an apt description for magical 
realist texts by writers from cultural milieus where the magical is external rather 
than integral to their constitution. Take, for example, the case of What the Crow 
Said by English-Canadian writer Robert Kraetsch. To the extent that there is little 
if any magical element which is integral to English-Canadian culture and belief 
system, we may argue that the magical in Kroetsch's novel functions purely as a 
top-down decentering discursive strategy. By contrast, Okri 's trilogy may be 
described as a bottom-up literary textualisation of the magical. That is to say, the 
36 See Holton (1998: 16) and Robertson (1995). 
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magical is derived not from external sources but from indigenous beliefs (the 
Nigerian abiku phenomenon, the Yoruba concept of predestination and so forth) 
that are central to the community upon which the trilogy is based. It is for this 
reason that Okri says the magical in his work is "not magic" at all but "a deeper 
kind of realism" (Blishen 1988) and "a dimension of the spiritual" (Falconer 
1997: 46). As he explains: 
I'm looking at the world in The Famished Road from the inside of 
the African world view, but without it being codified as such. This 
is just the way the world is seen: the dead are not really dead, the 
ancestors are still part of the living community and there are 
innumerable gradations of reality, and so on. It's quite simple and 
straightforward. I'm treating it naturally. It's a kind of realism, but 
a realism with many more dimensions. ( emphasis added, Ross 
1993: 337-8) 
Okri' s claim that he has rendered reality "naturally" is not unjustified. It is 
only natural for a spirit child like Azaro to see spirits, and for Dad who practises 
ancestor-worship to call upon his ancestors for assistance in times of trouble. 
Besides, the spirit world in the trilogy is not dreamt up willy-nilly but corresponds 
to the three-tiered Yoruba/Igbo spiritual cosmology comprising the ancestral 
plane, the sphere of higher spirits and the interspatial nomansland where spirit-
eaters reside (Achebe 1986: 11). Okri's claim to naturalness only becomes 
problematic when we come to SOE and IR. Ato Quayson correctly notes that, 
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unlike TFR, "the real world and the esoteric" in SOE (and IR, we might add) are 
so deeply interpenetrative that not only Azaro but "all characters have equal 
access to the world of spirits" (1995a: 154). Here we should qualify, though, that 
the characters do not always-really "see dead people" (to borrow the famous 
phrase from M. Night Shyamalan's film The Sixth Sense). An attentive reading 
will show that the magical are sometimes merely hearsay or unverifiable 
allegations: "People saw antelopes with aquamarine eyes running through them, 
as if they were ghosts"; "A woman claimed that while walking she had slipped 
into another world" ( emphases added, SOE 151, 166). 
There are, however, magical events which cannot be put down as mere 
allegation since they literally happen before the reader's eyes. Take the butterfly-
burning episode in SOE. Following the terror and devastation unleashed by the 
political forces, the compound people are amazed to find a mysterious avalanche 
of dead butterflies falling on every visible surface. Some are almost certain the 
world is ending soon. Others hallucinate in fear, "a new colossal helplessness" 
awakened in them (SOE 155). They all become ill for lack of dream until Dad, 
growing impatient, hustles and commands the inhabitants of the compound with 
great vigour and "the voice of a soldier who had received his mandate from the 
crisis of the moment" (163). He gets them to collect the dead butterflies and dump 
them in a pile, after which he drenches the heap with kerosene and sets fire to it. 
"As the flan1es lit up the darkness, flaring erratically, we [the compound people 
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including Azaro and his family] gasped in terror and amazement at seeing spirits 
rising into the air on golden plumes of smoke" (SOE 164). 
Is the above a case of collective hallucination? If so, can we say the same 
about the scene in IR where Dad, languishing in a boiling cell after being arrested 
by the police, suddenly finds himself "in the very presence of an unbearable fire 
which was roasting his being and brain, turning all that he was into living ashes" 
(IR 54)? What about the "gold dust" which the jailers find matted in Dad's hair 
and the "diamond powder" clinging to his face (55)? It would not be difficult to 
come up with symbolic interpretations of the above events. For instance, it may 
be argued that the butterfly-burning scene signifies the compound people's 
spiritual awakening and the renewal of their capacity to perceive the world around 
them in more than three dimensions. Dad's consumption by fire, by contrast, may 
be read as a fiery manifestation of his inner spirit and symbolic of the extreme 
purification required by the nation to "burn away [its] corruptions" (IR 53). (Okri 
has said that fire is one of his temperaments and the quality behind all his work 
(Hattersley 1999)). It is also equally possible to read the scene as inaugurating yet 
another one of Dad's symbolic rebirths, a re-origination of self through the 
baptism of fire. 
Many more similar interpretations may be drawn from these two episodes 
if we keep to the same literary-critical approach. What the approach is unable to 
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produce, however, is the illumination required to tackle the nai:ve but crucial 
question we posed earlier: how real are these magical phenomena? Should we 
approach them on the primary level as coded inscriptions or literal representations 
to be taken at their face value, that is, events registered as actually occurring 
'before our very eyes'. To what extent are they reflective of the African 
worldview as conceived by Okri? Are they a faithful presentation of reality from 
the traditional African standpoint, or have they been stylised-magnified as 
Quayson suggests? The evidence we have examined suggests that Okri does not 
always faithfully replicate traditional beliefs. Recall, for instance, his rewriting of 
the traditional conception of destiny which we discussed in Chapter 3. Rather than 
placing destiny in the hands of the External Divine, he invests it in the human 
agent. The rewriting is relatively minor since only one detail is tweaked. The 
result, though, is far-reaching since destiny is the most crucial element that holds 
the entire spiritual universe together. By investing destiny in the agent, Okri has 
quite terroristic inverted the traditional universe. 
Words Are Things 
The impossibility of formulating a ' one size fits all' interpretative solution to the 
magical allows for the reader to "multiply the possibilities of interpretation of a 
work [e.g. the abiku trilogy], to open up a work, to illuminate the world of a work; 
not to reduce it and to diminish it" (Okri, in Falconer 1997: 50). From the 
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standpoint of literary criticism, the infinite dialogue between the reader and the 
text can only be a positive good. What we have to bear in mind here, though, is 
that the openness of Okri's writings is not the aim but the result of his strategic 
thwarting the reader's desire to permanently capture their meaning. Okri' s aim is 
not to show that the magical in the trilogy is distinct from the real but to put it to 
the reader that, within and without the universe of the fiction, "what is perceived 
and said are real things too" (Okri, in Hattersley 1999). To clarify what we are 
proposing here, let us first look at what Okri says regarding the relation between 
the magical in his writings and the Nigerianness of his personal reactions: 
I still believe that words are things ... If you were to say that 
tonight's poetry reading would be a failure, I would ask you to 
withdraw it for fear that saying it would make it happen. Words 
resonate. They are parallel to events. It is magical thinking. Not 
what many critics have called magical reality. That is an 
exaggeration of reality, a transformation of reality. (Hattersley 
1999) 
Okri's proposition that words (thought-perception) can somehow 
magically shape or jinx events in real life, or that a "single thought of ours can 
change the universe" (Dad, in TFR 497), is likely to cause the cynic to roll his 
eyes and mutter 'silly superstition'. (The same cynic would most likely categorise 
the proposition in the same box as the well-known Chinese superstition which 
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says that the number eight is 'luckier' than four. 37) However, if we reformulate it 
as 'Can discourse construct the reality or meaning of an event?', we will see that 
what is at issue here is, as Okri maintains, not magic ( superstition, the 
supernatural, etc.) but the primacy of the signifier, that is, the way signifiers form 
signifying chains which in tum constitute discourse, and how discourse structures 
our thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, fantasies and ultimately reality itself. 
From as early as Stars of the New Curfew (SONC) (1989), Okri has paid 
special attention to the (political) function of the signifier, particularly the way in 
which an 'event' (as a floating signifier that bears neither absolute non-fixity nor 
absolute fixity of meaning) can be sutured to any number of signifieds to produce 
an infinite series of meanings and 'facts'. As we discussed in Chapter 1, in this 
language game, the meaning most likely to become hegemonic is the one that 
privileges those in the position of power. This much is cynically acknowledged by 
the nameless protagonist in Okri' s short story 'Stars of the New Curfew': "Those 
who get on in society, those who rise high and affect events, do so by 
manipulating, by manufacturing reality" (SONC 117). In IR, one of the palpable 
illustrations of the discursive construction of reality is found in the Governor-
General's wiiting of his memoir. The writing is not merely an inscription of 
personal observations on Africa and Africans from the perspective of a powerful 
37 In Chinese/Cantonese belief, eight symbolises prosperity. Number four, on the other hand, 
symbolises death. 
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colonial civil servant. Rather, it represents racist colonial discourse which 
overwrote the continent's past and altered its present (IFC 112). 
Local elites of all tribal groups too are capable of employing words to 
manufacture reality. Take the episode in IR where Mum rises and falls out of 
prominence by the stroke of a pen. It all begins with her having staged a 
successful protest which leads to Dad's release from prison. The newspapers 
applaud her courage and she soon becomes a national figure. Mum's sudden and 
unexpected rise is accompanied by positive changes. For the first time, we see her 
taking a keen interest in politics and speaking of "all the things she had always 
been silent about" (IR 34). On a platform hastily built on top of battered cars, she 
speaks in six languages on freedom and justice, independence and the end of 
tribalism, the unity and liberty of all women, and the special ways of African 
women. Rather amusingly, the deeper she immerses herself in politics, the more 
she becomes like Dad. Overtaken by fame and turning "loud-voiced", she speaks 
of becoming a wrestler and a politician (76). Her "new life", "greater 
opportunity" and "new freedom" are, however, unexpectedly snatched away when 
the newspapers, in an about-face manoeuvre, begin reporting that Dad was 
actually freed by a group of elite women (67). Infuriated by the news when she 
gets wind of it, Mum quickly sets out to correct the lie but to no avail. She 
subsequently learns that the leader of the vampiric elite women has become a 
politician and an official candidate of a political party. 
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On a larger scale, a similar reinvention of reality is found in the newspaper 
reporting of the much-anticipated political rally. Although the rally was an utter 
failure and literally a bloody riot, it is reported by "the new powers of the era" (IR 
296) as "an unqualified success" (297), while the people's protest is reported as 
"overwhelming support for the Party of the Rich" (297). To add to the air of 
authenticity, the report even carries accompanying photographs of the crowd at 
the rally - their faces beaming, their expressions intent and hopeful. The entire 
manufacturing process is so well coordinated that "we [the compound people] 
began to think of ourselves as hypocrites. We began to imagine that we had 
indeed been peaceful at the rally, that we had colluded in our cowardice by 
inventing the alternative ending, the disruptions, the burnings, the rage, the ten 
people dead" (IR 297). 38 From these examples, it is clear why Okri maintains that 
"what is perceived and said are real things too". Although words (signifying 
chains, thought-perceptions) are abstractions devoid of positive existence, they 
are real insofar as they are capable of bringing about concrete changes that can 
profoundly affect lives. 
38 As further illustration of the invention of reality, we might recall the episode in TFR following 
the milk-poisoning incident. The Party of the Rich unleashes terrible violence upon the compound 
but "nothing of the events appeared in the newspapers" (TFR 183). According to Azaro says, it 
was "as if the events were never real" . In the absence of words to concretise reality, real events 
take on "the status of rumours", causing the compound people to wonder if they have not 
collectively dreamt up the fevers of the night. 
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Narrating the Nation 
In Okri, the subject lives and dies by the signifier. Without logos, there is no 
subjectivity, no homo fabula or "story-telling beings" (Okri 1996a: 24), and no 
"meaning - apprehension - comprehension" (1996a: 22). "Without stories we 
would go mad. Life would lose its moorings and lose its orientation" (1996a: 25). 
In Birds of Heaven, Okri writes that 
It is through the fictions and stories we tell ourselves and others 
that we live the life, hide from it, harmonise it, canalise it, have a 
relationship with it, shape it, accept it, are broken by it, redeem it, 
or flow with the life. ( 1996a: 24-5) 
It is easy to forget how mysterious and mighty stories are. They do 
their work in silence, invisibly. They work with all the internal 
materials of the mind and self. They become part of you while 
changing you. Beware the stories you read or tell: subtly, at night, 
beneath the waters of consciousness, they are altering your world. 
(1996a: 34) 
As the subject lives and dies by the signifier, so too the nation. This is 
clearly conveyed by Okri who writes that ''Nations and peoples are largely the 
stories they feed themselves. If they tell themselves stories that are lies, they will 
suffer the future consequences of those lies" (Okri 1996a: 21 ). By "fictions and 
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stories", Okri means discourse in all its varied forms: parables, fables, songs, 
religious messages, history, "tribal myths of supremacy" (SOE 20) and so forth. 
Constituted by language, these forms belong to the same category as Kant's 
transcendental Idea and Lacan' s notion of the fantasy, that is, fictions which 
regulate the universe of our self-experience and literally "sustain our being-in-the-
world, our dwelling within the symbolic universe" (Zizek 2000d: 82). Without 
them, reality itself will lose its discursive-logical consistency. 
Similarly, in Lacan, there is no subject without language. The Lacanian 
subject is, if we recall, not a flesh-and-blood individual, the consciously thinking 
'I' (the ego, Cartesian subject) or the unconscious but that which one signifier 
represents to another signifier. Constitutively and literally the gap separating the 
conscious and the unconscious, the subject by definition exists in a state of 
discord between knowledge and being. That is to say, it "exists only so long as it 
does not 'register', 'take note of its non-existence - like the proverbial cat from 
the cartoons which, although it has no ground under its feet, is unaware of it and 
so calmly continues to walk in the air" (Zizek 1996c: 280). Applying this logic to 
the nation-peoples in Okri' s trilogy, we might say that the tribal members of the 
unborn undead nation do not exist, and that their misrecognition of their 
nonexistence as tribal members is the cause of the unborn nation's undeadness. 
They cling to "the comforting shapes of legends, no matter how monstrous or 
useless" (IR 32). They look at "shapes of [their] ordinary reality and didn't see the 
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things perceived, but only the myths [they] brought to them." They think they 
exist because they have yet to recognise that the tribal Other to be antagonised-
negated is but "a semblant" (Miller 1990: xxx), a distraction which fascinates-
repulses them to the point where they overlook their own nonexistence. So long as 
misrecognise that, the nation will continue to exist as a suffering undead. 
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Part III 
K.S. MANIAM 
Two Novels 
Karma is no more rebirth after death, controlled by 
metaphysical forces , but the transformation of 
personality undertaken by conscious choice. (Maniam 
1987: 220) 
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- 6 -
THE RETURN 
Trilogy of the Eternal Return 
For all their acknowledged similarities, K.S. Maniam's The Return (TR) and In a 
Far Country (IFC) - the two novels we will examine in Part III - are almost 
always read separately. This approach is not unwarranted since TR and IFC are 
strictly speaking self-contained works. The shortcoming of this approach, 
however, is that because it is takes TR and IFC as independent works, it has from 
the outset foreclosed the possibility that the writings may be more intimately 
related than a casual intertextual reading would suggest, and that there is, as it 
turns out, an authorially intended and textually supported unifying logic that binds 
TR and IFC together as two thirds of a 'trilogy' which concludes with the 
unpublished Delayed Passage (DP). 39 
By 'trilogy', we have in mind something other than the standard 
conception. In contrast to Okri's abiku trilogy, Maniam's trilogy is neither held 
39 Maniam has put the publication of the completed DP on an indefinite hold. He has since 
completed another novel , Between Lives (BL), which he expects to bring out in the second half of 
2002. See Appendix 1 and 2 for synopses of DP and BL. 
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together by the same characters nor a contiguous plot but by the preoccupation of 
each text with the protagonist's (political) struggle to eject into the past the curse 
of the 'eternal return'. In Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science, the eternal return 
( or the 'eternal recurrence of the same') is described as a life that has been lived 
before and that has to be lived "innumerable times" more (Nietzsche 1974: 273). 
In each repetition, there will be "nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy 
and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great [will return] 
all in the same succession and sequence." Scholars including Karl Lowith (1997) 
and Matthew Rampley (2000) have argued that between the two opposite poles of 
possible interpretations - fatalism on the one side and freedom on the other -
Nietzsche is located on the latter side, advocating that life be lived "in every 
moment so that you could will that moment back again over and over" (Lowith 
1997: 85). 
In Maniam, by contrast, the eternal return or what is referred to in IFC as 
an "eternity of repetition" (IFC 43) is neither life-affirming, "divine" (Nietzsche 
1974: 273) nor the affliction of just one individual. Instead, it manifests itself first 
and foremost as a family 'curse' that affects each and every generation down the 
bloodline. To inherit it - as each of the central Indian Malaysian protagonists in 
the trilogy suspect they have - is to be condemned to repeat their immigrant 
forebear's failure to find "some elusive rootedness" (IFC 40) in Malaya/Malaysia 
and in "that vast country ... called life" (144). Despite having escaped the abject 
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poverty of plantation life, and despite having made it further than their immigrant 
forebear could only have dreamed of (by attaining white collar dignity, career and 
material success, ownership of a home), the protagonists continue to suffer from a 
crippling incapacity for happiness. Always and somehow, any enjoyment that 
comes their way is "ruined or tainted by simultaneous feelings of dissatisfaction 
or displeasure" (Fink 1997: 210-1). Like the haunted male figures in Edvard 
Munch's iconic works, all of which are rooted in a single inquiry "Why was there 
a curse on my cradle?" (Munch, in Gibson 1988: 157), Maniam's anti-heroes are 
depressed and prone to brood on the past and such brow-knitting subjects as loss 
and alienation. Adding to this is an unbearable anxiety that haunts them, a 
disquieting feeling that life has somehow been compromised and the pnce 
exacted is the thwarting of their "deep seated desire for a home" (IFC 28). 
The pattern of the blind and endless repetition of the past is also reflected 
in the trilogy's overall temporal plotting. In TR, Ravi in his young adulthood takes 
stock of all that he has gained and lost in his lifelong pursuit of the "dignity of the 
individual" (TR 141) and escape from the fate of his father and grandmother who 
both went to the grave broken-hearted for failing to "earn a home in this land" 
(TR 140). This the reflective Ravi does from a point in time in the 1960s, when he 
looks as far back as the two decade preceding Malaysia's independence in 1957. 
IFC, the second novel, is similarly premised. The protagonist Rajan, a successful 
middle-aged businessman, traverses the same temporal distance as Ravi but from 
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a point in time between the 1970s and the 1980s, in his quest to come to terms 
with the forces that have (mis )shaped his life and "trapped and killed [his] father" 
(IFC 66). And in the mid 1990s in DP, Kumar, an academic at a retiring age who 
was "forced to retire ignobly from the university" (DP 6), confronts "the past he 
has avoided" in order to retrace "his straying [from] the true path of self-
fulfilment" (DP 2). The process takes him as far back as the 1940s, a time when 
Malaysia was Malaya, and the people were subjugated to British and Japanese 
imperial forces. 
From this brief mapping of the trilogy, two distinct patterns may be 
discerned. The first and more immediately apparent is the way the trilogy is 
structured to convey a calendrical sense of time's passing. From TR to IFC and 
finally to DP, the narrative present (the point in time at which the respective 
protagonists/narrators speak) advances closer to our own present. And as it does, 
so too the protagonist of each subsequent novel 'matures', paralleling Malaysia's 
coming of age as a nation. Indeed, it is the nation's independence and 
modernisation, its opening up of "a whole new world" (TR 132) of opportunities 
that has helped made it possible for the protagonists to escape the oppressive 
backwaters whence they came, and to become professionals in their own right. 
The second discernable pattern is the circular time of the eternal return. Notice 
how the same attempt at reconciliation with the past recurs in nearly every 
successive decade following Malaysia ' s independence. Rationally we know, of 
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course, that the protagonists are three. Yet it would be difficult not to think of 
them at some level as one and the same, caught in circular time, compelled to 
forlornly encircle the past until some form of release and redemption is found. 
Why, despite the protagonists' best efforts to cancel out the eternal return, 
do they continue to suffer from the same curse of alienation which plagued their 
immigrant forefathers when they themselves are not immigrants? Why, like their 
forefathers, do they keep longing for the inaccessible elsewhere, "that country that 
does not exist" but which they nevertheless bear in their dreams (Kristeva 1991: 
5)7 What does it take to break the cycle? End one's life by consuming weedkiller 
like the despairing rubber estate women in IFC? Our exploration of these 
questions, it should be signalled from the outset, will break from the standard 
approach which insists on the necessity of interpreting Maniam's works through 
Hindu symbology. As will become clear, this is a necessary step since one of the 
objects of our interrogation is Hinduism itself - or rather the Hindu/Indian Thing 
towards which Maniam's characters entertain an extimate relationship. 
Entangled Desires: Critics, Author, Narrator 
By way of unravelling the key issues raised above, let us begin with Tang Soo 
Ping's paradigmatic reading of TR in which she argues that the problem with 
Ravi, the protagonist, is that he "cannot perceive a more hopeful solution to his 
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problem" (1993: 85). He rejects "all symbols of proprietorship" valued by Naina 
and Periathai, respectively his father and grandmother (1993: 84). He ignores "the 
hearty passion and robust expressiveness of his Indian culture" (1993: 85). Most 
damning of all, he allows himself to be mentally colonised through the colonial 
education system by the "rapacious", "degenerate" and "impoverished" English 
culture (1996: 7). This, according to Tang, makes Ravi "more of a failure than 
N aina or Periathai" ( 1993: 86). Whereas the latter at least have the "Indian 
sensibility ... [to nurture] ... an intense response to the new land, a passionate 
desire to belong", Ravi only approaches life with half a commitment, hence his 
ending up with a "tightly insulated, sterile" life in which "the means to freedom -
the English language - is little more than a sanitizing and dulling agent" (1993: 
85). In Tang's opinion, Ravi's failure in life is ultimately Maniam's failure as a 
writer: 
Like most Malaysian works, [TR] is as yet unable to encompass 
that wider perspective that may be achieved with age and 
experience. For the marginal life can open the door to new vistas 
of meaning and understanding. One only has to look at Ellison's 
Invisible Man to realize the exciting possibilities of a freer and 
more searching outlook. (1993: 89) 
In Tang's revisitation of the subject in a later essay (1996) , she changes 
her stand slightly. She concedes that Ravi sees the light after all, as reflected by 
his having written and completed his autobiography. "The process of writing", 
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Tang writes, "mirrors Ravi's maturation, and signals the tremendous glimpse of a 
tradition which may bring him closer to his people and to the new land" (1996: 
11 ). He "becomes aware" in the end that his "desire to tap a foreign culture from 
afar [has] deprived him of that sustenance and enrichment available close to 
home" (1996: 11-2). 
Many of Tang's observations are to the point. There are, as she rightly 
highlights, blind-spots in Ravi's evolving consciousness. Ravi's "aggressive, 
intellectualized attitude" towards life is, as Maniam himself concedes, "reductive 
in ... scope" (Maniam 1987: 222). Periathai's and Naina's desire to belong does 
have a hint of spirituality about it - as does Ravi's, as we shall see. Unlike 
Ellison's fictional universe (and Okri's where the wretchedness of marginality is 
always at least minimally ameliorated), Maniam's world is largely one of 
eternally contracting light. As a reviewer once put it, any luminescence that 
manages to penetrate the darkness of Maniam's world, insofar as one perceives it 
as luminescent at all, is (always invariably) hard-won (Lang Bulan 1995). Finally 
the two forces which Tang pits against one another - the 'bad' ( colonial/west) and 
the 'good' (Indian) - do play a pivotal role in Ravi's life. However, for her to plot 
the trajectory of Ravi's life passage as one proceeding from utopian contentment 
to radical alienation and finally to the awakening of the desire to reclaim his 
Indian roots, and to then surmise that TR is "inward-looking" and "predictably 
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fixated on the ethnic [Indian] theme" (Tang 1993: 83) is to miss the point of the 
novel entirely. 
The thrust of Tang's critique of TR exemplifies critics' tendency to 
dismiss Ravi's crisis as a handiwork of colonialism, quasi-idealise and at times 
directly or otherwise disclaim any idealising of Periathai' s "mythological" 
struggle and the "glamorous Indian past" she is said to embody (Wicks 1997: 390; 
also see Tang 1996), and to then finally conclude that TR demonstrates Ravi's 
"desire to re-establish racial and ethnic origins" (Brewster 1988: 178) - or worse 
still, "the possibility of renewal ... through a return to religious values" (Lim 
1984: 42). What this line of argument does is to almost completely ignore the 
complexities of belonging and the perils of self-insularity - two themes that are 
foundational to TR and almost all of Maniam's major works. In addition, it fails to 
appreciate the epic significance of Ravi's twofold life passage: first, from a 
compromised life in an oppressed working class Tamil community to a dignified 
existence only the less unfortunate can afford; and second, from naive sense-
certainty towards possession of the kind of ethical self-knowledge that liberates. 
Indeed, a closer examination of the reasoning behind the argument we dispute 
would also reveal how closely it resembles the disturbingly popular 'nationalist' 
argument in Malaysia that to acquire and use the English language is to betray the 
national/Malay language, culture, religion and even the nation. Even ,vorse is how 
it recalls the insular logic which political chauvinists in the country employ in 
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calling for a national return to core Malay values as a means of repurifying the 
race from the corrupting influences of outsiders. 
It would not be entirely speculative to suggest that critics taking the above 
line of argument may have in part been injudiciously inspired by certain 
comments Maniam has made. Maniam has for example said in an interview that 
Ravi "shows the glimmering of a return to his culture" (Wilson 1993: 17). But he 
has also added that Ravi "cannot entirely go back to the old culture for he cannot 
eradicate from his consciousness the [English] language and education that he has 
acquired" (1993: 18).40 What Ravi can do is attempt to combine the "two worlds". 
The curious phrasing ( cannot . . . go back, cannot eradicate) suggests that 
Maniam actually sees himself as having scripted Ravi into a position where he 
chooses to combine the two worlds after coming to terms with the impossibility 
of his true desire to access the inaccessible (the "old culture") and to eradicate the 
ineradicable (the imprint of the new/foreign culture on his psyche). In short, what 
Maniam' s statement appears to convey is that Ravi does desire to return to his 
roots. With this apparent authorial encouragement, it is not difficult to see why 
some critics find it unnecessary to question if the text itself actually supports the 
view that Ravi "shows the glimmering of a return to his culture". 
40 Maniam's qualification here recalls Anne Brewster's argument that "The Return ... suggests the 
desire to re-establish racial and ethnic origins but this nostalgia is mixed with the sober realization 
of the impossibility of this quest" (1988: 178). 
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Critics' inclination to agree with Maniam does not seem to be motivated 
by the na1ve belief that 'authors know best'. Despite Maniam insistence that "I'm 
not writing 'autobiographical fiction"' (Yong 1992: 67), TR continues to be 
'secretly' read as Maniam's autobiography disguised as Ravi's. (If Ravi is 
Maniam, then who would know more about Ravi than Maniam himself?) It is not 
without reason that even a veteran critic like Anne Brewster should repeatedly 
describe TR as "K.S. Maniam's autobiographical novel" instead of Ravi's (1988: 
173). As is known to those familiar with Maniam's writings, Ravi's life is almost 
identical to Maniam's. Both come from a working class background, grew up in a 
small isolated town and went to a Tamil school for a brief period before they were 
transferred to an English school. As well, they both completed a teacher-training 
course in England. Indeed the two figures are so similar that Heather Neilson 
might just be right when she says that "the question of where the autobiographical 
material begins and ends" is ultimately unanswerable "without recourse to 
Maniam himself' (1999: 99). In the here and now, however, the problem remains: 
what are we to make of the situation where critics, while overtly engaging with 
TR as a work of fiction , quietly slip in and out of reading Ravi's textual desire as 
determined by and indistinguishable from Maniam's extratextual desire, and 
Maniam' s comn1ents on TR as more authoritative than the text itself? 
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Big Mother 
One should always bear in mind that due to the brevity and fragmentary nature of 
the few available essays by and interviews with Maniam, what might come across 
as the author's personal interpretation of his works is not always commensurate 
with his overarching thematic commitment. Neither is it always unambivalently 
borne out in his corresponding literary texts. In the latter part of this chapter, we 
will return to examine in detail how this relates to the negative reception Ravi 
typically receives. For now, let us consider the issue in relation to Periathai ('Big 
Mother'), the first generation immigrant whose portrayal is inspired by Maniam's 
real life grandmother: 
Periathai is not only Ravi's grandmother but also the source of his 
intellectual, emotional and, particularly, spiritual development ... 
[She] represents the spiritual strength and vision of a people [ as 
well as] rhythm and vitality, characteristics often associated with 
creativity in Hindu mythology. (Maniam 1987: 221-2) 
Following Maniam, many critics too have focussed on Periathai's nobler 
aspects. Undoubtedly, Periathai is a "remarkable woman" whose "tenacity and 
resourcefulness in starting life anew with her family in a strange land" can only be 
admired (Brewster 1988: 173). She is the only person in Ravi's life who 
encourages him to complete his secondary schooling and the only one who, 
despite her meagre resources, is prepared to see him through financially. This, at a 
232 
time when his father Naina would neither support nor discourage him, and when 
his unpredictable mother-substitute Karupi and the tyrannical 'estate' superior 
Ayah are maliciously bent on cutting short his education (TR 101-10). Also, as is 
often highlighted, it is from Periathai that Ravi learns "never [to] let anything 
break [his] spirit" (TR 7). Notwithstanding, it would be difficult to not also 
recognise that the same tenacity and resourcefulness that make Periathai a 
remarkable figure have also been utterly ineffectual in helping her obtain the one 
thing she desires above all else: legal ownership of her illegally-built house which 
has been marked for demolition by the town council. They could not save her 
from dying the way she does, pining away in consumption, "speechless, her eyes 
never spoke a farewell" (TRI 0). Lastly, they could not take away the reasons that 
make her bitterly vow to return after death and "never stop haunting the place" 
(TR 8). (Later in the chapter, we will see that it is a vow she is to indirectly fulfil 
with tragic consequences.) 
It would be fair to say that Periathai would most likely pass away in peace 
( or at least without the excessive emotional violence) had she not clung to the 
house. She has lived fully and resourcefully, and she has done her best to establish 
as secure a ground as possible for her family to hopefully prosper in the new 
country. In all , one might say that she has not fared too badly, especially if we 
consider how she first came "with nothing except some baggage and three boys 
[her sons] in tow" (TR 1). So if, as it appears, Periathai has neither regrets nor 
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unfinished business, how then do we account for her hysterical reaction to the 
eviction? Why, prior to her demise, does she deliriously blubber about the sea, 
melancholically croon to it, "beseeching for a safe passage with her tin trunks" 
(TR l O)? How is it that a woman who has taken worse in her stride ( cross-
continent migration, the communist threat, the Japanese occupation) and whose 
spirit has hitherto been indomitable can suddenly tum so emotionally cankerous 
over a house? Recall that even though she suffers from terminal cancer, it is not 
until the town council "got to her" (TR 8) that she starts to lose weight and hasten 
to her death. 
It goes without saying that anyone whose house is about to be tom down 
by the authorities is bound to be distraught. With Periathai, however, her over-
reaction does not seem to stem from the fear of losing the roof over her head or 
being turned into a destitute. If she so desired, she could have packed up and 
moved elsewhere, or perhaps even bought a new place to spend her remaining 
days preparing herself spiritually for her impending death, as traditional Hindus 
typically do. Money, if it is an obstacle, does not appear insurmountable, as may 
be inferred from Naina's attempt to purchase the property for her, albeit 
unsuccessfully because it "isn't for sale" (TR 133). At worst, she could have 
moved in with Naina and the family. What then is it about the house that makes it 
so special? 
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For Periathai, the house whose legal title she hopes to receive at no cost 
"on the grounds that she had occupied [it] long enough to be its rightful heir" (TR 
8) is clearly not just a physical shelter or even a home to be sentimentally 
cherished. Judging from the obsessive way she clings to it, it is as if the house is 
in her mind's eye the Thing that promises to saturate her with the pleasure of 
'arriving', legitimise her way of life and affirm her self-identity as a Hindu-
Indian. Here we should first clearly distinguish between the impossible-real Thing 
(das Ding), Periathai's Thing and the really-existing house. The first describes the 
empty place around which her world of desires turns and to which she relates "in 
a dimension of loss, regret and nostalgia" (Fachinelli 1996). Periathai' s very own 
Thing is, by contrast, a tangible object (a house in this case) which she has 
personally elevated to the level of the sublime Thing, fetishised as something 
worth dying for. From Ravi, we know that her house is quintessentially Hindu-
Indian. In it, traditional Hindu rituals are regularly performed and festivals 
celebrated. All these, according to Ravi, go to recreate "the thick spiritual and 
domestic air [Periathai] must have breathed there [in India]" (TR 6). Structurally, 
the house has "an old-fashioned, Indian cooking place" (TR 4) and a yard covered 
with kolam (threshold drawings) which sociosymbolically functions as "a visual 
index of the good Hindu woman" who created them (Kavuri 1998). As well, there 
are the four wooden pillars whose timber faces feature exquisite carvings of 
stories from the Ramayana : 
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Rama challenged, bow and arrow at the ready, yet his brow lined 
with anxiety for the missing Sita. The sculptured, fold-like flames 
envelop Ravana' s palace and threaten to engulf Sita ' s tender, 
shapely limbs and breasts. One pillar carried the creation of the 
Ganges, the cascading water stilled, another the typical, rustic look 
of the Indian village. ( TR 4) 
Because Periathai' s house-Thing has taken on higher functions in her 
world of desires (as the positivisation of her lack, and the object around which her 
Hindu-Indian identity is structured and to which her desire is bound), it follows 
that the negation of one would also be the negation of the other. This would 
explain why Periathai reacts to the demolition threat as if what is at stake is not 
merely a house but the very centre of her world - her Hindu-Indian Thing, in 
short. To recapitulate: if the house is precious only insofar as Periathai fetishises 
it, if her tenacious clinging to it is but a displaced gesture of her overpassionate, 
unconscious attachment to her Hindu-Indian self, and if this attachment is the 
reason which hinders her from finding belongingness within herself and to the 
new land, then would it not follow that the standard treatment of Periathai as the 
sacred Ideal against which the ' useless ' Ravi must but cannot measure up ought to 
be reassessed? 
The fact that Periathai fails to belong does not of course negate her worth 
as an individual. Neither, however, is it as inconsequential as implied by the 
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curiously scant attention it has received, nor is it as life-affirming as it has been 
made out to be at other times. Consider, for example, Peter Wicks' analysis. First 
he claims that "the story of Periathai serves to confirm Edward Said's view of 
narrative as 'the method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the 
existence of their own history"' (1997: 390). In the next sentence, he quizzically 
brackets the empowerment thesis by highlighting the irreconcilable gap between 
Periathai's strength and her failure to establish legal ownership of her house. Then 
instead of entering into what could have been a fertile discussion on the gap he 
appears to have unwittingly introduced, Wicks rather oddly concludes with only a 
hint of argument that "the semi-mythical" Periathai is a more "captivating" and 
"intriguing" character than Ravi (1997: 392). In contrast, Tang's reading is even 
more surprising. Not only does she not recognise Periathai's failure as failure, she 
even inverts it into her triumph, a symbol of her omnipotence. Periathai, Tang 
writes, "achieves some kind of mythological stature" that identifies her more as a 
"folk-[hero]" than a "defeated, homeless [exile]" (1996: 9). (Note that what we 
disagree with here is not the treatment of Periathai as a symbol of transplanted 
Indianness, 'a little piece of India ' in Malaya. Rather it is the haste with which 
some critics brush aside the contradictions in her characterisation and raise her to 
the level of Indian Goodness.) 
The tendency of critics to treat the flesh-and-blood and warts-and-all 
Periathai as a mere appendix to the abstract Ideal warrants a comparison with the 
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practice of mother fetishisation in popular Indian cinema. In the latter context, the 
mother is invariably made to bear the burden of Sita, the heroine of the epic 
Ramayana and the quintessential Hindu figure of ideal womanhood (Kakar 1981: 
63-71 ). On screen, she is "a fount of love, protection [ and] traditional morality" 
(Thomas 1995: 158). Above all, she is Mother India, the self-sacrificing guardian 
of Indianness and defender against the "cold, calculating, rapacious . . . 
West/outsider" (1995: 160). To cinemagoers who have grown accustomed to the 
maternal norm, it is simply inconceivable and unacceptable that she should be 
portrayed 'out of character'. Indian filmmaker Gopi Rorha had apparently so 
horrified cinemagoers with Kaaren ('Reason', 1981) when he portrayed the 
mother as a prostitute who is eventually killed by her own son that screening of 
the film ceased after three days because no one wanted to watch it (Thomas 1995: 
164). Kaaren is of course an exception rather than the rule. Indian cinemagoers' 
desire to avoid any psychosocial anxiety that may arise from being subjected to 
'disturbing' scenes ( e.g. uncharacteristic representations of the mother) is almost 
always met by filmmakers' eagerness to cater to their enjoyment (Dickey 1993: 
67). Between the two, there is normally a tacit understanding on how characters 
ought to find representation on screen. The burly leather-clad villain may drink 
and whore, the hero may err within reason, but the filmic mother must always 
remain chaste. Therein lies the crucial difference between our two contexts of 
comparison: whereas mother fetishisation in Indian cinema is the result of a 
symbiotic collusion between cinemagoers and filmmakers, the fetishisation of 
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Periathai by critics cannot be said to have been made with legitimate textual 
support. 
To further elucidate our point, let us return to Tang's reading. Periathai, 
she says, has been unfairly relegated by Ravi to a "rather tragic [role] that at times 
dwindled to pathos and grotesquerie" (1996: 9). Our question is, what if there is 
no false representation here? What if Ravi's point is precisely that his 
grandmother is not this infallible Super Mother standing above critique but a 
strong woman who is nonetheless ultimately killed by her relation to the Thing to 
which she anchored her self. True, her amiability recalls Dad, the kynical hero in 
Okri's abiku trilogy. Both are highly spirited and fiercely independent figures 
who, judging by the counsel they impart to their (grand)son, 'speak the same 
language'. Periathai, as we highlighted earlier, calls upon Ravi to ''Never let 
anything break [his] spirit" (TR 7). Similarly, Dad teaches his son Azaro to "Grow 
wherever life puts you down" (TFR 3 8). In terms of the legacy they leave behind, 
however, the two are anything but similar. As discussed previously, even if the 
seemingly futile political struggle to which Dad dedicates his life yields nothing 
concrete, that is, even if the unborn nation continues to persist in its undeadness 
despite his heroic exertions, his 'failure' would still be a radical success for the 
struggle. As the parable about the good man and the evil mosquito illustrates, this 
is because the future success of any revolutionary cause is always contingent upon 
its silent, ceaseless weaving by vanishing mediators such as Dad, i.e. rebels who 
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fight and, in perishing and sinking into invisibility, pave the way for others after 
them to advance the cause. We can assign Periathai the role of vanishing mediator 
and describe her (family) cause as driving "some [symbolic] stake into the 
country" (TR 140). In attempting to do so, however, we will find that not only 
does Periathai not 'vanish' (as she vows she would not prior to her demise), she 
also does not 'mediate' in the positive sense of facilitating her descendents' 
endeavour to realise the goal. What she does unwittingly accomplish with her 
decline and demise as a first generation immigrant is set a tragic precedent which 
her son N aina is to end up following, and by which her grandson Ravi is to be 
haunted. 
Encore! 
Like his mother before him, N aina too turns to the land for solace in the final 
stages of his life (TR 155). Uncannily, the more Naina desires the desire of his 
mother, that is, the more he fixates on the land, the more he resembles Periathai at 
the time of her death. "He has the same obsessed stare in his eyes", Ravi observes 
(TR 159). And the closer he is to his death, the worse his luck becomes. First his 
son Kumar is killed in a violent road accident that crushes his body from the waist 
down. Then he has to cope with the trauma of knowing that Kumar's body has to 
be dug up and reburied "in a proper graveyard" (TR 161) because he had 
previously stubbornly insisted on burying it next to the house, knowing full well 
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then that he would be breaking the law. On top of that, he faces eviction from the 
land he illegally occupies and on which his half-built house stands. The pressure 
ultimately pushes him over the edge. Driven from manic religiosity to psychotic 
delirium, N aina sets fire to his half-built dream house and then immolates himself 
(TR 152-3). 
Like Periathai, Naina's obsession for property which compels him to give 
up "everything, ... work, comfort and security" (TR 152-3) is not simply for or 
about property itself. From his traditional standpoint, the house of his dreams 
must be built as a family, with the family and the involvement of the eldest son. 
Otherwise, N aina says, "it isn't a house" (TR 154). The house should, in other 
words, positivise what the family lacks but should ideally possess: a homely sense 
of cohesion and togetherness. (According to Ravi, the "family was a work force, 
not a unit of affection, living together" (TR 93).) Likewise, the land on which 
Naina's uncompleted house stands is not just coveted for the "stability and 
security" that normally comes with land ownership (Tang 1993: 84). Rather, he 
appears to desire it for its fantasmatic properties, the 'something in the land more 
than the land' that promises to vindicate his life-long struggle ('make it all 
worthwhile') and give him the 'proof of love' which he desires from the (m)other; 
that is, absolute affirmation of his identity and belongingness to the ground 
beneath his feet. Notice also that, as with his mother, Naina's Thing is not only 
unattainable but also as if perversely sought and clung to because it is 
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unattainable. Of all the vacant plots of government land to (illegally) occupy, he 
has to select one that is not for sale (TR 15 8). This, despite having previously 
learned, when he tried but failed to buy the house for his mother because it too 
was not for sale, that illegal occupation of someone's land is more than likely to 
end in tears. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, it appears that what Naina actually 
desires is not so much the fulfilment of his desire but desire itself, i.e. pure desire 
qua jouissance derivable from ( and which is used to attenuate) the pain one 
inflicts upon oneself for no other reason than to set in motion the chain of events 
which we have just described. That Naina might unconsciously privilege pain 
over pleasure is not at all implausible. As Ellie Ragland says, "People love their 
pain. They reify it and dignify it, sing praises to suffering, painting it in colors of 
a higher and purer reality" (1996: 142). Far from being confined to the boudoir of 
perverts, sadomasochism is a constitutive element in many cultural and religious 
practices. Parents sometimes beat and torture their most beloved child(ren) as if 
they know of no other way of expressing their love. This, according to Sarah 
Caldwell, is "a form of intense interaction which is at the core of the Tamil 
concept of family love" (1999: 344). It creates "a deep unconscious association 
between suffering (physical and mental) and nurturance, acceptance and love". 
Indeed, pain is at times quite literally the royal road to higher pleasure. Hindu 
ascetics have known this for centuries, hence their practice of austerities that 
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range from self-deprivation ( e.g. fasting and abstinence from sex) to such 
extremes as lying on a bed of nails or holding one's arms upright in the air for 
decades, causing them to atrophy over time. The paramount goal is to mortify 
themselves into samadhi, the state of yogic jouissance (Fouce and Tomecko 1996: 
80; Kakar 1981: 154-60). Periathai herself is not unfamiliar with the practice. 
Ravi recollects how she sometimes "forfeited her customary warm bath [ and] 
punished herself with cold water" before commencing her elaborate Friday 
prayers ( emphasis added, TR 5). Later in this chapter, we will see why Ravi has to 
reject the potentially heritable masochistic desire of "indefinite awaiting of 
pleasure and ... intense expectation of pain" (Deleuze 1989: 71) if the cycle of 
the eternal return is to be broken. 
Because Naina's all-consuming desire for the land and house is, in the 
psychoanalytic sense, not his but his mother's, and because his passage from 
struggle to grave is but a perfectly sequenced repetition of Periathai's, it stands to 
reason that, for all his toil, his life is ultimately neither his own nor his to 
autonomously direct. Unbeknownst to himself, it has always-already been pre-
scripted for him to relive without the option of adding anything new. Strictly 
speaking, then, N aina' s life is not so much the same as Periathai' s as it is hers 
which he merely reenacts. And insofar as may be gleamed from Ravi's account, 
he reenacts it without any demonstrable understanding or consciousness of the 
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deeper motivations and actual implications of his singleminded obsession to sink 
the pillars of the house into the clay of the land (TR 158-9). 
The central significance of Naina's death is that it officially marks the first 
complete cycle of the recurrence of the same precedent started by Periathai. His 
death also retroactively converts what began as the family matriarch's isolated 
misfortune into a potentially heritable family fate of "straining towards 
achievement that does not end in fulfilment" (Maniam 1984: 30). The logic at 
work here is not unlike the logic behind, say, the emergence of the 'superstitious' 
belief that certain roads with a high accident rate are 'dirty' .41 Like Periathai's 
death, a single automobile accident may be attributed to any number of perfectly 
rational causes such as bad weather conditions and careless driving. Equivalent to 
Naina's death, a second road fatality at the same spot is likely to raise questions 
about the 'spiritual cleanliness' of the road and whether the two accidents may not 
be the handiwork of the 'unclean'. (Usually at this stage, stories previously 
' forgotten ' would suddenly be remembered; for instance, how several workers 
had previously died there in a series of inexplicable 'freak' accidents while 
constructing the road; or how the road is rumoured to have been built on top of an 
ancient graveyard.) Should a third accident occur at the exact same spot, not only 
would previous suspicions of the road's hauntedness be confirmed, the 
41 The belief that certain roads are 'unclean' or 'hungry', that is, haunted by spirits who claim their 
victims by deliberately causing fatal accidents, is prevalent in Nigeria and Malaysia. 
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rational/natural causes previously attributed to the past accidents would be 
reattributed to the work of 'vengeful spirits'. 
In the context of TR, the impending third accident should, for reasons to 
be made clear in the next section, claim all of Naina's offspring. The narrative, 
however, strongly suggests that Ravi is the only one amongst his siblings who is 
unfortunate enough to be conscious of and menaced by what is in his mind's eye 
shaping out to be a pattern of recurring family tragedy, and that he is the one 
keenly eyed by the dark gods to formally bring to completion the family's third 
cycle of the eternal return. Ravi's self-designation as 'the one' is not paranoiac at 
all. Consider firstly his intersubjective position within the family. He is the most 
educated and the most financially well-off amongst them. He is the one person his 
father respects "more than anyone else" (TR 157). Above all, he is the eldest son 
in a quintessentially traditional Hindu family that expects the firstborn male to 
"give more" (TR 156). For being who he is and despite his "wish to keep out of 
whatever mess [the family] might create" for themselves (TR 155), Ravi - more 
than his siblings - is always-already at the centre, expected to symbolically 
castrate himself like a worthy Hindu son before the "Great Fucker" (Father qua 
Law) (Lacan 1992: 307). He is expected to suppress all libidinal signs of 
individuality and "stifle every manifestation of his spontaneity and emotional 
responsiveness" so long as his father still lives (Carstairs 1999: 173). What this 
effectively means is that he must renounce his wish not to unquestioningly 
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comply with the ways of the family-transmitted "old culture" (Maniam, in Wilson 
1993: 18).42 This is the one thing he cannot do, intuitive enough as he is to know 
that to desire the desire of the Other is to risk repeating Periathai/Naina's life of 
eternal hardship. (The question of "why you're a nobody and how you can 
become a somebody" (Maniam, in Lim 1999a) we see germinating here is 
developed by Maniam in his subsequent novels IFC and DP.) 
As a marked man, Ravi is persistently dogged by a sense of imminent 
doom. It is as if he intuits that the bullet bearing his name has been shot and 
would sooner or later hit its mark. Opaquely, he also senses that he has somehow 
.unwittingly become a pawn in a sinister drama whose precise plot forever eludes 
him. We get the first intimations of this in the dark thoughts he begins to have 
soon after transferring to the English school: "Though I had bright dreams that 
night, some intolerable darkness pinched at my heart" (TR 25); "That night I felt, 
for the first time, my troubled heartbeats" (TR 39). The young scholar's 
hauntedness becomes more pronounced as the story progresses. Consider for 
instance his anxiety upon discovering that his only escape route from a life of 
petrification in the estate is as good as sealed should he, apart from having to 
overcome all the other obstacles laid in his path, fail to perform well enough in a 
newly introduced scholastic examination to qualify for Form One: "The year 
42 Naina who desc1ibes his mother as someone who "didn ' t respect worm-eating customs, she 
changed the1n! " (TR 137) is not as 'progressive' and open to change as he believes he is. As proof, 
consider his ' traditional' view of land and house. 
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ahead stood like a rope bridge over a slimy, crocodile infested river. Could I cross 
over to the other bank without falling to the snouts?" (TR 89) As final and most 
palpable illustration, consider the scene in which Ravi casually references an 
obscure film he had watched: 
I stayed back after school, at least once a week, to read in the 
library. Or I joined the seniors in the fortnightly screening of the 
Cinema Club. One film I can never forget is Odd Man Out for it 
stirred me strangely. (TR 80) 
Because Odd Man Out is mentioned but once, and because neither 
explanation nor hint is offered as to why Ravi is "stirred" by it, the reader could 
easily be forgiven if he assumes that the film is Maniam' s invention and that the 
passage, whilst piquing, is ultimately nothing to be fussed about. In assuming 
thus, however, the reader would miss a crucial clue to understanding Ravi's 
chosenness. A search in the film archives shows that Odd Man Out which stirred 
Ravi is almost certainly the 1947 film adaptation of F. L. Green's 'psychological' 
novel of the same name. 43 The antihero of the film/novel is Johnny McQueen, a 
mortally wounded IRA leader and the object of a massive police hunt. Making his 
escape through working class neighbourhoods and slums of Belfast, he encounters 
a series of characters - each of whom, unbeknownst to him, are animated by 
43 http: //us.imdb.com/Title?0039677 
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his/her own secret desire "to get something out of [him] before he dies" Uacket 
notes in Green 1948): 
Lukey, the young artist, sees in him a chance to paint the portrait 
of a mortal who, in his final agony, will disclose the enigma of 
existence in his face. Shell, the pathetic 'down and out', hovering 
between the hopes of an enormous reward and the vague promise 
of some wonderful Belief, wants to hand him over to whoever will 
yield the best bargain. Father Tom, the aged priest, no longer 
concerned with human conceptions of right and wrong, seeks to 
save his soul. Tober, the embittered medical student, wants to save 
his body. And Agnes, the girl who loves him, knowing the 
hopelessness of her love and its inevitable frustration, desires that 
both their lives shall end before Justice can claim her man. Each 
character endeavours to solve the dilemma of his own life in the 
ruin of Johnny's. Uacket notes in Green 1948) 
It would not be farf etched to suggest that Ravi is stirred by the film 
because he identifies with Johnny, his ideal ego and the 'odd man out' of the film. 
He sees himself in Johnny and recognises that they are stuck in the same 
proverbial boat. Both are under threat and on the run: Ravi, from the invisible 
hands of fate and significant figures in his life like Karupi and Ayah who each 
harbour some pathological wish to mould him in such a way that his potentiality 
would never be realised; Johnny, from the long arms of the law and the secret 
desires of those with whom he has the ill fortune of crossing paths. Additionally, 
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each step they take to avert drama seems to put them right back in the middle of 
it, leaving them with little choice but to participate in murky events which they 
sense would almost certainly lead to their perdition. 
Structural Fate 
If the thought of Tamil melodrama could not but insinuate its way into our mind 
as we were detailing the many high tragedies that have befallen upon Ravi and his 
family, that would be because in certain respects TR is a melodrama. Like its 
filmic cousin, the problems it depicts are drawn from the everyday reality of many 
Indian poor. Thematically, they revolve around 
family members' transgressions of their duties towards one 
another; ... comparisons of the 'nature' of the rich and poor, the 
relative sophistication of each, ... the value of their different types 
of education; [ and] tensions arising from interaction between 
lower-class and upper-class characters. (Dickey 1995: 140) 
Also like Tamil melodramas, TR is presented in acutely emotive and 
personal terms without directly drawing the reader's attention to the political 
underside of the depicted crises (Dickey 1995: 138). The reader is privy to intense 
private moments in Periathai and Naina's lives. He sees them mostly at their 
lowest, struggling to cope with one traumatic event after another (illness, mental 
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breakdown, death). Through all of this, however, the reader never actually sees 
them apprehending life from a perspective that is anywhere remotely political. 
Not once does the text impress upon the reader that Periathai and N aina suspect 
that their 'bad luck' may at least be partially shaped by the invisible sociopolitical 
forces. As Ravi rightly says, albeit somewhat arrogantly, "Their imagination 
couldn't grasp the real complexity that surrounded us" (TR 140). Similarly, Ravi's 
understanding of the 'complexities', while arguably more informed, is also never 
articulated in a way that immediately brings the political to mind. Ravi is 
cynically well aware of the "prescribed social rules" that prohibit him from 
speaking "pure" English (the language of the ruling class) and socialising with 
children from the high-class "yellow territory" (TR 75-6). He never, however, 
records his thoughts on these codes of social control in anything other than 
personal terms. It is him that fate wants to entrap, he is made to suffer indignities 
in the hands of Ayah, his family wants him to compromise his desire. As with the 
rest of the predominantly Indian characters in the novel, Ravi's world is so far 
removed from politics that momentous national events including the Japanese 
occupation of Malaya are referenced but casually. Independence is received as if 
it is merely an incidental half-curiosity: 
One night, while we were still at work on the clothes, we heard 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, our Prime Minister, on the radio, uttering 
the words: Merdeka! Merdeka! Merdeka! 
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So Independence came to us. Its immediate signs were the further 
reduction of the curfew hours and in the kind of goods displayed 
on the pavement stalls. (TR 131) 
Given these real-life, emotive, personal and non-political elements of the 
melodrama in TR, it is not surprising that Tang, faithful to her method, should 
argue that the novel lacks "engagement with the larger multi-cultural society", 
that it focuses too exclusively on "the ethnic theme" and therefore lacks "a sense 
of Malaysianness" (Tang 1993: 82-3; see also Wong 2000). Sharing her concern 
to an extent is Shirley Lim who writes, in less polemical terms, that "an 
[ unknowledgeable] reader may well believe Malaysia to be, even if pluralistic, an 
Indian-dominated nation, or at least not a Malay-dominated country" (1984: 49). 
Tang and Lim do admittedly have a point. From an angle, TR can appear the way 
they describe it. Here however we have to ask: is that all there is to the novel? 
Have they perhaps forgotten to approach the text tangentially, that is, consider 
how the narrative might alert the reader to issues confronting Malaysian society 
"through omission rather than inclusion" (Maniam 1988: 168)? In any case, can it 
honestly be said that the almost ethnically homogenous cast robs TR of its 
"Malaysianness" - a highly loaded and problematic term if ever there was one. 
Reading TR against the grain, we will find that although the novel has its 
moments of melodrama, it also departs from the film genre in at least one key 
aspect. Although Maniam draws material for the crises he depicts from the same 
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archive and depicts them in the same emotive and personal terms, he does not 
offer the reader unrealistic, fantastic resolutions that may "feed hopes that a 
spectacularly easier life is attainable" (Dickey 1995: 147). The manner in which 
the story concludes is neither happy in the escapist sense nor "achieved at the cost 
of repression - repression of real-life experiences, knowledge, and fears that 
would contradict the facility of the melodramatic solution" (1995: 137). Of 
course, even without the sugarcoating, TR's political underside is still not entirely 
self-evident. However, consider what it does reveal: a disquieting reflection of a 
community stifled "within the unmoving air of a clearing: geographical, mental, 
cultural and spiritual" (Maniam 1984: 30). Now, in the face of this, the reader 
may choose to worry that a lesser reader may come away with the false 
impression that Malaysia is overrun by Indians. Or he might perhaps find it more 
worthwhile to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the community's decay. 
He might ask, for instance, how this symbolic snapshot of life for migrants and 
their children in the early days of Malaya/Malaysia differs from the present, and 
what this in tum says about the nation and its postcolonial ideals. 
Although, as we saw, the fate of the eternal return runs in Ravi's family 
and perpetuates itself down the bloodline (as evinced by Naina's unconscious 
inheritance of his mother's Thing, and his desire to share it with the horrified 
Ravi), it is not just a ' family thing ' . With the benefit of historical hindsight, we 
know that Ravi's family is not unlike countless other working class, lower caste, 
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semi-dysfunctional Tamil/Indian families in Malaya/Malaysia that have been, for 
generations from the colonial days of mass migration to the present, structurally 
crippled from birth and primed to remain at the bottom of social hierarchy. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, decades of being subjected to systematic exploitation has 
trapped the community in a vicious cycle of economic dispossession and 
circumscribed life opportunities. The result has been the fossilisation of a 
subculture of woundedness ( characterised by the crippling feeling of 
worthlessness, apathy, self-loathing and so forth) which has, over several 
generations, led to the 'forgetting' of the actual underlying causes of the 'Indian 
dilemma' in Malaysia. Cruelly, their backwardness has even at times been 
perceived as the result of their inherent backwardness. In one of its publications, 
INSAN (Institute of Social Analysis, Malaysia) confirms what most Malaysians 
already silently know: many middle class Indian Malaysians often feel "indignant 
that these people [ working class Indians] are always whining, begging and 
quarrelling, instead of taking steps to improve themselves" (INSAN 1989: 26). It 
is possible that some of them may feel indignant because they honestly believe 
that "these people" give the entire Indian community a bad name. However, is it 
not possible that they might secretly, without admitting it to themselves, derive 
obscene pleasure from the pain of the poor and the downtrodden? 
In TR, the higher caste Ayah and Amah never seem to tire of "eroding 
whatever self-confidence [Ravi has] developed" and ensuring that he feels like "a 
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dhobi's son [who] could never dream of being more" (TR 95). Whenever Ravi 
goes over to their house to collect dirty laundry, they make him "sit on the bottom 
step instead of at the doorway" (TR 94) as if he were a beggar - which is precisely 
the term Amah uses to insult Ravi on one occasion (TR 83). Feigning benevolent 
concern, Ayah, rather than encourage Ravi to improve himself, urges him to be "a 
dutiful son and help the family" and not bring misfortune upon them with his 
"book ideas" (TR 98). Even when Ravi's family has achieved a small measure of 
independence after Naina sets up his own laundry business, Ayah continues to 
find the opportunity to enjoy Ravi's pain in person. Visiting the shop one day -
royally, without alighting from his Mercedes - he unloads a batch of dirty 
laundry, looks briefly at Ravi, turns to Naina and says with "a vengeful gleam in 
his eyes": "You're still washing my clothes!" (TR 133) Deferentially, Naina 
replies in Tamil that "Each man makes his way in life as best as he can" (TR 133). 
Ravi, surprisingly, keeps his silence, although one suspects he would have liked 
to break out into song: 
When we say: 
'We have no homes, 
no land, 
no fields, 
and no crops, 
There is no salvation.' 
They say: 
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'You have strong hands, 
Use them for begging bowls 
There are plenty of towns 
Can we help you in any other way? 
Be off with you.' 
They make us beggars 
When we tell them about the weeds, 
They teach us how to kill the crop. 
They push a man to his death. 
When we ask them how to start something, 
they tell us to end everything. 
When we say: 
'Tamils have no education, 
no energy, 
no support, 
and no guts 
No one helps them.' 
They say: 
'You have bellies 
fill them up. 
You have dreams, 
it's time to sleep. 
There's nothing to worry about. 
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Just eat and sleep.' 
When you ask how to improve yourself, 
they will tell you the riddles of the universe. 
When we say: 
'Tamils have no greatness, 
no unity 
and no possibility 
of changing any of this.' 
They say: 
'There are platforms, 
and speeches 
and great leaders. 
Here is a garland, 
and here is my neck; 
what other unity do you need?' 
They will lead us on their own. 
If you try to protect yourself, 
they will cut off your head. (in Haridas and Dhandayudham 1981: 
20-23) 
The English translation of the above 'tune', a Tamil poem by I. 
Ulaganathan, nicely captures our point on the working class Indian community in 
Malaysia. Not only have they been thrown into a world not of their own choosing, 
their well-off cousins who are in a position to help actually 'conspire' to 
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perpetuate and enJoy their oppression. Additionally, as the persona laments, 
political leaders who are supposed to uplift the community have proven useless. 
From the persona's description of the oratorical effusions and preoccupation with 
symbolic brown-nosing, one would be forgiven to think that he is indirectly 
referring to, amongst others, the leaders and stalwarts of the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC). MIC is the main all-Indian component party in Barisan Nasional 
(Malaysia's ruling coalition) that has been entrusted with the future of Indian 
Malaysians. However, largely because of its infamous politics of self-adulation, 
petty squabbles and personal enrichment, the Indian community has been 
languishing, as it has been since the nation's founding more than four decades 
ago (Khoo 1993: 279; Elegant 2000).44 Because the condition of working class 
Tamils has fundamentally remained unchanged throughout its history in 
Malaya/Malaysia, it stands to reason that, in retrospect, each and every generation 
of working class Tamils in the country has always-already been structurally fated, 
primed to relive their immigrant forefathers' circumscribed life. It is for this 
reason that all of Naina's offspring are, as we signalled earlier, ripe for fate's 
picking. 
44 Indian Malaysian rubber plantation workers have historically been one of the most exploited 
groups in the country. Even today, some are still treated as bonded labourers and paid with 
coupons instead of a proper salary. 
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Being Responsible 
Family dynamics and structural categories like class and race delimit our 
existence in more ways and more profoundly than we often consciously realise. 
Yet, as is often forgotten, they are not all-determining. If they were, Ravi should 
not by right have managed to postpone his meeting with fate in a way that eluded 
Kumar. (Kumar was Ravi's prematurely aged brother and the archetypal filial 
Hindu son in the novel. Lorry attendant by day and petrol pump attendant by 
night, he died before his potential was realised.45) Neither should Ravi have 
succeeded in acquiring the 'forbidden' white-collar skill that would at the 
minimum guarantee him "a comfortable, unthreatened" life of economic security 
(TR 140). 
Contrary to critics' portrayal of Ravi as someone who passively submits to 
the chain of causes that determine his conduct, Ravi - as we shall see - is the only 
one who comes closest to recognising the three key lessons in TR: first, that one's 
"relation with tradition should not be one of submission and repetition, but of 
transformation and critique" (Laclau 1990: 179); second, that meaningful 
belongingness is not contingent upon the coming into possession of one's 
45 From a young age, Kumar has been the obedient son in the family. Without complaint, he 
shoulders most of the laundry delivery duties after Ravi, having been abused once too often by 
Ayah, refuses to go on his rounds (TR 107). Kumar comes to the rescue again by volunteering to 
look after a new laundry shop in Gurun when, despite Naina's coercion, Ravi refuses to shoulder 
the duty (144). Also, although Ravi's reluctant financial contribution to the family is greater 
Kumar's and Samy's (his other brother) combined, it is Kumar who willingly gives his mother his 
entire salary from the petrol kiosk (154). 
258 
impossible Thing; and third, that one's potentiality is ultimately determined by 
one's active actualisation of it, not by one's structural fate or the transcendental 
beyond. Of course, this is far from saying that Ravi is perfect. He is in fact as 
deeply flawed and as incapable of real happiness as the rest of Maniam's 
trademark tragic protagonists like Krishnan ('Arriving'), Muniandy ('The Cord') 
and Rajan (IFC). Nevertheless, there is, one has to admit, something to be 
admired about his taking upon himself the task of critically examining himself 
"being aware of [himself] being aware of the world" (Solomon 1983: 313). This 
will to know rather than cripple himself (more than he already has been by his 
structural positioning) by adopting his family's insular worldview is curiously not 
always given its due weight by critics. As we previously mentioned, it is usually 
either passed over in silence or, if brought up, invariably inverted into evidence of 
his immaturity. Things become all the more curious if we take into account how 
integral the notion of agency is in TR and indeed almost all of Maniam's works. 
In the preface to his collection of short stories Haunting the Tiger: Contemporary 
Stories from Malaysia, Maniam writes: 
What is that passionate concern or commitment that has been the 
fuel ... ? It has to do with breaking out, with pushing the frontiers 
of consciousness further away from the purely social, political and 
cultural centre ... The writing tries to unearth the hidden resources 
of the man or woman beleaguered by unacceptable social, political 
and cultural visions and practices. (1996: x) 
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At its heart, Maniam's philosophical approach to life and literature is not 
unlike Okri' s which we discussed in Part II. Just as the latter postulates the 
overcoming of consciousness' humiliation as foundational to the unearthing of 
one's infinite wealth, Maniam sees "the transformation of leaden consciousness 
into the knowledge that [surpasses] understanding" ( 1997: 21) as the pivotal 
precondition "for developing a fuller attitude towards life and the appreciation of 
man's many-fold talents" (1987: 219). In Maniam, as in Okri, this requires more 
than pointing the accusing finger at others ('you did this to me', 'they corrupted 
us'). Infinitely less pleasurable, it calls for the recognition of and owning up to 
one's blameworthiness, one's complicity in the creation and perpetuation of the 
very dilemma one faces. In Lacanian terms, it necessitates the traversal of fantasy, 
a full recognition of who I always-already was, namely the effect of causal 
determination who makes the relation between the cause and its effect possible 
(Zupancic 2000: 29) . 
Before we proceed to elucidate how Ravi might or might not be said to 
traverse his fantasy by TR ' s conclusion, it would be useful if we first recall a few 
key concepts which we have covered previously but will encounter again later. 
For better contrast, let us proceed via Maniam's 'Booked for Life' (EFL), a short 
story which is thematically more intimate with TR than first meets the eye. EFL 
revolves around the life of Mary Lim, a college lecturer and "a hard, hard 
woman" (EFL 23). In her world, men are corrupters of women, the "neighbours in 
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their dark skins" are disgusting (EFL 45), and her maturing teenage son is fast 
turning into a version of his father, the allegedly conniving Indian lecher who is 
her ex-husband. Mary is simply unable to recognise that her world is 'bitter and 
twisted' because she herself has framed it that way. In her eyes, the wicked ways 
of the world exist independently of her participation and there can be no changing 
her mind about that. As she chastises herself when self-certainty falters, "Don't 
tell me I don't understand my own mind. Don't tell me I keep secrets from 
myself' (EFL 50). 
What Mary misrecognises 1s not of course the self of her symbolic 
identification but the fundamental fantasy that supports her universe of self-
experience - the way things actually, objectively seem to her even if they don't 
seem that way to her, to paraphrase Zizek (2000d: 83). A person may have several 
core fantasies, "some of which are conscious or preconscious", but in Lacanian 
discourse, there is "one single fantasy - an unconscious fantasy for most of us -
that is absolutely fundamental" (Fink 1997: 56-7). This absolutely fundamental 
fantasy which Zizek terms as "the primordial form of narrative" ( original 
emphasis 1997: 10) is the very frame through which the subject gains access to 
reality. It colours his entire existence, influences his orientation in life, the way he 
relates to other people including parents and lovers, and his capacity for sexual 
satisfaction. Like the Gordian knot, fundamental fantasy literally holds together 
the ontological consistency of the subject's self-experience. Cut the knot and his 
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world would fall apart. (Recall, for example, how Periathai' s world disintegrates 
when she loses her house.) Mary's fantasy is constructed around the empty space 
occupied by the fantasmatic figure of her former husband, Suresh. Initially 
eroticised as Siddharta "the handsome, incorruptible prince of men" (EFL 34), 
Suresh quickly loses his godly radiance after the birth of their socially stigmatised 
Chindian46 son, Michael. Gradually he unfolds into a gift of shit, an object 
desublimated of the dignity of the Thing: 
'He was a sneaky one, that Suresh,' ... 
'You can't make the leopard change its spot for something else. He 
only pretended to play the domesticated father. I hear he's still 
going from woman to woman, leaving his trademark behind. 
Wouldn't he have left something behind in Michael? Not just the 
genetics. Something only his crafty mind can scheme up?' (EFL 
43-4) 
Daily obsessed with Suresh's real and/or imagined evil deeds and the 
countless ways her life continues to be poisoned by them, Mary avoids 
confronting her fear and suspicion that there is, and has always been, something 
'dirty' inside of her "waiting to be stroked into motion" (EFL 33). What she does 
not realise is that any content that is repressed always returns as symptoms. In 
Lacan' s words, "what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real" ( 1992: 
46 
'Chindian' refers to a person of mixed Chinese-Indian parentage. 
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131 ). In Mary's case, they reappear as irrational guilt, persecution complex, 
obsessive compulsion for cleanliness and order, and incestuous dreams about 
Michael, her teenage son. As her supreme symptom, imaginary poison trickles 
daily from her withered nipples, a foul-smelling excrescence she takes perverse 
pleasure in cleansing and reviling as "the ugliness and filth women inherit from 
men" (BFL 62). Every day it reminds her of the possibility that she might be a 
Putana at heart. (In Hindu mythology, Putana is the demonness who tried to kill 
the infant god Krishna with her poisoned breasts/milk. The name is invoked here 
to symbolize the source of contaminated love, the kind that kills even as it 
nurtures. 47) 
Mary's tragedy is that although her fantasy surrounding that "bastard" 
(BFL 40) Suresh happily distracts her from her fear-suspicion of being 'unclean', 
it also "creates what it purports to conceal, its 'repressed' point of reference" 
(Zizek 1999a: 92). In other words, hidden by her paranoid construction is the fact 
that there is nothing to hide in the first place. Mary is and never was the 
inherently besmirched and outward~y corrupting horror her fantasy purports to 
conceal. From the omniscient narrator, we know that her neurosis is a reactive-
formation to her 'anal' parents having soundly inculcated in her such lessons as 
the importance of keeping her Chinese blood undiluted and her culture pure (BFL 
47 See Sudhir Kakar ' s Th e Inner World (1 981: Chapter 5) for discussion on the Putana myth . 
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41 ), the impropriety of giving expression to emotions, and the good etiquette of 
bearing pain "stoically, even heroically" (EFL 40). 
The key question that concerns EFL as much as TR is this: if the 
imaginary excrescence 'in Mary that is more than Mary' exists only insofar as its 
existence is presupposed by Mary, and if her presupposition of its existence is the 
founding gesture upon which her entire bitter life is built, whose fault is it? Is 
Mary accountable for the idiosyncratic way in which she relates to the world, or 
should the blame be absorbed by the Other (her parents, husband, son and so on)? 
Ethically speaking, are we answerable for our fundamental fantasy, our 
unconscious "choice of neurosis" (Zupancic 2000: 35)? For instance, if I were a 
Caucasian male whose over-fascination with Asian women compels me to 
obsessively pursue the objects of my desire to the detriment of my well-being 
(and the well-being of the objects I pursue), would I be answerable for my passion 
- or rather my erection, "one of the last remainders of authentic spontaneity, 
something that cannot be thorough! y mastered through rational-instrumental 
procedures" (Zizek 1999f: 385)? Am I the master of my fetish, or am I - horror of 
horrors - it, this point of pure desire palpitating beyond the pleasure principle? 
Analogously, if the leader of a political party is compelled by the 'voice of God' 
(the categorical imperative of his conscience) to impose some grotesque form of 
religious law upon the multireligious population of the country to which he 
belongs, and if this leads to the oppression, if not extirpation, of the 'infidel' half 
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of the population, should he be held responsible for his action if he argues in self-
defence that although he 'feels' for the victims, there is nothing he can do about it 
since he is only a humble agent-instrument of Divine Necessity? Apropos of TR: 
are Periathai and Naina accountable for the installation of the Hindu-Indian Thing 
at the centre of their world? Are they responsible for the good and bad, and the 
pain and pleasure they derive from being faithful-unto-death to It? Are they 
autonomous individuals who volitionally chose their own Absolute and therefore 
their destiny, or are they just 'simple folks' who know not what they do? 
In Lacan, the subject is always fully responsible for the maxim that guides 
his action: "the determination of the subject by the other is always the subject's 
self-determination" (Zizek 1993: 126). The subject is the effect of causal 
determination. But he is also the 'stumbling block' in the relation between cause 
and its effect, that is, the active mediator who makes the causal relation possible. 
As Zupancic explains: "it may well be that you were dragged along by the torrent 
of (natural) necessity, but in the final analysis it was you who made this cause the 
cause. There is no cause of the cause of your action; the cause of the cause can 
only be the subject itself' (2000: 34). For that reason, 
any immediate reference to my nature ('What can I do, I was made 
like this!') is false; my relationship to the impulses in me is always 
a mediated one, i.e. my impulses determine me only insofar as I 
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recognise them, which is why I am fully responsible for them. 
(Zizek 1993: 126) 
If the self for which I am fully responsible is not found-given but self-
posited, and if this self-posited self is the obstacle standing in the way of my self-
overcoming, then what steps can I take to overcome myself? The answer in Lacan 
is of course la traversee du fantasme, the authentic act of traversing the fantasy 
wherein I (the subject qua analysand) come to identify with the real of my desire, 
recognise myself in my own unacknowledged motivations, in the censured 
chapters of my self-expression (Zizek 1994: 25). This, according to Zizek, is how 
we should read Freud's formulation, wo es war, sol! ich werden: "you, the 
subject, must identify with the place where your symptom already was; in its 
'pathological' particularity you must recognize the element which gives 
consistency to your being" (1989: 75). By journeying in its entirety the path of the 
determination of his actions, the subject will arrive at the 'true knowledge' of his 
symptom, simultaneously dissolving it, thereby reconciling himself with himself. 
The "act of knowing is in itself an act of liberation from unconscious coercion" 
(1994: 25). 
Traversing the fantasy necessarily leads to the total annihilation of the self 
and its recreation ex nihilo. In Maniam's words, it results in the "death of a very 
restricting self' (Greet 1991: 8) and its replacement "by a paradigmatic self that is 
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capable of encompassing more" (Tan 1998: 109). In Chapter 3, we saw this 
exemplified by the flamenco dancer who leaps into the terrifying unknown and 
returns transformed, shining with a "new fiery stature" (Okri 1996a: 10). In the 
abiku trilogy, Dad undergoes not one but multiple cycles of symbolic death and 
rebirth. With each cycle, he becomes stronger and more powerful. Even from 
these few illustrations, it is clear that the cure of 'going through' the fantasy is 
beneficial. It is also clear that we should, if we love ourselves, desire it for 
ourselves. In psychoanalysis, however, the fundamental maxim is that we never 
really desire it. This, even when we claim and insist that we really do want to 
change. The basic position of the subject of desire "is one of a refusal of 
knowledge, a will not to know ... the why and wherefore of his ... symptom" 
(Fink 1997: 7). He would rather cling to his jouissance (his pleasure-in-pain, the 
precious self-defining memories he has woven around his symptom) than 'let go' 
of himself and risk ending up "in an entirely new landscape, a featureless territory 
in which [his] existence will no longer be confirmed by what [he] feels" 
(Zupancic 2000: 9). The fear of self-erasure is not unjustified. However, it is often 
forgotten that although the fear is real, it is also ultimately groundless "since it 
belongs to the very subject who will no longer be around ... to experience this 
'loss' as a loss". 
In EFL, the moment of 'the loss of the loss' never arrives. Mary moves no 
closer to renouncing the obscene enjoyment she derives from being bitter and 
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blaming the world for it. To compound to that, she even lures a concerned male 
friend, Mr. Tan, to her house and then proceed to goad and coerce him to put his 
lips to her nipples and suck the poison out of her. Hesitatingly and partially driven 
by the desire 'give it to her' so that she might become less frigid, Mr. Tan 
complies - not realising that in doing so he unwittingly becomes instrumental in 
converting Mary's unfounded fear of being a Putana into reality. Similarly, in TR, 
Periathai and N aina never 'got over' themselves. They die clinging to the fantasy 
that the Other (life, fate, the town council, etc.) has stolen their 'treasure', the 
house (qua Hindu-Indian Thing) of their desire. Till the bitter end, they refuse to 
own up to the fact that their Thing has the authority to confer upon them the 
completion they desire only insofar as they themselves authorise it. By their own 
volition, they made this cause their cause, "not as something subordinate to them 
but as their absolute Cause" (Zizek 1994: 39). For that reason, the argument that 
'they have no choice' ( except to cling to their house-Thing) or that 'they know not 
what they do' (because they are simple and uneducated) can only be taken as 
false. In the final analysis, they authorised their own incompletion. 
The Beautiful Soul 
It is clear that the kind of transformation which Maniam' s works seek is not 
sin1ply a matter of changing one 's opinion on particular issues or deciding 
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whether to adopt or not adopt this or that destiny. Neither does it call for the 
hacking away of one's cultural roots or the replacement of one set of religious 
ideals with another. What is demanded of the subject rather is a radical shift in the 
way he relates to his Thing. Put another way, we might say that it demands that 
the subject journeys from sense-certainty ( consciousness which takes what it sees 
as obvious) through perception ( critical consciousness of oneself being aware of 
oneself being aware of the world) to absolute knowledge (identification with the 
repressed pathological particularity that gives consistency to one's being). 
In TR, the only character who rises to this challenge and whose life 
trajectory closely parallels the movement of consciousness we have just mapped 
is none other than Ravi. In the early days of sense-certainty, life was idyllically 
unproblematic. He remembers its romantic earthiness, the wonder of his first 
Deepavali (the Hindu festival of light), the communal cooking and feasting, and 
the cultural taboos and old wives' tales that enchanted his imaginary world. He 
remembers the "echoed voices among the hills" which the children occasionally 
heard and took as "the chanting and tinkling of banana-tree spirits dancing in the 
courtyard at night". As well, he remembers the realness of fair Hindu gods and 
goddesses who fought evil "in battles that clashed over our sleeping heads" (TR 
14). "There was a lot of colour in our invisible world," Ravi writes. It was "a 
special country ... more tangible than the concrete one we flitted through every 
day" (TR 13-4). Ravi's sense-certainty dissipates into thin air the day he is 
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plucked from the Tamil school and placed in the English school (by Naina, at the 
crazy behest of Karupi who claims that a formally-attired axe-wielding white man 
had appeared to her in a dream and ordered Ravi's transfer). "The world I had 
known fell apart", Ravi dramatically puts it (TR 20) . In place of the comforting 
familiarity of his hitherto cocooned existence, he now faces the radical alterity of 
the English school which simultaneously impresses and intimidates with its 
colonial architecture and clinical atmosphere. In place of the specially imported 
Tamil textbooks, he is issued glossy English schoolbooks whose dazzling and 
colourful pages are capable of transporting him "into a pleasant, unreachable 
[Eng]land" (TR 24). And in place of Murugesu, his quirky former teacher from 
India, he has Miss Nancy, an expatriate English teacher whose obsession with 
cleanliness, order and discipline is as pathological as Mary Lim's in EFL. For 
Ravi, Miss Nancy is, despite her unconcealed (albeit humorously caricaturised) 
racism towards her pupils, an endless source of wonder. The repertoire of 
'English' children's stories she regularly tells in class, particularly the (Enid 
Blyton-like) tales of a blue-eyed, tawny-haired boy named Ernie and his flower-
n1unching horse called Dobbin, cannot but give wings to his imagination. As well, 
Ravi is strangely pleasured by the often-terrifying lessons in western-style 
personal hygiene Miss Nancy imparts with the keenness of a demented prison 
warden. They inspire him to draw comparisons between the colonial education he 
now receives and life as it was under Murugesu ' s tutelage. In one instance, he 
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reappraises the Hindu initiation ceremony Murugesu had guided him through and 
arrives at the following conclusion: 
Though the central figure in the ceremony, I had felt I was the least 
important person in the gathering. I could have been an age-old 
pebble, confirmed in its existence only because they had 
discovered it ... There was no unexpectedness. I was expected and 
accepted. [In contrast,] Miss Nancy made me feel I was a 
discovery in myself. (TR 30) 
Young Ravi's fateful entry into the new world of the English school 
clearly coincides with his awakening to the fact that there is more of the world to 
be discovered than he had previously realised. At this point, he could have, had he 
wanted to, run away from the question of why the colonial other is so fascinating 
and if it is truly as inherently fascinatingly other as it appears. Instead he engages 
with it, tries to fathom its enigma and, in the process of doing so, expands the 
boundaries of his self-understanding. These actions hardly qualify Ravi as the out-
and-out Sloterdijkian ' sucker' imagined by critics who treat his infidelity to his 
roots as inexorable evidence of his seizure-neutralisation by colonial ideology. By 
the same token, however, neither would it be accurate to say that he does not in 
time 'lose himself in his fascination with otherness. One might for example point 
to his over-enthusiasm in soaking up an ' alien' set of sociosymbolic rules which 
directly or otherwise inspires him to challenge the sanctity of the rules which 
govern-oppress his community. One might even be justified in arguing that Ravi 
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1s, at this point, as guilty as the "white monkeys" in TR ( 43), that is, his 
schoolmates' Anglomaniacal fathers who, complete in their "Bose caps", swagger 
aggressively in public, expect their children to speak English, and mock Naina for 
clinging "to the Tamil tongue and Indian religious practices so tenaciously" (TR 
18). The question is: what if all the drama is necessary? What if Ravi has to 'lose 
himself (misrecognise his unfreedom) and 'go through hell' (traverse his fantasy) 
before he can 'return to himself ( attain true freedom in the act of recognising 
himself as the cause of the cause of his actions)? 
Here we should bear in mind that one does not and cannot leap directly 
from sense-certainty to absolute (self-)knowledge without first working through 
the contradictions in one's self-conception. In the same way, Ravi cannot choose 
himself as a free subject without first recognising his unfreedom, i.e. the fact that 
he has, despite his cocksureness in the independence of his will to self-
determination, always-already been determined, 'carried along' by what we may 
term his 'English-Thing'. The crucial twist here is that he must recognise himself 
not simply as the inert causal effect of his relation to his Thing but the effect of a 
cause which, although he did not consciously posit as his Absolute (just as a 
fetishist does not rationally choose his fetish), is nevertheless his/himself. In other 
words he must attribute to himself the unconscious decision involved in the 
' 
incorporation of the English-Thing as the law of his heart. He must then be able to 
say to himself, 'I now know that I do not have to subordinate myself to the Thing 
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of my desire just so that I may feel "worthy of love" or that I have "the right of 
existence" (Fuery 2000: 28). The reason is because ultimately I am my Thing. It is 
I who has the authority to confer upon myself the belongingness I seek.' It is only 
when Ravi reaches this point that he may attain true freedom, or in Maniam's 
words, come "into the knowledge that [surpasses] understanding" (1997: 21). 
This, as we shall see later in our discussion, applies as much on level of the 
personal as it does on the political. 
To flesh out the 'logic of freedom' we have just described, let us continue 
tracing the movement of Ravi's consciousness towards its supercession. Earlier, 
we saw how his transfer to the English school simultaneously cures him of his 
naivety and plunges him into a world of uncertainty. We have also seen how he 
quickly gains some sense of equilibrium and starts to take pleasure in forming 
new knowledge about his world. Now, out of this, a new self-consciousness 
emerges - one that is increasingly precious about itself and over-confident that it 
is "something that exists on its own account" ( original emphasis, Hegel 1977: 
481). As Ravi himself says, "One's world was, after all, private and it was only 
through chance encounters, as had been Miss Nancy and mine, that one 
discovered the logic and the power that sustains the individual" (TR 140). 
Consider, as further illustration of his newfound preciousness, the following 
scene. One day after listening to Miss Nancy's story about a dominatrix-like 
Snow White giving her servile dwarfs a severe tongue-lashing for messing up her 
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house, Ravi returns home with a "craving for order" (TR 37). To satisfy this 
strange craving, 
I appropriated a corner of the front room - the trestle bed had been 
knocked down - for myself. I marked off a cubicle with chalk. No 
one could step into that imaginary room. I kept all my school 
things and I often read or wrote there . . . Once I stepped over the 
fictitious line I couldn't be disturbed. An imperturbable insulation 
cut off the happenings in the other parts of the house. Sometimes 
my mother came rushing in, grabbed me by the shoulders and beat 
me [ for not watching over my brother]. 
Gradually, however, the family respected my self-imposed 
isolation. It was the brightest corner in the room and soon attracted 
admirers. 
"Don't disturb him! He's reading," my mother said if any child 
crawled close to the lines. 
I rigorously drew these demarcations, not for myself but for them. 
My mother didn't even dare sweep that corner - I did it myself 
with a salvaged wooden-handled broom. (TR 38) 
Ravi's staking out of his own personal space amidst the household chaos 
is an obvious attempt at asserting his individuality, not to mention a pragmatic 
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move at ensuring that he has a quiet place to go when he needs to study or escape 
momentarily from the family bustle. Additionally - and this is the crucial part -
the act mirrors the folding back of Ravi's consciousness into itself, as if "in dread 
of besmirching the splendour of its inner being" (Hegel 1977: 400). Like the 
Hegelian figure of Beautiful Soul who "flees from contact with the actual world" 
in order to "preserve the purity of its heart" ( 1977: 400), Ravi turns "away from 
the God who ruled [his] people" (TR 79). He refuses to participate in the dirty 
games regulated by unwritten sociosymbolic rules that empower people like Ayah 
to keep them in subjection. As well, he withdraws from his family which he 
regards with a degree of condescension and a not-unjustified fear of being pulled 
down by them and turned into another victim of the eternal return: 
Only my studies mattered. I was at them constantly, aware that I 
could go to England if I won a teaching bursary. Naina's interests 
and my family's struggles became unimportant. The dignity of the 
individual was the only thing that engaged me. And this couldn't 
be acquired if I gave in to quirkish desires and irrational dreams. 
My father had surrendered to some secret grief at Periathai' s death 
and borrowed indiscriminately to salve a non-existent pride. 
It was amusing to watch the family repair its broken image. (TR 
141) 
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Ravi's strategy of staying out of the family's "mess" (TR 155) is hard-
hearted, to say the least. But lest we forget, it is a strategy that in the end yields 
him what was denied his father and grandmother: a comfortable, unthreatened life 
of economic security. This is by no means an empty victory, even if it comes at 
the high price of estrangement from his family, as it proves that the curse of the 
eternal return (the material, 'creature comfort' half of it, at this point) is ejectable 
into the past. There is of course the 'existential' half of the curse to be taken care 
of. For despite the solace Ravi derives from his English-Thing, the desiderated 
sense of belonging continues to elude him, just as it always eluded his father and 
grandmother. He remains unreconciled within, abstracted from the world, pining 
away for "the snow-capped isolation and the gentleness of the buttercupped 
meadows" of Ernie and Dobbin (TR 39). Ravi's two-year sojourn in England 
appears to have somewhat attenuated his fascination with his Thing. "The snow 
wasn't as white as I had imagined it to be", Ravi writes (TR 147). Similarly, Ernie 
who had hitherto been his secret ego-ideal turns out to be not so unique, appearing 
as he does "among the many faces [he had seen] in that midland town or in 
London". It is not until his father ' s suicide, however, that a radical break occurs. 
Naina and Periathai are no more, he writes, but they are still vivid in his mind (TR 
172). On that note, he closes with a poem containing "an immature and 
tormenting recognition" which he had written with "difficulty and uncertainty": 
276 
'Full Circle' 
(for Naina) 
Have you been lost 
for words? 
Have you been lost 
for words when 
you had them stacked 
like images in a dream? 
Have you been lost for words 
when they imprisoned 
your flesh, your thoughts, 
feelings that rose with the wind? 
Have you been lost? 
Then words will not serve. 
They will be like the culture 
you refused at adolescent, 
drinking from the tap 
instead of the well. 
The dregs at the bottom 
of well water is the ash 
of family prayers you rejected 
The clay taste 
the deep-rootedness 
you turned aside from -
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for the cleanliness of chlorine. 
Words will not serve. 
You'll be twisted by them 
into nameless little impulses 
that roam dark city roads, raging. 
They will be vague knots 
of feelings, lustreless, cultureless, 
buried in a heart that will not serve. (TR 173) 
Full Circle: The Spirit Returns to Itself 
Although it is clear to everyone that 'Full Circle' marks the turning point in 
Ravi's life, there is surprisingly little agreement on the direction his life is 
supposed to tum or even what it is exactly that he is supposed to recognise. Tang 
argues that the poem speaks of the price of alienation Ravi has to pay for steering 
clear of the "struggle to achieve identity that had so tormented his grandmother 
and his father" (1996: 7). Shirley Lim, on the other hand, emphasises Ravi's 
acknowledgment of the poignant fact that it takes his father's death to 
"resacralize" his "empty and passionless" middle class world and return him to 
the spiritual values of his people, as arguably attested to by his participation in 
Naina's traditional burial ceremony (1984: 43). Lynette Tan, on her part, ties the 
poem to Ravi's recognition of "his former self as victim to an excess of 
individualistic materialism" (1998: 124). 
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'Full Circle' is open-ended enough to contain many interpretations at 
once, including the three summarised above. But it does not in itself contain the 
answer to Ravi's recognition. The answer is in fact always-already decided in 
advance, concealed-implicit in the sense one makes of the central characters' 
respective struggles. That is, if the reader decides from the outset that Periathai 
and N aina remain unerring throughout the novel and that Ravi is wrong to believe 
that they should not have clung so tenaciously to their Hindu-Indian Thing, then 
the logical conclusion would have to be that Ravi's "tormenting recognition" is a 
recognition of the errors of his ways, one that must necessarily return him to the 
roots he had previously rejected. That would effectively make TR a novel about 
the importance of being a self-enclosed monad. The problem with this position is 
that it runs directly counter to the textual evidence we have examined, not to 
mention the spirit of Maniam's politics. Suffice it to recall as we emphasised 
earlier that the practical challenge in Maniam lies in self-supercession, in 
"breaking out" and "pushing the frontiers of consciousness" (Maniam 1996: x) -
not in recoiling into oneself like Beautiful Soul. In Hegelian terms, it requires the 
subject to undergo a series of progressive movements in consciousness; precisely, 
from sense-certainty through perception to absolute knowledge. 
If a nativist return to the roots is out of the question, then what other 
plausible options could there be? Our contention is that Naina's · death over his 
Thing is the trigger that makes Ravi realise for the first time that he too had erred 
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and been as guilty as his family whose dirty laundry he had hitherto aired with 
little restraint. As with his Periathai and Naina, Ravi had submitted to the amazing 
Thing of his desire, taken its Law as inviolable and acted as if only his Thing and 
no one else's had "the logic and the power" to sustain the individual (TR 140). He 
had believed himself free when he was in actual fact under its hypnotic spell, 
transfixed and "lost for words" (173) in powerless over-fascination with it. In 
allowing his consciousness to be thus humbled, he had, like them, ipso facto 
committed what Giorgio Agamben would term the ethically "evil" act of living 
"in a deficit of existence" (1993: Ethics). That is to say, Ravi had deprived 
himself of a fuller existence and the opportunity to "discover wider and more 
inclusive centres for the understanding and assimilation of larger areas of life" 
(Maniam 1994a: 10). 
Unlike N aina and Periathai, however, Ravi is luckier. If the poem bears 
witness to his past errors, then it would not be unjustified to argue that he has 
also, apart from having clawed his way out of poverty, come 'full circle', 
'returned to himself' in consciousness - not as the same person previously lost in 
alienation but as he who now recognises himself as 'his own work', as the one 
who precedes his Cause. Hence, he is no longer enthralled by and hostage to his 
mythic Thing. Neither does he seem inclined to enchain himself to other people's 
Thing, for instance, by practising again the rites and rituals he had "refused at 
adolescent". After all , culture, like words, is 'not-all ' (pas-tout as Lacan would 
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say): "Then words will not serve. / They will be like the culture / you refused". 
Culture is not the truth of one's being but the effect of its absence, a systematic 
notation of all past failed attempts to capture one's essence which lies beyond the 
wall of language. For this very reason, culture should not be blindly clung to - or 
worse, transmitted unchanged in content and form to future generations so that 
one's present existence might obtain (false) meaning. 
TR terminates at the point when Ravi, having overcome himself and found 
humility and self-knowledge (the long and hard way, like all of Maniam's anti-
heroes), might be conceived as being free finally to not live like a sensitive plant 
that withdraws into itself when touched. We know from the various examples we 
have seen that the change can only be a positive good for Ravi. This, even if his 
gain is neither 'earth-shattering' (to anyone but himself) nor 'magical' (in the way 
that symbolic rebirths are in Okri' s trilogy, as illustrated for instance by Dad's 
'miraculous' awakening to new powers on the seventh day of unconsciousness). 
Against this background, how then do we explain the sombre note on which TR 
concludes and which some critics have taken as the cipher of Ravi's final defeat 
as well as the just payment for having betrayed his culture? The real answer, one 
suspects, is simpler and closer to the joyless fact that his father had just died in a 
violent suicide and that he would need time to mourn before getting on with life 
again. Not so easy to answer in a sentence, however, are the pressing questions 
which TR leaves us with and which are picked up again in IFC, Maniam' s second 
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novel which he has described as a "take-off' on TR (Tan 1998: 249). How, for 
instance, might Ravi or someone like him who has returned to himself thenceforth 
proceed? What practical application might the logic of freedom (traced by the 
circular movement of Ravi's self-consciousness) have in the context of Malaysian 
politics and competing nationhood ideals? These are but two key questions we 
will be addressing in Chapter 7. 
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- 7 -
IN A FAR COUNTRY 
The Politics of Reading 
Maniam's second novel, In a Far Country (IFC), is widely acknowledged as a 
difficult piece of writing to penetrate. Wong Soak Koon, for instance, describes it 
as dense and obscure (Wong 2000), while C.W. Watson is of the opinion that it is 
"over-ambitious" for using "too many different styles and forms, too many 
literary devices" (Watson 1993a: 197, 204). Furthermore, Watson says, key 
moments in the novel tend to be ambiguous and disassociated from each other: 
"there is no overall coherence, either in terms of a consistent style or in terms of 
an overarching narrative structure" (1993a: 202). 
IFC is not perfect but flaws imputed to it are not always internal to the 
work. The fault sometimes lies with those critics who seem reluctant to engage 
with the text on its own terms. For instance, where TR is criticised by Tang Soon 
Ping for being predictably fixated on the Indian theme (1993: 83), IFC is 
ironically regretted by Charles Sarvan for not engaging "more fully with the 
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Indians in Malaysia, their history and situation" (1996: 67). In addition, as will be 
elaborated, critics tend to adhere too closely to Maniam's interpretation of IFC 
instead of focussing on the text's rich symbolic potential. Most disturbing of all , 
they tend to attribute to IFC political issues and questions it does not raise -
issues and questions which furthermore reflect a dangerously simplistic 
understanding of racial politics in Malaysia. 
An exemplary case is the standard treatment of Rajan, IFC's protagonist 
and anti-hero who has "lost that anchorage in ... life and only vaguely sense[s] 
where [he has] to tum to for a more meaningful centre" (IFC 121). Nowhere in 
the narrative is it suggested or implied that Rajan is not a Malaysian-born Indian 
Malaysian and a member of a historically dispossessed ethnic minority. Yet he is 
repeatedly described and treated by Wong Ming Y ook as a migrant who views the 
world "through the lens of an essentially migrant consciousness" (2000) . 
Similarly, Malaysian ethnic minorities are misrepresented as members of 
"migrant communities", many of whom, Wong states without irony, "have never 
resolved the problem their migrant fathers/mothers encountered earlier in the 
[twentieth] century: estrangement and alienation from the adopted new land". Not 
only that, "most of the current [Malaysian] writers in English" are wrongly 
framed as writing from "immigrant perspectives".48 It is strange to say the least 
48 Wong uses the terms 'migrant ' and 'immigrant ' interchangeably in her essay 'Traversing 
Boundaries: Journeys into Malaysian Fiction in English ' (2000). 
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that Wong, who is herself a Chinese Malaysian, should persistently refer to the 
individuals and groups concerned as (im)migrants when it is crystal clear that 
[they] are not pendatangs [Malay for '(im)migrants', a derogatory 
term "Only politicians campaigning for votes used"]. Their great-
grandfathers were pendatangs. Some of their grandfathers were 
pendatangs. Their fathers were not pendatangs. They're not 
pendatangs. (Krishnan, the protagonist in Maniam' s short story 
'Arriving', Mani am 199 5: 7) 
It bears pointing out that what we have here is not inconsequential 
hairsplitting over terminology. If IFC rejects "externally imposed views of group 
or collective identity", as Wong herself concedes, and if it seeks avenues of 
coming into meaningful belongingness to oneself and one's homeland in terms 
more embracing than 'race', then would the critic not be undermining the novel 
(not to mention the efforts of those seeking to repoliticise sedimented racial 
identities in Malaysia) if he/she allows him/herself to be seduced into accepting 
the framework of the social relationship of domination? That is to say, by 
referring to non-Malay Malaysians as migrants when they are not migrants, is the 
critic not by implication affirming the racist logic that non-Malay Malaysians 
have no right to claim equal rights as Malays in the country of their birth (not 
adoption, as Wong says) because their forefathers were migrants and because they 
themselves as descendents of 'outsiders ', can never have the same 'blood 
' 
connection' to the land as Malays? In short, is the ideological battle not won when 
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"the adversary himself begins to speak our language, without being aware of it" 
(Zizek 1991 b: 65)? 
Paul Sharrad, in his introduction to the Skoob edition of IFC, also makes 
the same error of describing Rajan as "a second generation, upwardly mobile 
migrant" (emphasis added 1993: xiv). However, his use of the term seems more 
like an unfortunate slip than an attempt at adding undue pathos to the notion of 
'displacement', albeit a slip that does not render his analysis of the text any less 
problematic. Sharrad posits as his central thesis that IFC expresses the "paradox 
of being and becoming" (1993: ix). That, he says, is exemplified by Maniam who, 
although a Malaysian, is compelled to write a novel "about trying to become a 
Malaysian". He then claims that Rajan too, like his creator, exemplifies the same 
paradox: 
Most readers today, in this world of shifting populations, will 
recognise the general problem facing Maniam's protagonist [i.e. 
Rajan]. How does the individual pull up cultural roots and retain a 
sense of life's significance; how can one not divest oneself of a 
specific group identity in this modern age of levelling multiplicity? 
Moreover, how do you hold to the supports of ethnic [minority] 
identity while affirming nationality, especially when your nation 
defines itself officially in terms of another [i.e. Malay] race and 
culture? (1993: x) 
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Sharrad's searching questions suggests that he views Rajan not as a 
migrant ( despite having described him as one) but an alienated Malaysian caught 
in a dilemma where he can neither pull up his cultural roots nor not pull them up 
without losing "a sense of life's significance ... in this modem age of levelling 
multiplicity". It is also a dilemma which - if we read Sharrad correctly- makes it 
impossible for Rajan to identify himself simultaneously as an ethnic minority and 
a ' true Malaysian' because only the Malay race fits the latter description. 
The weighty issues Sharrad raises are not extraneous to Malaysia. As we 
have discussed in Chapter 2, the country' s political system is founded upon the 
logic of Malay supremacy. To quote Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime 
Minister of Malaysia: "The Malays are not just the pribumi or indigenous 
community but also the people to whom this country belongs" (Cheah 1996: 66). 
Also, notions like culture and nationality which Sharrad invokes are crucial 
considerations in any debate on identity formation. The problem here is that the 
issues Sharrad raises are not the same issues directly confronting Rajan. The 
"general problem" facing the protagonist-narrator has nothing to do with having 
to decide if he should hold on to or let go of his "cultural roots" (Sharrad 1993: x). 
Neither has it to do with having to shift ''from the stifling insularity of cultural 
boundedness" to open-mindedness, as argued by Wong (emphasis added, Wong 
2000). The text makes it amply clear that Rajan need not unbind himself from his 
culture simply because he has never been bound to it. Rajan is a non-conformist, 
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always wary of being "trapped by the past" (IFC 76). He is the exact opposite of 
Santhi, his wife, who needs to periodically "re-immerse herself in the [Hindu-
Indian] life and values from which she had come" (102) in order to feel 'at home' 
within herself. For not holding fast to the belief that absolute fidelity to one's 
culture is a form of heroism, Rajan even earns himself, in a dream sequence, 
harsh rebuke from a faceless crowd of Indians referred to by his friend, 
Ramasamy, as "our kind of people": 
When I am sitting in some Indian restaurant, they crowd around 
me with leering faces and say, 'What are you eating? Rice and 
curry? Where does the taste come from? From women whose 
Indian arms sweated to grind the spices.' They get nasty ... When 
I go to a friend's funeral, they heat broad drums over the fire, swill 
toddy and chant at me: Who will beat the drums for you when you 
die? Who will sing your praises? Who will tell the world the story 
of your life? Which wife will beat her breast for you? (IFC 155-6) 
Similar to Ravi in TR, Raj an in IFC demonstrates no interest in practising 
the rites and rituals of the culture into which he was born and to which he has 
never shown passionate attachment. He is in fact even more disinclined to do so 
by the novel's conclusion. After returning from a perspective-altering journey to 
the north of the country, he openly objects for the first time to his wife's wish to 
organise a puja (Hindu ritual) to celebrate his homecoming. Forthrightly Rajan 
tells Santhi not to "waste time or money on any ceremony" (IFC 172). The wife 
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insists, arguing that it is necessary for her and the children. Rajan gives in and 
goes through the ceremony for her sake, but with indifference: 
"You've to fast for a day," Santhi told me after being in 
consultation with the priest [ who "looked an incongruous figure 
not because he was archaic in a modem setting but because he 
pretended to know so much and wield so much power over the 
women"]. 
"I don't have to do anything," I said, not quite angry. "Do anything 
you want but leave me out of it." 
"But you're the most important person 1n this ceremony," she 
protested. 
"You make me important," I said. (IFC 172) 
So if Rajan has always-already decided where precisely he stands in 
relation to his wife's Hindu-Indian Thing, what then is the nature of his life-
crisis? How is it related to the logic of freedom we traced earlier in our analysis of 
TR, and to Maniam's description of IFC as a novel "which deals with all three 
races" and in which "things are reenacted" (Tan 1998: 249)? Our analysis of IFC 
which will be guided by these key questions will commence in the next section 
and take us to the conclusion of this chapter. 
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Father and Son 
JFC opens with Rajan brooding in solitude, darkly admitting that he has now, in 
his middle-age, lost his mooring in life. Where there was once an aggressive 
ambition to make his mark in the world and influence the times, and where there 
were the supreme self-confidence and drive which took him out of the rubber 
plantation and put him in his "present status of house and property owner, with a 
solid bank account" (IFC 3), there is now only a "terrifying emptiness" (25), a 
"zero in [his] mind" (1). It is as if the soft gnawing of conscience he has had for 
the longest time of there being "something else to life besides money and 
success" (102) is only now exerting its true impact. 
Rajan's loss of self-certainty and contraction into himself is strangely 
something that 'just occurs', an unplanned event set in motion by something as 
commonplace as a "blade of light [he] saw one evening" - not a consciously-
willed or "deliberate" minimalising of his world, as Wong suggests (2000). 
Withdrawn from his immediate world, wife and children included, he finds his 
thoughts constantly returning on its own accord to "events and people [he] had 
thought hardly worth paying attention to" (IFC 3). Like a "helpless witness" (25), 
his mind turns to his late father who had migrated to Malaya on a ship filled with 
human dung, hoping to find "heaven" but instead he found "insect-gnawing 
ravines" (7) and no escape like the last time but through cheap alcohol. "Wife and 
children. Just cycle after cycle. Can't break the turning of the wheel. I tried" (7), 
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his despairing father had lamented in a moment of toddy-soaked indiscretion. 
Rajan also recalls his father's dying days, how his "puffy cheeks and premature 
grey hair traced the history of cynicism" ( 42), how he "dreamed too much and 
achieved too little" ( 46), and how this "showed in the disproportion he carried 
about with him: this distended belly and the rarely used, thin limbs" ( 46). Most 
traumatic of all , he remembers how his father coughed up blood and died with 
"his eyes closed to the world in which he had found no home" (22). Taking into 
account the trauma Rajan experienced early in childhood, it is no surprise that he 
should be driven by the desire to evade the ill fate which broke his father's spirit 
and to obtain for himself life security above all else ( 40). He works hard and 
succeeds in making a somebody out of himself. Yet despite that, he is unable to 
sever the umbilical cord which links him to his unlucky father: "Though I scoffed 
at him, how strange it is now to almost look and be like him" (3). 
Already here we can see the eternal return making its comeback. "Is it 
possible for despair to be inherited through the blood? ... Can memories be 
inherited?" (IFC 3-4 ), searches Rajan. "Can repetition make actual the past?" ( 4); 
that is, to put it in context, by ' involuntarily' returning to the past over and over 
again to refind himself and exorcise the blankness that has come into his mind 
(just as his late father kept retelling the same stories to young Rajan as an 
unconscious means of ' forgetting' the one immutable constant in his life: 
suffering), might Rajan unwittingly confer upon the past the reality it never had, 
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thus ending up even more lost to himself? IFC provides no direct answer, 
although it is possible that, by placing a question mark over the reliability of 
Rajan's memory, and by implication his reliability as narrator of his retrospective 
self-account, the text is cueing the reader to appraise the 'facts' with the critical 
eye of a doubting Thomas and to look out for inconsistencies in Rajan's 
reconstruction of the past, for moments when certainty falters or words fail. The 
text, we should note, is punctuated by several such moments: "Is this a trick of the 
mind or a fact?" (136); "Actually, I don't know what I mean" (132); "I may be 
wrong, of course ... But from where I stand, as one who has survived the chaos 
of the mind, I feel doubt is necessary before clarity can be grasped" ( 144 ). 
Just as Ravi's memory is bracketed, so too the consistency of the central 
characters in the novel - all of whom are, as is easily overlooked, never what they 
appear at first glance. Take Rajan ' s Tamil-speaking father who, according to 
Wong, represents "the obvious, Rajan's [Hindu-Indian] cultural heritage" (2000). 
Although Wong neither elaborates nor illustrates "the obvious", it is not difficult 
to see what she is aiming at. True, Rajan's father used to carry the pubescent 
Rajan away with the story about his ancestors, early voyagers from India who 
braved jungles and seas to build a fabulous ancient kingdom ( a "little India just 
here") in pre-Muslim Malaysia (IFC 6). (The little India is possibly an allusion to 
the lost Hindu-Buddhist civilisation known as Gangga Negara or 'A City on the 
Ganges' in Sanskrit, one of the ruins of which was discovered in Perak, a northern 
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state in Malaysia.) It is also true that Rajan's father had openly regretted how the 
same voyagers allegedly lost the opportunity "to lead and to rule" the land 
because, being "not right in the head", they chose to go "again on their 
unquenchable travels" instead of remaining in the land where they had built their 
temples. 
Based on the evidence, one might be tempted to agree with Wong that 
Rajan's embittered father represents his "cultural heritage" after all (2000). The 
question is: if the father truly incarnates Indianness ('what being an Indian is all 
about'), would he have troubled to bemoan, like a disillusioned egalitarian 
multiculturalist, the fragmentation of Malaysia along racial lines even before the 
advent of independence? To quote the words Rajan remembers his father using: 
"People [came] together like brothers from the same family. Not strangers from 
different countries. Look where we are now. Shadows in the darkness, not even 
hearing the other person breathe. Not even caring" (IFC 6). As for the father's 
apparent longing for India, might it not be viewed as a false longing for 
something he never possessed in the first place? Recall that Rajan's father left 
India to escape suffering, not because it was "a motherland flowing with milk and 
honey" (105). India, whose harsh poverty migrants had cursed before they left, 
only grew "into the tree of plenty" in their "hunger-filled dreams" when the land 
to which they had migrated offered them no "work to earn the money for their 
food" (105). 
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There are unmistakable similarities between Rajan's father and Periathai, 
Ravi's grandmother in TR. Both figures are first generation working class 
migrants and traditionalists in comparison to Rajan and Ravi. But unlike Periathai 
who bears her lot stoically until the final days of her life, Rajan's father is a 
highly inconsistent character whose neurotic attitude towards the same object of 
contemplation shifts constantly, often from pole to pole. The India in his mind is 
simultaneously a "dry, gossip-diseased . . . land" of suffering (IFC 7) and a 
blessed land from which sprung artisans of exquisite temples and temple bells 
whose pure music could hold "together the whole world" (6). In the same way, 
the stars are cursed for pulling him to Malaya like a blind bat to fruit trees, 
adulated for the shine of its benevolent light which led the bold ancient voyagers 
to Malaya, and subsequently berated for leading the same voyagers away from the 
magnificent little India away from India they had built for themselves. 
In contrast to Periathai who derives enjoyment from subordinating herself 
to the Hindu-Indian Thing she had brought with her from India, Rajan's father in 
IFC used to dream, prior to his spirit's defeat, of going beyond the boundaries of 
the familiar, namely the rubber plantation. Recall, as we saw in Chapter 2, that 
rubber plantations in those days were "a death trap yawning to engulf the surplus 
population of India" (Sandhu 1993: 153). It was a place of "much suffering and 
futility" in which the majority of Indian labourers tragically chose to remain 
because they saw the unknown beyond "as some territory of even greater pain" 
294 
(IFC 44). Finally and most significant of all, although the two characters enter the 
graves in a state of unredeemable brokenness, there is nothing in IFC to suggest 
that Rajan's father precipitates towards death for the same Thing which Periathai 
volitionally elevates from constative to imperative. His is ultimately the curse of 
having been born poor and insignificant - a bitter curse he shares with other 
Indian migrants living under the same treacherous conditions, all shuffled and 
manipulated through life by forces over which they have no mastery: "The source 
was external, a national crisis or words radiating from the white administrators" 
( 43). It is also the selfsame curse young Rajan, propelled by the "desire to be the 
master of [his] own destiny" ( 68), must cancel out of existence or be reaped by it. 
Attitudes of Thought 
In contrast to TR, IFC does not detail the first steps of the protagonist's transition 
from the rubber plantation to white-collarship. An entire period is summarised in 
several lines before the narrative focuses on Rajan in his young adult years 
working in an isolated interior north of the country. There he stays until shortly 
after the death of his colleague, Lee Shin, by which time he has gained "financial 
security and more, a nest-egg vvith which to strike out on [his] own" (IFC 66). He 
subsequently relocates to a larger town south of the country, sets up his own 
business in land development, and comes to the premature conclusion that he has 
295 
"finally freed" himself from the force which "killed [his] father and his 
generation". Thereafter the narrative takes a sudden political tum. 
The scene marking the change in direction pivots around the controversial 
demolition of old colonial buildings. (The incident occurs not long after Rajan 
moves to the new town.) The buildings, including the District Office and the 
Court House, "so full of history and culture" (IFC 69), are to be destroyed to 
make way for new post-independence development projects. Reactions to the 
proposal are surprisingly spirited. "The whole town seethed with talk and there 
were many camps, attitudes and opinions" (69). Rajan is reluctantly drawn into 
the fray by his friends Ramasamy ( an Indian bookshop proprietor whose "smiling, 
ageless" face shines "with a kind of velvety assurance") and Jimmy Kok (a 
"nebulous" Chinese man who inherited his rubber-dealer business from his 
father). Despite their heated arguments, the three men agree in principle that the 
best way to tum the demolition issue from a "simple town affair" into a "national 
concern" is to do it through the newspapers. To generate controversy and create a 
semblance of genuine debate, they send in to the press letters containing several 
contrasting viewpoints. But "when the letters went out to the papers, it became 
clear that they were not playing a game of strategy" (72). 
Rajan, in his retrospective account of the episode, is brow-raisingly 
contemptuous of the published letters, particularly Ramasamy's and Jimmy's -
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both of whom, he says, had then truly become "the voice of the public" (IFC 74). 
In his opinion, Ramasamy' s letter betrayed "pretensions to progressive thinking" 
(73) while Jimmy's "contradicted the way he presented himself to the world ... 
He didn't come through ... as an uncertain searching man. What he said seemed 
to confirm what he secretly believed" (74). Furthermore, says Rajan, both letters 
displayed "much self-congratulation and mutual admiration but hardly any 
original thought." The following are extracts of Ramasamy' s and Jimmy's letters, 
followed by Rajan's response: 
A man's life is not his life; a country's progress is not its own 
progress. The events that time brings [shape] the destinies of both. 
And time flows like the river, moves like the sea. It can push 
against the banks and pull them down; it can wash against the 
shore and take away the land. But both the river and the sea can 
also .. . leave us with more. These buildings the Council want to 
pull down are the more that has been given to us. These structures 
that the British have left behind do not belong to them alone. They 
do not only reveal their domination and culture. They reveal us 
too. They reveal us as shaped by forces that have worked within 
the larger force - time. (Ramasamy, IFC 74) 
We are not against progress 1n this country or have become 
members of that invisible group that 'obstructs the sense of 
belonging to the country.' We merely question the wisdom behind 
297 
the words 'sense of belonging to the country.' This expression has 
been used to cover, ironically, almost everything from eating 
habits to the games that ought to be played in this country. I assert 
that everything that has happened in this country belongs to us ... 
These buildings are records and reminders of the systems that have 
come down to us. In destroying them, we are destroying our past 
and, more importantly, our future. (Jimmy, IFC 74) 
The underlying reason, and the main one, why people are so 
opposed to the demolition ... is simple: they cannot bear to see 
what has given them a sense of security be brought to rubble in a 
few hours. The destruction of the familiar is a destruction of the 
comfortable. If we look deeply into the phenomenon, we will 
discover the imperative for why these buildings will have to go ... 
What do they tell us about the spirit of the people [i.e. the 
colonialists] who built them? 
They leapt across the sea of the unknown to discover new 
territories for themselves. They left behind themselves the safe and 
the domestic to carve out a new land for themselves. There was no 
continuity, past or future. Once they got here, they looked into the 
resources available and built a familiar environment around 
themselves. They transplanted their language, culture, systems of 
order, justice and administration. 
That is what we have to do: make a great leap. Now that we have 
the land we have to build the systems that will support our hopes 
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and ambitions. We must not allow ourselves to be trapped by the 
past, by the familiar. We must go forward into the great unknown. 
(Ravi, IFC 7 6) 
Few who read Rajan's letter would disagree that it takes great courage to 
let go of the comforting familiar and make that dangerous leap into the unknown. 
(We have seen this positively exemplified in TR by Ravi who ' finds himself only 
after he 'loses himself.) At the same time, however, the two overlapping views 
which Rajan summarily dismisses are clearly not without merit either. (This holds 
true irrespective of whether Ramasamy and Jimmy mean what they say or are 
merely pretending to be progressive thinkers. In Lacan, truth resides not in what 
one means to say but in what is said.) Neither have the issues raised by 
Ramasamy and Jimmy become irrelevant in Malaysia today where the few 
remaining colonial buildings continue to be targeted for destruction by neglect or 
'redevelopment' by certain overzealous authorities. As Jimmy poses, must every 
sign of otherness (the ugly past, the colonial culprit and so forth) be expunged 
from sight and memory before the country and its people may be said to be 
progressing? Are those who question the practice of narrow nationalism really 
obstructing "the sense of belonging to the country" (IFC 7 4 )? Similarly, and 
notwithstanding his use of well-worn metaphors, Ramasamy is not unjustified in 
arguing that colonial structures do not unmediatedly signify the Other's 
"domination and culture" (IFC 74). If the structures are perceived as purely and 
necessarily representing ' the one who did this to me' , then might the reason not 
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perhaps be due to the perceiver's unwillingness to see that the Other who is 
supposed to impede my fulfilment is in truth the very precondition of my self-
identity; "without it, I would lose the big Culprit, the point by reference to which 
my subjective position acquires its consistency"? (Zizek 1991a: 71) 
Rajan' s approach to the controversy is directly counterposed to 
Ramasamy' s and Jimmy's shared approach. While the latter acknowledges the 
limitation and dependency of each identity on the other, the former views the 
Other as irreducibly Other (that is, as radically exterior to himself) and takes 
himself to be a motionless tautology of 'I = I'. In this precise sense, Rajan's 
attitude of thought or "mode of action and belief' (Zizek 1991 b: 164) is similar to 
Ravi's in the early stages of his life: they both occupy the position of the Hegelian 
Beautiful Soul. As we have discussed, Beautiful Soul is a self-centric attitude of 
thought that refuses to "decipher in the disorder of the world the truth of its own 
subjective position" (Zizek 1991 a: 100). It is close to what Maniam describes as 
the "mightier-fightier-than-thou" attitude of closing oneself off from "wider 
horizons and bigger worlds" (Wilson 1993: 23). We saw this exemplified in 
Chapter 6 by Ravi who only realises 'after the fact' that he too had been as guilty 
of subordinating himself to his particular Thing as his 'stupid' father and 
grandmother were to theirs. By the same logic, Rajan in IFC wrongly perceives 
himself as a neutral observer of a world whose regressive ways he denounces as 
vigorously as he protests his innocence. In addition, he is possessed by the need to 
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be proven right, that individuals like Ramasamy and Jimmy are working against 
him and the "discovery of a common ground for identity" (IFC 73) even though 
they are working towards it, as their letters attest. By overlooking the invertedness 
of his world, Rajan ends up contributing to the preservation of the unfortunate 
conditions he bemoans. This is implied by Rajan who says in retrospect that his 
letter to the press had indirectly strengthened the Town Council's case for the 
demolition of the colonial buildings. That in tum paved the way for the actual 
razing of the buildings - "planned modernization of the town" in official terms 
but something shadier in reality: 
Some of the Town Council members sought me out and 
congratulated me. They looked on me as a valuable source of 
sympathy and support for the planned modernization of the town. 
However, I still detected an aloofness in them that told me they 
had more up their sleeves than I could ever know. (IFC 77) 
Beautiful Soul is one of three 'forms of consciousness' the subject may 
adopt in relation to the Thing around which his desire turns. As with the other two 
forms which we will examine subsequently, it is not merely an insular attitude one 
assumes in one's own private world. The person I cannot not be, my relationship 
with the interior of my being, the symbolic universe I inhabit, the radical Other 
thwarting the realisation of 'who I really am', the obstacles in my path to the lost 
(Nation-)Thing that makes n1e unique - all that exist in the same space as "the one 
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in which political parties intervene and in which elections are fought" (Laclau 
1991: 95). As IFC' s demolition scene illustrates, the line between public and 
private is "an unstable frontier constantly trespassed, with personal autonomy 
investing public aims and the private becoming politicized" (Mouffe 1996: 3). 
Here we need to emphasise that Beautiful Soul is not a racial positioning 
but an attitude of thought. To render this palpable, let us consider Maniam's 
portrayal of the melancholic Lee Shin, a Beautiful Soul whom Wong mistakes for 
"the Chinese ... consciousness" (2000). No doubt, Lee Shin is marked in IFC as 
an ethnic Chinese and a Sinophile who is "so self-contained that nothing seem[ s] 
to touch him" (IFC 31, 34). He obsessively collects things Chinese - "furniture, 
crockery, [intricate bamboo] flute, banners, calligraphy and decorated dragons" -
as if he is "trying to convert a country foreign by creating cultural landscape and 
landmarks in which he could be at home" (162). On top of that, Rajan says, "his 
preference for the so-called virtuous life could disgust anyone" (54). These are 
indeed unflattering descriptions but do they make Lee Shin guilty of being 
representative of the Chinese consciousness? What is the Chinese consciousness 
anyway? Is it a natural property essential to all Chinese, something only the 'real 
Chinese' possess? Can one opt not to have it? Can a non-Chinese possess it? And 
what about Rajan, Ravi, Periathai and other Beautiful Souls in Maniam's 
writings? Do these Indian figures not share with Lee Shin the same self-denying 
attitude of thought towards their Thing? 
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Wong's thesis that Lee Shin personifies the Chinese consciousness 1s 
faulty - not because the Chinese in Malaysia are 'not really like that ' but because 
her notion of the Chinese being inherently insular and Chinese-centric ultimately 
has nothing to do with the Chinese. The fascinating 'conceptual Chinese' painted 
by Wong only functions as "a way of stitching up the inconsistency of our own 
ideological system" (Zizek 1989: 48), the evocation of which falsely "explains 
everything: all of a sudden "things become clear", perplexity is replaced by a firm 
sense of orientation" (1991a: 18). The operation we have here is homologous to 
the way in which the "Jewish plot" allows anti-Semites to "unify in a single large 
narrative the experiences of economic crisis, "moral decadence" and loss of 
values, political frustration and "national humiliation", and so on." It "blocks any 
further inquiry into the social meaning ( social mediation) of the phenomena that 
arouse fear in the common man" (1993: 149). 
Law of the Heart 
For the same reasons, it is erroneous of Wong to represent Zulkifli (or Zul, the 
Malay villager in JFC) as the Malay consciousness and to then simplistically 
equate Malay consciousness with authentic oneness with the land and the 
antithesis of "migrant" consciousness (Wong 2000). Of course, Zul is identified in 
the novel as an ethnic Malay and, wryly, as representative of "the oldest 
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inhabitant of the country" (IFC 162). He is not dissimilar to Pak Mat, a character 
in S. Othman Kelantan's Perjudian ('Gambling '), who proudly declares "I am a 
real peasant. My land is mine for the whole of my life" (Hooker 2000: 327). IFC 
also makes it apparent that Zul believes in his heart that only Malays like himself 
"really understand this country" and outsiders like Rajan can "only dishonour the 
land" (IFC 92). All that is spelled out from the outset, when Zulkifli tries to get 
Rajan to discover the spirit of the land "as my people did" so that he (Rajan) 
would "know what this country is" (93) really about: 
"You seem to know everything about it [the land/country]," I 
[Rajan] say. 
"Through the instinct that has travelled to me through the blood of 
my ancestors," he [Zul] says. 
"Are you saying I can't have such an instinct?" 
"You don't have ancestors here," he says. (IFC 92-3) 
The binary oppositions set up in the text are hard to miss: Zulkifli against 
Rajan, Malay against non-Malay, ' son of the soil' against 'outsider'. The question 
is: does JFC accept what it sets up as necessary, ideal and/or inevitable? Does it 
affirm the racist logic of eternal Malay supremacy which allows Zul to claim 
preeminence over Rajan? Or does it contest the said logic and offer up an 
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alternative and a more inclusive re-imagining of the nation? We contend that IFC 
takes the latter path - not because it wants to demonstrate that Zul embodies the 
"Malay consciousness" (Wong 2000) and consequently that all Malays are as self-
conceited as Zul. It would be illogical to formulate Zul as that since the self-
conceit he exemplifies and which in tum overdetermines his character is not a 
racial feature but an attitude of thought which anyone can assume. 
Conceitedness is not the birthright of any one race but it is descriptive of 
Malays, including those in the political and literary circles, whose defining 
"psychocultural trait ... is the assumed superiority and legitimacy of their culture, 
society, and institutions" (Tham 198 la: 272). Analysing the works of modem 
Malay writers like Syed Sheikh al-Hadi, Shahnon Ahmad, Muhammad Dahlan 
(Arena Wati) and Abdullah Sidek, Tham Seang Chee notes that even though the 
literary intelligentsia speak out strongly against what they see as immorality, 
inhumanity, hypocrisy and irreligiosity, they never question their self-foundation: 
"the spirit of the adat, namely the traditional behavioural precepts that underlie 
correct behaviour as conceived by Malays" ( 1981 a: 25 5). The validity and 
appropriateness of the Malay social system - both as a framework of social and 
economic modernisation and a source of values - is accepted as simply given. 
This strange habit of Malay-centric Malays to not question the foundation 
of their being has its roots in the Malay system of the old. Malay classical and 
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semi-historical works like the seventeenth-century Sejarah Melayu ('Malay 
Annals') and Hikayat Hang Tuah ('Story of Hang Tuah') reveal that the system, 
enmeshed with Islam and centred around the institution of the sultanate, upheld 
unquestioning loyalty as a virtue. It forbade the challenging of Authority and 
taught commoners to believe that breaking with the adat was as unthinkable as 
trampling on the head of one's parents. In this autocratic world, oral literature -
proverbs and maxims, customary sayings, riddles and puns, animal stories, 
legends, folk tales, and the pantun (a quatrain sung or spoken with social 
intentions) - functioned not as today's 'sacred' repository of culture but as an 
ideological apparatus for maintaining the established feudal order. It "validated 
traditional social norms and emphasized the correctness of the adat or customary 
practices" (Tham 1981a: 254). 
Modem Malay literature is not dissimilar to the pre-modem. It is neo-
traditional insofar as it habitually rationalises the infallibility of the Malay way of 
life, the legitimacy of Malay hegemony and the superiority of Islam as solution to 
the Malay community's inner conflicts.49 Islam, says Shahnon Ahmad, 
"guarantees the right path that is valid for guiding oneself, [the] family, 
community and country" (Solehah Ishak 1998: 83). It is "the true sign from God", 
unlike "the irrational, non-scientific and fairy-tale ideas like the values before the 
49 See, for example, Virginia Hooker's analysis of Kepulangan ('The Home-Coming ') (2000), a 
novel by Fatimah Busu which campaigns for a community 'home-coming ' to traditional Malay 
values. 
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arrival of Islam." Even before the heydays of 'ASAS 50', 50 it has been the norm 
for the majority of Malay writers to show in their works how Malay ways are 
superior to others (Hooker 2000: 307). Malay kampung ('rural-traditional') life -
its values, institutions, problems and personalities - is framed as the "objective 
and permanent reality" (Tham 1981 b: 226-7). Kampung folks are painted poor 
and in need of development and improvement in "their way of thinking to a way 
that makes them feel the necessity to defend their own kind when threatened with 
the strength of another" (Solehah Ishak 1998: 76). They are not paranoid, just 
good simple folks striving to make an honest living and to submit to Almighty 
Allah. 
Considering the above, it is no surprise that the characteristic impression 
readers get from reading Malay literature is the "kindness, magnanimity, and 
understanding of the Malays, partly a manifestation of the traditional Malay moral 
code (budi) and more accurately a manifestation of perceived cultural and 
political superiority" (Tham 1981 a: 273 ). In Ibrahim Omar's novel Des a Pin git an 
('Secluded Village'), a Chinese family survives the Japanese occupation only 
because Malays were kind enough to offer them shelter. In Abdullah Hussain's 
Jnterlok ('Interlogue'), the reconstitution of Ching Huat's family after the 
Malaysian Emergency "is attributed in no small part to the actions and 
50 ASAS 50 or Angkatan Sasterawan 50 ('the Generation 50 Writers') was founded in the 1950s. It 
consisted of radical Malay nationalists-writers whose avowed concerns were to awaken and 
defend the Malay race through literature. 
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understanding, indeed the forgiveness, of Lazim who symbolizes the exploited 
Malay in the hand of the Chinese businessman" (Tham 198 la: 273). Less subtly, 
Shahnon Ahmad, in his novel Menteri ('Minister'), "tells the non-Malays that 
they are in Malaya because of Malay generosity and magnanimity" (Tham 1981a: 
274). Tham's study provides many more illustrations but the pattern is consistent: 
The [Malay] literary elites accept the foregoing framework of ideas 
and thus look at communal problems and issues from the vantage 
point of their community. Their claim to be committed writers, as 
men with a mission to shape ideas and mould beliefs, is therefore 
communally oriented. They are the literary intelligentsia ... 
concerned with the evaluation, examination, formulation, and 
transmission of thoughts and ideas, but they are not in Mannheim's 
conceptualization 'free intelligentsia'. (Tham 1981 b: 227)5 1 
The writers' inability to break free from "the psychological and cultural 
moorings of [their] native self' (Tham 1981b: 225) is due in no small part to the 
intellectual climate created by the modem-day Malay political class. Certainly, 
Malay writers and Malay politicians do not always see eye-to-eye. The former can 
be and have been highly critical of the political class - the latter described as 
"able to feed from other people ' s corpses" (Hooker 2000: 333) in S. Othman's 
Perjudian ('Gambling') and as pieces of excreta in Shahnon Ahmad's Shit @ 
51 A student of Georg Lukacs, Karl Mannheim defined the socially-unattached or free(-floating) 
intelligentsia as agents unbound in loyalty to any particular group and who are open-minded 
enough to exannne and critique their own social momings. 
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Pukimak @ PM. In spite of their differences, however, players from both fields 
share the same compulsive obsession with the Malay race and the "ideology of 
'rights' for Malays who in the pre-modem era had none" (Hooker 2000: 360). 
(Recall that pre-modem ordinary Malay never had 'rights' before their ruler, just 
as Rajan's father never tasted the nectar of India he purports to have lost.) 
Even before official links between literature and politics were established 
1n 195 8 (with the launch of the first Malay novel-writing competition), agents 
from both sides have directly or indirectly worked together to ensure the 
flourishing of Malay-centric literature. In 1958, budding writers were urged to use 
their talents to sustain and valorise the Malay race. They were and still are 
provided sustained patronage by the UMNO-dominated Malaysian government 
which sees them as the hope for bringing the race "to an era which is glorious in 
good books" (former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak, in Hooker 
2000: 260-1 ). More than four decades later, they continue to be trained to do the 
same. 
"Malay literature has not come of age", admits A. Samad Ismail, a veteran 
journalist and an early-day member of 'ASAS 50' (Maniam 1997: 21). "It seems 
to be operating within its own community. It is too sheltered and there is no free 
development." Consider for instance the 1995 'New Malay Novel' Competition 
which called for Malay writers to produce works containing "great concepts for 
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the race, nation and religion" (Hooker 2000: 350). Writers should discuss Melayu 
Baru ('New Malays') who "revere their past history and civilisation" and possess 
a "resolute spirit in facing the twenty-first century in the new industrialised Malay 
nation" ( emphasis added, 2000: 3 51 ). The winner of the competition was Saloma 
Mat Lajis. Although a product of the late twentieth century, her novel Pelangi 
Tengah Hari ('Midday Rainbow') "displays many points of continuity with the 
narratives of the early part of the century. The Malay race remains at its heart." 
The narcissistic attitude of thought we have just described above has a 
special name in Hegelian philosophy; it is called 'Law of the Heart'. Similar to 
Beautiful Soul, Law of the Heart treasures its being-for-self. It takes pleasure in 
the excellence of its own nature, believing that it alone were truly pure and good. 
Unlike the Soul, however, the Heart actually seeks to impose as universal 
ordinance its inner Law which it mistakes for the necessary Law of Everybody, as 
Law of the Land (Zizek 1993: 267). It "tries to elevate this heart-felt 
sentimentality to the level of ethics, to an articulate philosophy which applies to 
anyone other than oneself' (Solomon 1983: 507). That, the Heart does with the 
earnestness of a high purpose, as exemplified by Malay loyalists in Malaysia and 
Zul inIFC. 
Malay loyalists are not only unable to break free from the moorings of 
their native self, they also want ethnic minorities in Malaysia to 'acculturate' to 
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the 'host' (Malay) culture. As Mohd. Taib Osman opines, the latter should use the 
Malay language, dress in an "almost similar" fashion to Malays, demonstrate 
visible similarities with Malays and acculturate Malay habits and customs into 
their "transplanted culture" (1988: 133). Parallel to that, Zul in IFC is not only 
unable to 'get over' the Tiger qua primordial Law of his Heart, he also wants 
Rajan to submit to it. He wants Rajan to "moult", to free himself completely from 
"the burden of being responsible for [him ]self' by yielding to the "more 
encompassing and powerful" (IFC 142) Tiger that is the Malay-Thing. 
The Malay-Thing is the Law of Zul's Heart, the presupposed Guarantor of 
Zul's ontological consistency and claim to pre-eminence over Rajan. It is the 
Thing posited as holding together the Malay race as uniquely distinct from other 
races, something accessible only to Malays, something 'they', the others, can 
neither partake in nor grasp (Zizek 1993: 201 ). The Malay-Thing is represented 
by the Tiger, a feared animal that is "more than an animal" (IFC l 00), "the oldest 
symbol of our [Malay] civilization" (129), an integral symbol on Malaysia's 
national coat-of-arms, and a cultural symbol of superstitious significance in the 
M 1 · 52 a ay community: 
"You must see the tiger." 
52 A Malay belief has it that shamans, practitioners of pancak silat (a Malay martial art) and 
ordinary mmials with supernatural lrnowledge have the power to transform into a tiger or be 
possessed by its spirit (Wessing 1986: 97) . 
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"What tiger?" I [Rajan] said. 
"Are you afraid?" 
"You want me to go tiger hunting?" I said. 
"We've to go on a trip to tigerland," he said. 
"Tigerland?" 
"Don't you know that the tiger lived in this country long before we 
came?" he said. "We must look at the country through its eyes." 
"Have you done this yourself?" 
"No, my forefathers went through that experience," he said. "I 
want to experience what they saw. You must come with me. Then, 
maybe you'll believe. (IFC 93) 
We must see through its eyes. Feel through its body. We must 
become the tiger. (Zul in IFC l 00) 
To Rajan, Zul professes belief in the goodness of "free[ing] ourselves 
from thoughts given to us by the past" (IFC 96). Otherwise "we can't move 
forward". Yet in reality Zul - like the aforementioned Malay loyalists who saw 
themselves as ostensible agents of change - enjoys nothing more than to hark 
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back to the past, to recapture the Tiger-Thing by surrendering his self-
responsibility to it. In addition, Zul also desires Rajan to desire his desire to 
become one with the Tiger. So strong is his desire that he coerces the latter into 
accompanying him on a journey into Tigerland. From the outset and for almost 
the entire journey which Maniam narrates in 'magical realist' mode, Zul takes 
charge, self-assuredly leading Rajan through crossings into the interior of the 
jungle, beyond a certain mythical tree stump which marks "the door to the tiger's 
world" (IFC 95). Along the way they undergo surreal transformations: strangely 
open to each other, "overcome by something beyond us" (97), then locked in a 
battle-of-wills over the appropriate way of approaching the Tiger. On the first 
night, Zul keeps up a long conversation with Rajan about his past in a voice "rich 
with the memory of his ancestors" (94). The next morning his face takes on a 
haunted look, "filled as he was with the necessity to discover a way through to his 
ancestral memory" (95). The closer they get to the Tiger, the more deeply 
possessed Zul becomes. 
Rajan, by contrast, takes the headstrong approach. When Zul confides that 
the Tiger is watching them, he boldly suggests that they outwatch it. To Zul's 
prescription "We've to leave everything behind ... We've to be nothing to know 
the unknowable" (IFC 100), Rajan self-queries "Why do I have to submit to his 
fantastical talk?" When asked to "take on the character of the tiger" so as to come 
into its presence, he informs Zul that he would rather kill the beast by surprising 
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it. Zul insists "You must surrender your self to be the other self' ( 101 ), until 
Rajan's curiosity finally dissipates, causing him to recoil from Zul ' s "desire to 
reveal his private vision to [him]" (94). Zul, however, is not to be resisted. He 
goes into a ritual on Rajan's behalf, against his will. As Rajan recounts: 
All I remember is the incessant chanting that came from his lips. 
Though the words poured from him, I only remember their sound . 
. . it even affected my sight. The jungle became, suddenly, a 
seething mass of colours that glowed as if in a subterranean 
landscape. They fell all over my body in bands that were at first 
warm but later became almost intolerably hot. They didn't actually 
bum my skin but I could feel it peeling and leaving me in a 
vulnerable nothingness. Was that when I turned and ran? Or much, 
much later when my personality threatened to dissolve into 
nothingness? All the time the chant poured from Zulkifli's throat 
like an ageless invitation to disown whatever I was and to merge 
with the Tiger. I didn't wait for that to happen. (IFC 101) 
The excursion ends with neither Zul nor Rajan sighting the Tiger they had 
gone into the jungle to 'hunt' - but what is the failure symbolic of? What is it that 
Rajan hopes to attain by reaching out to the elusive Tiger qua Malay-Thing? And 
why is he unwilling and unable "to go the whole road" (132) and merge with it. 
To answer these questions satisfactorily, it is necessary that we take a detour 
through 'Haunting the Tiger ' (HTT), Maniam's short story and prototype to IFC's 
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jungle scene. 53 As will be elucidated, HTT shares several key similarities and 
differences with the novel it inspired. It also contains original segments excluded 
from IFC- all of which are helpful in shedding light on the symbolism of Rajan's 
journey into the heart of Tigerland. 
Haunting the Tiger 
As in IFC, HTT portrays Zul as wanting Muthu (Rajan's precursor) to admire his 
Malay-Thing, to capitulate to the embodiment of what is "deep inside" him (HTT 
42), namely the Tiger. Zul wants to show Muthu that "he was somebody" ( 43). 
Muthu in tum follows Zul into the jungle, hoping that sighting the Tiger will 
somehow enable him to "become somebody" (43). In HTT more than IFC, 
however, Zul's self-conceit and over-confidence in his "being of the land" 
(Maniam 1997: 20) is conveyed much more strongly. For example, when queried 
by Muthu if he too possesses the Thing he says his ancestors possessed, Zul 
claims with false humility that it is "deep inside [himself]. No need to show it so 
loudly to the world . . . Centuries of living here" (HTT 42). Also significantly 
amplified in HTT is the Indian protagonist's alienness in Zul 's eyes, as illustrated 
by the following scene which did not make its way into IFC: 
53 HTT was reworked into JFC about three years after it was first published. 
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"I know what's wrong," Zulkifli says. [The tiger] won't show 
himself until the smells are gone." 
Zulkifli fixes Muthu with a surveying stare. Muthu becomes 
nervous. 
"What smells?" 
"Mind and body smells," Zulkifli says. 
Muthu is offended and turns away from him. 
"Not in the way you can't go near a person," Zulkifli says 
confronting Muthu. "The clothes you wear, the thoughts you think. 
Where do they come from?" 
"They're just clothes and ideas," Muthu says. 
"They must fit into the place where the tiger lives." 
"Why must they fit in?" Muthu says. (HTT 45) 
The most notable point of contrast between the two writings 1s the 
conclusion. In IFC, Rajan gets a second chance to 'confront' the Tiger (as will be 
elaborated). HTTs Muthu, on the other hand, ends up a broken old man lying 
pathetically on his deathbed - sick and dying but unable to find peace in death 
because death would not come easily to him. Haunted by the Tiger he never got to 
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sight, all Muthu can do is to ramble on deliriously about how he now regrets 
having compromised his life and the lives of those close to him. Like Rajan 
towards IFC' s closing, he realises that he has wronged his wife by treating her 
like an object devoid of inner life from the day they married. He also realises that 
he has wronged himself by having crudely sought nothing but material wealth for 
the longest time: 
Buying this house, land, becoming big man ... Nothing in all these 
things. Only violence. Taking is violence ... Just wanted the thing 
I could see, touch and be sure. What to be sure? I can't die. How 
can I die? The mind isn't full to be emptied. The body isn't there 
for the blood to go cold ... This is the dying. Having not lived, 
this is the dying. (HTT 46) 
Muthu's search for the Tiger has attracted considerable interest from 
commentators. Wong Phui Nam (a renowned Malaysian literary figure), for 
instance, interprets it as an inward quest for "the vital centres" of the self and a 
symbolic movement towards "interior night" (Tan 1998: 224-5). He explains that 
the interior night, which is based on the experience of mystics and 
contemplatives, consists of the dark night of the senses and the dark night of the 
soul, after which there is promise of mystical union. Muthu only makes it into the 
first night because he clings to "worldly acquisitiveness, the need for possession 
(wife, house, land)" (Tan 199 8: 224). Wong makes a strong and interesting case 
in arguing that HTT finally indicts the "grasping attitudes prevalent at all levels of 
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economic life in our country" (Tan 1998: 224). Textual evidence may easily be 
gathered to support this reading. In fact, Maniam himself would probably support 
it, seeing that the philosophy he espouses is radically anti-materialistic: "I want to 
see destructuring so that man can get to be himself ... I don ' t see why human 
beings should serve out their lives in this materialistic sense" (Greet 1991: 7). 
Nonetheless, and without detracting from Wong's interpretation, it is possible to 
show that the prime bone of Maniam' s contention is not capitalist modernity but 
"cultural entrapment", the "reluctance to enter into perspectives offered by other 
cultures" (Maniam 1997: 21). 
In his conference paper, 'The New Diaspora' , Maniam provides his most 
elaborate interpretation of HTT yet. Consider his reading of Zul and Muthu which 
we may provisionally apply to IFC's Zul and Rajan. According to Maniam, Zul 
lives by "the way of the tiger", that is, he believes in "the continual and ritualistic 
immersion into the spirit of the land so as to be affirmed" (1997: 20). 
Muthu/Rajan, by contrast, lives by "the way of the chameleon". He adapts and 
blends "into whatever economic, intellectual and social landscapes that are 
available." While Zul believes in cultural purity and loyalty, Muthu/Rajan yearns 
for something less confining. On the symbolic level, Muthu/Rajan is looking for 
Bangsa Malaysia, a "much more seamless Malaysian society" that transcends 
race and religion (1997: 20). He seeks a national identity that all Malaysians can 
share. But he is unable to find it because it "has not yet been evolved ... There 
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isn't a common reality accessible" to all. Consciously or otherwise, Malaysians in 
general have come to believe that a common Malaysian identity is an impossible 
dream, that superficial togetherness is the best one could hope for, and that 
"pragmatic tolerance" is the best option available to a country where race 
conquers all. Maniam concedes that pragmatic tolerance has, "at its most 
constructive level, generated mutual respect and the love for peace between and 
among the various races" in Malaysia (1997: 19-20). Ultimately, however, it 
makes for cultural entrapment. It ensures that "each community remains within its 
cultural territory and tries not to transgress into the cultural domains of other 
communities." It isolates and freezes everyone in their respective cultural 
enclaves. It closes off the borders of their awareness and puts them at risk of 
turning into Beautiful Souls, that is, subjects of narcissism who live in fear of 
besmirching the pure Thing of their culture. 
Because the phenomenon of Beautiful Soul cuts across all boundaries, all 
ethnic communities in Malaysia would have in their fold members who believe 
that "extreme, even absurd, form of cultural loyalty" is a virtue (Maniam 1997: 
22). However, unlike their non-Malay counterparts, Malay loyalists in the mould 
of the earlier-described Malay intelligentsia are by far the most active and 
vociferous in urging their community to defend and remain eternally faithful to 
their race and religion. Routinely in gatherings and through the medja, they divide 
the nation and deepen their community' s insecurity by reiterating over and again 
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that Malay privileges are far from secure from 'outside threats', the precise nature 
or identity of which is rarely made clear but is implicitly understood as referring 
to non-Malay Malaysians and the Christian West, both conceived as secretly 
wanting to steal the Malays' enjoyment of their special Thing. Towards that end 
Malay loyalists devote their time and energy instead of encouraging Malaysians 
of all backgrounds to genuinely work towards "interaction, acceptance, a process 
of growing towards something we can call 'us'" (Maniam, in Lim 1999a). 
Furthermore, Malay loyalists are the ones with the political clout to style 
multiethnic Malaysia after self-valorising images of their race and religion. They 
articulate and implement national policies in an idiom that is "highly ethnicized 
and deeply pro-Malay" (Shamsul 1998: 141). Most worrying of all, they use their 
status as 'sons of the soil' to impose upon ethnic minorities the Malay Law of 
their Heart which they mistake for the necessary Law of Everybody. As example, 
Maniam cites the Malaysian civil service which has long been veering towards a 
"code of ethics in terms of dress and manner which is closely aligned to Islamic 
manner" (Greet 1991: 3). It maybe a good thing, Maniam says, but "in a way it is 
turning away from other cultures, which is a sad waste of cultural resources" (3). 
"Why make one culture dominant? Not because of its accumulated wisdom but its 
cultural arrogance" (Maniam, in Lim 1999a). 
These are all crucial points we must bring to bear when reading the 
following popularly-quoted passage from Maniam's 'The New Diaspora': 
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The 'tiger' represents the land, Zulkifli the Malay and Muthu the 
Malaysian-born Indian. Muthu never makes the ' leap ' for he is 
confronted by more than the sense of discretion for the other' s 
nationalistic yearnings that tolerance implies ... The leap is not 
made into a common culture for this common culture has not yet 
evolved. What Muthu discovers is that he has to cling to an 
inherited sense of culture, that is, Indian culture. (Maniam 1997: 
20) 
The above passage is not, as it appears, Mani am' s interpretation of HTT in 
a nutshell. Maniam is far from simplistically suggesting that Malays are 
inherently oppressive and self-obsessed and that Indian Malaysians have no 
choice but to cling to the Indian culture because the sought-after Malaysian 
identity has not yet evolved. From the essay in which the passage occurs, we 
know that the real divide in Maniam's eyes is not between Malays and non-
Malays but between those who want to "entrench themselves more deeply within 
their own cultures" and those who choose to "come out from [ their cultural 
enclaves] and reach out to the world" (Maniam 1994a: 18). Put simply, the 
problem is attitude of thought, not race. 
Apart from contradicting its context, the above passage also flies in the 
face of HTT the text itself - how? Consider Maniam' s description of Muthu as 
' 
having to "cling to an inherited sense of culture, that is, Indian culture" (1997: 
20). Reading HTT, one would scarcely find any evidence to suggest that Muthu 
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identifies with the Indian culture. Instead, what one would find is a self-centric 
individualist like Rajan who sees himself as someone set radically apart from 
everyone else and who shows no interest in things Indian. As a young man, 
Muthu refuses to return to India with his parents. "They want to return to the 
country from which they came. 'They can give up this land for a life they've 
known,' he thinks. 'But what do I have to give up?'" (HTT 41) After his parents 
set sail, he marries the young girl he had seen in a nearby estate, only to ignore 
"the innocence and the unbounded mysteries that lay hidden behind the sari-
veiled figure." India(nness) is clearly not Muthu's Thing if his actions are 
anything to go by. 
LawisLaw 
That Muthu dies unfulfilled while Rajan, his successor, is given a second chance 
to 'capture' the Tiger seems to suggest Maniam had different sights for IFC when 
he reworked HTT into it. It is not unlikely that the three years between the 
publication of the two writings may have given Maniam time to refine the lesson 
he wants to impart via the Tiger episode. That perhaps explains why Rajan is not 
only spared Muthu's fate but is reunited with Zul many years after their failed 
encounter with the Tiger - a reunion which, as we shall see, paves the way for 
Rajan's arrival at a "more substantial grain of truth" and "a new openness to life" 
(IFC 167). 
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The reunion is prompted by a realisation that suddenly dawns on the 
unmoored middle-aged Rajan while reading a book given to him years ago by 
Sivasurian (Siva), an enigmatic friend and a vagrant-philosopher. A compendium 
of Siva's writings, the book has no title but it contains a section entitled 'Not a 
Story, Not a Chronicle' wherein Siva contemplates life and ethnic relations in pre-
independent Malaysia of the 1940s. Interestingly, the country in Siva's account 
was already home to Bangsa Malaysia symbolically pursued by Rajan and Muthu. 
"There was so much togetherness, trust and innocence. We didn't behave like 
single men or women but more like a people with a common heart and mind" 
(IFC 111). "There was always sharing" (106) despite food shortages caused by 
the Japanese occupation of the country (between 1941 and 1945, twelve years 
prior to independence). Exchanges of small tokens of friendship between 
members of different ethnic communities were not uncommon: 
I [Siva] gave him [Sulaiman, a Malay villager] some brinjals and 
maize; he gave me a comb of bananas and some groundnuts. These 
things became our kind of greeting and understanding. He 
[Sulaiman] came to Murugiah's house [where Siva stayed] and we 
sat under the tall , many-branched tree. We sat talking as man with 
man, not as people made different by their own kinds of worship 
and living. 
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Not only the two of us. There were meeting grounds where more 
of us gathered. (IFC l 06) 
All that changed when the Japanese surrendered and left the country. 
Invisible walls came up everywhere and people became peoples, always wary, 
suspicious and fearful of each other. ''Now there were many countries inside that 
one country" (IFC 116). It is not clear if Maniam intends Siva's idyllic account of 
Malaysia's lost unity to be read as springing from "a memory, a vision, or both" 
(Tan 1998: 259). What is clear, though, is that it prompts Rajan to go on a journey 
"to that region where [he] can meet Zul and try to look at things ["life and 
country"] through a different lens" (IFC 118). 
Rajan packs a bag and sets off on a journey north of the country to "bring 
back some people I [have] left out of my life" (IFC 119). On his way to the 
village where he hopes to locate Zul, he passages through small towns "barely 
touched by the modern rebuilding spirit" (120). In the town where his land 
development business has its origins, he chances upon his old friends, Jimmy and 
Ran1asamy, now resembling the hemmed-in peoples Siva had encountered 
everywhere after the Japanese Occupation. "Jimmy Kok has become paunchy and 
is coarser in the face, which is heightened by the secretiveness of his eyes. 
Ran1asan1y sin1ply rattles on, indifferent to what the others have to say" (121). 
When Rajan finally meets up with Zul ("Pak Zul - that's how people address him 
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now"), he finds that the latter too has changed (IFC 121 ). Hospitable as to a 
stranger, Zul 's eyes glow with "suspicion and hostility" when he first set eyes on 
Rajan. The reception of Zul's wife is no warmer: "Kak Jamilah did not hide her 
resentment and indifference towards me. All the time I stayed in her house ... she 
kept away from me. She put the dinner and the lunch on the table and withdrew" 
(121). Rajan subsequently learns that misfortune has befallen Zul's family since 
they last saw each other. Tin1es have been bad in the kampung; "there isn't 
enough land for our own planting" (122). Worse still, Zul's eldest son, Mat, has 
been locked up in an institution after he went mad, ran wild and hacked a man to 
death. 
According to Zul, it began when Mat left the village for the big city-life of 
Kuala Lumpur after being exposed to "ideas" through books and television (IFC 
129). He wrote home during the first few months he was there. Then there was a 
long silence. A year later Mat came home. "He had long hair and had grown a 
beard. His mother nearly fainted. His brothers and sisters were too afraid to go 
near him" (123). He kept to himself, talked with some invisible friend for a long 
time and fought with enemies his distraught family could not see. At rare 
occasions he would open up to talk about the city where people "cut you down 
without mercy ... trampled all over you [ and] built large houses over your broken 
bones" (126). Mat alternated between silence, calmness and agitation until one 
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day, without warning, he erupted into murderous violence. With a curved grass-
cutting knife, he ran amok, injuring three men and killing one in the process. 
Zul has only seen his son once after the authorities took him away. "They 
had shaved his head and face and filled his veins with medicine so that he looked 
like a child again" (IFC 129). Embittered by what has happened to his family and 
community, he says to Rajan in a voice full of accusation: 
When I look back I see you and others like you as the cause. We 
lived well, maybe too peacefully, before you all came with your 
ideas and your energies ... You gave up everything to come to this 
land. We offered you what we had. But you all became greedy and 
wouldn't share. Saw no other world but the world of progress and 
money. And we had to make the sacrifices. (IFC 129) 
Zul blames modernity and 'outsiders' like Rajan for bringing to the 
country alien energies and ideas that "can even destroy the tiger, the oldest 
symbol of our [Malay] civilization" (IFC 129). In his ravings, however, he never 
paused to consider if the cause of his misery might not be the world he denounces 
as corrupt but rather lies within himself, in the Tiger qua Malay-Thing of his 
Heart which serves as the aim and impetus of his moral activity. Zul never saw 
the internal contradictions in his conception of the Tiger. He claims to have made 
Mat see the Tiger before the latter migrated to the city where he lost his mind 
(129), but has he himself seen it? (Recall that neither Zul nor Rajan laid eyes on 
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the Tiger during their trip to Tigerland.) Also, he harps on at every opportunity 
about his Tiger and its pleasurable associations, making it clear to Rajan that he 
cannnot not follow "the way of the tiger" 54 (Maniam 1997: 20) because the Tiger 
is the eternal truth of his being, the substance 'in him more than himself which is 
so essential to his identity as a 'real Malay' that he would just 'die' if it is ever 
taken away from him. Yet, despite all the fuss about it, we never see the Tiger 
open its mouth to spell out what Zul must or must not do in order to live 'the 
moral life'. We never see it instructing him to follow, defend and remain eternally 
faithful to the Malay race and 'way of life' championed by the earlier-mentioned 
Malay loyalists. (The careful reader will find that all the Tiger's dictates come 
directly from Zul.) In fact, the Tiger never once appears in persona. No one (not 
the reader, Zul, Rajan or Muthu) ever comes face-to-face with it - which begs the 
question: does it even exist? 
Certainly, as we have established, the Tiger exists as the Law of Zul's 
Heart. However - and this is the crucial twist - it becomes the Law only if Zul 
represses into his unconscious the fact that the Tiger qua Law is "a capricious and 
arbitrary law, the law of the oracle, the law of signs in which the subject receives 
no guarantee from anywhere" (Lacan, in Zizek 2000d: 131). Contrary to Zul's 
conscious belief, it is not always-already there, existing prior and external to the 
54 As we discussed previously, "the way of the tiger" is defined by Mani am as "the continual and 
ritualistic immersion into the spirit of the land so as to be affirmed" (Maniam 1997: 20) . 
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processes of knowledge, waiting for him to submit. Rather, it is his very 
submission to the Law that constitutes the Law as Law. As Zupancic phrases it, 
"the Law is constituted only in the act of the subject" ( emphasis added, 2000: 
167). Such is the self-referential logic of 'Law is Law ' which "articulates the 
vicious circle of its authority, the fact that the last foundation of the Law 's 
authority lies in its process of enunciation" (Zizek 1989: 3 7). 
The secret truth of the Tiger qua Malay-Thing - its tautological nature, the 
fact that it is 'alive' only insofar as it is continually resuscitated by the believer's 
passion - is the unthought that grounds Zul' s identity as a 'real Malay'. It is the 
truth Zul cannot integrate into his living consciousness, for if he does, the 
symbolic universe he inhabits would collapse on account of its inherent 
inauthenticity. By disavowing the Tiger's truth, he is condemned to cling to the 
land and relate to the world as if the land and the Malay race are the be-all and 
end-all. As well, he is condemned to defraud himself of the opportunity to be 
liberated-reconstituted as a f ree subject, as he who recognises himself as the 
absolute cause of the cause of himself, the One who precedes the 'I' qua 'real 
Malay'. 
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True Freedom 
Zul' s inability to surmount his Malay self and his persecution complex is not lost 
on Rajan who, having ruminated on Zul's irrationality and Mat's insanity, is now 
coming to realise that the "structures of our minds we see so clearly may, after all, 
be the first impressions of a truer consciousness" (136). Hitherto as self-certain as 
Zul, Rajan is beginning to grasp the perils of sense-certainty, how overconfidence 
"has a way of throwing limitations around life" (133). 
Rajan does not dispute that Zul "meant well when he tried to show [him] 
the spirit of the Tiger" (IFC 144). The problem with Zul is that he has found "too 
much clarity". Without a second thought, he abandons himself to the immediacy 
of his emotional impulses, to his belief in his essential Malayness and the insular 
ways in which he must live his life. Till the end of IFC, he does not see that 
"when we act "spontaneously" in the everyday meaning of the word, we are not 
free from but prisoners of our immediate nature" (Zizek 1993: 126). To act 
according to our 'deepest convictions' or 'authentic inclinations' is not to be free 
but to be subject to the laws of causality. To gain true freedom, we must act freely 
- not by doing whatever we want but by surmounting our unfreedom, our 
determination by and "dependence on the Other ( such and such laws, inclinations, 
hidden motives ... )" (Zupancic 2000: 28). As Rajan says towards the end of the 
novel: 
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one must be ready to let go even the most prized personal ideals 
and beliefs in order to come by an even more substantial grain of 
truth. The self, shaped by family, society, education and all that 
nourishes the ego, must be firmly put aside. One must escape from 
the prison of self-imposed or imposed upon order so that a new 
openness to life can be discovered. (IFC 167) 
Through Zul, Rajan comes to recognise his own shortcomings too. He 
recognises that, even as he tenaciously clung to his individuality and self-
independence, he had unwittingly allowed Zul to instil in him the belief that the 
Tiger may hold the key to the Other-Place where he would be 'truly at home'. He 
had taken the Tiger as a Transcendental Authority located outside himself, 
something to which Zul had more of a claim because of his 'blood connection' to 
the land. He had looked upon it as "a spiritual goal" (IFC 141) instead of what it 
really was: the obstacle preventing him from seeing that the Tiger was never 'out 
there' but always-already within himself. In other words, he had overlooked how 
he was his own Tiger, the presupposed messianic Other whose ontological 
guarantee he had sought for his existence: 
No wonder it has taken me so long to discover its presence! ... I 
see the true ramifications of that search for the tiger. I see now how 
I found a tiger for myself: in my attitude to my profession, the 
country and life. (IFC 143-4) 
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If we accept that Rajan finally recognises himself as the cause of his 
cause, what then is the significance? And how does it relate to Malaysia and the 
politics of nationhood? In order to flesh out the answer to these two questions, let 
us take a step back to retrace the path ofRajan's self-recognition. 
After leaving Pak Zul's village, Rajan returns home but keeps to himself, 
not yet ready to go back to family life. He has yet to gain full access to the Tiger's 
secret at this point in the novel. As he says, "the borders of my consciousness are 
still not sufficiently destroyed for me to know the heart of that country" called life 
(IFC 137). Lying in bed one afternoon in a semi-conscious state, his mind returns 
to the jungle into which he had trekked with Zul a long time ago. This time, 
without Zul by his side to guide and impose on him, he traverses the fantasy 
jungle with an agility of his own. "There is no more an eye, neither Zul's nor the 
tiger's, watching" (IFC 13 8), he says. "I've suddenly become the eye itself. A 
lidless eye so that nothing can be blinked away; so that nothing can be distorted" 
(138). In Rajan's gaze, the fascinating Tiger first appears as a stain which 
condenses all that he "can't [ won't?] understand" (140), something to which he 
presently has the urge to pay homage. To offer it sacrifice, he hunts and skewers a 
boar to death through the anus, decapitates it and spills its blood in a circle: "I've 
made my sacrifice and my spirit is light. I know the tiger won't harm me for I've 
left the boar's carcass in the centre of that holy circle. I am now part of the tiger 
and it contains everything that needs to be known" (IFC 142). 
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Immediately after the sacrifice, Rajan sees signs of the Tiger's absent 
presence everywhere: in a flower bud, the green of the trees, a fledgling tree, an 
anthill and in the very silence of the jungle. So absorbed with what he sees that he 
'loses himself in the act. That, it suddenly strikes him, is "the ultimate sacrifice 
needed to gain access to the tiger's presence: the giving up of the self' (IFC 142). 
If Rajan was against the idea the last time, he is convinced this time around that it 
is only rational for him to subordinate his will to the Tiger. With that 'realisation', 
his spirit becomes even lighter, as if a heavy burden has been removed. "There is 
no more necessity to understand not only myself but also all those shapes, objects 
and the network of creepers that seem to be always changing. There is no more 
need to worry about the force behind the changes. There is only the need to be 
subservient and to accept" (142-3). 
Rajan is now burning with the desire to be fully released from the burden 
of thinking and being responsible for himself. He feels his skin peeling and his 
flesh "merging with the flesh of another, the other" (143). The merging process 
has begun but something is blocking the way. A voice from within Rajan is 
protesting, piping up "like the voice of my childhood when innocent and therefore 
made bold, I accepted nothing, submitted to nothing. Raj an is tom "between 
wanting to be merged with the tiger and the need to be really free" ( emphasis 
added, 143 ). "The idea that nothing of me [his will to self-determination, not his 
Indianness J will ever remain appals me." Finally, he decides that he cannot and 
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will not give up his will to self-determination. With that decision, the v1s1on 
vanishes and Rajan starts to feel, for the first time in months, the trickle of vitality 
returning to his body and mind. 
Noir Malaysia 
Rajan has passed the trial of fire, "freed [his] mind from all kinds of suppressions 
and repressions" (IFC 145) and gained access to the Tiger's truth. But his journey 
is not yet concluded. "Just when I thought I had reached some sense of peace and 
clarity, I find odd things happening ... Strange interferences - that's all I can call 
them at the moment - are coming into my sleep." These "strange interferences" 
centre on a dark microcosm of Malaysia, a settlement not unlike other settlements 
in the country. Overcast with the shadows of dark conspiracy, it is home to 
citizens who live in trepidation of the country's leader whose absent presence is 
all-pervasive: 
We, the ordinary citizens, are somehow aware of the leader's 
presence all the time. 
Any man suspected even of thinking of subverting the leader's 
leadership is taken away and has things done to him. When the 
man returns, he is so docile even Mani the goat has more spirit. 
But quite often things don't get that far. There are check systems 
already operating at lower, ordinary levels. 
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These watch-dog institutions are not that obvious to the ordinary 
eye. They work through existing customs and rituals practised by 
the various communities. (IFC 146) 
The "customs and rituals" Rajan refers to involve some form of sacrifice. 
Flowers, food and slaughtered animals are offered to deities, gods and the dead. 
They are usually found at graveyards, temples and shrines beside bends in the 
road. Offerings - "the most colourful and abundant" (IFC 14 7) - are also made to 
men occupying high positions of power, usually complemented by the best 
caterers, a live band and a cultural dance performance. Lastly, there are what 
Rajan calls "cultural sacrifices", i.e. sacrifices that "weld us together in obedience 
to the ruling regime" (IFC 14 7). Members of the community who partake in 
cultural sacrifices may slaughter a buffalo, goat or pig. They may do so for a 
variety of reasons: for the enjoyment of it, as a way of expressing allegiance to 
their community and so on. At that level, cultural sacrifices are neither wrong nor 
harmful. They only become insidious when we believe "our culture is not 
whatever beliefs and practices we actually happen to have but is instead the 
beliefs and practices that should properly go with the sort of people we happen to 
be" (Walter Benn Michaels, in Zizek 1997b: 26). 
Culture is today' s politically-correct way of continuing racial thought. It 
becomes race the moment we take what we do ( our custom and rituals) as 
something we should do because of who we are ' deep inside', our race qua 
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fantasmatic Thing in us that makes us 'us'. As Walter Benn Michaels explains, "it 
is only the appeal to race that makes culture an object of affect and that gives 
notions like losing our culture, preserving it, stealing someone else's culture, 
restoring people's culture to them, and so on, their pathos" (Zizek 1997b: 26). We 
see this clearly demonstrated in IFC by the inhabitants of Rajan's dark world, 
including Ramasamy, Jimmy Kok and Zulkifli (respectively representing the 
insular Indian, Chinese and Malay). 55 Along with a host of hostile, faceless 
figures, they pressure Rajan to recant his 'heretical' belief in self-determination 
and to embrace racial determination: 
"Why are you like this?" Ramasamy says. "You 're one of us and 
yet you're not one of us." 
"Can't a man be just himself?" 
"When you were born did your mother leave you naked?" he asks 
and when I don 't answer he says "She wrapped you up in the 
clothes of our [Indian] culture. See how it has fed you and 
strengthened you. Gave you mind and spirit." 
"I can find them by myself," I say and he laughs. 
55 The role Ramasmny and Jimmy play in the dream sequence is different from their role in the 
demolition scene we discussed earlier in this chapter. The inconsistency is strategic in that 
Ramasamy and Jimmy are not, like Rajan and Zul, fu_11-fledged . characters but multipurpose 
caricatures Mani am uses to convey different messages at d1fferent porn ts of the nove1. 
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"You've to fight everything our culture gave us," he says. (IFC 
155) 
From behind the businessman ' s mask, Jimmy Kok too tries to steer Rajan 
back on to the accepted path, but Rajan remains as headstrong as before. Instead 
of unconditionally accepting the nature of things as defined by Jimmy, he finds 
holes in it: 
"You say things too openly," [Jimmy] says. "You must hide your 
real self. Otherwise you'll be in danger." 
If I'm not myself I'll be in danger" I say. 
"See what I mean?" he says. "There are eyes and ears 
h " everyw ere. 
"Why are they everywhere?" I ask. 
"We live by rules here," he says. "They can't be broken. New ones 
can't be made until everyone agrees." 
"If everyone agrees how will the new be found?" 
"This is an old story," Jimmy Kok says. "There can be no new 
1 " rues. 
"So sacrifices must be made?" 
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"We've been friends for a long time," he says. "This is the only 
way I can help you. By giving you advice. Play the game." 
"If the game is bad?" 
"Don't say I didn't warn you." (IFC 156) 
Zul conducts himself no differently from Ramasamy and Jimmy in the 
dream sequence. Even though he has overcome his sorrow for his son, he has yet 
to emerge from "the darkness of the limited mind" (IFC 153). To him race is still 
everything. True to character, he chastises Rajan - this time for not showing due 
respect for the unique Thing of the Other. He is saddened that Raj an does not 
appreciate the Other's cultural domain as a sacrosanct domain that outsiders must 
never transgress. Until the end, he neither sees nor appears to care that the beliefs 
he champions are "building up walls" and "preventing us from knowing each 
other, knowing ourselves" (157) . He does not see that when communities keep to 
themselves and respect from afar other communities' enjoyment of their own 
Thing, they are - by that very act - creating "many countries inside that one 
country" (116). Performatively they ensure that Bangsa Malaysia will always 
remain a pipe dream and that Malaysia will always be racially divided. 
What we have just delineated above is the effect of pragmatic tolerance 
( discussed earlier with regard to HTT). Pragmatic tolerance causes what it says 
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Malaysia can never achieve precisely by presupposing that the various races in the 
country are as different from each other as chalk and cheese. It turns on the 
assumption that given the insurmountable differences between the races, 
superficial togetherness is the best that the country can hope for, and that the best 
way to realise this is to appeal to the so-called universal values, e.g. "the love for 
peace", "economic and materialistic security and success, the desire for relatively 
high educational achievements" (Maniam 1997: 20). Pragmatic tolerance does not 
see that "the common ground that allows cultures to talk to each other, to 
exchange messages, is not some presupposed set of universal values, etc., but 
rather its opposite, some shared deadlock". It does not see that cultures only truly 
communicate when they "recognise in each other a different answer to the same 
fundamental "antagonism," deadlock, point of failure" (Zizek 1993: 31 ). 
Members of all cultural communities are everywhere the same insofar as 
they share the same ontological wound, that is, insofar as they are, as subjects, 
always-already internally antagonised, blocked from within from achieving full 
identity-with-themselves. To occult the traumatic emptiness at the heart of their 
subjectivity, "the castration that is the inheritance of every human subject" 
(Ragland 1996: 134), they have but language to spin out soothing fictions about 
how their cultural universe was once complete and how the Enemy is responsible 
for its present incompletion. They create customs and habits they call culture in 
order to assure themselves that 'everything will be OK' if they never stop 
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practising what they have created. Until they traverse their fantasy, they will not 
see that culture is not, as we explained in Chapter 6, the truth of one's being but 
the effect of its absence, a genealogy of failures to capture one's essence which 
lies beyond the wall of language. Until then, they will not see that yes, we lose a 
few feathers by letting our illusions of knowing fall, by admitting that what is 
most precious to us is in the last instance a gift of shit. We lose "our pride, the 
comfort of the familiar, and our symptoms. What do we have to gain? Some space 
for freedom to breathe deeply, some chance to change, to live, love, laugh. And 
maybe the chance to live beyond the first death of alienation from "within," which 
Lacan placed before the second animal death, or mortal one" (Ragland 1996: 
146). 
Rajan, unlike Muthu in HTT, gains the chance to live beyond the first 
death of alienation. But he is the odd man out, at least in his nightmare-world 
which thinly disguises contemporary Malaysia. There, as in Malaysia, non-
compliance with the social dogma invites disciplinary action from the 
government. 56 For being a "deviant" (IFC 15 8) and for not "spreading and 
upholding the administration 's policies" (148), Rajan has to be punished, just as 
56 As discussed in Chapter 2, Malaysia ' s draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) is routinely used 
by the ruling regime to crack down on dissent and opposition. In the year 2001, for instance, 2520 
people were detained under the various detention-without-trial laws. Among those detained were 
ten key leaders from Keadilan (the National Justice Party) and Suaram (a human rights group), 
including Tian Chua (Keadilan vice-president). See Suaram 's Executive Summary of Malaysian 
Civil and Political Ri ghts 2001 at http://www.suaram.org/hr summary 200 l .htm 
339 
Mani the recalcitrant goat in the novel is ritually slaughtered for having "the 
courage to show his feelings so openly" (147). 
Mani is interestingly similar to Rajan in spirit. He "isn't like the other 
goats, cowed" (IFC 147). His eyes have an indeterminate quality about them; it is 
as if they were the apertures of "a deeper awareness" (14). "He is almost human 
in the way he looks at you; almost human in the way he protects his freedom. He 
doesn't allow anyone to put the rope around his neck" (147). As if to express what 
he thinks of the ruling regime, Mani farts raucously while a politician is half-way 
through pontificating "about how the administration has only the welfare of the 
people at heart" (149). When the politician continues with his praise of the 
administration's far-sightedness , Mani uncouthly fills the air with the stink of a 
goat's pellet-dung and urine. He gets away with it but is soon caught and ritually 
prepared for castration before the presiding politician. "Watch this carefully ... 
He has to be taught a lesson" (154), the executioner says to the crowd before 
pulling out a curved knife and makes an incision which travels from Mani's penis 
sheath to the scrotum. The executioner then slices downwards until he reaches 
Mani's throat. Mani stays proudly silent and indifferent to pain, which infuriates 
his executioner into discarding his professionalism and to savagely hack at Mani's 
throat. Mani is then skinned and dismembered before the crowd rushes forward to 
carry away this or that piece of him, all looking in the politician 's direction with 
"devotional gratitude" (155). 
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After Mani comes Raj an' s tum to be neutered in the interest of the nation. 
Still in the nightmare sequence, a strange machine with many instruments 
descends on Rajan to "get at the root of [his] uselessness" and make him "one of 
us": "I feel suction-like pads on my head, face, chest, thighs and feet. Then the 
machine pauses as if it has found the source of my non-conformity. There is a 
sharp pain as a clamp is riveted to my temples; a sharper pain when a casing is 
fitted to my testicles and penis" (IFC 158). Rajan struggles and lashes out until he 
is woken from his nightmare by his wife who rushes into the room when she hears 
him screaming. 
Arriving ... 
Although Raj an gained access to the truth of his being before the strange 
interferences began, it is only now - after the nightmare - that he wakes up as a 
different person, as someone perceptibly more 'at home' with himself: "I've 
become a dreamer since I returned. No, not in the escapist sense. All I want to see 
is life unfold itself in its entirely" (IFC 171 ). This is not to suggest that Rajan has 
'arrived' and his life will thenceforth be free from strife. At the point when the 
novel concludes, he still has his wife, Santhi, to reconcile with after years of 
having reduced her to the level of object. And he has his children, Ravi and 
Sivam, to protect from the curse of the eternal return which he can already see 
dancing in their eyes. 
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Rajan feels responsible for having "maimed" (189) the older boy, Ravi 
who is the more thoughtful and determined: "I saw in him a younger version of 
what I had been and turned away in disgust" (188-9). Sivam, the younger boy is 
not as set in his ways. He still has some fluidity of accommodation in his 
personality. But already Rajan has seen in his eyes "the flicker of light that had 
played in Mani's eyes" (189). Disconcerted, he asks his wife if he had somehow, 
by his actions or inactions, "turned them away from being themselves" (189). Had 
he somehow altered their destiny the way that the woman from his childhood 
altered her child's destiny? Rajan recalls how the woman, once the beauty of the 
rubber estate and a model Hindu wife, gradually lost her youthfulness and turned 
bitter from the abuse she suffered in the hands of her husband. In a powerful 
moment in the novel, she is seen sitting in the doorway of her house, hugging her 
pregnancy and saying: 
Little one, you about to be born, listen. You came into my womb 
violently. I didn't want you. The man put you there while smelling 
of drink and vomit. Other, worse things are smelling inside him. 
He has made me smell too. When you come at last into this world, 
you won't be drinking milk from my breasts. You'll be drinking 
bitterness, hatred, suffering. You can stop the suffering if you try. 
you must get the strength for that from the little milk you can 
receive from my breasts. If it's not the custom for a son to beat his 
father, you must break that custom. You must break his head and 
spill his blood. There won 't be any brains to spill. So, son, you 
must be stronger than your brothers and sisters ... You must be 
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hard. Hard like a twisted metal that can't be twisted any more. 
(IFC 183-4) 
The last Rajan saw of the family before he left the estate many years ago, 
the child was already showing signs of becoming his mother's desire. There 
wasn't anything the child didn't leave ravaged: plants, windows, clothes, bicycles. 
"He was defiant for the sake of defiance. His mother had been successful in 
passing this spirit to him while he was still inside her" (IFC 184 ). 
IFC closes on a disconcerting note without confirming or dismissing what 
Rajan fears might be history repeating itself. It leaves the reader to ponder if 
every generation does not inherit the ring of the eternal return which it must break 
in order to come into freedom. The closing is quintessentially Maniam. Victory is 
never complete in Maniam's universe. We need only recall how, although Ravi 
returns to himself in TR, his triumph is sapped by his father's suicide. Maniam 
explains the logic behind his work: 
I don't think many of my characters reach what you call a full 
sense of achievement at all , or a sense of completeness or a sense 
of fullness ; they are always son1ewhere progressing towards it but 
they don 't quite get there and I think that progressing towards it 
would define what I believe is humanity always progressing in that 
sense towards a con1pleter image of itself. You don't quite get 
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there because if you get there then you would all be dead, reaching 
a point and not going forward in this field. (Greet 1991: 7) 
Maniam's logic of non-arrival applies not just to his fictional characters 
but also, ultimately, to Malaysia and its peoples. Maniam says that his greatest 
fear for the Malaysian society "is that they want to be stable and enjoy the 
pleasures" (Lim 1999a). He recognises that Malaysians have generally come to 
accept and even appreciate authoritarian rule, norms and institutions. They are 
grateful for the government-promoted 'golden formula' ( obedience to the 
government, pragmatic tolerance, Malay supremacy, eternal Malay hegemony) 
which allows them to live in comfort, work and earn a good living from their toil. 
Some might disagree with the government's 'divide the races and rule' policies, 
or the way it plugs for the Malay race to be put on "a very high pedestal" 
(Maniam, in Tan 1998: Appendix 1, p. 7). Rarely, however, do they have the will 
or the courage to not "play the game" (IFC 156). This could be due to a variety of 
reasons: fear of being taken away and have things done to them by the 
representatives of the "watch-dog institutions" (146), fear of accidentally 
destroying "the society we've so carefully built" (158), and failure to see that the 
alternative to the 'golden formula' is not anarchy, as the government would have 
them believe. No doubt, one can argue that the Malaysian general public may well 
have been conditioned to fear and regard the government as the end-point of 
knowledge and the final authority on life. But as Maniam poses, "Does that mean 
344 
conditioning is always one-hundred percent effective? Need it be effective, unless 
you surrender to it?" (Lim 1999a) 
Rajan is Maniam's proof that one can not surrender one's will to self-
determination to the government, however paternalistic it may be as the agent of 
Law. Against Sarvan who rather cynically interprets the protagonist as trying to 
"pass off his essential powerlessness as virtuous restraint and democratic 
accommodation" (Sarvan 1996: 72), we argue that Rajan, like Mani, not only 
agentively acts the way he believes, he even pays a price for it. For refusing to say 
that the Emperor is not a naked usurper of power, he is singled out for castration. 
At the end of IFC, Rajan emerges as an unlikely hero, a "political strong 
poet" (Laclau), a "subject of drive" (Lacan), a "god" (Okri) or what Maniam calls 
"the universal man" (1996: xii) and "the new diasporic man" (1997: 23). Rajan 
belongs to a "new diaspora" in Malaysia, a fragmented and dispersed community 
of men and women from all backgrounds, all of whom are concerned with the 
quality of thought and life that can be made available to the Malaysian populace. 
"Their approach to individual, historical and socio-cultural developments is 
markedly different from that of the cultural loyalist; they will not subscribe to the 
concept of pragmatic tolerance discussed earlier" ( 1997: 23: 22). They do not, like 
the cultural loyalist who follows the way of the Tiger, "seek to be reassured by an 
imagined cultural stability." They recognise that "man has been artificially 
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categorised into a monocultural, ethnic and political being when multiplicity is his 
true nature" (1997: 23: 23). Reading Maniam through Lacan, we may say that 
they fully assume the uttermost contingency of their being. They recognise that 
"no-one arrives; there is no platform where one can stand permanently." Instead 
of lamenting their fate and blaming the Enemy, they find happiness "in being in a 
state of always arriving rather than having arrived" (Maniam, in Wilson 1993: 
22). The new diaspora seeks to influence through "the more persuasive imaging 
of a vision in the present" (Maniam 1997: 22). But will it succeed in 
hegemonising its vision? Its status as a minority without power seems to work 
against it. But as Martin Tyrell optimistically points out, at the bottom of any 
process of social influence there is always a relatively small social group, and all 
social influence is ultimately a process of minority influence (1996: 238). 
Whatever the odds, the new diaspora' s success is absolutely necessary if Malaysia 
is to live up to its radical possibilities. 
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CONCLUSION 
Perhaps our very physical survival hinges on our ability 
to consu1nmate the act of assuming fully the 
"nonexistence of the Other", of tarrying with the 
negative. (Zizek 1993: 237) 
A Way of Being Free 
If there is a vital lesson to be learned from our discussion on Okri and Maniam, it 
is that the subject of desire is not only much more unfree than he believes, he is 
also much freer than he knows. Where the subject believes himself free, Lacan 
insists on a causal order beyond his control. But where the subject becomes aware 
of his dependence on the Other (such and such Law, pathological motives, ... ) 
and is ready to give it up, Lacan "indicates a 'crack' in the Other, a crack in which 
he situates the autonomy and freedom of the subject" (Zupancic 2000: 28). We 
have seen this logic of freedom expressed in different ways by different characters 
throughout our discussion. In Okri, we saw how because the nation-peoples 
berated by Dad for their sheep-like philosophy volitionally choose the Bad (by 
tolerating tyranny and allowing themselves to be lured into supporting corrupt 
politicians and receiving crumbs of reward for their patronage) over the Worse 
(the undecideable which leads to either total annihilation or greater freedom), they 
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condemn themselves to a life of unfreedom. By contrast Azaro ' s father Dad 
' ' ' 
fully assumes the Worse. Realising that there is 'no gain without pain' , he readily 
risks it all, cuts himself loose from the things through which corrupt politicians try 
to keep him in check: his personal well-being and even his life. In doing so, Dad 
creates a space for himself and others to redream the abiku nation and make the 
dream real. By his actions, Dad demonstrates that we are free whether we want to 
be or not, free in both freedom and unfreedom, free in good and in evil, and free 
even when we follow nothing but the trajectory of natural necessity (Zupancic 
2000: 39). 
In Maniam, the logic of freedom is articulated in the movement of Ravi's 
and Rajan's consciousness towards self-supercession, in their passage from desire 
to drive and ultimate recognition of the fact that they had, despite their 
cocksureness in the independence of their will , acted under the shadow of the 
Other. Ravi and Rajan had unconsciously subordinated themselves to their 
libidinal Thing. They had committed the ethical crime of living in a deficit of 
existence. However, after a lifetime of emptiness and unhappiness, they finally 
recognise their complicity in the creation and perpetuation of their ontological 
dilemma. They recognise themselves as their own making, the absolute cause of 
the cause of their actions . No longer hiding behind the Law, they recognise that 
the Law is the necessary Law of their Heart only insofar as they personally 
institute it as such. Because Ravi and Rajan fully assume the contingency of their 
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subjectivity, they get the chance to live beyond the first death of alienation from 
within. By contrast, Zul the 'real Malay' never accepts that he is the Tiger he 
seeks, the One who chooses the Law that chooses him. He rejects the power of 
choice and is condemned to live in perpetual dread of the Enemy stealing from 
him the freedom he himself had rejected. He tries to impose unfreedom upon 
'outsiders' living in the land he calls his, and ends up holding himself and the 
nation back from discovering "wider and more inclusive centres for the 
understanding and assimilation of larger areas of life" (Maniam 1994a: 10). 
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and 
with the world being rushed by leaders of Mahathir' s ilk into a final showdown 
between the east and the west, Islam and Christianity, it has become all the more 
urgent for cultures everywhere to come into self-knowledge, to traverse the 
fantasy in such a way as to be free from the illusion that by denouncing and 
defeating the Enemy, the past and all that they value as 'heritage' will be 
redeemed, dignity will be restored, and society will finally return to a state of 
Edenic fullness. Cultures need to see that "true loyalty to a tradition lies in 
recognising in the past its transient and historical character, its difference with the 
present ( a difference that involves continuities and discontinuities at the same 
time), and not in transforming the past into a model and an origin to which one 
tries to reduce the present through more and more absurd and less credible ... 
manipulations" (Laclau 1990: 193-4). Cultures need to understand that the proper 
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response to events following September 11 is not to withdraw into their blameless 
selves like a sensitive plant and denounce the world as wicked. The proper 
response should be the inverse, that is, for cultures to come out from their cocoons 
long enough to see that, if the world is to have a chance at all , each and every 
culture must refuse to give its own organisation, values and social order the status 
offundamentum inconcussum (Laclau 1990: 187). 
Overcoming Passions 
At the time of writing this, two of eleven states in Malaysia have controversially 
enacted the strict Islamic-Sharia Law as state Law. The Law presently applies 
only to Muslims (Malays by default) but will be imposed on non-Muslims (non-
Malays) in the future "when every citizen understands them", says Abdul Hadi 
Awang (president of PAS, the Islamic fundamentalist party which introduced the 
legislation) (Lim 2002a). The marriage of state and religion has far-reaching 
consequences, for Hudud and Qisas (the newly-introduced Islamic-Sharia 
religious code) cover all aspects of living. Among other things, the Law bars non-
Muslims from having any policy-making role in government. It also empowers 
religious authorities to amputate the limbs of convicted thieves, behead 
murderers and stone adulterers and homosexuals to death. 
' 
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The stand taken by Barisan Nasional (the ruling coalition party) has been 
ambivalent at best. Its leader, Mahathir Mohamad, cannot be said to be happy 
with PAS' increasing popularity among Malay-Muslims in the country. But that 
does not mean he opposes the idea of an Islamic state. As we saw Chapter 2, as 
far as Mahathir is concerned, Malaysia is already an Islamic nation even though 
the constitution defines the country as secular. Neither does he appear to be overly 
concerned about the fate of dhimmis ('non-Muslims') who, already facing racial 
discrimination, now have to struggle against the imposition of Islamist values on 
their lives. To quote an amazing statement Mahathir made on the brewing 
political crisis: "minority groups have no mandate to determine or question 
whether Malaysia is an Islamic country or otherwise" (Liu 2002). 
Notwithstanding, PAS' move has been publicly condemned as 
retrogressive by concerned non-governmental organisations and right-minded 
sections of the Malaysian society. "It reflects the narrow-mindedness and lack of 
understanding of modem issues by the leaders", says Maria Chin Abdullah, the 
executive director of a women's group. DAP national chairman, Lim Kit Siang, is 
equally emphatic: "We oppose any theocratic state or any laws based on religion 
not just because it is insensitive to the multi-religious and multi-racial society but 
also because it is incompatible with the p1inciples of democracy, human rights, 
justice and freedom" (Lim 2002a). 
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Responding to criticisms of his Islamist utopia, Hadi Awang says that the 
public has paid too much attention to the Law' s punitive aspects, so much so that 
its "beauty" has been obscured (Lim 2002c ). The legislation, he say, signals the 
dawn of a post-political era. It will ensure a safe, peaceful, crime-free and fully-
constituted society, as exemplified by countries like Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
which have successfully implemented Islamic Law. What Hadi Awang does not 
mention is that Saudi Arabia has one of the worst human rights records in history. 
According to Amnesty International, "secrecy and fear permeate every aspect of 
the state structure in Saudi Arabia. There are no political parties, no elections, no 
independent legislature, no trade unions, no Bar Association, no independent 
judiciary, no elections, no independent human rights organizations" (Lim 2002b; 
see also Amnesty International 2002a). The situation in Sudan is even worse. 
Mohamed al-Amin Khalifa, a leading northern Islamist, asserts that "Sharia leads 
to low crime, low prostitution, low numbers of AIDS cases, and a sense of 
tranquillity. It is a deterrent" (Hammond 2002). In reality, Sharia has, since its 
introduction in Sudan by former ruler J aafar Nimeiri roughly twenty years ago , 
bitterly divided the war-tom country between the Islamist north and the animist 
and Christian south. The conflict is further complicated by issues such as oil and 
ethnicity. 
It is true that, in this post September 11 world, it has become "very 
fashionable to present the Muslims as particularly susceptible to being crazy or 
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blowing themselves up" (Feldner 2001). In the face of mounting hysteria, one 
must be careful not to defame Islam as the "most stupid" of all monotheistic 
religions, as have Michel Houellebecq, a well-known writer in France who was 
recently charged in court (but subsequently acquitted) for allegedly inciting 
religious hatred against Muslims. Likewise, one should not, when opposing the 
logic of Malay supremacy and the unconstitutional Islamisation of Malaysia, 
follow in the footsteps of Houellebecq. One should instead endeavour to show, as 
we have in this thesis, that the political desire of the likes of Hadi Awang and 
Malay-centric Malays is not only unethical in the Lacanian sense of the term, but 
also fatal. 
Nigeria, which has had a headstart in implementing Sharia, provides a 
good example of what might be in store for Malaysia should it continue in its 
present path. Since the year 2000, twelve of thirty six states in Nigeria have 
introduced the Sharia penal legislation, a move denounced as unconstitutional by 
Nigerians who vehemently oppose it. (Nigeria's constitution requires the 
separation of state and religion. It guarantees freedom of religion to individuals 
but denies it to the states (Emeagwali 2000).) Since the introduction of the Law, 
lashings for infractions such as drinking and disturbing the public peace have 
been doled out on a daily basis in the Sharia states (see Astill 2002; Faris 2002). 
Many have had their limbs amputated and at least two women have been 
sentenced to death by stoning for having a baby out of wedlock. One of them is 
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Amina Lawal, a 30 year-old woman whose death sentence has outraged civil 
society in and outside of Nigeria. 
Amina Lawal' s sentence has even prompted Soyinka to go on radio to 
berate the states for "putting us through this very sadistic charade in which human 
beings are being made the mere game of politics in a very traumatic way" 
(Efeizomor 2002). Soyinka insists that Sharia is "a pure political ploy", an 
"attempt to create a crisis - a pure political crisis - because of disgruntlement 
with the current government. There is nothing really religious about it. I mean, 
what excuse do these people - who are just another group within a multi-religious 
plurality - what excuse do they have?" Soyinka's viewpoint is entirely justified if 
we consider the widespread religious violence the Sharia issue has touched off. 
One of the worst carnage and devastation was inflicted in Kaduna in the year 
2000, where more than two thousand people were reported to have been killed. In 
his speech following the incident, President Olusegu Obasanjo says: 
I could not believe that Nigerians were capable of such barbarism 
against one another. But what I saw there was perhaps even more 
gruesome in detail ... The devastation was so massive, it seemed 
as though Kaduna had overnight been turned into a battlefield ... 
All so suddenly, people who had been their neighbours for decades 
turned on them, and massacred them. And yet, those who were 
responsible for these murders claim that they were acting in 
defence of faith or religion . . . When all the statistics of the 
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devastation in Kaduna, Kachia, Aba and Umuahia are recorded, we 
will find, I am sad to say, that this has been the worst incident of 
blood-letting that this country has witnessed since the Civil War. 
(Obasanjo 2000) 
Much has been said about the Sharia issue in Nigeria. It has been said, for 
instance, that the imposition of Sharia leaves Nigeria "with its left foot in the 
Stone Age and its right foot in the Information age" (Emeagwali 2000). It has 
been said that Sharia allows Muslim leaders to shift the blame of evil to 
Christians, capitalism and adulterous women. It has also been said that the 
problems faced by the Muslim North "cannot be solved by seeking divine 
guidance or fighting Christians" and that the North should instead "declare a jihad 
[holy war] against illiteracy, overpopulation and AIDS which is spreading like 
wildfire in Nigeria" (Emeagwali 2000). But what do we say to someone like 
Abdul Majeed, a primary school teacher in Shuwarin (a remote village in northern 
Nigeria) who believes that "with Sharia it is going to be a very good, decent 
society, with no harlots or drunkards ... All those unwanted customs that are not 
in our blood, are going to go away" (Phillips 2000)? Is Abdul Majeed accountable 
for the installation of the Islamist Thing at the centre of his world of desires? Is he 
responsible for the pleasure and pain, and the good and bad he derives from being 
unquestioningly faithful to it? Is he an autonomous individual who volitionally 
chooses his own Absolute and therefore his destiny, or is he merely a simple 
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villager who knows not what he does? Our short answer is yes, he is fully 
responsible for his relationship to his Thing, and our long answer is this thesis. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Synopsis of K.S. Maniam's Unpublished Novel 
Delayed Passage 
Dr. Kumar retires, in the mid-nineties, from the Social Anthropology Department 
of a local university, disappointed he could not assimilate into Malay culture and 
society. Resolved, therefore, to have nothing to do with the world for the rest of 
his life, he cocoons himself within a precarious tranquillity. But this is soon 
chiselled away by his attraction to his widowed and young daughter-in-law, 
Sumathi. 
She has come to his house with the vague idea of tracking down his son's 
spirit, appeasing it, and so release herself not so much from the grief as the guilt 
she feels over his death. Kumar agrees to help her in the bizarre quest, for the 
inexplicable and youthful fascination he develops for her sensual presence has 
somehow to be satisfied. He listens to her self-exploratory stories, and 
reconstructs, with voyeu1istic eagerness, when he is alone, her married life with 
his son. 
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When he finds and shows her a crucial letter from his son, to recreate for 
her his voice, Kumar's mask of aloofness and moral imperturbability comes 
tumbling down. Sumathi too, subconsciously realizes she has inherited the 
immorality of her adoptive mother. Caught now within a trance-like urgency, she 
sees in him his son, and he, far gone into that trance of sensual attraction, borrows 
his dead son's brooding air and gestures, and ceasing to be the father, becomes the 
son. On the verge of satisfying that incestuous impulse, he pulls away from her, 
becoming aware, unexpectedly, of a mythical innocence flooding upon him. 
He now enters the past he has avoided in an attempt to track to the source 
this mythical innocence, which he senses is closely tied to his regression and his 
straying the true path of self-fulfilment. He sees it is his empty shell of a father, a 
victim of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, that drives him towards an early 
sense of himself. This is to be like Faizal, his Mal2.y classmate, who is not only 
sensuous himself but also enjoys a sensuous relationship with the land. 
Kumar spends as much time as he can with Faizal, away from his poverty-
stricken family living in depressing rubber estate; he allows Faizal to initiate him, 
instinctively, into the pulse and seasons of the land, climaxing in a ritual 
immersion in the river, from which he emerges feeling he has somehow caught a 
glimpse into his essential self, and can now confront the shrieking wilderness lies 
ahead of him. 
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All this changes when he meets Hashim at the teacher training college he 
and Faizal attend several years later. Hashim fuels Kumar's latent imagination 
with his seductive interpretation of the country's history, and convinces him that 
there is a deeper way to belong to the land. The spell he casts wears off when they 
are posted to their old school; they tum to the practicalities of getting on with 
their lives. They marry, Faizal a Malay girl his mother finds to match his 
boisterous nature; and Kumar, reminded of the empty boldness of some of the 
college women, the brooding and rebellious Devi, from a family ruled by the 
mother's sense of Hindu tradition. 
It is about this time that Kumar gets a further glimpse of himself, Faizal 
and Devi, as coming from that mythical source, untouched by intellectual, cultural 
or political corruptions of the self. However, Kumar doesn't accept this abstract 
sense of the self; he doesn't want to drift away into some void, as his father had 
done. 
When Hashim reappears in his life, Kumar sees him as an Odyssean 
cultural hero, and is eager to fashion himself after this image. But Hashim, 
influenced by the 1969 May racial riots, has already discarded his liberal 
humanist approach for an anti-colonial and more narrowly nationalistic one. 
Kumar too, coming from immigrant stock, sees the only way to become 
Malaysian is to belong as closely to the land as a Malay does; consequently, when 
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he goes to study in the university he becomes physically and emotionally 
distanced from his family. Devi withdraws into a marbled remoteness, which he 
fears but explains away as a relapse into an atavistic version of the Hindu woman. 
After the family shifts to Kuala Lumpur, Devi comes out of her 
withdrawal to remind him, through the house-blessing rituals, of his cultural 
origins. He himself organizes a house-warming party during which Azman, a 
wayang kulit puppeteer, deeply touches him, and a racially mixed audience, with 
a Malayised version of the Ramayana episode of Sita entering the flames to prove 
her purity. But Kumar ignores the wider cultural implications of these occasions, 
and goes the other way: he surrenders to the process Hashim has indirectly 
designed for his assimilation into Malay culture. 
This takes place in Badnock estate, where Kumar meets Ramasamy, a man 
renowned for living within a deep silence. Kumar sees this as a withdrawal into 
Indianness, and he helps Hashim's henchmen flush out this cultural nostalgia in 
Ramasamy and its suspected residue in himself. When Kumar returns to his 
family, he returns as one who has made a successful cultural cross-over. 
The distance between himself and his family widens: Devi withdraws into 
her marbled remoteness; his son, Surin, who had rebelled earlier, now turns away 
from him; his elder daughter, Sunita, tries to bring him to his senses and, failing, 
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marries Sunder, a bank clerk, and goes away from the family; his other daughter, 
J anaki, leaves for America to make a life for herself. From that time onwards he 
' 
and his wife lead separate lives, completely removed from each other by an 
irrevocable silence. 
His situation in the university is no better. Hashim feels he has created 
Kumar too much in his own likeness, and, by extension, fears a cultural 
displacement if the process of assimilation is allowed to continue. This fear 
transmutes itself into self-assertion and a greed for power. He enjoys having 
Kumar at his beck and call, influencing others to keep away from him, and, 
finally, turning him into a reflector of his power. Kumar sees that his dependence 
on others for a life has brought him close to being, ironically, the empty shell of a 
man his father had been. 
Coming out of these recollections, Kumar realizes he has to confront that 
marbled remoteness from which he turned away a long time ago. He discovers it 
is not only an inborn endurance in women, but also a deep source of strength and 
openness in all individuals. And to acquire that inner and inventive sombreness 
one has to tread the path of humility. He goes, therefore, to pay his daughter, 
Sunita, that long overdue visit. He is received with a cruel coldness, but he feels 
he is prepared to face whatever humiliation his wife and daughters may have in 
store for him. 
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This happens at a special family reunion dinner, when they tum into the 
priestesses of a necessary and cathartic ritual. By enduring the humiliation, he 
buries his past, distorted self and regains his place in the family, and a sense of 
balance. His memory begins to filter back, and with it his original and more 
encompassing imagination. 
He now sees that everything is integrally connected, and though he has 
been forced to retire ignobly from the university, he helps a Malay student 
research for his PhD; he picks up from where left off, his relationship with Faizal; 
and he insists that Hashim approach the history of multicultural Malaysia more 
objectively. But Hashim looks at him from behind the smooth face of a self-
assured, cultural arrogance. 
Nagged by the doubt that his may only be a subjective experience, he sets 
out to find out if this racial and cultural exclusiveness has taken wider root. While 
this is a walk through a busy Kuala Lumpur street, it also an Odyssean spiritual 
undertaking. Leafing symbolically through the history of the country, he discovers 
that there is no common cultural memory, and that the main culture has locked 
itself up behind the inaccessible and smooth face of self-absorption. 
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Taking a symbolic bus ride towards the future , he realizes he has become a 
womb-like intelligence, waiting for the burst of light to come through the 
membranous mists of another awakening. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Synopsis of K.S. Maniam's Forthcoming Novel 
Between Lives 
Sumitra, a social worker, sent to persuade the old woman, Sellamma, to be 
relocated to a welfare home, finds her stubbornly refusing to leave her land. 
Sumitra persists, until Sellamma lets her into her memories, and treats her as her 
long-lost elder sister. By playing along, Sumitra hopes to find that one weakness 
that will help her dislodge Sellamma from her memories, and from her land. 
Instead she finds herself, affected by Sellamma's past and her personality, 
entering her own past and the nooks and crannies of her family and society. She 
discovers that she only has pretended to have an identity, and, after Sellamma's 
death, refuses, with the support of Christina and Aishah, to give up the land 
Sellamma bequeaths her. 
Sumitra, like Christina and Aishah, all between twenty-six to twenty-eight, 
has been dubiously trained for the Social Reconstruction Department (SRD). The 
recently set up, nation-wide SRD hopes to identify and root out those socials ills 
that hinder the multiracial society from becoming really integrated. Sumitra takes 
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pride in belonging to this reformist institution, as she does in her inner detachment 
that she has used, so far, to make a success of her career. 
But it doesn't help her when she comes face-to-face with Sellamma. 
Sumitra tries to impersonate her sister, getting a sample of her voice from 
Sellamma, and so get into her memories or, as she thinks, her delusions. But 
Sellamma only withdraws into the stillness from which, according to her, 
everything comes, and into which everything disappears. Not to be thwarted from 
her purpose, Sumitra sits at the edge of Sellamma's consciousness, and her 
silence, until she herself becomes a patient and empty stillness. Sellamma finally 
looks at her, as if through her memory-eyes, and sees her as her long-lost sister, 
Anjalai. 
Sellamma puts Sumitra through various rituals: immersion in a nearby 
river and a remembrance ramble through the ruined houses of the settlement, her 
land and house, and, finally, through a mesmerizing puja. Then she recreates her 
memories, taking on the voices of her family members, and compels Sumitra, 
through accusations and affectionate appeals, into becoming her Anjalai-Akka. 
Sumitra tries not to be overwhelmed. 
That's when she starts the alternative file, not so much to help her write 
that all-important report for the Department Head (DH), as to retain her inner 
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detachment. She deceives herself by finding specious reasons for Sellamma's 
attachment to the land. She also tries to fall back into her gestural life, playing 
word games with Christina, and reading her favourite magazine. When these 
don't help, she reassures herself by re-immersing herself in her own rituals: 
wresting a specious philosophy out of the brooding hills behind Charlie Wong's 
Club, and drawing attention to herself through her flamboyant, sensuous 
swimming in the Club's lagoon. 
As she progresses into Sellamma's case, she rouses susp1c1ons 1n her 
colleagues and family. Christina, her colleague and close friend, fears that a 
deeper involvement with Sellamma will make Sumitra discover that the SRD is a 
fake institution, and so jeopardize their careers. Aishah, a Malay, and her other 
perceptive colleague, suspects Sumitra of indulging in cultural nostalgia. Her 
mother fears that her straying from a normal work life will be taken by her 
husband and mother-in-law as inherited from her own, earlier waywardness. 
Sumitra finds herself becoming drained, and sees a thin line of separation 
between herself and the Department. But she still doesn't look at herself closely, 
even though her other subject, Hisham, slowly going out of his mind, tells her 
point-blank that she is a phony. 
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She makes a final attempt to exorcise Sellamma' s memories from her. She 
repeats the trip Sellamma made with Anjalai-Akka into the jungle, in their teens; 
she hopes the harsh realities will show Sellamma that it's merely jungle, not some 
fantasized dream centre of a homeland. Instead, she finds Sellamma is one step 
ahead of her: she, in fact, leads her to the shocking devastation caused by illegal 
logging. Sellamma once more recreates her family's voices, and ends by saying 
that forgetting those voices would create a hole in one ' s memory. When she falls 
silent, Sumitra finds herself looking into her own memories, especially those 
inexplicable silences that lie behind the behaviour of her school friends, Christina, 
Aishah, her father and her mother. She is also suddenly frightened by the thought 
that she is only a negligible presence in that teeming night landscape. 
With her newly opened eyes she sees in her father a ridiculous figure, and 
herself, as Hisham put it, as someone without firm ground under her feet. She is 
taken off his case, and he subsequently kills his father in a gruesome manner. She 
is unable to write that report on Sellamma, and sees only a terrible emptiness in 
the Department, her colleagues somehow trying to come through their daily lives, 
intact. 
She packs up, and heads for Sellamma's place, to really see to the 
recreation of her memories and also to sort herself out. She rewrites the 
alternative file into a fuller and even self-indicting narrative. Between Lives is this 
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narrative, mainly following her awakening, in response to Sellamma's dramatized 
tales, to a truer sense of herself. Sellamma' s tales tell of her father's ambition to 
really belong to the land. He tries to identify with it as a Malaikaran (Malay) 
would: he gets to the spiritual centre of the land with the help of Mat, he designs 
his house in the Malay style, and grows what they grow, besides Indian and 
Chinese crops, following Mat's methods. Sellamma and her sister, Anjalai, 
following his example, invest the land with their own dreams and even name their 
vegetable plot the Rama-Sita Grove, taken from the Ramayana to remind 
themselves they would truly come into their own homeland. But WW2 interrupts 
this assimilation. After the war, her brothers desert the land for the towns, thus 
breaking up the family. Her father sees that the encroaching racial divides, borne 
out of an emergent nationalism, will always prevent him from becoming a true 
citizen of the country. Disillusioned, he returns with his wife to India, but 
Sellamma stays on with her artist brother, to carry on the struggle. 
Sumitra also records and links, through her developing and more inclusive 
consciousness, to this main narrative, the account of her mother's life with Jan, 
Nathan's confession about his ambition to truly belong to the country, Christina's 
confessions about her loss of self, her own memories, and stories from the media 
that shape and control her and other peoples' lives. 
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She is helped in this by the publicity she gets in the papers, after her 
excursion into the jungle with Sellamma. She hopes another family-humiliating 
article in the papers will bring her father out to Sellamma's place, and perhaps the 
rest of her family. Sellamma will see them, through her memory-eyes, as her own 
family, and go, with dignity, to her final rest. 
Once again events don't happen as Sumitra expects, and Sellamma's place 
becomes the nooks and crannies she so glibly wrote about in a brief statement to 
the DH. Christina and Aishah tum up, showing, respectively, their fear and 
scepticism. Then Nathan appears, and Sumitra doesn't anymore see him as a 
threatening figure, only as someone who has been really concerned about her. 
And most unexpectedly, her mother arrives by herself in a taxi. 
Her mother's account of her life with Jan, the midwife, when she ran away 
from home to continue her schooling reveals, horrifyingly, how insensitive 
Sumitra has been to her own mother's moods and withdrawals. But her 
appearance also allows Sumitra to really recreate Sellamma's past for her. 
When her father finally comes, self-righteous and indignant, she puts him 
through the remembrance ritual she herself went through at Sellamma's hands. 
Her father at first resists, then working with the DH (suggested indirectly), he 
tries to be Sellamma's father, and persuades Sumitra ' s brothers to play along as 
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Sellamma's brothers. Sumitra's mother steps in now, and makes Sumitra' s father 
and her brothers see how wrong they have been about her so-called unstable 
behaviour. In the final ritual, Sellamma feels touched and reassured by her 
reunion with her surrogate family. Sumitra's mother only comes into her own 
after she puts her mother-in-law through a ritual of humiliation. 
When on her death bed, Sellamma bequeaths Sumitra her land, she doesn't 
know what to do with it, until the condominium-and-theme-park developer arrives 
and razes the other houses in the settlement. She now realizes that Sellamma' s 
land is, in a symbolic way, her country, and that, as Sellamma used to say, life 
can't be traded for anything, not for a secure, comfortable existence or for wealth. 
Between Lives now becomes a confrontation between the newly-emerged 
Sumitra and the SRD, or the powers-that-be. The developer, its representative, 
tries scare tactics on her: he demonstrates the ruthless destructiveness of the 
bulldozer and makes his workers hurl mud and stone missiles at her house. But 
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Sumitra resists him by building fences around her property. 
Her mother who has gone back returns with her father. He strengthens the 
fences and installs a generator. This is his way of making up for betraying his 
family, and also himself. But the developer, now incensed, puts, the powers-that-
be supporting him behind the scenes, an advertisement in the newspapers. This 
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advertisement is meant to drive home, terrifyingly, the message that Sumitra ' s 
defiance can become racial and lead to national chaos. 
Sumitra, now realizing that the others must know what she really feels , 
shows Christina and Aishah the notebooks, where she has re-written the 
alternative file into the present narrative. Christina and Aishah see it not only as 
Sumitra' s attempts to understand herself but also them, though they are not 
always positively presented, and their repressive society. 
The alternative file very much in their minds, they take a ritual ramble 
through the land meant to exorcise their resentments and suspicions for each 
other, but also to show their true attachment to the land. Aishah, though a Malay, 
has also become displaced from her country by political ambition and 
materialistic greed. After their immersion in the river, they become sisters-in-
struggle for a true homeland. They realize they can 't be silenced anymore by the 
powers-that-be. They set up a web site, the other media being denied them, and 
put in Sumitra's narrative, together with their own advertisement. They hope that 
the silent majority will one day, soon, come out in their support, so they can all 
return from their exile in their own country. 
371 
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED 
Texts for Special Study 
Maniam, K.S. 1984. The Climb to Nowhere. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 
July, 30-1. 
---. 1986. Language in a Melting Pot. South, December, 110-1. 
---. 1987. Fiction into Fact, Fact into Fiction: A Personal Reflection. In The 
Writer's Sense of the Past: Essays on Southeast Asian and Australasian 
Literature, edited by K. Singh. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
---. 1988. The Malaysian Novelist: Detachment or Spiritual Transcendence. 
In A Sense of Exile: Essays in the Literature of the Asia-Pacific Region, 
edited by B. Bennett. N edlands, W.A: Centre for Studies of Australian 
Literature. 
---. 1993a. In a Far Country. London: Skoob Books. 
---. 1993b. The Return. London: Skoob Books. 
---. 1994a. In Search of a Centre. Paper read at Seminar on 'Malaysian 
Writing: The Writers Speak' during the 26th Singapore International 
Festival of Books and Book Fair, 4 September 1994, at World Trade 
Centre, Singapore. 
---. 1994b. Sensuous Horizons: The Stories and the Plays . London: Skoob. 
---. 1995. Arriving . .. and Other Stories. Singapore; Kuala Lumpur: Times 
Editions. 
---. 1996. Haunting the Tiger: Contemporary Stories from Malaysia. 
London: Skoob. 
372 
---. 1997. The New Diaspora. In Globalisation and Regional Communities: 
Geoeconomic, Sociocultural and Security Implications for Australia, 
edited by D. H. McMillen. Toowomba: USQ Press. 
---. 1998. Synopsis of Delayed Passage. Unpublished. 
---. 2000. Another Awakening. World Literature Today 74 (2):283-284. 
---. 2002. Synopsis of Between Lives. Unpublished 
Okri, Ben. 1989. Stars of a New Curfew. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Original 
edition, 1988. 
---. 1990. Redreaming the World: An Essay for Chinua Achebe. Guardian on 
CD-ROM, 9 August. 
---. 1992a. An African Elegy. London: Jonathan Cape. 
---. 1992b. The Famished Road. London: Vintage. Original edition, 1991. 
---. 1992c. Flowers and Shadows. Harlow: Longman. Original edition, 1989. 
---. 1992d. Plea for Somalia. Guardian on CD-ROM, 3 September. 
---. 1993. A Prayer From the Living. Guardian on CD-ROM, 11 September. 
---. 1994a. The Catastrophe now Facing Nigeria. Guardian on CD-ROM, 6 
September. 
---. 1994b. Songs of Enchantment. London: Vintage. Original edition, 1993. 
---. 1995a. Astonishing the Gods. London: Phoenix House. 
---. 1995b. Time to Dream the Best Dream of All. Guardian on CD-ROM, 7 
January. 
---. 1996a. Birds of Heaven. London: Phoenix. 
---. 1996b. Dangerous Love. London: Phoenix House. 
---. 1997a. A Moment of Timelessness: A Lecture. Scotsman Online [cited 26 
August 1997]. Available from http: //www.scotsman.com. 
373 
---. 1997b. A Way of Being Free. London: Phoenix House. 
---. 1998. Infinite Riches. London: Phoenix House . 
. 1999a. The Awakening Age. On The Line [cited 26 December 1999]. 
Available from http: //www.ontheline.org.uk/action/benolai.htm. 
---. 1999b. Mental Fight: An Anti-Spell for the 21st Century. London: 
Phoenix House. 
---. 1999c. Soul of the Nation: A Poem. Guardian (UK) [cited 20 January 
1999]. Available from 
http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/ Archive/ Article/0,4273 ,3810187 ,00. 
html. 
Other Works Consulted 
Abati, Reuben. 1999. Exit, Voice and the Nigerian Military [cited 11 July 1999]. 
Available from http: //www.kilima.com/abati/military.html. 
Abdul Hamid Ahmad Sarji, ed. 1993. Malaysia's Vision 2020: Understanding the 
Concept, Implications and Challenges. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk 
Publications. 
Abiandu, Chukwudi, Oma Djebah, and Layiwola Adeniyi. 1999. Blueprint for 
National Healing, by Soyinka. Guardian (Lagos) [cited 30 April 1999]. 
Available from http: //www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/nn747402.htm. 
Abimbola, Wande. 1994. Ifa: A West African Cosmological System. In Religion 
in Africa: Experience and Expression, edited by T. D. Blakely, W. E. A. v. 
Beek and D. L. Thomson. London; Portsmouth, N.H: James Currey; 
Heinemann. 
Achebe, Chinua. 1984. The Trouble with Nigeria. Oxford: Heinemann. 
---. 1988. Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays 1965-1987. London: 
Heinemann. 
374 
Achebe, Chinwe. 1986. The World of the Ogbanje. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth 
Dimension Publishing. 
Adil, Alev. 1995. More Narnian than Olympian (Review of Astonishing The 
Gods). TLS, 10 March, 23. 
Adorno, T.W.; Horkheimer, Max. 1979. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated 
by J. Cummings. London: Verso. 
African Statesmen. 1969. Towards a New Nigeria. Lagos: Committee of Ten. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1993. The Coming Community. Translated by M. Hardt. 
Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. 
---. 1999. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Translated by D. 
Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Aina, Wale Akin. 1999. Human Rights. Newswatch (Lagos), 11 October, 26-7. 
Aizenberg, Edna. 1995. The Famished Road: Magical Realism and the Search for 
Social Equity. Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature 43 :25-30. 
---. 1999. 'I Walked with a Zombie': The Pleasures and Perils of Postcolonial 
Hybridity. World Literature Today 73 (3: Summer): 461-466. 
Akinnaso, F. Niyi. 1989. One Nation, Four Hundred Languages: Unity and 
Diversity in Nigeria's Language Policy" Language Problems and 
Language Planning 13 (2): 133-146. 
---. 1991. Toward the Development of a Multilingual Language Policy in 
Nige1ia. Applied Linguistics 12 (1): 29-61. 
Albrow, Martin. 1997. The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Alcorn, Marshall W., Jr. 1994. The Subject of Discourse: Reading Lacan through 
(and beyond) Poststructuralist Contexts. In Lacanian Theory of Discourse, 
edited by M. Bracher, M. W. J. Alcorn, R. J. Corthell and F. Massardier-
Kenney. New York; London: New York University Press. 
Amnesty International. 2002a. Amnesty International Report 2002: Saudi Arabia. 
[ cited 16 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/mde/saudi+arabia!Open. 
375 
---. 2002b. Amnesty International Report 2002: Sudan. [cited 16 October 
2002]. Available from 
http: //web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/afr/sudan!Open. 
A. Wahab Ali. 1976. The Role of Literature in Transmitting National Values -
Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya. 
Alter, Peter. 1994. Nationalism. London: Edward Arnold. 
Andaya, Barbara Watson, and Leonard Y. Andaya. 2001. A History of Malaysia. 
2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London; New York: Verso. 
Arasaratnam, Sinnapah. 1993. Malaysian Indians: The Formation of Incipient 
Society. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sadhu 
and A. Mani. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Armstrong, Andrew. 2000. Speaking through the Wound: Irruption and Memory 
in the writing of Ben Okri and Festus Iyayi. Journal of African Cultural 
Studies 13 (2): 173-183. 
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. 1995. The Post-Colonial 
Studies Reader. London; New York: Routledge. 
Astill, James. 2002. Nigeria warns Miss World contestants to beware of Sharia 
law. Guardian (UK) [cited 14 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/Print/0 ,3 8 5 8, 44 799 54, 00 .html. 
Astora Jabat. 2001. ISA Menurut Rasulullah. Utusan Online (Malaysia) [cited 13 
September 2001]. 
Available from 
http: //www.utusan.com.my/utusan/content.asp?y=2001&dt=0909&pub=U 
tusan _Malaysia&sec=Bicara _Agama&pg=ba _ 01.htm. 
Austen, Ralph A. 1993. 'Afiicanist' Historiography and its Critics: Can there be an 
autonomous African history? In Af rican Historiography : Essays in honour 
of Jacob Ade Ajayi, edited by T. Falola. Harlow, Essex; Ikeja, Nigeria: 
Longman. 
A dele EA 1979. Nigerian Historical Studies . London; Totowa, NJ: Frank yan , .. 
Cass. 
376 
Ayerza, Josefina. 1994. 'It doesn't have to be a Jew': Slavoj Zii ek interviewed by 
Josefina Ayerza [ cited 31 December 1999]. Available from 
http: //www.lacan.com/perfume/Zizekinter.htm. 
Ayida, Allison A. 1990. Rise and Fall of Nigeria. Lagos: Malthouse Press. 
Ayoade, I.A.A. 1997. Nigeria and the Squandering of Hope: An Inaugural 
Lecture. Ibadan: University of Ibadan. 
Badiou, Alain. 2001. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. Translated 
by P. Hallward. London; New York: Verso. 
Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa. 1964. Nigeria Speaks: Speeches made between 1957 
and 1964. Ikeja; Enugu; Benin: Longmans of Nigeria. 
Bardolphe, Jacqueline. 1992. Azaro, Saleem and Askar: Brothers in Allegory. 
Commonwealth: Essays and Studies 15 (1 ): 45-51. 
Barthes, Roland. 1997. The Discourse of History. In The Postmodern History 
Reader, edited by K. Jenkins. London; New York: Routledge. 
Bascom, William. 1993. Sixteen Cowries: Yoruba Divination from Africa to the 
New World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bell, Sir Gawain. 1989. An Imperial Twilight. London: Lester Crook Academic 
Publishing. 
Bemama. 1998. Malaysians of Various Races Live in Peace. Malaysian National 
News Agency [ cited 6 September 1998]. Available from 
http://www.bemama.com. 
---. 2001. Mahathir Chokes with Emotions as he delivers Poem on Malays. 
Malaysian News Agency [cited 23 June 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.bemama.com. 
Blishen Edward. 1988. Ben Okri with Edward Blishen. London: ICA. Video 
' Recording. 
Boo, Cheng Hau. 1998. Quotas versus Affirmative Action: A Malaysian 
Perspective. Kuala Lumpur: Orientgroup. 
Booth, James. 1981. Writers and Politics in Nigeria. New York: Africana 
Publishing Company. 
377 
Bowman, Paul. 1999. Politics, Polemics and Academics: An Interview [ with 
Ernesto Laclau]. Parallax 5 (2): 93-107. 
Boylan, Clare. 1991. Writers at Work: An Ear for the Inner Conversation. 
Guardian on CD-ROM, 3 October. 
Brennan, Timothy. 1993. The National Longing for Form. In Nation and 
Narration, edited by H. K. Bhabha. London; New York: Routledge. 
Brewster, Anne. 1988. Linguistic Boundaries: K.S. Maniam's The Return. In A 
Sense of Exile: Essays in the Literature of the Asia-Pacific Region, edited 
by B. Bennett. Nedlands, W.A.: Centre for Studies of Australian 
Literature. 
Brown, David. 1998. Why is the Nation-State so Vulnerable to Ethnic 
Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism 4 (1): 1-15. 
Brubaker, Rogers. 1998. Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism. 
In The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, 
edited by J. A. Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buckley, David. 1995. Full Diddly Delirium. Observer on CD-ROM, 16 April. 
Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek. 2000. Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London; New York: 
Verso. 
Caldwell, Sarah. 1999. The Bloodthirsty Tongue and the Self-Feeding Breast: 
Homosexual Fellatio Fantasy in a South Indian Ritual Tradition. In Vishnu 
on Freud's Desk: A Reader in Psychoanalysis and Hinduism, edited by T. 
G. Vaidyanathan and J. J. Kripal. Delhi; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Canavan, Margaret. 1996. Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham; 
Brookfield: Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd. 
Carey-Webb, Allen. 1998. Making Subject(s): Literature and the Emergence of 
National Identity. New York; London: Garland Publishing. 
Carstairs, G.M. 1999. Hindu Personality Formation: Unconscious Processes. In 
Vishnu on Freud's Desk: A Reader in Psychoanalysis and Hinduism , 
edited by T. G. Vaidyanathan and J. J. Kripal. Delhi; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
378 
Case, William. 1995. Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences in Legitimacy. In 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, 
edited by M. Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
---. 1996. Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational 
Democracy . Clayton: Monash Asia Institute. 
---. 1999. Politics Beyond Anwar: What's New? Asian Journal of Political 
Science 7 (1): 1-19. 
Cezair-Thompson, Margaret. 1996. Beyond the Postcolonial Novel: Ben Obi's 
The Famished Road and its 'Abiku' Traveller. JCL 31 (2): 33-45. 
Chabal, Patrick. 1996. The African Crisis: Context and Interpretation. In 
Postcolonial Identities in Africa, edited by R. R. Werbner, Terence. 
London; New Jersey: Zed Books. 
Chanady, Amaryll Beatrice. 1985. Magical Realism and the Fantastic: Resolved 
Versus Unresolved Antinomy . New York; London: Garland Publishing. 
Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. London: 
Zed Books. 
---. 1993. The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
---. 1996. Whose Imagined Community? In Mapping the Nation, edited by 
G. Balakrishnan. London: Verso. 
Cheah, Boon Kheng. 1996. Writing Indigenous History in Malaysia: A Survey on 
Approaches and Problems. Crossroads l O (2): 33-81. 
Chen, May Yee. 1993. Malaysian Literature in English. Wings of Gold, October, 
40-4. 
Childs, Peter, and Patrick Williams. 1997. An Introduction to Post-Colonial 
Theory . He1ifordshire: Prentice Hall. 
Chong, Raymond. 2002. Media Statement dated 27 August 2002. DAP [cited 15 
October 2002]. Available from http: //malaysia.net/dap/bul 17112.htm. 
Clark, J.P. 1967. 'Abiku'. In West African Verse: An Anthology, edited by D. I. 
Nwonga. London: Longman. 
379 
Coleman, James S. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Collins, Alan. 1998. The Ethnic Security Dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 20 (3): 261-278. 
Comber, Leon. 1983. 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations. 
Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia. 
Cooper, Brenda. 1998. Magical Realism in West African Fiction: Seeing with a 
Third Eye. London; New York: Routledge. 
---. 1999. Snapshots of Postcolonial Masculinities: Alan Hollinghurst's The 
Swimming Pool Library and Ben Okri's The Famished Road. JCL 34 (1): 
135-157. 
CPJ. 2001. CPJ Names 10 Enemies of the Press on World Press Freedom Day. 
Committee to Protect Journalists [cited 6 June 2001]. Available from 
http://www.cpj.org/enemies/enemies _ O l .html. 
Cribb, T.J. 1992. Transformations in the Fiction of Ben Okri. In From 
Commonwealth to Post-colonial, edited by A. Rutherford. Sydney: 
Dangaroo Press. 
---. 1999. In the Shadow of Language: from Joyce to Okri. In Imagined 
Commonwealths: Cambridge Essays on Commonwealth and International 
Literature in English, edited by T. J. Cribb. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
Crick, Malcolm. 1997. Entangled Lives and Meanings: Colonialism and its 
Cultural Legacy. In Global Forces, Local Realities: Anthropological 
Perspectives on Change in the Third World, edited by B. Geddes and M. 
Crick. Geelong: Deakin University Press. 
Critchley, Simon. 1998. Das Ding: Lacan and Levinas [cited 19 July 2001]. 
Available fron1 
http: / /www.helsinki.fi/~rpol_ bas/vol 1/vol 1 nr2/simonc.htm. 
Crouch, Harold. 1996. Government and Society in Malaysia. Ithaca; London: 
Cornell University Press. 
Crowder, Michael. 1973. The Story of Nigeria. 3rd ed. London: Faber and Faber. 
380 
Daly, Glyn. 1999. Politics and the Impossible: Beyond Psychoanalysis and 
Deconstruction. Theory, Culture & Society 16 (4): 75-98. 
Darby, Philip. 1998. The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading between International 
Relations and Postcolonialism. London; Washington: Cassell. 
Das, K. 1987. Malay Dominance? The Abdullah Rubric. Kuala Lumpur: K. Das 
Ink. 
Davidson, Basil. 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the 
Nation-State. New York: Times Books. 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1989. Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty. New York: Zone 
Books. 
Departments of State and Public Institutions, and Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation. 1969. Voices of unity (Twenty newstalks broadcast over 
Radio Nigeria.). Lagos: Departments of State and Public Institutions; 
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Dews, Peter. 1995. The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary 
European Philosophy . London; New York: Verso. 
Diamond, Larry. 1988. Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure 
of the First Republic. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
Dick, Bernard F. 1998. Anatomy of Film. 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Dickey, Sara. 1993. Cinema and the Urban Poor in South India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
---. 1995. Consuming Utopia: Film Watching in Tamil Nadu. In Consuming 
Modernity: Public Cultures in a South Asian World, edited by C. A. 
Breckenridge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Dienstag, Joshua Foa. 1997. 'Dancing in Chains': Narrative and Memory zn 
Political Theory. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Dombrowski, Peter. 1998. Fragmenting Identities, Shifting Loyalties: The 
Influence of Individualisation on Global Transformations. Global Society 
12 (3): 363-388. 
381 
Dumarcay, Jacques, and Michael Smithies. 1998. Cultural Sites of Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Efeizomor, Victor. 2002. Amina Lawal: Soy inka calls for Sanctions on Sharia 
States. Liberian Orbit [cited 15 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //www.liberiaorbit.org/wolesharia.htm. 
Eguzozie, Ben. 1999. Obasanjo Urged to End Igbo Marginalisation. P.M. News 
(Lagos) [ cited 5 March 1999]. Available from 
http: //www.africanews.org/west/nigeria/stories/ 19990305 _ feat7.htm1. 
Elegant, Simon. 2000. Big Daddy (20 April 2000). Far Eastern Economic Review 
[cited 13 January 2002]. Available from 
http://www.f eer .com/ articles/2000/0004 _ 20/p29malaysiaregion.html. 
Elliot, Anthony. 1992. Social Theory and Psychoanalysis in Transition: Self and 
Society from Freud to Kristeva. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Emeagwali, Philip. 2000. Sharia Crisis in Nigeria. emeagwali.com [ cited 15 
October 2002]. Available from 
http://emeagwali.com/interviews/sharia/crisis-in-nigeria.html. 
Evans, Dylan. 1998. From Kantian Ethics to Mystical Experience: An Exploration 
of Jouissance. In Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, edited by D. 
Nobus. London: Rebus Press. 
Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi, ed. 1997. Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical 
Reader. Cambridge, MA; Oxford: Blackwell. 
Fachinelli, Elvio. 1996. Lacan and the Thing (I). Journal of European 
Psychoanalysis (Online) 3-4 (Spring 1996 - Winter 1997). 
Falconer, Delia. 1997. Whispering of the Gods: An Interview with Ben Okri. 
Island 71 (Winter): 43-51. 
Fanon, Franz. 1990. The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Original edition, 1967. 
Farah, Nuruddin. 1996. Savaging the Soul of a Nation. In The Writer in Politics, 
edited by W. H. Gass and L. Cuoco. Carbondale; Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
382 
Faris, Stephen. 2002. Religion and Justice in Nigeria. motherjones.com [cited 14 
October 2002]. Available from 
http://www.motherjones.com/web _ exclusives/features/news/nigeria _islam 
.html. 
Faris, Wendy B. 1995. Scheherazade's Children: Magical Realism and 
Postmodern Fiction. In Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community, 
edited by L. P. Zamora and W. B. Faris. Durham; London: Duke 
University Press. 
Federal Information Service. 1957. Nigeria Debates Independence: The Debate 
on Self-Government in the Federal House of Representatives on 26 March 
1957 as Recorded in the Official Report. Lagos: Federal Information 
Service. 
Federal Ministry of Information. 1967a. The Struggle for One Nigeria. Lagos: 
Federal Ministry of Information. 
---. 1967b. Towards One Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information. 
Feldner, Yotam. 2001. Inquiry and Analysis No. 74: Jihad and Terrorism Studies. 
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) [ cited 22 November 
2001]. Available from http: //www.memri.org/ia/IA7401.html. 
Fink, Bruce. 1995. The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
---. 1997. A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Cambridge, 
Mass.; London: Harvard University Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
Translated by A. Sheridan. London: Allen Lane. 
---. 1997. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In The Postmodern History 
Reader, edited by K. Jenkins. London; New York: Routledge. 
Fouce, Paula, and Denise Tomecko. 1996. Shiva. Bangkok: White Orchid Press. 
Fraser, Robert. 2002. Ben Okri: Towards the Invisible City. Tavistock, Devon: 
Northcote House Publishers. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1961. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Translated by J. Strachey. 
London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis. 
383 
Fuery, Patrick. 1995. Theories of Desire. Carlton: Melbourne University Press. 
---. 2000. New Developments in Film Theory. Basingstoke; London: 
Macmillan Press. 
Funston, John. 2001. Malaysia: Developmental State Challenged. In Government 
and Politics in Southeast Asia, edited by J. Funston. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 
Gass, William H. 1996. The Writer in Politics. Carbondale; Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
Geddes, Bill. 1997. Third World Nations: Global Demands, Local Political 
Realities. In Global Forces, Local Realities: Anthropological Perspectives 
on Change in the Third World, edited by B. Geddes and M. Crick. 
Geelong: Deakin University Press. 
Gellner, Ernest. 1988. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
---. 1997. Nationalism. New York: New York University Press. 
Ghani, Yusof. 2002. Prepare to suffer same fate as Suqiu, Chinese education 
movement told. malaysiakini.com [ cited 21 June 2002]. Available from 
http: //www.malaysiakini.com/news/20020621001611 0.php. 
Gibson, Michael. 1988. The Symbolists. New York: HarryN. Abrams. 
Gomez, Edmund Terence, and K.S. Jomo. 1999. Malaysia's Political Economy: 
Politics, Patronage and Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodwin, Barbara. 1997. Using Political Ideas. 4th ed. Sussex: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Graf, William D. 1988. The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State Class and 
Political Systems in the Post-Colonial Era. London: James Currey. 
Green, F.L. 1948. Odd Man Out. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Greet, Annie. 1991. An Interview with K.S. Maniam at the Flinders University of 
South Australia. CRNLE Reviews Journal 1991 (1): 1-11. 
Griffiths, Gareth. 1997. Islands of Community: Autobiographical Accounts of 
Indian Displaced Communities - Subject, Community and Nation. In The 
384 
Contact and the Culmination: Essays in Honour of Hena Maes-Jelinek, 
edited by M. Delrez and B. Ledent. Liege, Belgium: L3 - Liege Language 
and Literature. 
Griffiths, Ieuan LI. 1995. The African Inheritance. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Grigg, Russell. 1998. From the Mechanism of Psychosis to the Universal 
Condition of the Symptom: On Foreclosure. In Key Concepts of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis, edited by D. Nobus. London: Rebus Press. 
Guibemau, Montserrat. 1996. Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in 
the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gutmair, Ulrich, and Chris Flor. 1998. Hysteria and Cyberspace: Interview with 
Slavoj Ziiek [cited 14 January 1999]. Available from 
http: //www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/2492/1.html. 
Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflection on the 
African Experience. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, John A., ed. 1998. The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory 
of Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hall, Stuart. 1992. The Question of Cultural Identity. In Modernity and its 
Futures, edited by S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Hammond, Andrew. 2002. Peace and War: Islam Could Divide Sudan. East 
African Standard (Kenya) [ cited 16 October 2002]. 
Available from 
http: //www.eastandard.net/wednesday/eahome/story04092002006.htm. 
Hanlon, Christopher. 2001. Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview 
with Slavoj Zizek. New Literary History 32 (1): 1-21. 
Haridas, Anand, and R. Dhandayudham, eds. 1981. The Interior Landscape of the 
Heart: Tamil Poetry from Malaysia and Singapore. Calcutta: Writers 
Workshop. 
Hatch, John. 1971. Nigeria: A History. London: Secker and Warburg. 
385 
Hattersley, Roy. 1999. Ben Okri: A Man in Two Minds. Guardian (UK) [cited 21 
August 1999]. Available from http: //www.guardianunlimited.co.uk. 
Hawley, John C. 1995. Ben Okri's Spirit-Child: Abiku Migration and 
Postmodernity. Research in African Literatures 26 (Spring): 30-39. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hemminger, Bill. 2001. The Way of the Spirit. Research in African Literatures 32 
(Spring): 66-82. 
Henry, Wilson. 1996. Filling in the Blanks. Sun Magazine (Malaysia), 3 May, 6. 
Hindess, Ban·y. 1996. Discourse of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford; 
Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. 
Holton, Robert J. 1998. Globalization and the Nation-State. Houndmills; 
Basingstoke; Hampshire: Macmillan Press. 
Hooker, Virginia Matheson. 2000. Writing a New Society. St. Leonard's, NSW: 
Allen and Unwin. 
Horton, John, and Andrea T Baumeister, eds. 1996. Literature and the Political 
Imagination. London; New York: Routledge. 
Hughes, Glyn. 1991. The Famished Land. Guardian on CD-ROM, 21 March. 
Human Rights Watch. 2001. World Report: Malaysia. Human Rights Watch 
[ cited 8 December 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.hrw.org/wr2k1 /asia/malaysia.html. 
Idowu, E. Bolanji. 1973. African Traditional Religion: A Definition. London: 
S.C.M. Press. 
INSAN. 1989. Sucked Oranges: The Indian Poor in Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: 
Institute of Social Analysis, Malaysia. 
International Bar Association, Centre for the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers of the International Commission of Jurists, Commonwealth 
Lawyers' Association, and Union Internationale des Advocats. 2000. 
Justice in Jeopardy . International Bar Association [cited 12 October 
2001]. Available from http: //www.ibanet.org/pdf/malaysia.pdf. 
386 
Irukwu, J.O. 1983. Nigeria at the Crossroads: A Nation in Transition. London: 
Witherby & Co Ltd. 
Isichei, Elizabeth. 1983. A History of Nigeria. London; Lagos; New York: 
Longman. 
Jaggi, Maya. 1996. Scumscape Vituoso (sic). Guardian on CD-ROM, 5 April 
1996. 
Jameson, Fredric. 1988. The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986 (Volume 2: 
The Syntax of History). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
---. 2002. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
Jefiyo, Biodun. 1988. Ben Okri. In Perspectives on Nigerian Literature: 1700 to 
the Present (Volume 2), edited by Y. Ogunbiyi. Lagos: Guardian Books 
Nigeria. 
Jenkins, Richard. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. 
London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Jesudason, James V. 1996. The Syncretic State and the Structuring of 
Oppositional Politics in Malaysia. In Political Oppositions in 
Industrialising Asia, edited by G. Rodan. London; New York: Routledge. 
Jewsiewicki, Bogumil, and David Newbury, eds. 1986. African Historiographies: 
What History for which Africa? Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Joseph, Richard A. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise 
and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jowitt, David. 1996. Review of Ben Okri's Dangerous Love. Wasafiri 24 
(Autumn): 62-63. 
Kakar, Sudhir. 1981. The Inner World: A Psycho-analytic Study of Childhood and 
Society in India. Delhi; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kavuri, Santhi. 1998. Ritual Do,nestic Threshold Drawings of South India: A 
Visual Trope of the Socialised Hindu Feminine. Iconomania: Studies in 
Visual Culture [ cited 9 May 2000]. Available from 
http: //www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/arthist/icono/kavuri/kolam.htm. 
387 
Kedourie, Elie. 1993. Nationalism. 4th ed. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Kellner, Hans. 1997. Language and Historical Representation. In The Postmodern 
History Reader, edited by K. Jenkins. London; New York: Routledge. 
Khoo, Eddin. 1996. Straying to the Path Less Taken. Star (Malaysia), 3 March, 
18-9. 
Khoo, Kay Kim. 1993. Malay Attitudes towards Indians. In Indian Communities 
in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sadhu and A. Mani. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press. 
Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. 1968. Introduction. In Lugard and the Amalgation of 
Nigeria: A Documentary Record. London: Frank Cass & Co. 
---. 1971. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-
1969. London: Oxford University Press. 
Kojeve, Alexandre. 1969. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Translated by J. 
H. Nichols. New York; London: Basic Books. 
Kristeva, Julia. 1991. Strangers to Ourselves. Translated by L. S. Roudiez. New 
York; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Krutnik, Frank. 1991. In a Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, Masculinity. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Kua, Kia Soong, ed. 1985. National Culture and Democracy. Petaling Jaya: 
Kersani Penerbit-Penerbit Sdn Bhd. 
Kurtz, Stanley N. 1992. All The Mothers are One: Hindu India and the Cultural 
Reshaping of Psychoanalysis. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Lacan, Jacques. 1988. Freud's Papers on Techniques 1953-1954 (The Seminars of 
Jacques Lacan: Book 1). Edited by J.-A. Miller. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
---. 1989. Kant with Sade. October 51: 55-75. 
---. 1990. Television. Translated by J. Copjec. New York: Norton. 
---. 1992. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960 (The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan Book VII). Translated by D. Porter. London: Routledge. 
388 
---. 1998. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: 
Vintage. Original edition, 1973. 
---. 2001. Ecrits: A Selection. London; New York: Routledge. 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1989. Preface. In The Sublime Object of Ideology, by S. Zizek. 
London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1990. New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. London; New 
York: Verso. 
---. 1991. Community and its Paradoxes: Richard Rorty's "Liberal Utopia". 
In Community at Loose Ends, edited by T. M. T. Collective. Minneapolis; 
Oxford, Ohio: University of Minnesota Press. 
---. 1993. Discourse. In A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, 
edited by R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Basil 
Blackwell. 
---. 1996a. Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony. In Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism: Critchley, Derrida, Laclau, Rorty, edited by C. Mouffe. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
- - -. 1996b. Power and Representation. In Emancipation(s) , by E. Laclau. 
London: Verso. 
---. 1996c. Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject. In Emancipation(s), by 
E. Laclau. London: Verso. 
- - - . 1996d. Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity. In 
Emancipation(s), by E. Laclau. London: Verso. 
---. 1996e. Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics? In Emancipation(s), 
by E. Laclau. London: Verso. 
---. 1997. The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology. MLN 
112.3: 297-321. 
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
389 
Lang Bulan. 1995. Fictional Landscapes that Reflect Reality (Review of Haunting 
the Tiger: Contemporary Stories from Malaysia). New Straits Times, 8 
November, 6. 
Lawson, Stephanie. 1995. The Authentic State: History and Tradition in the 
Ideology of Ethnonationalism. In The State in Transition: Reimagining 
Political Space, edited by J. A. Camilleri, A. P. Jarvis and A. J. Paolini. 
Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Lawson, Thomas. 1984. Religions of Africa. New York: Harper and Row. 
Lee, Kam Hing. 1981. Malaya: New State and Old Elites. In Asia: The Winning of 
Independence, edited by R. Jeffrey. London; Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Lee, Kit. 1987. Introduction: Big Brother Lives. In 1984 Here and Now, by K. T. 
Chye. Petaling Jaya: K.Das Ink. 
Lee, Kuan Yew. 1965a. Are There Enough Malaysians to Save Malaysia? 
Singapore: Ministry of Culture Publication. 
---. 1965b. The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia. Singapore: Ministry of 
Culture Publication. 
---. 1998. The Singapore Story : Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: 
Times Editions. 
Levin, Michael D. 1997. The New Nigeria: Displacement and the Nation. Journal 
of Asian and African Studies 32 (1-2): 134-144. 
Lily Zubaidah Rahim. 1998. In Search of the 'Asian Way': Cultural Nationalism 
in Singapore and Malaysia. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 36 
(3): 54-73. 
Lim, Chong Lim. 1996. Redreaming the World: Multidimensional Reality in 
Selected Works of Ben Okri. M.A., Department of English, University of 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. 
---. 1999a. Interview With K.S. Maniam (September 1999, Kuala Lumpur): 
Unpublished. 
Lim, Chong Lim. 1997a. Haunting K.S. Maniam: What's Eating Malaysia's 
Leading Literary Figure. Journal One, January, 72-4. 
390 
Lim, Kit Siang. 1997b. Transcript of Speech made in Penang on 3 January 1997. 
DAP [ cited 7 July 1999]. Available from 
http: / /www.malaysia.net/dap/sg21 0.htm. 
--- . 1998. Political and Economic Crisis zn Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: 
Democratic Action Party. 
--- . 1999b. Call on Mahathir to keep faith with the non-Malay non-Muslim 
voters. DAP [ cited 2 February 2000]. Available from 
http://www.malaysia.net/ dap/sg2134.htm. 
---. 1999c. Media Statement, dated 30 November 1999. DAP [cited 30 
November 1999]. Available from http: //malaysia.net/dap. 
---. 2000. Talk on "Chinese or Malaysian Identity? Issues and Challenges" 
at the Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora (CSCSD ), 
Australian National University, Canberra. DAP. Available from 
http: //www.malaysia.net/dap/lks0334.htm. 
---. 2001. Malaysia an Islamic state for 44 years without anybody knowing 
about it? DAP [cited 1 December 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.malaysia.net/dap/lks1282.htm. 
---. 2002a. Media Statement on PAS' Syariah Criminal Offences Bill, dated 
JO July 2002. DAP [cited 15 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //malaysia.net/dap/lksl 715.htm. 
---. 2002b. Media Statement on the Second Phase of "No to 911, No to 929, 
Yes to 1957" People's Awareness Campaign, dated 13 July 2002. DAP 
[ cited 15 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //malaysia.net/dap/lks 1723 .htm. 
--- . 2002c. Media Statement on the Second Phase of "No to 911, No to 929, 
Yes to 1957" People's Awareness Campaign, dated 14 July 2002. DAP 
[cited 15 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //malaysia.net/dap/lks 1726.htm. 
Lim, Shirley. 1984. Gods Who Fail: Ancestral Religion in the New Literatures in 
English fron1 Malaysia and Singapore. Commonwealth Novel in English 3 
(1): 39-55. 
---. 1986. Voices Beyond the Pale. South, December, 111. 
391 
Linton, Martin. 1991. Dreams of Utopia on Road to Reform. Guardian on CD-
ROM, 4 November. 
Liu, Ronnie Tian Khiew. 2002. Media Statement on Malaysia and the Issue of 
Islamic State. DAP [ cited 15 October 2002]. Available from 
http: //malaysia.net/dap/bull 748. 
Lloyd, P.C. 1970. The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis. In Nigerian 
Politics and Military Rule, edited by S. K. Panter-Brick. London: Athlone 
Press. 
Lo, Jacqueline. 1995. The Politics and Practice of Opposition and Resistance in 
Singaporean and Malaysian Drama in English. PhD, Department of 
English, University of Western Australia, Perth. 
- - -. 1999. Return of the 'Native' in K.S. Maniam's The Cord. In 
(Post)Colonial Stages: Critical and Creative Views on Drama, Theatre 
and Performance, edited by H. Gilbert. Hebden Bridge, West Yorkshire: 
Dangaroo Press. 
Loomba, Ania. 1998. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Loone, Susan. 2001. Booklet tells how to criticise government 'The Islamic Way'. 
Malaysiakini.com [cited 26 November 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.malaysiakini.com/News/2001 / 11 /2001112608.php3. 
Lovink, Geert. 1996. Civil Society, Fanaticism, and Digital Reality: A 
Conversation with Slavoj Zizek. CTheory [cited 14 January 2000]. 
Available from http: //www.ctheory.com/a37-society_fan.html. 
Lowith, Karl. 1997. Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same. Translated by J. H. Lomax. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: 
University of California Press. 
Luke, Timothy W. 1995. The Times and Spaces of Modernity (or Who Needs 
Post-Modernism? In Global Modernities, edited by M. Featherstone, S. 
Lash and R. Robertson. London; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Mahathir Mohamad. 1970. The Jvfalay Dilemma. Singapore: Asia Pacific Press. 
392 
---. 1998a. The Challenges of Turmoil: Speech delivered at the 1998 UMNO 
General Assembly. Star Online [ cited 19 June 1998]. Available from 
http: //www.thestar.com.my/saturday/20speech.htm1. 
---. 1998b. The Way Forward. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Malay Mail. 2002. Students sad to see him leave too. Malay Mail, 26 June, 5. 
Majstorovic, Steve. 1997. The Politics of Ethnicity and Post-Cold War Malaysia: 
The Dynamics of an Ethnic State. In The Rise of East Asia: Critical 
Visions of the Pacific Century, edited by M. T. Berger and D. A. Borer. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
Makang, Jean-Marie. 1997. Of the Good Use of Tradition: Keeping the Critical 
Perspective in African Philosophy. In Postcolonial African Philosophy: A 
Critical Reader, edited by E. C. Eze. Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Mamadu, Ayo. 1991. Portrait of a Young Artist in Ben Okri's The Landscapes 
Within. Commonwealth: Essays and Studies 13 (2): 85-91. 
Mansfield, Nick. 2000. Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway. 
New York: New York University Press. 
Marimuthu, T. 1993. The Plantation School as an Agent of Social Reproduction. 
In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sadhu and A. 
Mani. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Markovitz, Irving Leonard. 1969. Leopold Sedar Senghor and the Politics of 
Negritude. London: Heinemann Educational. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1996. The Communist Manifesto. London: 
Phoenix. 
Mauzy, Diane. 1993. Malaysia: Malay Political Hegemony and 'Coercive 
Consociationalism'. In The Politics of Conflict Regulation, edited by J. 
McGarry and B. O'Leary. London; New York: Routledge. 
Mazrui, Ali A., and Michael Tidy. 1984. Nationalism and New States in Africa 
from about 1934 to the present. Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books. 
McGrew, Anthony G. 1998. The Globalisation Debate: Putting the Advanced 
Capitalist State in its Place. Global Society 12 (3): 363-388. 
393 
Mead, Richard. 1988. Malaysia's National Language Policy and the Legal 
System. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies. 
Mehmet, Ozay. 1986. Development in Malaysia. London; Sydney; Dover: Croom 
Helm. 
Memmi, Albert. 1965. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Translated by H. 
Greenfield. New York: Orion Press. 
Miller, Jacques-Alain. 1990. Microscopia: An Introduction to the Reading of 
Television. In Television, by J. Lacan. New York; London: W.W. Norton 
& Company. 
Milner, Anthony. 1995. The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting 
Nationalism and the Expansion of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
- --. 1998. Ideological Work in Constructing the Malay Majority. In Making 
Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, 
Fiji, Turkey and the United States, edited by D. C. Gladney. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Minsky, Rosalind. 1998. Psychoanalysis and Culture: Contemporary States of 
Mind. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mishra, Vijay. 1999. Mourning Becomes Diaspora. In Impossible Selves: Cultural 
Readings of Identity, edited by J. Lo, D. Beard, R. Cunneen and D. 
Ganguly. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing. 
Mitchell, Carol Lynn. 1993. Language as an Instrument of National Policy: The 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka of Malaysia. PhD Thesis, Library and 
Information Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin. 
Moore-Gilbert, Bart. 1997. Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics. 
London; New York: Verso. 
Mohd. Taib Osman. 1988. Kebudayaan Melayu dalam beberapa Persoalan. 
Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 
Monis-Hale, Walter. 1996. Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies: An 
International Perspective. Edited by G. W. Sheldon, Major Concepts in 
Politics and Political Theory Vol. 9. New York: Peter Lang. 
394 
Mouffe, Chantal. 1992a. Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community. In 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy : Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. 
edited by C. Mouffe. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1992b. Preface: Democratic Politics Today. In Dimensions of Radical 
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, edited by C. Mouffe. 
London; New York: Verso. 
. 1993a. Introduction: For an Agonistic Pluralism. In The Return of the 
Political, by C. Mouffe. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1993b. Radical Democracy: Modem or Postmodern. In The Return of the 
Political, by C. Mouffe. London; New York: Verso. 
- --. 1993c. The Return of the Political. London; New York: Verso. 
- --. 1996. Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy. In 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Critchley, Derrida, Laclau, Rorty, 
edited by C. Mouffe. London; New York: Routledge. 
- --. 1999. Introduction: Schmitt's Challenge. In The Challenge of Carl 
Schmitt, edited by C. Mouffe. London; New York: Verso. 
Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the 
Order of Knowledge. Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press. 
Munro-Kua, Anne. 1996. Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Muzaffar, Chandra. 1993 . Political Marginalization 1n Malaysia. In Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sadhu and A. Mani. 
Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
National Operations Council. 1969. The May 13 Tragedy : A Report. Kuala 
Lumpur. 
N ederveen Pieterse, Jan, and Bhikhu Parekh. 1995. Shifting Imaginaries: 
Decolonization, Internal Decolonization, Postcoloniality. In The 
Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, Power, edited by J. 
Nederveen Pieterse and B. Parekh. London; New Jersey: Zed Books. 
395 
Neilson, Heather. 1999. The Postcolonial Child in the Fiction of K.S. Maniam and 
Lois-Ann Yamanaka. In Impossible Selves: Cultural Readings of Identity, 
edited by J. Lo, D. Beard, R. Cunneen and D. Ganguly. Melbourne: 
Australian Scholarly Publishing. 
Neumann, A. Lin. 1999. Malaysia's Press Remains Shackled. Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) [cited 27 December 1999]. Available from 
http: //www. cpj. org/Bri efings/Mala ysia/Mala ysia22nov99 .html. 
Ngugi wa Thiong'o. 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in 
African Literature. London: James Currey. 
---. 1997. Writers in Politics : A Re-engagement with Issues of Literature and 
Society. Oxford: James Currey. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1969. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No 
One. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
- --. 1974. The Gay Science. Translated by W. Kaufmann. New York: 
Vintage. 
Nkemdirin, Bernard. 197 5. Social Changes and Political Violence in Colonial 
Nigeria. Elms Court; Ilfracombe; Devon: Arthur Stockwell Ltd. 
Nnoli, Okwudiba. 1995. Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria. Aldershot; 
Brookfield: Avebury. 
Nnolim, Charles E. 1993. The Time is Out of Joint: Ben Okri as a Social Critic. 
Commonwealth Novel in English 6 (1 & 2): 61-68. 
Nobus, Dany, ed. 1998. Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: 
Rebus Press. 
No1ma Mahmood. 1994. Malaysia. In Rethinking Political Development in 
Southeast Asia, edited by N. Mahmood. Kuala Lumpur: University of 
Mala ya Press. 
Nugent, Paul. 1996. Arbitrary Lines and the People's Minds: A Dissenting View 
on Colonial Boundaries in West Africa. In African Boundaries: Barriers, 
Conduits and Opportunities, edited by P. Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju. 
London; New York: Pinter. 
396 
Nugent, Paul, and A.I. Asiwaju. 1996. Introduction: The Paradox of African 
Boundaries. In African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, 
edited by P. Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju. London; New York: Pinter. 
Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha, and Samuel Udochukwu Ifejika. 1969. The Making 
of a Nation: Biafra. London: C. Hurst & Company. 
Nwosu, Maik. 1996a. The Suns of Kush. Lagos: Malthouse Press. 
Nwosu, Nereus I. 1995. The Politics of State Creation in Nigeria. African Study 
Monographs 16 (1): 1-18. 
---. 1996b. Religion and the Crisis of National Unity in Nigeria. African 
Study Monographs 17 (3): 141-152. 
Obasanjo, Olusegun. 1981. My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 
1967-1970. London; Ibadan; Nairobi: Heinemann. 
Obasanjo, Olusegun. 2000. Text of Speech (March 1, 2000) following religious 
crisis ... in Kaduna and parts of southeastern Nigeria. nigeriaworld.com 
[ cited 14 October 2002]. Available from 
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/obasanjo sharia address.html. 
Obasanjo, Olusegun. 1999. Inaugural Speech by His Excellency, President 
Olusegun Obasanjo following his swearing-in as President of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria on May 29, 1999. www.naijaspace.com [cited 1 June 
1999]. Available from http: //naijaspace.com/publications/inaugural.html. 
Ogunsanwo, Olatubosun. 1995. Intertextuality and Post-Colonial Literature in 
Ben Okri's The Famished Road. Research in African Literatures 26 (1): 
40-52. 
Okafor, Dubem. 1998. The Dance of Death: Nigerian History and Christopher 
Okigbo's Poetry. Trenton; NJ; Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. 
Okonkwo, Rudolf. 1999. Nigeria, a Deferred Dream [ cited 3 May 1999]. 
Available from 
http: //nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/okonkwo/dream.html. 
Okunoye, Oyeniyi. 1998. Representations of the Ruling Elite in Recent Nigerian 
Poetry. In Literature, Ideology and Society: Essays in Honour of Abiola 
Irele, edited by A. Adebayo and S. Odunuga. Ibadan: AMD. 
397 
Oliva, Renato. 1999. Re-Dreaming the World: Ben Okri's Shamanic Realism. In 
Coterminous Worlds: Magical Realism and Contemporary Post-Colonial 
Literature in English, edited by E. Linguati, F. Casotti and C. Concilio. 
Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi. 
Omoruyi, Omo. 2001. Opportunity for Reflection, Not Merriment (Part 1). 
Nigeria Exchange [cited 28 December 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.ngex.com/personalities/voices/oomoruyi 102101.htm. 
Omotoso, Kole. 1993. No Poor Relation. Guardian on CD-ROM, 23 March. 
Star Online. 2001. Don't Doubt We're an Islamic Nation. Star Online [cited 29 
October 2001]. Available from 
http: //thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2001 /10/29/nation/lwidoubt&s 
ec=nation. 
Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1989. The Passage from the Past to the Present in African 
Political Thought: The Question of Relevance. In African Traditional 
Thought and Institutions, edited by J. A. A. Ayoade and A. B. Agbaje. 
Lagos: Centre for Black and African Arts. 
- --. 1991. A Re-examination of the Conception of Ethnicity in Africa as an 
Ideology of Inter-elite Competition. African Study Monographs 12 (1 ): 43-
60. 
---. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. Bloomington; 
Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
Osborne, Peter, ed. 1996. A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Osundare, Niyi. 1998. Bard of the Platform: A Personal Experience of Newspaper 
Poetry in Nigeria. In Mapping Intersections: African Literature and 
Africa's Development, edited by A. V. Adams and J. A. Mayes. Trenton, 
N.J; Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. 
Palmer, Eustace. 1998. African Literature: Its Role in Development. In Mapping 
Intersections: African Literature and Africa's Development, edited by A. 
V. Adams and J. A. Mayes. Trenton, NJ; Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World 
Press. 
398 
Palmer, Judith. 2002. Ben Okri: 'Great Art Tries to Get Us to the Place of True 
Enchantment'. Independent (UK) [ cited 20 September 2002]. Available 
from http://independent.co.uk. 
Parrinder, Geoffrey. 1969. West African Religion: A Study of the Beliefs and 
Practices of Akan, Ewe, Yoruba, Ibo and Kindred People. London: 
Epworth Press. 
Parsons, William B. 1999. Freud's Encounter with Hinduism: An Historical-
Contextual Overview. In Vishnu on Freud's Desk: A Reader in 
Psychoanalysis and Hinduism, edited by T. G. Vaidyanathan and J. J. 
Kripal. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Payne, Michael. 1993. Reading Theory: An Introduction to Lacan, Derrida, and 
Kristeva. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
PEN American Centre. 1998. Nigerian Poet, Ogaga Ifowodo, Freed from Prison 
Days after Announcement of 1998 PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Freedom-to-
Write Awards. New York: PEN American Centre. 
Perham, Margery. 1956. Lugard: The Years of Adventure 1858-1896. London: 
Collins. 
---. 197 4. Foreword. In Transition in Africa: From Direct Rule to 
Independence - A Memoir, by S. J. Robertson. London: C. Hurst & 
Company. 
Perumal, Elan. 2001. MB tells why temples have to go. Star Online [cited 27 
October 2001]. Available from 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp ?file=/2001/10/27 /nation/klgtemple& 
sec=nation. 
Phillips, Barnaby. 2000. Sharia Marches On. BBC World Service [cited 14 
October 2002]. Available from 
http: //www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus_magazine/archiv 
e/nigeria/sharia.shtml. 
Phillips, Maggii. 1996. Storytellers, Shamans and Clowns: Postcolonial 
Engagement with the Supra-Human in the Novels of R.K. Narayan, 
Nuruddin Farah, Bessie Head, Ben Okri and Salman Rushdie. PhD, 
Northern Territory University, Darwin, Australia. 
399 
---. 1999. Madame Koto: Grotesque Creatrix or the Paradox of Psychic 
Health? In Seriously Weird: Papers on the Grotesque, edited by A. Mills. 
New York: Peter Lang. 
Pillai, M.G.G. 2002. Malay Racists, Islamic Fundamentalists, and Sleepwalking 
into Hudud [ cited 2 June 2002]. Available from 
http:/ /lamankm2.tripod.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?read=7141. 
Pillai, Shanthini. 2000. A Portrait of the Imagination as a Malleable Kolam: K.S. 
Maniam's In a Far Country. Jouvert 5 (1). 
Plato. 1968. The Republic of Plato. Translated by A. Bloom. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Porter, Abioseh Michael. 1988. Ben Okri's The Landscapes Within: A Metaphor 
for Personal and National Development. World Literature Written in 
English 28 (2): 203-210. 
Poster, Mark. 1997. Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings 
and Challenges. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Quayson, Ato. 1995a. Esoteric Webwork as Nervous System: Reading the 
Fantastic in Ben Okri's Writing. In Essays on African Writing 2: 
Contemporary Literature, edited by A. Gumah. Oxford: Heinemann. 
---. 1995b. Orality - (Theory) - Textuality: Tutuola, Okri and the 
Relationship of Literary Practice to Oral Traditions. In The Pressures of 
the Text: Orality, Texts and the Telling of Tales, edited by S. Brown. 
Edgbaston, Birmingham: Centre of West African Studies, University of 
Birmingham. 
- - - . 1997 a. Protocols of Representation and the Problems of Constituting an 
African 'Gnosis': Achebe and Okri. The Yearbook of English Studies 
27:137-149. 
- - -. 1997b. Strategic Transformations in Nigerian Writing: Orality and 
History in the work of Rev. Samuel Johnson, Amos Tutuola, Wale Soyinka 
and Ben Okri. Oxford: James Currey. 
---. 2000. Postcolonialism: Theory, Practice or Process? Cambridge; 
Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell Publishers. 
Quinn, Anthony. 1996. The Vision Thing. Observer on CD-ROM, 14 April. 
400 
Rabushka, Alvin. 1973. Race and Politics in Urban Malaya. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press. 
Radford, Tim. 1991. Ben Okri's Magical Road Wins Booker. Guardian on CD-
ROM, 23 October. 
Ragland, Ellie. 1996. The Discourse of the Master. In Lacan, Politics, Aesthetics, 
edited by W. Apollon and R. Feldstein. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Raj endra, Cecil. 2001. Kingdom of Purplaya (in 'Purple people poem generic, 
says Rajendra', in news report by Tong Yee Seang). malaysiakini.com 
[cited 6 June 2001]. Available from 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/N ews/2001/04/200104101 0.php3. 
Ramachandran, Selvakumaran. 1994. Indian Plantation Labour in Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co/ INSAN. 
Ramasamy, Rajakrishnan. 1984. Caste Consciousness among Indian Tamils in 
Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications. 
Rampley, Matthew. 2000. Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Renan, Ernest. 1993. What is a Nation? In Nation and Narration, edited by H. K. 
Bhabha. London; New York: Routledge. 
Rengger, N.J. 1995. Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity: Beyond 
Enlightenment Critique. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Richards, David. 1992. 'A History of Interruptions': Dislocated Mimesis in the 
Writings of Neil Bissoondath and Ben Okri. In From Commonwealth to 
Post-colonial, edited by A. Rutherford. Sydney: Dangaroo Press. 
Robertson, Roland. 1995. Glocalisation: Time-Space and Homogeneity-
Heterogeneity. In Global Modernities, edited by M. Featherstone, S. Lash 
and R. Robertson. London: Sage. 
Robertson, Sir James. 1958. Foreword. In A Great Trusteeship, by M.A. Nigumi. 
London: The Caravel Press. 
---. 1974. Transition in Africa: From Direct Rule to Independence - A 
Memoir. London: C. Hurst & Company. 
401 
Ross, Jean W. 1993. Ben Okri. In Contemporary Authors Vol. 138. Detroit, 
Mich.: Gale Research Co. 
Rotberg, Robert I. 1966. African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion? JMAS 4 
(1): 33-46. 
Rudolph, Joseph Russell. 1971. Federalism and Nation-building: India, Pakistan, 
Malaysia and Nigeria. Ann Arbor: UMI. 
Rushdie, Salman. 2001. A war that presents us all with a crisis of faith: Salman 
Rushdie on Islam versus Islamism. Guardian (UK) [cited 3 November 
2001]. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/saturday_review/story/0,3605,586471,00.html. 
Rustin, Michael. 1991. The Good Society and the Inner World: Psychoanalysis, 
Politics and Culture. London; New York: Verso. 
Ryan, N.J. 1971. The Cultural Heritage of Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Longman. 
Said, Edward. 1995. Orienta/ism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
---. 2000. Reflections on Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Salecl, Renata. 1998. (Per)versions of Love and Hate. London; New York: Verso. 
Sandhu, Kemial Singh. 1993. The Coming of the Indians to Malaysia. In Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani. 
Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Sargisson, Lucy. 2000. Utopian Bodies and the Politics of Transgression. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
Sarvan, Charles. 1996. Ethnic Nationalism and Response in K.S. Maniam's In A 
Far Country. World Literature Written in English 35 (1): 67-74. 
Schwarzmantel, John. 1994. The State in Contemporary Society: An Introduction. 
New York; Sydney: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Scott, David. 1999. Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
402 
Senghor, Leopold Sedar. 1964. On African Socialism. Translated by M. Cook. 
London, Dunmow: Pall Mall Press. 
---. 1993. Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century. In Colonial 
Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, edited by P. Williams and 
L. Chrisman. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Seshadri-Crooks, Kalpana. 2000. Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of 
Race. London; New York: Routledge. 
Seth, Sanjay. 1995. Nationalism in/and Modernity. In The State in Transition: 
Reimagining Political Space, edited by J. A. Camilleri, A. P. Jarvis and A. 
J. Paolini. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Shahnon Ahmad. 1967. Menteri. Alor Setar, Kedah: Pustaka Sekolah. 
---. 1999. Shit @ Pukimak @ PM. Kubang Kerian, Malaysia: Pustaka Reka. 
Shamsul A.B. 1996. Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia. In Asian Forms of the Nation , 
edited by S. T0nnesson and H. Antlov. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 
---. 1997. The Making of a 'Plural' Malaysia: A Brief Survey. In Emerging 
Pluralism in Asia and the Pacific, edited by D. Y. H. Wu, H. M. McQueen 
and Y. Yasushi. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies. 
---. 1998. Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modem State: 
"Malayness" in Postwar Malaysia. In Making Majorities: Constituting the 
Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United 
States , edited by D. C. Gladney. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Shaq Faruqi. 2002. Problem of Defining a 'Malay'. Sunday Star, 26 May, 24. 
Sharrad, Paul. 1993. Introduction. In In a Far Country, by K. S. Maniam. 
London: Skoob Books. 
Shonekan, Ernest. 1998. Towards National Integration and Unity. Guardian 
(Nigeria), 6 March, 15 . 
Slemon, Stephen. 1995. Magic Realism as Postcolonial Discourse. In Magical 
Realism: Theory, History, Community, edited by L. P. Zamora and W. B. 
Faris. Durham; London: Duke University Press. 
Slimming, John. 1969. Malaysia: Death of a Democracy. London: John Murray. 
403 
Sloterdijk, Peter. 1987. Critique of Cynical Reason. Translated by M. Eldred. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Smith, Anna Marie. 1998a. Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic 
Imaginary. London; New York: Routledge. 
Smith, Anthony D. 1998b. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of 
Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Smith, David. 1996. The Dance of Siva: Religion, Art and Poetry in South India. 
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 
Smith, Harold. 1991-7. All the World's a Stage . .. The Major Players [cited 11 
August 2000]. Available from 
http: //www.libertas.demon.co.uk/players.htm. 
---. 1991-7. Bad Guys (and Good Guys): Right and Wrong in Good Books 
[cited 11 August 2000]. Available from 
http://www.libertas.demon.co. uk/badguys.htm. 
Solehah Ishak, ed. 1998. Malaysian Literary Laureates: Selected Works. Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 
Solomon, Robert C. 1983. In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. WF. Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Soyinka, Wole. 1967. 'Abiku'. In West African Verse: An Anthology, edited by D. 
I. Nwonga. London: Longman. 
---. 1996. The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the 
Nigerian Crisis. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
---. 1997. New Year Message Broadcast on Radio Kudirat Nigeria (RKN) 1 
[cited 2 February 2001]. Available from 
http: //nigeriaworld.com/feature/article/radio.html. 
---. 1998. Redesigning a Nation (Text of a Public Lecture at the Nigerian 
Law School, Lagos on 16 October 1998) . Kilima [ cited 3 0 November 
1999]. Available from http: //www.kilima.com/nigeria/soyinka.html. 
---. 1999. The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness. New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
404 
Speight, Allen. 2001. Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1987. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. 
New York; London: Methuen. 
---. 1993. Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York; London: Routledge. 
Star. 2002. PM: Easy to Split the Malays. Star, 21 June, 2. 
Stavrakakis, Y annis. 1999. Lacan and the Political. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Straits Times. 2001. Mahathir's poem turned into a song. Straits Times 
(Singapore) [ cited 1 September 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/Weekly2001 /09.04.2001 /Malaysia2.htm. 
Suaram. 2001. Overview of Malaysian Civil and Political Rights in 2001. Suaram 
[cited 30 August 2002]. Available from 
http: / /www.suaram.org/hr _ summary _2001.htm. 
Syed Farid Alatas. 1997. Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and 
Malaysia: The Rise of the Post-Colonial State. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
Synge, Richard. 1998. The Final Year of a Disappearing Dictator. Africa Today, 
14-5. 
Tan, Anthony. 2001. Malaysia faces attack from within. Star Online (Malaysia) 
[cited 1 December 2001]. Available from 
http: //thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2001 /12/1/nation/astsec&sec=n 
ation. 
Tan, Lynette Mary. 1998. K.S. Maniam: Seeking 'The Universe in Man'. PhD, 
School of English, Linguistics and Media, Macquarie University, Sydney. 
Tang, Soo Ping. 1993. Ralph Ellison and K.S. Maniam: Ethnicity in America and 
Malaysia, Two Kinds of Invisibility. MEL US 18 (4) (Winter): 81-97. 
---. 1996. Cultural Crossings: Renegotiating Identity and Belief in K.S. 
Maniam's The Return. Paper read at Third International Conference of the 
Modem Language Association (13-14 May 1996). 
405 
Tatsuo, Inoue. 1999. Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism. In The East 
Asian Challenge for Human Rights, edited by J. Bauer and D. A. Bell. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Charles. 1998. Nationalism and Modernity. In The State of the Nation: 
Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, edited by J. A. Hall. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Temu, Arnold, and Bonaventure Swai. 1981. Historians and Africanist History: A 
Critique - Post-Colonial Historiography Examined. London: Zed Press. 
Tham, Seong Chee. 1981a. Literary Response and the Social Process: An 
Analysis of Cultural and Political Beliefs among Malay Writers. In 
Literature and Society in Southeast Asia: Political and Sociological 
Perspectives, edited by S. C. Tham. Singapore: Singapore University 
Press. 
--~. 1981 b. The Politics of Literary Development in Malaysia. In Literature 
and Society in Southeast Asia: Political and Sociological Perspectives, 
edited by T. S. Chee. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
Therborn, Goran. 1995. Routes to/through Modernity. In Global Modernities, 
edited by M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson. London; Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Thiong'o, Ngugi wa. 1997. Writers in Politics: A Re-engagement with Issues of 
Literature and Society. Oxford; Nairobi; Portsmouth: James Currey. 
Thomas, Rosie. 1995. Melodrama and the Negotiation of Morality in Mainstream 
Hindu Film. In Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian 
World, edited by C. A. Breckenridge. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Thompson, Richard H. 1989. Theories of Ethnicity . Westport: Greenwood Press, 
Inc. 
Thurston, Luke. 1998. Ineluctable Nodalities: On the Borromean Knot. In Key 
Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis , edited by D. Nobus. London: 
Rebus Press. 
Tijjani, Kyari. 1989. The Ruling Elite. In Nigeria Since Indep endence: The First 
25 Years (Vol. 1 - The Society), edited by Y. B. Usman. Ibadan: 
Heinemann Educational Books. 
406 
Tiles, Mary, and James Tiles . 1993. An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: 
The Authority of Knowledge. Oxford; Oxford, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Tong, Yee Seong. 2001a. 2001 A 'bad year' for human rights, expect worse to 
come: Suaram. Malaysiakini.com [cited 9 December 2001]. Available 
from http:/ /www.malaysiakini.com/N ews/2001 /12/2001120906.php3. 
---. 2001b. Purple people poem generic, says Rajendra. Malaysiakini.com 
[ cited 6 June 2001]. Available from 
http: //www.malaysiakini.com/N ews/2001 /04/200104101 0.php3. 
Torfing, Jacob. 1999. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Moujfe, Ziiek. Oxford; 
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. 
Tyrell, Martin. 1996. Nation-states and States of Mind: Nationalism as 
Psychology. Critical Review 10 (2): 233-250. 
Vaidyanathan, T.G., and Jeffrey J. Kripal, eds. 1999. Vishnu on Freud's Desk: A 
Reader in Psychoanalysis and Hinduism. Delhi; New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Vaillant, Janet G. 1990. Black, French and African: A Life of Leopold Sedar 
Senghor. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press. 
Van Pelt, Tamise. 2000. The Other Side of Desire: Lacan 's Theory of the 
Registers. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Vargas Llosa, Mario. 1996. Politics and Literature: The Odd Couple. In The 
Writer in Politics, edited by W. H. Gass and L. Cuoco. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press. 
Vatikiotis, Michael. 1993. Two-Edged Pen. Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 
November, 38-9. 
Verhaeghe, Paul. 1998. Causation and Destitution of a Pre-Ontological Non-
Entity: On the Lacanian Subject. In Key Concepts of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis, edited by D. Nobus. London: Rebus Press. 
Vermeulen, Hans, and Cora Govers. 1997. From Political Mobilization to the 
Politics of Consciousness. In The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness , edited 
by C. Govers and H. Vermeulen. 
407 
Watson, C.W. 1993a. Afterword. In In a Far Country, by K. S. Maniam. London: 
Skoob Books. 
---. 1993b. Introduction. In The Return, by K. S. Maniam. London: Skoob 
Books. 
---. 1996. The Construction of the Post-Colonial Subject in Malaysia. In 
Asian Forms of the Nation, edited by S. T0nnesson and H. Antlov. 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 
Wessing, Robert. 1986. The Soul of Ambiguity: The Tiger in Southeast Asia. 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University. 
West, David. 1996. An Introduction to Continental Philosophy. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Wicks, Peter. 1997. Maniam's Malaysian Vision. Asian Profile 25 (5):387-96. 
- --. 1998. Malaysia as Myth in K.S. Maniam's In a Far Country. Asian 
Culture Quarterly XXVI (4):59-64. 
---, ed. 2001. Malaysian Literature in English: A Critical Reader. Petaling 
Jaya: Pearson Education Malaysia. 
Wilkinson, Jane. 1992. Talking with African Writers: Interviews with African 
Poets, Playwrights and Novelists. London: James Currey. 
Williams, Adebayo. 1998a. Intellectual and the Crisis of Democratization in 
Nigeria: Towards a Theory of Postcolonial Anomie. Theory and Society 
27 (2): 287-307. 
---. 1998b. Reinventing Nigeria. Africa Today, July, 8-9. 
Wilson, Bernard. 1993. An Interview with K.S. Maniam. World Literature 
Written in English 33 & 34 (2 & 1): 17-23. 
Wong, Irene, and Margaret Yong. 1983. The Case of English in Malaysian 
Fiction: A Look at K.S. Maniam's The Return. Southeast Asian Review of 
English (6 & 7): 1-22. 
Wong, Loong, and Beverley Blaskett. 1995. Manipulating Space in a Postcolonial 
State: The Case of Malaysia. In The State in Transition: Reimagining 
Political Space, edited by J. A. Camilleri, A. P. Jarvis and A. J. Paolini. 
Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
408 
Wong, Ming Yook. 2000. Traversing Boundaries: Journeys into Malaysian 
Fiction in English. World Literature Today 74 (2): 277-282. Online Full-
text via http://proquest.umi.com. 
Wood, Mara-Helen, ed. 1992. Edvard Munch: The Frieze of Life. London: 
National Gallery Publications. 
Yen, Ching-hwang. 1986. A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and 
Malaya: 1800-1911. Singapore; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Yong, Margaret. 1992. Returning to a Far Country: Can We Recover the Past? On 
the Biographical Trail with K.S. Maniam. Southeast Asian Review of 
English (24): 65-76. 
Zamora, Lois Parkinson, and Wendy B. Faris. 1995a. Introduction: Daiquiri Birds 
and Flaubertian Parrot(ie )s. In Magical Realism: Theory, History, 
Community, edited by L. P. Zamora and W. B. Faris. Durham; London: 
Duke University Press. 
---, eds. 1995b. Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community. Durham; 
London: Duke University Press. 
Zizek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1990. Beyond Discourse-Analysis. In New Reflections on the Revolution 
of Our Time, by E. Laclau. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1991a. For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1991 b. Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through 
Popular Culture. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press. 
---. 1992. Enjoy Your Symptom! : Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out. 
New York; London: Routledge. 
---. 1993. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of 
Ideology. Durham: Duke University Press. 
---. 1994. The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and 
Causality. London; New York: Verso. 
409 
---. 1996a. I Hear You With My Eyes; or, The Invisible Master. In Gaze and 
Voice as Love Objects, edited by S. Zizek and R. Salecl. Durham; London: 
Duke University Press. 
---. 1996b. The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related 
Matters. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1996c. Lacan with Quantum Physics. In FutureNatural: Nature, Science, 
Culture, edited by G. Robertson, M. Mash, L. Tickner, J. Bird, B. Curtis 
and T. Putnam. London; New York: Routledge. 
---. 1997a. The Plague of Fantasies. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1997b. The Abyss of Freedom I Ages of the World. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
---. 1998. Cartesian Subject versus Cartesian Theater. In Cogito and the 
Unconscious, edited by S. Zizek. Durham; London: Duke University 
Press. 
- --. 1999a. Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach. In The 
Ziiek Reader, edited by E. Wright and E. Wright. Oxford; Malden: 
Blackwell. 
- --. 1999b. Kant with ( or against) Sade. In The Ziiek Reader, edited by E. 
Wright and E. Wright. Oxford; Malden. MA: Blackwell. 
---. 1999c. Otto Weininger, or 'Woman doesn't Exist'. In The Ziiek Reader, 
edited by E. Wright and E. Wright. Oxford; Malden: Blackwell. 
---. 1999d. The Spectre of Ideology. In The Ziiek Reader, edited by E. 
Wright and E. Wright. Oxford; Malden: Blackwell. 
---. 1999e. The Thing from Outer Space. Artmargins [cited 6 June 2001]. 
Available from http: //www.artmargins.com/content/feature/zizekl .html. 
---. 1999f. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. 
London; New York: Verso. 
---. 1999g. The Undergrowth of Enjoyment. In The Zii ek Reader, edited by 
E. Wright and E. Wright. Oxford; Malden: Blackwell. 
410 
---. 2000a. Class Struggle or Postmodemism? Yes, please! In Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, by J. 
Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 2000b. Ethics of the Real. In Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan, by A. 
Zupancic. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 2000c. Foreword: The Cartesian Body and its Discontents. In An Utterly 
Dark Spot: Gaze and Body in Early Modern Philosophy, by M. Bozovic. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
---. 2000d. The Fragile Absolute or, Why the Christian Legacy is Worth 
Fighting For? London; New York: Verso. 
---. 2001 a. Did Someone Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions zn the 
(Mis)use of a Notion. London; New York: Verso. 
---. 2001b. On Belief London; New York: Routledge. 
Zupancic, Alenka. 2000. Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. London; New York: 
Verso. 
411 
